


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A HISTORY
OF
THE FAR EAST
IN MODERN TIMES

Borzoï Historical Series

Edited by HARRY ELMER BARNES, *Smith College*

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THE BORZOI HISTORICAL SERIES

*Under the editorship of Harry Elmer Barnes, Ph.D., Professor of Historical
Sociology, Smith College*

A HISTORY OF
THE FAR EAST
IN MODERN TIMES

BY HAROLD M. VINACKE, PH.D.

*Professor of International Law and Politics
University of Cincinnati*



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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE BORZOI HISTORICAL SERIES

IN FEW fields of human learning has there been more progress than in the development of historical writing in the last half-century. Fifty years ago, while the subject-matter of history had increased in accuracy to a notable degree, as compared with the works of the early chroniclers and pamphleteers, it was still extremely narrow in its scope and interests. The more scholarly historians were so absorbed in the problem of the methods of documentary research that they neglected the larger consideration of the type of subject-matter most likely to reveal the nature of cultural development in the past. The content of historical works was chiefly political material, treating of wars, dynastic changes, political campaigns, diplomatic entanglements, and governmental corruption. Much space was devoted to anecdotes and episodes, interesting and amusing in themselves, but of no vital importance to an understanding of the past. Events were organized about great personalities instead of being put in the dynamic setting of cultural life and institutional development. This historical literature of a half-century ago was usually nationalistic in its outlook, chauvinistic in tone, and bigoted in its attitude toward other peoples and races. It was for the most part written from that decisively patriotic point of view which held that the culture and institutions of other peoples were markedly inferior to those of the countrymen of the writer, and national culture and institutions were looked upon as a unique local achievement. The time perspective was fatally restricted by the conception of the "dawn of history" some six thousand years ago. There was little or no conception of human history as a process extending back through an almost immeasurable period of time and combining contributions from all parts of our planet. The truly genetic point of view and the world outlook were conspicuous by their absence.

In the last two generations, due to the originality and enthusiasm of such historians as John Richard Green and his disciples in England, Karl Lamprecht and his school in Germany, Rambaud and Berr in France, Altamira in Spain, Ferrero, Croce, and others in Italy, and John B. McMaster, James Harvey Robinson, Edward P. Cheyney, Frederick Jackson Turner, James T. Shotwell, James H. Breasted, Carl Becker, Preserved Smith, and others of their type in the United States, we have witnessed the repudiation of this old narrow and inadequate type of historical writing and the development of what has been called "the new history."

This form of history is concerned with an account of the development of human culture and institutions. While fully conscious of

the necessity of employing accurate methods of research, it pushes on to the next and more vital task of providing a broader content to history and of arousing an interest in the interpretation of the materials gathered by research. The new history is as wide in its interests as the entire range of human activities and achievements in the past. It deals not only with politics, dynasties, and treaties, but likewise with art, material culture, philosophy, education, medicine, literature, and manners and customs. Cultural achievements have replaced racy anecdotes, and institutional evolution has supplanted striking episodes.

The content of the new history has been widened as much with regard to the geographical range of its outlook as with regard to the scope of the interests embodied. The new history is as universal in its international orientation and appreciation as it is comprehensive in subject-matter. It adopts a world point of view, searching out the contributions to the growth of human culture which have been made on all parts of the planet. It also makes clear the fact that human history has become more and more an international process with the progress of modern discovery and the new methods of transportation and communication. Further, as a result of the new time-perspective forced upon us by contemporary astro-physics, historical geology, biological evolution, and cultural anthropology, the new history rests upon a recognition of the slight fraction of human existence comprised within a period of so-called "written history." The whole age of man since the "dawn of history" is in reality modern history, and the old chronology and periodization of history are proved to be hopelessly inadequate and misleading. The genetic viewpoint and the new time perspective reveal the history of man as a long process of growth and expanding achievement, reaching from *Pithecanthropus Erectus* to the radio and aeroplane. The new history, then, includes the achievements of all the historic peoples of the past and present. It completely abandons the chauvinism and bigotry of the earlier variety of nationalistic historical narrative. While it freely recognizes that some nations have been more important than others in their contributions to human culture, this discrimination in emphasis is based solely upon the relative historical influence and the comparative level of the cultures produced, and not upon their racial basis, geographical location, or political affiliations.

Thus far the new history has been limited, for the most part, to the monographic, methodological, and polemic works of the leaders of the various groups interested in this movement. There has been little organized effort to rewrite the totality of human history from the standpoint of the newer interests and assumptions. Hitherto world histories have tended to be either ephemeral literary projects executed by authors possessed of stylistic capacity but with little historical knowledge, or they have been equally unreliable anthol-

ogies of the works of the contemporary historians of past ages, few of whom have had any comprehension of the standards of historical accuracy which have been worked out in the last hundred years.

A new standard for textbook writing was set a quarter of a century ago by James Harvey Robinson in his *History of Western Europe*, which revolutionized the spirit and subject-matter of historical manuals. Since that time a number of his former students, such as Charles A. Beard, J. S. Schapiro, C. J. H. Hayes, Lynn Thorndike, and Preserved Smith have followed his example in writing excellent manuals which have embodied the same breadth of interests as exemplified by Professor Robinson. Others, such as Professors Cheyney, Breasted, and Webster, have independently arrived at dynamic and synthetic attitudes toward history and the preparation of historical textbooks. It is believed by the editor, however, that the *Borzoi Historical Series* represents the first organized and systematic effort to plan a group of college textbooks which are to deal with the greater part of human history and the leading cultural areas strictly from the standpoint of the tenets of the new history. The Series is designed to provide textbooks which will enable teachers sympathetic with the newer point of view in the writing and teaching of history to present the history of mankind in such a fashion as to emphasize the evolution of civilization and the growth of institutions, instead of solely chronicling battles, describing the alternations of dynasties, analyzing treaties, and relating anecdotes concerning diplomats and political bosses. The comprehensive *History of Civilization* series, which is being published by Mr. Knopf parallel with this *Borzoi Historical Series* will provide a vast body of supplementary reading similar in the scope of its subject-matter and identical in its historical objectives.

In regard to time-perspective, the editor of the Series holds that history must begin with the very origins of the human race, and the background for the succeeding volumes is supplied by the excellent manual by Dr. Goldenweiser on the civilization of primitive man. At the same time it is evident that the history of mankind since the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions has become much more complex and varied, and much more pertinent for the guidance of contemporary social opinion. As a consequence, more volumes have been planned for the recent age than for the earlier periods. No attempt has been made to control and distribute the assignments on a sharp chronological basis. Here the governing conceptions are the principle of the continuity of history, and the recognition of the need for special treatment and analysis of the cultures of particular areas.

As to subject-matter, main emphasis is laid upon the history of culture and institutions. Yet there is no ignoring of the really vital aspects of political evolution. International relations and political and diplomatic history are presented in a broad fashion, with an indication of their relation to the deeper social, economic, and

cultural forces which condition them. Instead of the usual procedure of making political history the backbone of the narrative, and then offering a sop to the more progressive historians by sandwiching in an occasional chapter on manners and customs, this Series assumes that institutional and cultural development constitute the only intelligent basis for the organization of historical material, and political and diplomatic history is viewed as of secondary, though by no means negligible, significance.

In regard to geographical and cultural outlook, this Series endeavors as far as possible to get away from the Occidental psychosis so prevalent in the Western world. The world point of view is adopted as basic, particularly in modern times, and adequate attention will be given to a survey of the rise and development of civilization in all the important cultural areas of both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. The main emphasis is, of course, put upon the growth of Western civilization, but nothing will be neglected which has in any important way contributed to the building up of Occidental culture. The Series frankly embodies the assumption that in the contemporary age, in particular, it will not be possible to ignore the fact that civilization has progressively become a world process, and that the interaction of East and West must be kept continually in mind.

It is further maintained as a fundamental premise that historical facts are vitally important only when intelligently organized and accurately interpreted. Hence, the interpretation of historical data will be emphasized distinctly more than casual narrative and the mere chronicling of many concrete facts. Only in this way can history be made a real introduction to the social sciences from the genetic point of view, and a valuable impulse to the growth of social intelligence.

While these are the dominating principles guiding the editor of this Series, no attempt will be made to impose his particular theories of history in detail upon any of the collaborators in the enterprise. Each author will be left free, as he should be, for a wholly independent organization and exposition of the material in the field which he covers. General adherence to the program above outlined has been assured in advance by selecting as authors of the volumes which will be included men who are in general sympathy with the historical philosophy underlying the new history. It is believed that such individual differences as exist with respect to their views on the organization and interpretation of historical material will only lead to a greater originality, vividness, and variety in the successive volumes.

If this collection of textbooks is able to achieve rather more than any previous enterprise in the way of bringing about that indispensable *rapprochement* between the abstract formulation of the principles of the new history and the actual writing and teaching of history in

the institutions of higher learning, the aspirations of both the editor and his collaborators will have been amply realized.

Mr. Knopf has spared no expense to make the maps which will appear in the successive volumes of the Borzoi Historical Series as distinctive a feature of these books as the subject-matter itself. An arrangement has been made with the famous German cartographers, F. A. Brockhaus of Leipzig, to furnish a new and unique set of maps for the Borzoi Historical Series which will be distinguished alike for workmanship, accuracy and originality of conception. As adviser in all matters of cartography related to the Series, we have selected Dr. Donald E. Smith of the George Washington High School, New York City. It is hoped that, upon the completion of the Series, the maps utilized will be combined with others in a comprehensive historical atlas which will be issued under the editorship of Dr. Smith as a concluding volume in the Series.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

THE statement has been made that it is an integral element in the policy of the publisher and editor of the Borzoi Historical Series to break with the conventional tendency to regard history as primarily a record of the thoughts and activities of man in the area of Western Europe. The world point of view has pervaded the entire conception which has inspired and guided the planning of this Series as a whole, and it is hoped that it will likewise dominate, as far as is legitimately possible, the execution of each individual volume. This aspiration was admirably achieved in the volume on *Modern World History*, 1776-1926, by Professor Flick. The present work on *The History of the Far East in Modern Times*, by Professor Vinacke, constitutes a very definite proof of the sincerity of the espousal of the world outlook in the Borzoi Historical Series. While excellent popular histories and many specialized monographs have been written on the history of the Orient, this work constitutes, so far as is known to the editor, the first attempt to provide a comprehensive and systematic college textbook on the modern history of the Far East. This step has been taken for two definite reasons: (1) a conviction that the importance of the subject warranted assigning a special volume to this purpose; and (2) the belief that historians throughout the country have come to recognize the significance of the Orient in modern civilization to a sufficient extent to render a book of this sort desirable and useful. It is hoped that the book will both promote a more ardent and widespread interest in the history of the Far East, and at the same time make adequate provision for serving the need produced by the growing attention devoted to the subject.

Not only in the nature of the cultural area surveyed, but also in the character of the material presented, does Professor Vinacke's work conform to the general program of the Series. One of the foremost tenets of the "new history" is that perhaps the most vital and dynamic factor in social change is the contact of cultures. Nowhere has this basic process in historical development been more marked and active than in the relations between the Occident and the Orient in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Inasmuch as most of these contacts since 1800 have fallen within the period and behavior patterns of modern imperialism, it is inevitable that diplomacy and wars have assumed a prominent position in such relations. Likewise the tendency for the Orient to imitate the Occident in certain ways has resulted in great political transformations in the Far East since 1850. On this account much space has been devoted to political and diplomatic history during this period. Yet this has not been done

at any sacrifice of an adequate treatment of economic, social, and cultural transformations. The effort has been made to produce a well-rounded account, with the space distributed about in proportion to the relative importance which these various aspects of historical development have assumed in the progress of the Far East in the last hundred years.

It will scarcely be necessary to argue for the timeliness of any good book dealing with some significant aspect of contemporary Oriental history. No person can expect to follow modern journalism or contemporary discussions of politics, diplomacy, economic life, or cultural developments unless he is somewhat familiar with the outstanding facts of the culture of the Orient and of the relations of the Occident to this area. It is obvious that no person can intelligently support or condemn our own policy in the Far East unless he is acquainted with the facts involved. Hence, it is of particular value to have a relatively complete and thoroughly up-to-date survey in such a form as Professor Vinacke's book. The volume, of course, is intended primarily for use as a college textbook, but both in content and in expression it is admirably adapted to the needs of that growing body of intelligent general readers who are desirous of acquainting themselves with the momentous transformations which are taking place in the Orient of today.

The material in Professor Vinacke's book is limited chiefly to an account of the history of China and Japan. Developments in Siberia, India, Australasia, and the Philippines are touched upon only as they impinge very directly and forcefully upon the policies and activities of China and Japan. These other areas in the Far East will be dealt with in detail in other volumes in the Series, particularly in Professor Jenks's volume on the British Empire.

Professor Vinacke's book is in itself the best testimonial to its excellent qualities. No one would pretend that a first book of the sort in the field would be infallible. Yet it is the belief of the editor that Professor Vinacke has succeeded admirably in the task which he has assumed to execute. The work exhibits a sound scholarly grasp of the subject, an appreciative understanding of the principles of the new history, an enlightened and fair-minded attitude toward international relations, and real skill in putting his material before the reader in a clear and straightforward manner. We believe that both teachers of history and intelligent American citizens have been placed under obligations to him by this service.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Smith College
Northampton, Mass.
June 15, 1928

PREFACE

THE term "Far East" has come to have a definite meaning attached to it. It has come to mean primarily China, Japan, and Korea rather than all of the countries of eastern Asia; and precisely with this restricted geographical use of the phrase in mind this book has been called *A History of the Far East*. The restriction would seem to be justified, however, for more important reasons than because the established usage sanctions it, and these reasons of course help to explain the usage itself. With the exception of Siam, the countries of eastern Asia have fallen under European control. Consequently their history has been largely that of colonies of the several European Powers rather than that of independent or semi-independent peoples. Thus the history of India is of major importance, but from the standpoint of relationship it is more logical to bring its consideration within that of the history of the British Empire than to unite it with that of China and Japan. In modern times these countries have been affected by India indirectly through England's possession of the country more than directly. Similarly the Philippine Islands are important in the Far East, but as appanages of the United States which condition its policy rather than in terms of their own development. In both cases this condition is tending to change, but the change has not yet been realized. Furthermore, with the possible exception of India, none of the Oriental countries, save China and Japan, have separate cultures of great development; and none, up to the present time, have seriously affected the course of international development and of world history. Consequently, since restriction is necessary in a single-volume treatment, it seems entirely justified to restrict by acceptance of the customary terminology.

The modern period is dated from the time of the movements to bring China, and subsequently Japan and Korea, into an enlarged contact with the world. Thus "modern" is defined in terms of the Far East rather than of Europe. Institutional changes commenced after that time, even though there were significant internal movements antedating the application of foreign pressure. The Chinese and Japanese political, economic, and social systems had continued virtually unchanged for more than two hundred years before the establishment of treaty relations with Western nations. A new order has begun to evolve since the negotiation of the first treaties. It is this which distinguishes the modern from the pre-modern period.

In this volume it would have been out of place, even if it had been possible, to enter into a comprehensive and detailed description of

the institutions and cultures of pre-modern China, Japan, and Korea. All that could be attempted was to lay down a foundation sufficiently extensive, (1) to be built upon by making use of the reading lists appended to the first and fourth chapters, and (2) to make possible the tracing of the changes which have taken place in the modern period. Since until the present time these changes have been largely political and economic, there has been relatively more consideration of political and economic development than of social and cultural. As the present tendencies toward social, intellectual, and artistic change become more than tendencies, the historical emphasis will naturally shift from the politico-economic to the cultural realm.

It must be recognized that the most important single conditioning factor in the development of the Far East in modern times has been the impact of the West. In order to withstand the pressure of the Powers, these countries of the Orient had at once to attack the problems of their political and economic reconstruction. The larger cultural background of political and economic life is being more gradually adapted to the New World; and just as the foreign impact has led to an over-emphasis on political development, so the rivalries of the Powers have assumed a larger relative importance in the Orient than has been the case in the Occident. For that reason more space has been given to international relations than would otherwise have appeared justifiable. The history of China and Japan, from the standpoint of movement, has been more largely political and diplomatic than it would have been if these countries had taken their places in the modern world in a more normal and natural manner.

Thus the logic of events has determined the general treatment of the various phases of the subject. The plan of the book has been similarly fixed. The streams of Japanese and Chinese history ran in separate channels until the struggle over Korea caused them to converge. After 1895 they continued to diverge somewhat, but never as widely as in the previous years. The attempt has been made to follow these natural lines of development. Sometimes the two streams are brought together, and at other times they are allowed to separate; but most of the time the two main channels have been fed by waters from Europe and America, from Korea, Indo-China, and Siberia.

Responsibility for the planning and execution of the work is the writer's, but he is deeply indebted to the editor of the Borzoi Historical Series for much valuable advice, particularly as to ways and means of bettering the plan. The writer is further indebted to his colleague, Professor George A. Hedger, who read and criticised parts of the manuscript. The entire manuscript was read by Professor K. S. Latourette, through whose criticisms and suggestions not a few errors were avoided and the entire work was strengthened at many points.

HAROLD M. VINACKE

University of Cincinnati
June 15, 1928

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A HISTORY
OF
THE FAR EAST
IN MODERN TIMES

CHAPTER I

CHINA UNDER THE MANCHUS

I. THE COUNTRY AND ITS RESOURCES

THE modern history of the Far Eastern countries begins with the drawing of those states from their long-continued seclusion into contact with the Occidental world. This history has been shaped in large part by outside forces, the operation of which in each case has resulted in a modification of ancient cultures and long-established and firmly-rooted institutions. If these changes and the historical developments attending them are to be understood, the general condition of society at the beginning of the modern period must be appreciated. Consequently the attempt must be made to describe pre-modern China in its many-sided life as a necessary preliminary to the tracing of the pattern of its history since 1842.

*Modern period
begins with
foreign
intercourse*

At the time of the opening of the East to intercourse with the West the Chinese Empire consisted of: (1) China proper, comprising the eighteen provinces; (2) Manchuria, now divided into three provinces; (3) such dependencies as Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, with which close supervisory relations were maintained; and (4) nominally vassal states such as Korea and Annam. Excluding the vassal states, but including the dependencies, China had a total area of 4,277,170 square miles of compact territory—an area exceeding that of the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico, by 705,947 square miles. We may place the region geographically, and to some extent climatically, by observing that it extends, from north to south, from the extremes presented by Vancouver, B. C., on the north and Mexico City on the south. Thus it falls largely in the north temperate zone, with variations ranging from the tropical to the extremely cold regions.

*Territorial
extent of
Empire*

This made possible a well diversified agricultural life, with the staple crops including rice, cotton, sugar, tea, wheat, barley, millet, and other cereals. Because of this varied productivity the Chinese were able not only to provide themselves with food, but also to develop an industrial activity sufficient to supply their limited needs for clothing, implements, and ornaments. It made possible the development of as extensive a trade as the limited means of communication permitted.

*Diversified
agriculture*

Add to this the richness in the sub-soil or mineral wealth, and at once the explanation of the self-sufficiency of China begins to appear. Coal and iron, copper, tin, lead, antimony, and silver—all are found in the country and in pre-modern times they were sufficiently

*Mineral
wealth*

worked to supply the primitive needs of the people. Economically, then, the Empire was sufficient unto itself, and hence was regarded with some envy by early European travelers and traders. At no time have the Chinese looked abroad to supply their needs, whereas other peoples have always, if intermittently, been interested in establishing trade contacts with China. This interest has unquestionably led to an over-estimate of the natural resources of the country, but with all due allowance for exaggeration it represents an appreciation of a reality—that of a basically richly-endowed country.

*Physical
features
1. River
basins*

The diversity in agricultural production not only represents a wide variation in climate, but indicates as great a range of physical features as that presented by the United States. Over against the desert and pasture lands of northwestern China and Mongolia may be set the fertile loess plains of the north, watered and often inundated by the Yellow River—"China's Sorrow." South of the Yellow River lies the broad central area drained by the Yangtse River, the greatest waterway of China and one of the greatest in the world. Still farther south lies the basin of the West River and its confluent. These three river basins represent as many natural geographical regions, each one distinct, with its own contributions to make to the life of the Chinese people, and yet each presenting many features of similarity to the others. The most important of these similarities is the great fertility of the soil from north to south.

*2. Mountain
ranges*

The monotony of the plains is relieved by mountain ranges, which rise ever higher to the west and the southwest until they reach the Himalayan system. There are four main chains of mountains—the Tien Shan, the Kwanlun, the Hingan, and the Himalayan—which serve, as do the river systems, to distinguish different geographical areas. They further serve the life of the country by furnishing much of its mineral wealth. But where the rivers facilitate communication and intercourse, the mountain ranges obstruct them, making Szechuan province virtually an empire within China, cutting it off from constant and effective contact with the rest of the country, and retarding relations with, and control of, the other southwestern provinces. On the other hand, the western chain of mountains has served as a barrier between China and the regions to the west.

2. THE PEOPLE

Population

In 1842 not only was China one of the largest political-geographic areas in the world, but it was also one of the greatest population units. Only estimates of population are available, due to faulty methods of census-taking, but that for 1812—362,467,182 millions—may be accepted as fairly accurate.¹ Because of the pressure of population the people on the whole were poor, and the standard of living, judged by modern Western standards, was low—although for the masses it was not materially lower than the standard in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe.

¹ WILLIAMS, S. W., *Middle Kingdom*, vol. I, p. 263.

The people now known collectively as the Chinese undoubtedly consist of a blending of the various stocks which came into the country from Central Asia originally and from the northwest subsequently. The first migrants seem to have settled in the Yellow River valley, pushing the aboriginal inhabitants farther south. They and, in turn, their successors were driven southwards by succeeding waves of migration. After these movements of peoples stopped, the blending process began, or proceeded further toward completion. At the present time remnants of the original inhabitants, such as the Miao people, may be found in southwestern China; others, driven south-east, found their way into Indo-China, Siam, and Malaysia. Physical differences between the southern and northern Chinese are still clearly perceptible, preserved partly because of climatic differences and partly because of imperfect assimilation of stocks, due to the pushing of one group out by another rather than to the overlaying of one by another. At the time of the Manchu conquest the cultural assimilation had proceeded further than the physical.

*Chinese an
amalgam of
racial stocks*

3. PRE-MODERN SOCIETY

Both theoretically and actually the people were divided into five divisions or occupational groups. Highest in the social scale were the scholars or *literati*, from whom the officials were selected. Next came the farmers, numerically by far the largest group and the most important for the maintenance of life in a self-sufficient state. The artisans ranked third, with the merchants and traders fourth, while at the bottom of the social scale were the servants and the soldiers. There is a Chinese proverb to the effect that "good iron is not used for nails, nor are soldiers made of good men."

Social divisions

Partly because the road to official position and preferment lay through learning, but also because of the general esteem in which learning was held, the scholars constituted the highest class in Chinese society. All of the sages urged respect for the learned, whose success reflected glory upon the entire community. Furthermore, the road of the scholar was rough and toilsome. The difficulties encountered caused a high mortality among those seeking degrees, and this of course enhanced the prestige of the successful.

1. *Literati*

The emphasis on learning did not, however, lead to the establishment of "schools" as we understand this term in the West, nor did it result in a progressive broadening of knowledge. In fact, education came to constitute one of the greatest barriers to enlightenment in the Empire. This was due in large part to the exclusive emphasis laid upon reproducing the ideas and sayings of the Ancients, but also to the educational objective, which was preparation for the examinations. These were set entirely on the basis of the Classics, and candidates knew that their time would be wasted if they devoted it to study outside of the literature on which the examinations were based.

*Educational
system a bar
to progress*

*Merits of
educational
system*

The educational system produced stability through its emphasis on the past, and consequently it amply served the ends of a static society conscious of having perfected its culture. It had the merit, as far as the examination system was honestly applied, of attracting men of ability to the public service, in so far as a purely reproductive training developed, and the examinations revealed, a talent fitted for the performance of public duties. It produced persevering scholars of a high refinement according to the standards of the time. But in spite of its good features, and notwithstanding its utility in preserving and perpetuating the best elements of a developed social life, the fact must be emphasized that it did not adequately serve a society which had to adapt itself to new ideas and practices.

*Nature of
school studies*

The prestige attached to membership in the class of scholars caused many to aspire to it—or caused their families to aspire for them. Often one member of a family would be devoted to learning, as in other countries one child might be consecrated to the church. Such a fortunate individual would be supported by the family, or sometimes by the village, if he were a promising student and his family could not afford to give him an education. At the age of seven or eight he would attend the village school, an institution maintained by those who had children to be educated; and while his brothers worked or played, he would pore over his books from early to late. His task was to learn by rote the various books set before him, beginning usually with the "Trimetrical Classic," followed by such an elementary book as the "Thousand Character Classic." From these he proceeded to the "Four Books"—the Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the works of Mencius. These were followed by the Poetical Classic, the Book of History, the Book of Changes, and the Spring and Autumn Annals. All of these the pupil was expected gradually to memorize, with imperfect understanding and with little or no explanation of their meaning. Further learning consisted of a mastery of the innumerable commentaries on the Classics. At the same time the embryo scholar began to learn to form characters as a necessary antecedent to his entrance upon the next stage of his education. This consisted of mastering the art of essay-writing, preliminary to undergoing examination for the lowest degree.

*District
examinations*

Once in three or twice in five years an examiner came to the province from Peking. Prior to his arrival qualifying examinations were held in the several districts of the province for the purpose of selecting the candidates to appear for the provincial examinations. Five hundred or more would be found competing in the district examination. On the first day three themes would be announced for treatment, two in the form of a classical essay and one in the poetical form. Starting at daylight, few candidates finished before three or four o'clock in the afternoon; some might not finish until midnight; and the slowest, if permitted, might write until the next morning.

After an interval of one or two days for considering the results, the examination would be continued, with perhaps half of the original number of contestants. All together there were four separate sittings in this district examination, with some of the candidates eliminated after each sitting.

The next competition, limited to candidates successful in the district examinations, took place in the prefectural city. The contestants came from all of the districts in the prefecture and numbered into the thousands. The examination procedure was similar to that followed in the district city, although the standards of achievement were higher and the essay subjects were more difficult. Success in the prefectural examination was rewarded by the granting of a degree—the *Hsüeh Ts' Ai* or Bachelor's Degree.

*Prefectural
examinations*

The holders of this degree were entitled to compete in the provincial examinations for the next higher award—the degree of *Chü-Jén*. Those who achieved it might receive an appointment to office or compete in the metropolitan examinations for the third degree, the *Chin Shib*. The highest degree of all (the *Hanlin*) was rather an office, as it admitted to the Imperial Academy and to a salary.

*Provincial and
metropolitan
examinations*

This education might entitle the student to an official appointment, provided he was successful in the examinations, but it failed to prepare him to grapple satisfactorily with the complex problems of modern life. Failing in the examinations, or finding himself among the large number of those qualified for official position in excess of the offices to be filled, the scholar could support himself in only two ways—by teaching or by doing clerical work. In spite of the respect for learning, the emoluments of the teacher were small. Furthermore, for each school there were likely several applicants, whom the patrons could play against one another with a view to lowering the teaching cost.

*Means of
support of
successful
scholar*

Thus the life of even the successful scholar was not free from anxiety unless he gained admission to officialdom. And in order to secure office, in spite of the theory, it was usually necessary to have either influence or wealth, for those controlling the appointments expected a reward for favors extended. Consequently there were large numbers among the *literati* who had a very precarious economic existence in spite of the prestige which they enjoyed. In a material way, the scholar might derive only a meager livelihood from teaching. Among his privileges, however, was a standing at the magistrate's *yamen* not enjoyed by the common man, and in case he was an offender against the law he might not be beaten with the bamboo.

*Precariousness
of existence of
literatus*

Among people who emphasized learning as did the Chinese, it seems strange, on first thought, that scientific knowledge failed to develop, or that large professional classes should not have existed; but such indeed was the case. Medical practice was largely quackery, because knowledge was not gained from experiment; the legal profession, as such, had no existence; engineering and mechanical knowl-

*Scientific
knowledge
undeveloped*

edge had been left in an undeveloped condition after a promising start. The *féng shuì*, for example, had more to do with the location and construction of buildings than did an analysis of the problems confronted. This state of arrested development in all branches of learning, it must be reiterated, was due fundamentally to an educational system established on the basis of an acceptance of the teachings of the past as embodying the wisdom of all times, and was motivated by a desire to prepare for examinations set for the purpose of selecting officials whose primary qualifications were considered to be the ability to write essays well and to reproduce the maxims of the philosophers. It was also due to the lack of contact with other societies which had undergone as great an advancement as China. Out of such contact and the resultant comparisons of ideas and practices would have come a stimulus to development which was lacking. This was, perhaps, as fundamental a reason for the arrested development as the educational emphasis. Certainly both need to be considered in seeking an explanation of it.

2. *Farmers:
agricultural life*

About eighty per cent of the people of China were engaged in agriculture. They did not live on farms, as the agricultural population of the United States does, but in villages, which sometimes consisted of only a few houses, sometimes of several hundred. With so large a population engaged in tilling the soil it was inevitable that in some parts of the country one village would seem to begin almost where another left off. To an American the peculiarity of the Chinese landscape lay in the fact that no houses were to be seen outside the villages.

The village

Since so large a part of the population lived in villages, it will be well to consider briefly the make-up and life of the village community. Because the villages were usually named after one or two families, the limited number of surnames meant a multiplication of *Chang*, *Wang*, *Li*, and other *chuang* or villages. But sometimes the name came from a temple, if the village contained one at a comparatively early time, or from the distance to the seat of the district magistrate. Often a nickname was given the village, which came to be known by it, both unofficially and officially, rather than by the original name.²

*The village
temple*

The life of the village was centered in the temple, whether ancestral or Buddhistic, although there was no influential priestly class to guide and admonish the people. The temple grounds, or the area adjacent to them, usually provided the place for the weekly or bi-weekly market to which the people brought their surplus produce to exchange for the goods of the itinerant traders who moved from one market to another. They also provided space for the theatrical entertainments which were the primary source of amusement for the people. And they furnished neutral territory on which the "peace-talkers" could meet to compose the innumerable disputes which arose

² See SMITH, A. H., *Village Life in China*, ch. 3, for a discussion of village nomenclature.

between the inhabitants, either as individuals or as members of families.

Socially China was organized on the basis of the family rather than the individual. To this rule the village was naturally no exception. The Chinese family, furthermore, consisted of much more than husband, wife, and children. The young man brought his wife to the home of his parents, whose parents might also be living. Thus within the same establishment might be found a great-grandfather, grandfathers, fathers and their sons, all under the control of the oldest male, or, in case the great-grandmother or grandmother outlived her husband, under her authority. A man thirty, forty, or even fifty years old was not the master of his household merely by reason of his age.

The family the basis of social organization

Where this patriarchal conception of the family existed it might be expected that particular emphasis would be laid on its perpetuation and on relationships within the family. Since this was so, the individual was not free to marry or remain single as he chose, but his marriage was arranged for him at an early age to insure a continuation of the group; and one of his primary duties was to have sons to carry on the family name. Since the family could be perpetuated only through male children, girls were at a discount and boys at a premium. The birth of a son was an occasion of great rejoicing, while the coming of a daughter passed virtually unnoticed where it was not actually lamented. This difference was further emphasized by the fact that girls on marriage severed their connection with their own families and merged their fortunes with that of the husband. Thus not only could they not perpetuate the family, but their labor and service were early lost to it. The only advantage to be gained by affording them educational or other opportunities lay in the possibility of increasing the chances of making a favorable alliance and thus strengthening the family.

Emphasis on marriage and on male progeny

One may see the prevalence of this view of the family in the grounds recognized for divorce. A man might be freed from his wife for any one of the following reasons: barrenness, lasciviousness, disregard of her husband's parents, talkativeness, thievish propensities, envious and suspicious temper, and inveterate infirmity. This, however, was possible only if the wife had parents to whom she might be returned, and in case she had not yet mourned for her husband's parents during the customary period. On the other hand, the only recourse of the wife, except in very extreme cases, lay in the pressure which the family from which she came might exert to protect her interests.

Recognized causes of divorce

The development of ancestor-worship gave added importance to bearing sons and providing for their marriage. A father who had no heir would have no offerings laid before his tablet after his death, and for the same reason he would fail in his duty to his father and his father's father. Thus religious practice grew out of the emphasis on the family and, in turn, added to the emphasis.

Ancestor-worship

Concubinage

Concubinage also grew out of, and was justified by, the obligation to continue the family line. In case of barrenness or failure of the wife to give birth to a son, the husband, if well-to-do, might take one or more "secondary wives" or concubines. They had a status inferior to that of the wife, both legally and in authority within the home. Their children were considered as the children of the wife, from the standpoint of obedience and also from that of mourning in case of death.

Paternal authority

Within the family great importance naturally was attached to filial obedience, but the relations of husband and wife, of brother to brother, and of brother and sister, were all regulated under the direction of, and subject to the authority of, the head of the house. This should have led to harmony and household quiet, but perhaps because of the monotony of life, and in part because of the lack of privacy due to the number of persons living within the family compound, dissension was frequently rife. If the quarrel became noticeable it might easily attract the neighbors, on the theory that what was anybody's business became everybody's business; for the family life itself was not lived in the privacy which is accepted as natural in the West.

Inter-family relations

Inter-family relations within the village were adjusted, as the common affairs were carried on, through the medium of a Council of Elders under the direction of a village headman. This council was never formally selected at one time, but might consist of the heads of households, or of a few persons generally recognized as capable of carrying on village business. The practice differed from one section of the country to another. Often difficulties were adjusted through the efforts of those who may be described as "peace-talkers"—individuals who were drawn in or who took it upon themselves to find a basis of agreement between the parties to a particular controversy. Usually they were rewarded for their services by a feast.

The farmer and the land

The land outside the village was held in individual ownership by the villagers. As a result of continued subdivision among the sons after the death of the father or on his retirement, holdings were small and often scattered. Consequently many mouths had to be filled from the production of what, to an American farmer, would seem a totally inadequate allotment of land. Hence the Chinese farmer was led to extremely skilful intensive farming, and even with primitive implements he was able to get a large return from the soil. This, however, demanded unceasing toil on the part of all and the practice of numberless small economies in farming. Since the soil had been worked by so many preceding generations it had continually to be restored. All waste and refuse was carefully collected and prepared for use as fertilizing material. Modern science in the West is just beginning to give the farmer knowledge of soil treatment which the Chinese had gained from the experience of their ancestors.

But with all of his skill the Chinese farmer gained only a bare

subsistence from his small holding of land. Most of the farmers lived from year to year, able to make ends meet, to buy seed and replace implements, to provide for weddings and funerals, and to help support the village theatricals and take part in an occasional feast, but unable to lay by sufficient reserves to banish the specter of want. If crops failed because of drought or flood, or if the returns were under the normal, there was no way of meeting the emergency. Famine conditions would ensue, with all of their attendant horrors—subsistence on roots and herbs; the break-up of families, the daughters being sold into slavery; and for many, actual starvation.

*Marginal
existence of
farmer*

Even in normally good years there would be some who could not make ends meet and who might have to be cared for by the more fortunate members of the family, if such there were. Sometimes they were able to tide themselves over by gleaning from the fields after their neighbors had harvested, and if opportunity afforded they might pilfer before the harvest. This possibility led each farmer to watch his crops day and night during the growing season and until they had been stored after the harvest. Often the entire village united to hire watchers, or the inhabitants took turns in standing guard. The apprehended thief was liable to harsh treatment at the hands of the villagers.

*Petty thievery
common*

Thus, in spite of the natural fertility of the soil and the skill of the farmer, and in spite of the natural resources of China, the Chinese farming population lived a precarious life. To a great extent the intense struggle for existence resulted from the size of the population, together with the constant tendency toward increase because of the premium on birth. It was a struggle for the necessities of life and not for its luxuries. Mud-walled and thatched-roofed houses, unheated and unadorned; cotton clothing, padded for winter; a subsistence allowance of food; and a round of unceasing labor—were what the majority of the people had to look forward to and what they looked back upon.

*Life of farmer
a struggle for
existence*

And yet the life of the people was not hopeless, nor was it altogether devoid of interest. Occasional theatrical entertainments relieved the monotony of toil. Every pretext for a feast was seized upon—eating being one of the chief sources of enjoyment. And gambling opportunities were eagerly sought, even though loss meant actual suffering.

*Rural
entertainment*

The artisan class ranked next to the farmers. Since industry was in the handicrafts stage, there was no industrial class divided sharply into two groups—the employers, or capitalists, and the workers—as there is in most Western countries today. All work was done in a small establishment which served as the home as well as the shop. Often the shop opened on the street, so that the passer-by could see the men at work. The establishment consisted of the master, journeymen, and apprentices. A long term of apprenticeship, usually seven years, had to be served before the aspirant was admitted to the craft

*3. The artisans:
Handicrafts
stage of
industrial
development*

as a workman or as a master. As the number of apprentices to each journeyman in the shop was limited by the craft rules, there was little danger of an excessive supply of workmen or of an over-expansion of the industry. After serving his apprenticeship the individual might remain in the shop, receiving pay for his work instead of the maintenance given him as an apprentice; he might find employment in some other shop; or he might go into business for himself. Usually, however, he continued to work, at least for a time, in the same shop.

Partnerships

The larger undertakings were often operated on the basis of a partnership of two or more men, but the corporate or joint-stock form of organization was unknown. The partners were jointly and severally responsible for the obligations of the firm and for the fulfilment of its engagements. And this was reinforced by the prevailing system of family responsibility for its members. It has become almost proverbial that the word of a Chinese is as good as his bond, which indicates that individual business standards were comparatively high. It must be recognized, however, that the social organization, with its system of family responsibility, and the close economic organization, helped to establish and perpetuate these high standards.

Guild organization

The entire craft was organized into a guild, to which all but apprentices might belong and which all were expected to support. The guild organization consisted of a president, an executive committee elected at the annual meeting, and a secretary, who was invariably one of the *literati* and a degree-holder, and the real administrator of the guild affairs.

Functions of the guild

The guild controlled prices, fixed quality, and determined wages within the craft to the extent that the minimum price and minimum wages were decided upon in its annual meetings and minimum standards were established. The minimum might be, but seldom was, raised at the discretion of the master. This control had the effect of preventing unfair competition and thus helped to stabilize the industry, just as did the limitation of the number of apprentices who might be received.

Guild arbitration

Fully as important a work was that of adjusting disputes between guild members, between masters and workmen, and between the guild and other industries. Rarely was there appeal from the decisions of the guild arbitration committee to the magistrate, for he almost invariably found it expedient to accept the committee's award. The only other recourse was to withdraw from the organization rather than accept its penalties, but this extreme step was seldom or never taken because it put the individual at the mercy of his competitors. They were free to entice his workmen away from him; they could throw innumerable petty obstacles in his way; and the whole craft and others from whom he obtained his supplies might use their collective power to drive him out of business.

The settlement of trade disputes and inter-craft difficulties through

guild intervention was no more important an activity than that of serving as the connecting link between the magistrate and the crafts. While the industry ruled itself, as has been suggested, its members sometimes came into the magistrate's *yamen* over actions affecting the public peace which he could not overlook or leave for decision by the guild. In that case the organization stood behind the individual, aiding him in his defense. The guild secretary, as a degree-holder, had access to the magistrate on terms enabling him to prevent too arbitrary action. He could also inform the magistrate as to local feeling in the matter and thus prevent him from taking action likely to cause trouble. Thus the individual as a guild member had in his dealing with officials a support which it would have been difficult to replace from any other source. This economic group solidarity was just as marked a feature of the life of China as was the social solidarity represented by the family.

*The guild and
the magistrate*

The magistrate, in turn, found it expedient to consult with the guild before imposing any new taxes or increasing customary levies, or before taking any other action affecting the craft. If he did not reach agreement with its officers in advance he was merely courting trouble in case his action aroused opposition. He might find trade stopped and production brought to an end. On occasion a mob could easily be raised which would storm the *yamen*, loot his premises, and even threaten his life. Consequently the successful magistrate kept on good terms with the guild officers, aiding them, when necessary, in the enforcement of guild rules and penalties, and working with and through them in the performance of the duties of his office.

*The magistrate
and the guild*

Many of the guilds had their own halls for meetings and for social purposes, and some of the wealthier and more important ones maintained large establishments. Here feasts and theatrical entertainments for the members were held. A poorer organization might rent the hall of another guild for its meetings and entertainments; for it must be emphasized that the guild served as a social as well as an economic organization. Its benevolent activities were also important, although perhaps not so much emphasized in the case of the craft guilds as in that of the provincial or trade guilds.

*Social activities
of the guild*

The traders and merchants were organized in much the same way as the artisans. The dealer in local products, of course, was also an artisan, and sold over the counter in the front of his establishment the goods produced in the rear. But where traders took the specialized production of the locality to other parts of the Empire they felt the need for membership in some sort of organization. This took the form of the provincial club, or guild, composed of men from different economic groups but from the same geographical area. Thus the Fukien or Shantung men in Tientsin, Peking, or Shanghai, whether they were officials or traders, would be found organized in their club. The advantage of this organization can be appreciated when one calls to mind the wide variation in dialect, amounting in some cases to a

*Provincial
guild*

difference in the spoken language, and the important differences in custom and manner of living from district to district and from province to province. For in the north the Cantonese was really a foreigner, unable to make himself readily understood and without understanding the customs of the region. More important to him, he was likely to find himself receiving the treatment accorded to foreigners in a strange land. Under these circumstances it was not strange that he should come into association with others in similar circumstances and through union erect a buffer between himself and the community. This organization also stood him in good stead in his dealings with the officials, who might have treated him with scant courtesy as an individual, but who did not dare to deal in summary fashion with an organization.

*Economic life
self-controlled*

Thus we find the entire economic life of the country organized and largely self-controlled—the farmers in the village, the artisans, merchants, and traders in the guild. The range of the guild organization is indicated by enumeration of a few of them: the spinners' and weavers' guilds in various parts of the Empire; the bankers' guild, also a provincial organization, since the bankers came from Shansi province; the silk guild; the piece-goods guild; the goldbeaters' guild; the wheelbarrow guild; the organizations maintained by the beggars and the thieves; and the provincial clubs found in every sizable city.

*Communications in
pre-modern
China:
1. Waterways*

By implication, since there were traders, there must have been trade. This, in turn, implies means of communication. Internal trade in pre-modern China, however, existed in spite of poor means of communication rather than because of highly-developed and well-maintained arteries of commerce. Goods could be transported from one coastal place to another, but only with risk, since the Chinese junk was not well fitted to withstand violent storms or long voyages. Some of the rivers afforded admirable arteries for the shipping of goods from far inland to the sea. Thus the Yangtse River, navigable for over sixteen hundred miles from its mouth, together with its tributaries, made trade possible throughout the great central basin. The West River served the south in the same way, and the Pei-ho and Yellow Rivers facilitated east and west communication in the north so far as they were navigable. The system of waterways was further artificially expanded by means of canals, the greatest of these being the Grand Canal, running from Tientsin in the north to the Yangtse at Chinkiang, thus affording a north-and-south waterway. In central and southern China, particularly in the eastern provinces, there were many smaller canals which helped in the moving of goods from one region to another. Unfortunately many of these, including some sections of the Grand Canal, had been so neglected during the last part of the Manchu period that they were little used.

Beyond the places served by waterways, communication and transportation were more difficult. Of good roads there were none, for such as had been constructed for Imperial military and courier

purposes had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The camel was used as a medium of transportation in the north, together with the donkey-cart, but the load had to be carried or pulled along paths which had become mere ruts, often sunk many feet below the level of the surrounding country, and during part of the year absolutely impassable. In the central and southern provinces even the pretense of roads had disappeared. Their place was taken by narrow foot-paths between the rice paddys or fields. On the northern plain and in central China the wheelbarrow was in common use for the transportation of goods and sometimes for the conveyance of people. The wheel was placed in the center and goods were loaded high on either side. It was sometimes propelled by pullers as well as pushers, and in this way a considerable load could be carried. For short distances, in the south, goods were moved by human carriers, the load being suspended on either end of a pole balanced on the shoulder.

2. Roads

Given such primitive means of conveyance, it is remarkable that there should have been as much internal trade as was carried on. And it is not surprising that the movement of peoples was reduced to a minimum—the principal exception being officials who were forced to move from province to province. This difficulty of travel was fully as effective as the family tie in keeping people at home and consequently in preserving a spirit of provincialism and localism.

Effect of poor communications

For while we have been speaking of China and the Chinese we must not forget that there was almost as much variety within the Empire as there was in nineteenth-century Europe. The differences in spoken language and the lack of uniformity of custom and tradition have already been mentioned. This diversity extended to food, beyond certain large staples, and particularly to the preparation of food, and to the minutiae of every-day life. The people, prior to the coming of the Europeans to China, thought of themselves in terms of the locality and, at the maximum, of the province. Thus an individual would first of all place himself, in terms of his village, as a man from the village of the Wang family (*Wang chuang-jên*). His problems were local in character, to be settled to the local advantage, even though the consequences of his decisions were felt elsewhere. While it was possible for him to coöperate readily with his fellow-villagers or townsmen, it was almost impossible to bring him into coöperation with outside groups. Flood-prevention measures along the Yellow River, for example, would be taken coöperatively in the region locally affected, often with disastrous consequences to other villages. But inter-village coöperation in the solution of such a common problem was rare. Each village took care of its own interests, and expected others to do likewise.

Variation within the Empire

4. CULTURAL LIFE

The common bonds of union which make it permissible to think of China as an entity lay in the larger cultural life and in the political

Cultural unity

organization. To offset the variety of the spoken was the unity of the written language. A Cantonese might not be able to talk to a northerner, but he could communicate with him in writing. The written language, non-alphabetical, consisting of many distinct characters each representing a particular thing or concept, had been used to develop and preserve a common literature and a broad community of ideas, ideals, and culture. The Confucian code, with its emphasis on the family relationship, and the doctrines of other great philosophers were uniformly taught and accepted throughout the Empire. Buddhism was not a local cult but was diffused throughout the state, not as a foreign religion, but as one which was essentially Chinese as a result of long modification of an originally foreign system. The southerner could feel at home in the Taoist temple north of the Yangtse. And all of the common people were united in their superstitious belief in good and evil spirits. That certain days were propitious for beginning journeys, marrying and burying; that demons might be exorcised; that evil spirits always moved straight ahead; that the spirits of the air had an effect on the destinies of men—these were national and not local beliefs, although there were emphases and variations due to peculiar local conditions. Deities might be given local names, but their characteristics were the same and the methods employed to hoodwink them were similar throughout the Empire.

*Corruption of
Buddhism and
Taoism*

It is this superstition, rather than any real religious bent, which has corrupted Buddhism from the originally subtle doctrines received from India into a system of propitiatory acts undertaken occasionally under stress of adverse circumstances. It is this which has overlaid the teachings of the Old Philosopher (Lao Tzu) with all sorts of debased ceremonies and rites, so that the original doctrines relating to the *Tao* or Way, leading to the living of correct and virtuous lives, have been lost to sight and certainly to practice.

Confucianism

Even Confucianism has been altered. Although Confucius refrained from pronouncements as to God and an after-life, and attempted to focus attention on right living, he himself has not escaped from deification and his philosophical system has been changed into a religious one. Yet Confucianism has been corrupted less than Buddhism or Taoism, for the elements of worship in it have been accepted much more perfunctorily than have the teachings with respect to living in this world. His exhortations to obedience, to filial piety and right conduct toward one's neighbors, were thoroughly inculcated into the thinking and living of the people. The unfortunate consequences of Confucianism came from the over-emphasis on the past. The Great Teacher did not profess to create a system, but only to restate and systematize the moral experience of the past. He thus emphasized adherence to former practice rather than experiment and innovation. To get back to the ideal life rather than to go forward to it, was his exhortation. The long acceptance of the Confucian view inevitably led to the development of a static society, which it was

possible to maintain because of the absence of contact with the non-Chinese world after the Manchu conquest in 1644.

5. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In addition to this cultural unity there was a political unity in the China opened to limited foreign intercourse in 1842. The Empire was, it is true, divided into provinces, each of which constituted a political as well as an administrative subdivision of the state. And although the provincial officials were all appointed by the Emperor, they were allowed so much discretion in carrying out the Imperial commands that they were in reality semi-independent rulers. This was necessary because of the poor means of communication and the variety of local problems and customs. Nevertheless, the allegiance of the officials was to Peking; they were moved freely from post to post throughout the Empire; there was a common obligation to preserve peace and good order in the provinces, and to transmit funds for the support of the central government; and appeals from the decisions of provincial officers went to Peking.

*Political unity
in spite of
territorial
subdivision
1. The province*

The provinces were subdivided into prefectures (*fu*), which, in turn, were combined for administrative purposes into circuits (*Tao*). In the eighteen provinces there were about one hundred eighty-four prefectures and ninety-five circuits. Each prefecture consisted of several districts (*hsien*), of which there were all together fourteen hundred and seventy. The district was the political and administrative unit, although it usually consisted of several villages.

*2. Prefectures
and districts*

Surrounded by tributary states, and enjoying little of that contact with the European world which might have developed national feeling, China tended toward internal variation rather than toward national unity. Loyalty was contracted to the locality or expanded at the most to the province. Until the impact of the West had afforded a new basis for comparison and differentiation, what went on in other localities or beyond the province was the concern only of the people immediately affected. The historical consequences of this localism were fully revealed in the years following the opening of China. But the importance of the territorial decentralization of the country must be emphasized at this point in order to focus attention on an explanation of latter happenings in the Empire.

Localism

Similarly it is necessary to turn attention to the actual political organization of pre-modern China, both at Peking and in the provinces, in order to lay the foundations for an understanding of the history of modern China and of the Far East as affected by that of China.

*Importance of
understanding
pre-modern
political system*

An informed writer describes the political system of the Chinese Empire as an "autocracy superimposed on a democracy." From one point of view the justification for this characterization is exhibited in the theory of political relationships in the Empire. The Emperor exercised the autocratic powers of the typical Oriental despot. He

*Position of the
Emperor*

was the supreme lawmaker of the state; the executive and administrative functions were exercised under his direction and control; and he was the fountain of justice. In other words, the people, including the officials, were accustomed to a complete concentration of power in the hands of one individual. In a very real sense he governed by "divine right," for his responsibility was not to any body representative of the people as a whole or of important groups in the state. Heaven bestowed upon him a "mandate" to rule, and until that mandate was withdrawn there was no authority to which he could be held accountable for his acts. The Emperor did, nevertheless, act under a limited sense of responsibility. In return for the autocratic power conferred on him by Heaven he assumed a definite responsibility for the maintenance of peace, order, and comparative prosperity within the Empire. Thus if famine became widespread, the condition was held to be a result of some failure on the part of the Emperor. Famine, of course, would produce brigandage, and the gathering together of large bodies of armed men might easily result in rebellion against the Imperial authority. A successful rebellion would bring the dynasty to an end, and consequently would indicate that the "mandate of Heaven" had been withdrawn. Obviously it was to the real interest of the Emperor to make certain, so far as he could, that the condition of the people was good. As a matter of fact, the end of many of the dynasties in Chinese history has come as a direct result of some such process as that just described, whether the new rulers came from within the country or subjugated it from without. It should be said, however, that, coupled with hard times, the hand of authority would have to be relaxed throughout the country in order that a rebellion might be carried to a successful conclusion. The forcible overthrow of the Manchus in 1911, then, was not a new method of getting rid of a dynasty. The right of revolution was given explicit recognition in Chinese political theory, and China has always been known as a country of revolutions.

*Theory of
political
relationships*

A few quotations from the Confucian Classics may serve to illustrate the theory back of the old Chinese political institutions. "Heaven hears as the people hear. Heaven sees as the people see." Again: "In a political state the people are the most important, institutions come next, the monarch is the least important of all." This conception of the importance of the people, enforced by the theory and practice of revolution, gave China a very workable theory of "divine right" indeed, from the complete operation of which would result a well-ordered state.

*Limitation of
autocracy*

But there were other restrictions and limitations on the absolute power of the Emperor. He was conditioned in the exercise of his supremacy by the Imperial House Laws and by the edicts of his predecessors. While he was not absolutely bound by them, they constituted a valuable guide for his conduct, both personally and in the government of the realm. Furthermore, he was decidedly limited by custom

and tradition. While he had the power to issue orders contrary to custom, yet it is never possible to change a custom by a law, and nowhere is this more true than in China where it is impossible to over-estimate the force of tradition.

In a country of personal rule the first autocrats may exercise their authority to a large extent; but by degrees, as the dynasty continues, the rulers tend to concern themselves less and less with affairs of state, leaving the real power in the hands of their advisers. When the ruler confines himself to his palace or his capital, it becomes more and more necessary for him to rely upon the advice of others in formulating the policy of the state, thus transferring the real power to those who can gain and retain his confidence, often mere servitors in the palace. In any case the autocrat must rely upon others to carry out his commands. This reliance still further modifies his actual power.

*Palace
government*

In formulating his will the Emperor of China was assisted by two bodies, the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council. The former, by 1842, had become a Court of Archives and was of little importance in the actual government. The Grand Council, on the other hand, was a very important advisory body. It usually consisted of six members, all of whom held other high offices in the central government, usually the presidency of one of the administrative boards.

*Organs of
Central
Government
1. Grand
Secretariat and
Grand Council*

It was through the administrative boards that the actual administration of the Empire, so far as Peking had any relation to it, was carried on. They were six in number until 1861, when the *Tsungli Yamen* (Board of Foreign Affairs) was established as the seventh. The original six were: Civil Appointments, concerned primarily with the disposal of the patronage; Revenue, under the direction of which the contributions from the provinces were received and assigned to the various services; Rites, concerned with the regulation of ceremonial, a very important function at an Oriental court; War, superintending such of the military and naval establishment as was not under provincial control, or otherwise provided for; Punishments, corresponding somewhat to the Department of Justice in this country; and Works, entrusted with the superintendence of the public buildings, highways, and other public property.

*2. Adminis-
trative Boards*

One of the organs of the central government deserving of more than incidental mention was the Censorate, which has been well described as the "eyes and ears" of the Emperor. There were twenty-four Censors in Peking and fifty-six in the provinces, the Viceroys and Governors of the provinces being honorary members. The function of the Censor was to criticize, and this function he exercised freely, though not always without bias. No one in the entire official system, from the highest, the Emperor, to the lowest, the district magistrate, was immune from this criticism. As late as the last quarter of the past century one of these critics sent in a memorial to

3. The Censorate

the Empress-Dowager, then the ruler of China, severely censuring her conduct in not making suitable provision for an heir to carry on the worship of the late Emperor, at the same time committing suicide in order to lend weight to his criticism as well as to avoid the displeasure of the Empress-Dowager. The provincial censors were, in a sense, spies sent out to report on the conduct of the officials in the provinces in order that the Emperor might be kept informed of their acts, rewarding those who were faithful and punishing those who were lax in the performance of their duties or who might be suspected of disloyalty. This was one of the means by which the Imperial Government was able to maintain its control over the provincial officials.

*Provincial
self-control*

It has already been pointed out that the provinces were semi-autonomous units in the Empire. While the general policy was established in Peking, it had to be carried into effect in the provinces, where it was modified as local customs and conditions, or the sympathy of the higher provincial officials with the policy, determined. A good example of this is to be found in the development of the Boxer movement. When the Empress-Dowager finally determined to support the Boxers, secret orders were sent out to the provinces to drive all foreigners into the sea. While in some few provinces attempts were made to carry out this command, in others it was totally disregarded, and, in violation of the Imperial orders, the foreigners were protected to the extent of the ability of the officials. When the Boxer movement collapsed, these men, among them Yüan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung, were honored for their superior understanding of the strength of the Powers instead of being punished for their disobedience to the Imperial orders. But while in this instance the exercise of discretion justified itself, it must be recognized that here was an element of serious weakness whenever it was desirable to secure complete uniformity in the administration of a policy.

*The provincial
system*

At the head of the province stood the Viceroy or Governor. Most of the provinces were grouped into vicerealties. The exceptions were Shantung, Shansi, and Honan, which were headed by only a Governor. In two cases, Chihli and Szechuan provinces, the single province constituted a vicerealty, and over it no Governor was placed. One vicerealty was made up of three provinces (Kiangsu, Anhui, and Kiangsi), and each of the other five was formed by a combination of two provinces.

*1. The Viceroy
and Governor*

The Viceroy, unless he assumed the functions of the Governor of one of the provinces in addition to his viceregal duties, as in Kansu, Chihli, and Szechuan provinces, was a kind of superior colleague to the Governor, having a general power of supervision of the provinces within his jurisdiction. Both officials bore the same general relationship to the vicerealty or the province as the Emperor bore to China. They were held responsible to him for the condition of the province and for the transmission of the provincial contributions to

Peking. In the accomplishment of these limited ends they were allowed a wide choice of means, so that theoretically they exercised absolute authority in the area over which they had control. However, it should be borne in mind that in the exercise of this power they were subject to the same general limitations as the Emperor, i.e., custom and tradition in the province, and the necessity of maintaining peace and order, and comparative prosperity. They were naturally forced to act under a greater feeling of real responsibility also, since they were accountable directly to the central government. At the same time they were limited in their authority by the presence of other officers in the provincial system who were appointed directly under its supervision. These officers served as a check on the Governor and on one another. Finally, the high provincial officials were supreme only to the extent to which the prefect and the district magistrate accepted their commands and faithfully carried them into effect.

Among the other important provincial officials was the Treasurer, "the nominal head of the civil service in each province, in whose name all patronage is dispensed, even when directly bestowed by the Governor; and is treasurer of the provincial exchequer, in this capacity providing the Imperial Government with a check on his nominal superior, the Governor."³ Others were the Judge, with supervision of the criminal law, and appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases; the Salt Comptroller, "in control of the manufacture, movement and sale of salt," a government monopoly; and the Grain Intendant, controlling the collection of the grain tribute. These officials constituted the general provincial official system.

Each circuit was presided over by an official called the *Tao-tai*, with special administrative functions, and the prefecture was supervised by the Prefect, together with his deputies.

At the bottom of the official ladder we come to the *Hsien*, or district magistrate, the real administrative officer in the Empire, and in many respects the most important official in the entire system. His functions were many and diverse, and a complete enumeration of them is impossible here. The general position of the magistrate in the official system, and in his relation to the people, is indicated by the title sometimes given him—"the father and mother official." Some of his more important duties may be indicated. He was the police magistrate and decided ordinary police cases. He was court of first instance in all civil and criminal cases. He was also coroner, prosecuting attorney, sheriff, jail warden, the agent of the Imperial Government in the collection of the land tax and grain tribute, registrar of the land, famine commissioner for his district, and the local representative of the Board of Works, and the provincial treasurer in the custody of official buildings. Aside from his manifold duties, the magistrate was important because he was the only official within the cognizance of the great majority of the people—the con-

2. *Provincial
officials under
the Governor*

3. *The Prefect*

4. *The District
Magistrate*

³ MORSE, H. B., *Trade and Administration of China*, p. 51.

necting link between them and the political system of the country. This fact has considerable importance in view of the later attempts to establish a national system of representative government.

*Provincial
system as
foundation for
the Republic*

The provincial system during Imperial days has been described in some detail because it furnished the real foundation on which the Republic had to be built. And out of it grew the post-revolutionary condition of military rule in China—a rule based upon control of the province and then gradually extended to Peking.

*Appointment
of officials*

All of the members of the official hierarchy were appointed by the Emperor, acting either directly or upon the recommendation of one of the higher officials. In making his choice the Emperor was supposed to appoint from among those who had qualified in the examinations held at regular intervals throughout the country. Thus one who wanted to enter into the civil service would start with the local examination, pass from there to the prefectural and provincial examinations, and, if again successful, perhaps go up to Peking to compete in the metropolitan examinations. Anyone, with certain exceptions, such as soldiers and members of certain occupational groups, was eligible to compete. However, success did not ensure appointment to office, or promotion after appointment, for in order to get ahead it was necessary to have a friend at court or among the higher officials, or, in the latter years of the Manchu rule, to gratify the cupidity of one or more of those with influence. In fact, there existed a regular system of traffic in office which radiated from the Palace. While the eunuchs were not supposed, under the Imperial House Laws, to concern themselves with public affairs, under the Empress-Dowager the real power had come to reside in the hands of the chief eunuch. This condition was partly responsible for the political decay which set in during the last half-century of Manchu rule.

*Examination
system for
selection of
officials*

In spite of this fact the examination system did mean that officialdom was largely recruited from among those with a satisfactory education according to the standards of the time. Unfortunately administrative capacity was not tested at all in the examinations, nor knowledge of the problems of government, since the educational system was built on the Confucian Classics, and the abilities stressed in the examinations were those relating to essay-writing on classical subjects. So long, however, as the duties of the administrator were nominal rather than real, and demanded the attribute of common sense rather than a technical training in administration, the system gave satisfactory results.

Tenure of office

All officials were appointed, according to the general rule, for three years, with the possibility of one reappointment before transfer to another post. This was not an absolute rule, however, for some officials were retained in the more important posts for much longer periods. A notable example of this deviation from the general practice was the maintenance of Li Hung-chang in the Tientsin vice-royalty for twenty-four years. But a rule that was never departed

from was that no official, whether governor or district magistrate, should be appointed to his native place. There was good reason for both of these rules, especially the latter. If a man were appointed to the governorship of his native province, for example, and left in the one post over a long period of time, he would, because from the beginning he would have a local following, and because his family life would be deep-rooted in the province, be able, if he were a capable and wise administrator, to establish himself in a position of independence of the Imperial Government. By appointing him to a province where he was unfamiliar with the local customs, and by transferring him to a new environment frequently, the central authorities prevented the development of a sense of independence and the possibility of an attempt to detach the province from the Empire, a danger which was, of course, greater in the provinces most remote from Peking. These two practices help to account for the maintenance of the Imperial rule in spite of the large discretionary power vested in the officials.

Another practice which serves to explain the continuance of the Imperial rule was that of balancing the various cliques or factions in dispensing patronage. In the first place, in the central government care was taken, in the making of appointments, to strike a balance between the Manchus and the Chinese, and this practice continued until near the end of the last century, when the Manchus began to predominate. In the second place, during the same period the two major factions, known because of the province of their leaders as the Chihli and Anhui men, were played against each other in order that neither should gain the supremacy to the disadvantage of the Manchus. After 1895 a third group, the Cantonese, who had always been discriminated against in official life, came into prominence by supporting the Emperor in his attempt to reform the government. With the failure of the reform movement many of them were driven into exile, so that the Cantonese became identified with the revolutionary propaganda. This partly explains the leadership of the south in the uprising of 1911. This balancing of the various groups against one another was followed in distributing provincial posts as well as those of the central government.

Before we turn from the official to the extra-official system of government, the relationship between the various officials in the hierarchy should be explained more fully. The Emperor, as has been pointed out, was responsible for the government of the entire country. But he exercised his responsibility by the appointment of the Governor or Viceroy, holding him to account for the government of the viceroyalty or province. The Governor held the Prefect responsible for the condition of the prefecture, and he passed the responsibility on to the magistrates of the several districts in his jurisdiction. The magistrate, in his turn, held the headmen of the villages responsible for those under their direction. However, in spite of this complete

*Appointments
distributed
among factions*

*Delegation of
responsibility*

devolution of responsibility, no one was able to plead the negligence of those inferior to him as an excuse for the non-fulfilment of his own duties.

Illustrated

This delegation of responsibility is well illustrated by the specimen proclamation given by Parker: "The magistrate has had the honor to receive instructions from the prefect, who cites the instructions of the Tao-tai, moved by the Treasurer and the Judge, recipients of the commands of their Excellencies the Viceroy and Governor, acting at the instance of the Foreign Board, who have been honored with his Majesty's commands."

*Salaries and
"squeeze"*

Still another feature of Chinese political life remains to be noted. None of the officials received salaries large enough to enable them to support their establishments adequately, or to provide for their own future. The official salary of the magistrate is given by Morse as ranging from 100 to 300 *taels* per annum, and the pay of the higher officials, while proportionately greater, was equally inadequate. This salary was supplemented by an allowance "for the encouragement of integrity among officials" amounting to several times the salary. But even with this allowance the official was decidedly underpaid. The natural result was that all added to their salaries by whatever means came to hand. The system of financial administration in the Empire enabled the officials to "squeeze" (i.e., graft) more than enough to recompense themselves for the meagerness of their official doles.

*Taxation and
finance*

The Imperial Government did not tax the individual directly, but apportioned its needed income among the provinces according to their ability to contribute. Thus the Governor would be notified that his province would be expected to send in a given amount to the Imperial Treasury. If this contribution was paid, the central government had no further interest in the methods of finance of the province. Since the Imperial expenses were not great, normally the province could pay more, from the established sources of revenue, than was actually requested by the Board of Revenue. Consequently the practice early developed for the Governor to add to the contribution demanded a sum large enough to enable him to maintain properly his official establishment, consisting of a large number of necessary officers who were entirely unprovided for in the official system, and whom he was expected to pay out of his own purse. This increased sum he would divide among the various prefectures. If the requested amounts were duly paid, his responsibility ended, and he, in turn, made no attempt to see that the amount paid in to the provincial treasury was that actually collected. The Prefect then took the liberty of adding to the sum assessed on him an amount which would enable him to take care of his own needs. This further increased sum was then distributed among the districts for actual collection under the direction of the magistrate. Since he had to account, not for the amount actually collected, but only for that sum

for which the district was assessed, he in turn fixed the taxes to be collected from the individual according to the amount which he thought could be collected without undue friction. The balance he retained for his own needs.

It is immediately apparent that there would be a wide discrepancy between the revenue collected from the villagers and the sum actually delivered to the Imperial Treasury. The fact of this divergence was well known and these successive accretions were considered to be entirely right and proper. It would seem, however, that under this system, as in that of "farming" the taxes resorted to in the Turkish Empire, the burden on the individual would soon become intolerable. This would have been the case had it not been for the fact that there was a natural disinclination on the part of the individual to pay more than his ancestors had paid, and, in the annual struggle between the tax collector and the farmer or villager, the force of custom was on the latter's side. In a society where custom was the determinant in all disputes, the interests of the individual were fairly well protected. The sources of direct revenue were fixed and immutable, and the levy on those sources could not go far above the customary rate without provoking disturbance. Since undue disturbance would reflect on the governing ability of the magistrate, his normal tendency would be not to exceed the figure marked by the individual as the point of open resistance. As a matter of fact, taxes were not unduly burdensome at the time of the opening of China.

*Custom a check
on tax increases*

The same system of finance marked the collection of the customs duties and the administration of the salt monopoly, Peking losing and the individual official decidedly gaining. Some of the most lucrative posts in the Empire were those connected even indirectly with the foreign trade at Canton. The payments to secure these posts were correspondingly heavy, but the officials usually managed to amass more than a competency before being transferred. There was no regular schedule of charges upon the importation of goods into, or their exportation from, the Empire, and the foreign traders were taxed all that the traffic would bear. Much of what was received went into the pockets of the officials.⁴

*Collection of
customs*

Throughout, then, there was what may be described as corruption in the financial administration, justified in part by the small salaries paid, but having its effect in the lowering of the public integrity of the officials.

*Effect of
"squeeze"*

So long as the Imperial Government needed only a nominal and fairly constant revenue, the system just described proved to be workable. But with the added demands on the treasury of the central government due to the imposition of foreign indemnities, the necessity for more extensive armaments, and the cessation of contributions

*Defects in
system apparent
as expenses
increased*

⁴ This was true only up to the time of the first treaties, when a regular system of charges was provided. Corruption disappeared from their collection and transmission to Peking when the foreign customs service was organized on its present basis with a staff largely made up of foreigners.

from provinces devastated by famine or rebellion, it became necessary either to increase the levy on the existing sources of revenue and develop new sources, or to bring to Peking a greater proportion of the amounts actually collected. Increase in the levy, however, as in the case of the tax on land, could not go beyond a certain point without provoking resistance to the tax collector. New resources could not be developed rapidly enough to meet the expanding needs, because of the force of customary modes of procedure, although substantial revenue was derived from the *likin*, a transit tax developed after the middle of the last century; and the greatest source of expansion of income for a state, the foreign customs, early became fixed by treaty at a low point. The third alternative proved impossible as a solution, owing to the unwillingness of the officials to abate their own needs and demands. Consequently the financial problem became one of increasing difficulty during the last period of Manchu rule.

*Political system
one of
administrative
centralization
and territorial
decentralization*

*Democratic
elements in
system*

*Family control
in village*

*Minimum of
governmental
interference in
life of people*

Thus far we have described a highly centralized administrative system in a decentralized territorial system, the main feature of which was autocracy with some important democratic modifications. The soundness of the characterization of political China as an autocracy superimposed on a democracy has not yet, however, been fully demonstrated, since we have not called attention to the democratic features of the system. These are to be found in the village, family, and guild systems which have already been described. The official system stopped where the real control of the lives of the people began—below the district magistrate. They paid taxes and in return expected the government to maintain peace and order. From the standpoint of law this meant that the officials made and administered the criminal law. Commercial law was established and enforced through the guild organizations, and trade disputes were usually settled out of court. Even the taxes were often not collected by the magistrate, but were returned to him by the village headman, who was selected by the village rather than by the magistrate.⁵ As has been indicated, the village largely controlled itself through its Council of Elders, and the family, the real unit in the country, served as an agency of control to a much greater extent than in Occidental states.

It thus becomes clear that the real life of China, both social and economic, was carried on without the direction of the officers of government, and yet with a high degree of organization. The people were self-controlled in virtually all of their activities. With the provincial and craft guilds and the village and family organizations, it was possible to get along with a government that exercised the minimum of actual power. The official system was grafted on to the family and guild systems, and was supported by the people for the reasons already mentioned. It is in this extra-political system of

⁵ Subject, however, to his confirmation. In some parts of the country it would seem that the magistrate suggested the headman. But this was rather the exception than the rule.

government that the democratic element in the Chinese state was to be found, and from it, as the conservator of local custom, that the autocratic features of the official system were modified. But the fact is worthy of note that it was not democracy in the political sense.

The account of how these features of Chinese life were modified will be found to be part of the history of modern China, dating from the attempt on the part of the states of the West to establish political relations with the Chinese Empire.

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CHAPTER II

THE OPENING OF CHINA

I. EARLY RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

*Pre-modern
contact with
the West*

FROM the middle of the eighteenth century until 1842 the Chinese Empire was closed to foreigners except for peep-holes at Canton and Macao. Before 1757 the Chinese government had passively permitted rather than actively encouraged the entrance of foreigners into the country. The Portuguese were the first Westerners to reach China by sea in modern times. After the first visit of Portuguese ships in 1516, other Europeans began to come in search of trade. The Spanish arrived in 1575, the Dutch in 1604, the English in 1637, and the Americans in 1784. At the same time that the south of China was being visited by the vessels of those states, Russia was reaching out territorially toward the Pacific. By 1689 the establishment of a common frontier with China necessitated an agreement regulating trade across it and arranging for control of the peoples moving back and forth, and China made her first modern treaty in that year (Treaty of Nerchinsk). This treaty also gave the Russians the right to send a mission to Peking, and consequently placed them on a different footing in China than other foreigners.

*Conduct of
foreigners
questionable*

While, in harmony with a long tradition of hospitable treatment of strangers, no serious obstacles were placed in the way of foreign traders, there must have been some doubt from the first as to the proper policy to be pursued toward them, for news of Portuguese activities in India and Malaysia, of the occupation of the Philippines by the Spanish, and of Dutch and English aggressions, must have reached Peking. That these tales were not exaggerated was revealed by the behavior of the first arrivals in China. The Portuguese showed themselves to be more interested in loot than in legitimate trade, and were soon restricted to contact at Macao. The Spanish were early warned off and made no real attempts to establish trade relations. The Dutch tried to establish themselves first in the Pescadores and then in Formosa, where they remained for a time. And the Chinese were prejudiced against the English both by the Portuguese, who gave them a bad name in the hope of keeping them from trade, and by the brusque conduct of the English themselves. All of these things gave the foreigners a poor start, and their chances were not bettered by the tendency of one group to fight another.

At the same time the reigning dynasty was being threatened from the north by the Manchus, and rebellion was rife south of the Great

Wall. Consequently it is not strange that the Ming rulers began to fear the complications presented by the coming of the Westerners, whose behavior was so often alarming. After the Manchus gained control of the country they, by edict in 1685, permitted foreigners to trade at all the coast ports, but in their turn, perhaps in part because of their experiences in attempting to control the traders, they finally decided to restrict access to the country, and in 1757 trade was definitely confined to the southernmost port, Canton.

*Trade relations
restricted after
Manchu
conquest of
China*

Just as commercial relations came to be restricted, so the Chinese government, after favorably receiving Christian emissaries from the West, gradually became less friendly to them and finally prohibited Christian propaganda. The first period of Roman Catholic missionary activity in China extends from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. The second and more fruitful period, beginning after the middle of the sixteenth century with the establishment of Matteo Ricci in the country, deserves a few words of comment. The first missionaries were Jesuits, who established themselves firmly in the country by largely adapting their religious views to the practices and prejudices of the Chinese, coming as philosophers and men of science rather than as priests. By 1601 Ricci was able to establish himself at Peking, where he and his associates and successors won favor at court and made converts among the higher officials. Many conversions took place in the provinces also as a result of Jesuit labors. After the Jesuits, the Franciscans and Dominicans found a footing in China in spite of some opposition from the Jesuits.

*Early Roman
Catholic
missions*

After the Catholic missionaries had secured a firm hold no serious obstacles were placed in their way until there developed a rivalry among the various orders. This rivalry, which also infected the converts, was made more significant politically by reason of the fact that some of the priests had been drawn into public positions, both at Peking and in the provinces, and by the tendency of others to assert a lay as well as a spiritual authority over their flocks. Consequently fear was expressed that missionary zeal might give rise to serious internal disturbance.

*Rivalry
between
religious orders*

Even more serious in its consequences was a controversy which arose as to the legitimacy of the continuance of ancestor-worship by native Christians. The dispute turned on the meaning of the Chinese word for Heaven. Appeal was taken both to the Emperor of China and to Rome, and, as their conclusions ultimately differed, question was raised as to the effect on the Chinese state of the propagation of a faith which led its believers to recognize as supreme a distant and external authority. "The disputes between the various orders of missionaries and the resistance of some converts to the Emperor's commands respecting the ancestral rights, together with the representations of his own officers upon the tendency of the new religion to undermine his own authority, gradually opened his eyes to the

*Controversy
over ancestor-
worship leads
to prescription
of Christianity*

true character of the propagandists."¹ Consequently, in 1724 an edict was issued prohibiting the propagation of the "religion of the Lord of Heaven."

*Work continued
in secrecy*

Some of the missionaries were permitted to remain at Peking for a time in scientific capacities. Some others, after they had been ordered out, secreted themselves at various places in the provinces and continued the work. Their presence, together with that of native Christians, led intermittently to persecutions, which, however, did not result in the extermination of the faith. "In 1820 an estimate gives six bishops, two coadjutors, twenty-three foreign missionaries, eighty native priests, and 215,000 converts."²

*Experience with
foreigners
explains
closing of
China*

Thus a survey of the first two centuries of Occidental contact with China reveals the fact that it was experience and experiment rather than innate hostility to foreigners which resulted in the closing of the Empire. A few missionaries remained *sub-rosa*, and Christianity itself was not wholly eliminated, it is true; but Catholic missions did not begin to regain their former importance until steps were taken to lift the ban (1844). The trader was also barred from the Empire except for the limited access permitted through Canton and Macao, a restriction which continued until 1842. The sole relations permitted through those places were commercial, the only contact being with Chinese merchants. Portugal, Holland, and England all attempted to establish direct political relations with Peking by sending embassies to the capital, but each attempt resulted in failure. The ambassadors were invariably treated as tribute-bearers, and they were expected to perform the *kowtow* (the nine prostrations) before the Emperor or his picture, which the English invariably refused to do, and which the Dutch did without avail. After exhortations to obedience and good conduct the foreign missions were informed that the Emperor saw no reason to change established procedures.

*Failure of
attempts to
reestablish
relations*

2. THE CANTON TRADE

*Traders not
permitted to
reside at
Canton*

While the trade was carried on at Canton the foreign merchants were not permitted to reside there throughout the year. During the summer months, or from the end of one trading season to the beginning of the next, the traders retired to Macao, which was in the nature of a Portuguese leasehold, although Chinese jurisdiction was maintained. When they returned to Canton they were forced to leave their wives and children, if they had any, at Macao, and this served to emphasize the temporary and precarious nature of their stay.

*Conditions of
trade fixed by
Chinese*

The conditions of trade were determined exclusively by the Chinese and, so far as charges were concerned, were variable, fixed by the operation of the principle that levies should be as heavy as the traffic would bear. Only a small part of the income reached Peking, the balance being pocketed by the collectors and the officials from

¹ WILLIAMS, S. WELLS, *Middle Kingdom*, vol. II, p. 303.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 307.

the magistrate to the viceroy. Tonnage, export and import duties, together with a variety of service charges, all contributed to swell the total.

In order to milk the trade effectively the Chinese set up a monopoly organization through which alone it could be carried on. In 1702 an individual known as the "Emperor's merchant" (*Hoppo*) was appointed as the sole agent with whom the foreigners might deal. This system proved unsatisfactory and was replaced fifty years later by that of "security merchants" organized into what came to be known as the *Co-hong*, the guild of Chinese merchants engaged in foreign trade. Formally abolished in 1771, the *Co-hong* was revived in 1782 and continued until 1842. This revival did not destroy the monopoly system, but merely modified it by increasing the number of Chinese firms entitled to participate in the trade first to twelve and then to thirteen. Each foreign trader had to be "secured" by one of the *Hong* merchants. This meant that he could buy and sell only through him, buying at the minimum the *Hong* merchant would consider and selling at his maximum. On his side the "security merchant" took care of all payments to the officials, relieving the foreigner of the task of meeting the innumerable petty exactions which burdened the trade. These of course were figured in as part of the price finally agreed upon.

The *Co-hong* was the buffer between the foreign community and the Chinese official world. The thirteen merchants were the sole medium of communication between the factories and the viceroy, governor, and magistrate. Letters, even though carrying complaints of the conduct of *Hong* merchants, could be transmitted only through them, and in the form of petitions. After some time it was agreed that petitions might be transmitted direct, but there was no assurance that this regulation would be invariably observed. Furthermore, other Chinese could participate in the trade only through members of the *Co-hong*. Thus the control both of exports and imports lay in their hands, subject to official interference; and official interference was rare so long as each official, from the highest to the lowest, received his "squeeze." As good business men the "security merchants" conducted the trade with a view to securing the maximum of return, and so adjusted prices and exactions as not to make it unprofitable for the foreigners. These realized such large profits, in spite of the monopoly control, that they were ready to endure almost any inconvenience to keep the trade open. It was this desire, well realized by the Chinese, which gave them the upper hand in their dealings with the foreign community.

The members of this community lived, while at Canton, in a restricted area just outside the city walls. They had their residences over their warehouses and offices in buildings called "factories," from the name "factor" given to the permanent representative of the foreign firm. The establishment, in addition to foreign clerks and other assistants, consisted of a *compradore*, a trusted Chinese who

*Monopoly
organization
of Chinese
traders: the
Co-hong*

*The Hong
merchants the
medium of
trade and
communication*

*Conditions of
life of foreign
trader at
Canton*

served as the buffer between the foreigner and his "security merchant", linguists, and servants. Since the foreign trader had not learned the language or studied the business needs of the country, and could not buy its products directly himself, he had to have a Chinese whom he could trust to look after the Chinese end of the business. From the standpoint of their personal needs and comforts the foreigners were dependent on the good will of the Chinese. It was only by connivance, and not of right, that Chinese servants were permitted to serve them. Their food and water came to them from the Chinese city, and their recreation and pleasure grounds were restricted. Judging by Chinese regulations and proclamations, Europeans were considered to be of a lower order of moral being than the natives and were so treated. It must be remembered, however, that these proclamations were issued by officials who knew the traders either not at all or only at second-hand. With the *Hong* merchants and others with whom they came in close contact the Europeans were often on the friendliest terms. And it must also be remembered, when one is considering the tone of the proclamations, that not all of the traders were representative of the best elements in the countries from which they came.

*The East India
Company and
British trade
supremacy*

Before the middle of the eighteenth century the English had outstripped all of their competitors in the Canton trade. After the East India Company established its factory at Canton in 1715, the bulk of the trade was under its control, due to its monopoly of the English trade. Other Englishmen were permitted to participate only under license of the company, and then only partially. The company was represented at Canton by superintendents who were to a large extent the spokesmen for the entire body of foreign merchants. Since these superintendents had a larger control over their countrymen than other foreign representatives, and since the English formed the largest group, the Chinese tended to deal with them and to hold them responsible for the conduct of the trade on the foreign side.

*The American
trade and
traders*

After 1789 the Americans rapidly assumed a position second only to that of the English. By 1832 there were seven well-established firms and twenty Americans regularly coming to Canton. These firms served as brokers for almost the entire American trade, disposing of goods brought in and securing outward cargoes. The Americans, it should be noted, came to China as individuals, and while they gained from that fact a freedom in trade denied to their English competitors, they lost by not having behind them a powerful organization such as the British East India Company. They were served, it is true, by a merchant-consul, but with the Chinese he had little more standing than any of his fellow-merchants. "The consul was merely a merchant whose only compensation was the fees of the office, the dignity of the position, and such information as to the business transactions of his competitors as would become available to him because of his access

to official reports.''³ While the position was actively sought, this was not because the consul had any real authority over his fellow-traders. Unable to unite them in the pursuit of any common policy except by consent, he could not deal with the Chinese as the authoritative spokesman of a well-organized group. Thus what the Americans gained through release from the discipline of a controlling company, they lost in their relations with the Chinese.

One of the peculiarities of the early trade was that it was largely one-sided. The Chinese did not desire European products, while the Europeans were willing to make the long voyages and take the grave risks necessary to secure Chinese goods. The Chinese consequently came to believe that the peoples of Europe were dependent on China for their well-being. This is clearly indicated in the references made by Commissioner Lin, as late as 1839, to the foreign inability to do without China's "tea and rhubarb."

*The early trade
one-sided*

For this reason there developed among the Chinese a feeling of strength in dealing with the traders. Stoppage of the trade merely affected Chinese pocket-books, while there was a feeling that it not only did that to the European traders but injured the well-being of their countrymen as well. They came, therefore, to look upon a threat to stop the trade as a very effective weapon to be used in controlling the foreign merchant. The trade was permitted as a privilege and not as a matter of right—a privilege to be withheld at the discretion of the Chinese authorities. Thus the fact that relations between the outer world and China were solely on a commercial basis, that the traders seemed willing to accept almost any conditions laid down by China in order to keep the port of Canton open to trade, and that the trade was granted as a privilege rather than conceded as a right, developed in the Cantonese an undue sense of the inferiority of the foreigner, and bred in him an arrogance which finally reacted to his own disadvantage.

*This facilitated
China's control
of the trade*

While at first the trade was entirely one-sided, Chinese products being paid for in specie or bullion, an exchange of commodities was gradually built up. In return for tea, silks, nankeen cloth, and other Chinese products, the English and Americans brought to the Empire ginseng, for which there was an existent market, furs, from both the eastern and northwestern American coasts and from the sealing trade, sandalwood, some cotton goods, increasing in amount in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, rice, and other commodities. An enumeration of the imports indicates that the trade was triangular rather than direct. The traders had to exchange their own products in various places for the goods to be used in the China trade. The Americans especially had to acquire not only goods but specie to supplement them; for it was only after opium began to figure largely in the imports that specie was no longer needed to settle a balance adverse to the foreigners.

*Import trade
gradually
became
important*

³ DENNETT, T., *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 63.

*Growth of
opium trade*

The demand for opium grew until by 1830 the balance of trade had become unfavorable to the Empire, the value of the opium imported alone exceeding that of all of the commodities exported. Most of the opium came from India, some from Persia, and, toward the last, some Turkish opium was imported by the Americans. All of the nationalities represented at Canton, but not all of the traders, participated in the traffic, although here as in the general trade the English occupied a leading position, the carrying, however, being left to the "country" ships. The larger British responsibility was due not so much to their bringing opium to China as to the official encouragement of cultivation in India, to the official control of sales in India for export, and to the interest in the trade as a source of revenue for the Indian government.

*Opium smoking
an imported
practice*

This great increase in importation⁴ was indicative of an increasing number of users. It may be pointed out here that opium smoking was not a natural vice of the Chinese, but one that had been introduced into the country. The drug had been known for its medicinal properties long before it began to be used for its narcotic effect. Its use in the pipe, first mixed with tobacco, itself brought to China by foreigners, and then unmixed, seems to have been introduced from Formosa following the temporary Dutch occupation of that island in 1624. After its introduction opium smoking rapidly became a common practice and soon attained the proportions of a national vice. Many of the officials and the gentry, together with people from all classes who could afford it, became addicts.

*Trade increased
in spite of
Imperial
prohibition*

Objections to its use on both moral and hygienic grounds were raised from an early time. Edicts in 1729 and 1800 fulminated against the practice, and that of 1800 prohibited opium importation. In spite of the prohibition, however, the trade in the foreign product increased to the extent of dominating the import trade, although both the *Co-hong* and the British East India Company ceased to engage in it. Officials were ordered to bring it to an end, but they found it too profitable as a source of "squeeze" to regard the edicts as anything more than an excuse for taxing the traffic much more heavily than would have been possible if it had not been illicit. After 1820, under orders from Peking, the trade was driven away from Canton for a time, but this only resulted in the traders' going up the coast to dispose of their cargo. It further resulted in such a loss of "squeeze" to the officials at Canton that they winked at the trade and permitted the traders to establish themselves in receiving ships at Lintin. Not until 1838 was an honest attempt made to enforce the prohibition, and it was out of this attempt that the conflict grew which resulted in war and the treaty of Nanking.

The foreign responsibility for the fostering of opium smoking by

⁴ The average importation from 1800 to 1811 was 4016 chests; 1811-1821, 4494 chests (I, MORSE, p. 176); 1821-1828, 9708 chests; 1828-1835, 18,712 chests (I, MORSE, p. 182).

the Chinese cannot be overlooked, nor should it be minimized. But the inability of the Imperial Government to control the evil must not be forgotten, or the reasons for it. The institution of "squeeze" was largely responsible for the failure to enforce the prohibition against importation. The decentralized system of administration—the discretion left to officials in carrying out Imperial commands—made it impossible to check consumption except by limiting the supply. And the foreign supply was augmented from a rapidly increasing home production in the south-central and western provinces. This production had to be brought to an end if the use of opium was to be restricted. But the crop was very profitable because of the demand for it throughout the Empire, and production was certain to increase unless the officials took severe action against the producers. The official could either carry out the commands of the Emperor or could charge heavily for immunity. He usually chose to do the latter. This production, it should be noted, had an important consequence other than that of adding to the supply of opium available to the smoker: it withdrew land from cereal growing and thus tended to interfere with the food supply in some sections of the country. This consequence as well as the other should be borne in mind as one of economic importance.

*Joint foreign
and Chinese
responsibility
for opium
traffic*

Another economic factor at work grew out of the foreign trade in opium and served to emphasize the social objections to it. As the opium imports increased, the specie of the Empire was drawn to Canton and was exported in settlement of an adverse trade balance. The ultimate possible effects of this on the monetary system and the economic life of China were soon perceived by some of the higher officials and brought to the attention of the Emperor in memorials and petitions. Some looked upon it as an added argument for prohibition, while others advocated legalization of the trade as the easiest means of controlling it. For a time, just before the final attempt to enforce the prohibitory edicts, it appeared certain that the advocates of legalization and restriction would carry the day at Peking, but on the eve of success the Emperor determined on the enforcement of the established policy. The prospect of change, felt at Canton to be a certainty, made the action finally taken seem to the foreigners more drastic than it actually was.

*Economic
objections to
opium trade*

While the traders engaged in the traffic without regard to nationality, it may be pointed out that some of them were in sympathy with the prohibition policy. The social objection had its weight with a few of them, and some of the American and English traders saw in the enlarged importation of opium a decided handicap to the development of a more legitimate import trade. Even then many of them were as much interested in exploiting China as a market as in drawing supplies from her. Importation of opium unquestionably interfered with the development of a market for foreign goods, both because of the ease with which it could be handled, and because of the impos-

*Foreign
objections to
opium trade*

sibility of China's paying in specie both for opium and for other imports. Thus there was a conflict of interest as to opium among the foreigners toward the end of this pre-modern period of intercourse.

3. ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS (1834-1840)

*End of East
India
Company's
monopoly
(1834)*

Opium, however, was the occasion, and not the cause, of the war between the British and the Chinese. In order to understand this, for a moment we must turn our attention back to the conditions of trade at Canton. For a long time independent British merchants had been agitating in favor of ending the East India Company's monopoly at Canton, in order that they might join in the trade competition as freely as the nationals of other Powers, particularly the Americans. This agitation, coupled with the situation in India, finally (1834) moved the British government to abolish the monopoly. But its abolition forced the government to devise something to take its place for the purpose of supervising and promoting British interests in the Far East. It also raised for the Chinese the problem of controlling the traders. They had tried to extend the principle of responsibility to foreigners by holding the British superintendent largely responsible for them, dealing with them through him. Both sides, therefore, desired to see some officer appointed to take over the duties formerly performed by the agents of the company. The Chinese, however, were more than satisfied with a commercial agent empowered to deal with the Chinese merchants.

*English decide
to establish
direct contact
with Chinese
officials*

The English, on the other hand, decided to appoint superintendents who should represent the British government rather than a commercial company. These superintendents were to exercise the powers that had been vested in the agents of the East India Company, and to that extent the desires of the Chinese were complied with. But Lord Palmerston went a step farther and directed Lord Napier, who was appointed as the chief among three superintendents of trade, to "announce your arrival at Canton by letter to the Viceroy." Bearing in mind the fact that the former agents had dealt with a commercial agent or group of merchants, and not with the regular provincial officials, and that they represented a commercial company, and not a sovereign nation, the reader will perceive what a great change this instruction to communicate only with the Viceroy, the highest official of the province, would inevitably work.

*Chinese
satisfied to
maintain only
commercial
relations*

The Chinese could see no reason for change in a method of communication which was working to their entire satisfaction. Even if the Viceroy had been willing to deal with the English representative, which he was not, it would not have been on terms satisfactory to one who felt that he represented one of the great states of the world. The Viceroy would have dealt with him, not as the direct representative of England, but as a commercial agent, and consequently as one inferior to himself in rank. Since Lord Napier was prepared to insist on treatment in accordance with his position as

the representative of a state equal in every respect to China, his appointment and subsequent arrival at Canton opened the whole question of the establishment of the states of the Western world in China on a footing of equality.

The conception of the equality of states was entirely foreign to China, as well it might be. She had lived her own life so long, apart from contact with all states except those which were inferior to herself in size, power, and civilization, that she conceived herself as the one civilized state, surrounded by others which were in a more or less highly developed condition of barbarism. It was this conception which caused China to call herself the "Middle Kingdom." All attempts that had been made before this time to establish relations on a footing of equality had failed because of this attitude, and such a feeling of superiority, ingrained through the centuries of isolation, could not be immediately overcome. As a matter of fact, it took force, and the subjection of the Empire to repeated humiliation, before the Imperial Government could be brought to an understanding of its true position in the world.

The fact that the British were the first to apply force to China is readily understandable. They were the chief traders at Canton and had always had a semi-governmental backing in their trade. When the East India Company was brought to an end it was only natural that its position should be officially taken by the government. The Americans, the next largest group of traders, had always been less restricted by governmental supervision. American contacts continued to be non-diplomatic and non-political, and the merchants were desirous of having them continue so lest the trade should be disturbed and they should lose the slight hold which they, with the other traders, had gained at Canton. They were interested, immediately, in peace at any price; and even after the partial opening of the country, American interest and policy were directed toward peace. The Americans continued their trade after the British traders had been forced to withdraw from Canton, and, in fact, their presence there proved to be an advantage to the English traders, as through the Americans they were able to discharge their cargoes in spite of their own government's embargo.

But the British insistence on the establishment of official intercourse and on enlarged trade opportunities was dictated by more than the ending of the East India Company's monopoly. Indeed that act was an expression of a larger interest. This was in the development of markets and the opening-up of new supplies of raw materials throughout the non-European world. Other states developed the same interest later than England, and, with the interest, used much the same means to satisfy it. The Commercial Revolution brought in its train the discovery of America as the result of the European desire for commerce with the Orient. And the Industrial Revolution, with its consequent development of trade, with the demand that it brought

*Conception of
equality of
states foreign
to China*

*Reasons why
British were
first to apply
pressure to
China*

*Effects of
industrial
revolution felt
first by
England*

for raw materials and for markets, made it certain that the industrialized nations of Europe would not permit any profitable center of trade to remain unexploited because of a desire on the part of its government or people to remain aloof from the current of world affairs. If other states had become industrialized before Great Britain, they would have played the leading rôle in forcing intercourse with the West on the countries of the East. If China had not been opened by the application of British force in 1842, she would have had other assaults to withstand, all of them motivated by an insistence on the establishment of interstate relations according to the basic principles of the international law developed in Europe.

*Difficult
position of
Lord Napier*

Lord Napier,⁵ arriving at Macao in July, 1834, was placed in a most unfortunate position by his instructions and the construction he placed on part of them. He was to announce his arrival at Canton as the representative of England, and not of a commercial company, directly to the Viceroy. His interpretation of his instructions forbade his using the *Hong* merchants as the medium of communications and forced him to regard himself as the guardian of the honor of his sovereign and his country. And yet he bore the same title as the representatives of the British East India Company and his duties were similar to theirs. Furthermore, he was instructed not to run counter to Chinese prejudices, to behave in a conciliatory and circum-spect manner, and to seek to maintain a friendly understanding with the Chinese so as not to endanger the trade. Under the existing conditions it was impossible for him to carry out from the beginning, as he tried to do, the part of his instructions which referred to his position, without offending Chinese prejudices, stirring up trouble, and endangering trade relations at Canton. Trouble began when he proceeded to Canton without bothering to notify the Chinese and obtain a permit. After his arrival he tried to communicate directly with the Viceroy. This led to a series of abortive negotiations, Napier trying to live up to his instructions, and the Chinese attempting to preserve the old practices. The Chinese view of the general principles governing their intercourse with the foreigner was given by the Viceroy as follows:⁶

*Chinese view of
relations with
foreigner and
foreign state*

The object of the said barbarian headman (Lord Napier) in coming to Canton is for commercial business. The Celestial Empire appoints officials-civilian to rule the people, military to intimidate the wicked; but the petty affairs of commerce are to be directed by the merchants themselves. The officials are not concerned with such matters. In the trade of the said barbarians, if there are any changes to be made in regulations, in all cases the *Hong* merchants are to consult together, and make a joint statement to the superintendent of customs and to my office, and they will then be informed officially whether the pro-

⁵ Lord Napier was actually first among three appointed as superintendents of the trade. Since the lead was his throughout, his name is used as if he alone were the English representative.

⁶ MORSE, H. B., *International Relations*, vol. I, pp. 126-127.

posals are to be allowed or disallowed. . . .

The great ministers of the Celestial Empire are not permitted to have private intercourse by letters with outside barbarians. If the said barbarian headman throws in letters, I, the Viceroy, will not at all receive or look at them. With regard to the barbarian factory of the company, without the walls of the city, it is the place of temporary residence for barbarians coming to Canton to trade. They are permitted to eat, sleep, buy and sell in the factories. They are not permitted to go out and ramble about. All these points are decided by fixed and certain laws and statutes, which will not bear to be confusedly transgressed.

To sum up the whole matter: the nation has its laws; it is so everywhere. Even England has its laws; how much more the Celestial Empire! How flaming bright are its great laws and ordinances! More terrible than the awful thunderbolt! . . .

It is clear that, so long as the Chinese officials acted on such views, any attempt to shift from a commercial basis to even a semi-political one was foredoomed to failure. All of Lord Napier's endeavors to open direct intercourse with the Viceroy proved unavailing, and his very presence at Canton constituted an embarrassment to the traders, who preferred the old conditions, no matter how unsatisfactory, to an endangering of the trade. Consequently, being unable to accomplish his mission as he interpreted it, and becoming ill, Lord Napier finally retired to Macao, where he died. The victory in the first contest rested wholly with the Chinese, who continued to dictate the terms of contact at Canton, and whose confidence in their ability to deal with the foreigners as they chose was strengthened by the retirement of the English representative. They drew the natural conclusion that he had withdrawn because of the Viceroy's orders, supported by the stoppage of the English trade and the proclamation of non-intercourse.

His place was taken by Mr. L. V. Davis, who shortly gave way to Sir George B. Robinson, both of whom had been Lord Napier's associates. They were succeeded by Captain Eliot as Chief Superintendent. For the next few years no serious attempts were made to open direct intercourse with China through official channels. The matter was suspended, however, and not abandoned. During this period of quiet the trade was supervised by the British superintendent from Macao.

The whole question of the regulation of the trade was again opened in 1838, when the Emperor appointed a special commissioner to deal with the opium question, giving him instructions and authority to enforce the prohibitory edicts. The commissioner, Lin Tzū-hsu, assumed the offensive from the time of his arrival at Canton. After a brief study of the situation he decided to compel the foreigners to enforce the prohibition edicts for him. Thus he demanded that they give up all of the opium in their possession, and give bond not to engage in the traffic. To force compliance with his demand he threatened a complete stoppage of the trade. The English finally complied

*English and
Chinese points
of view
irreconcilable*

*Lord Napier's
failure and
death*

*Period of
quiescence*

*Chinese
determine to
enforce the
opium
prohibitions*

partially with the demand for the opium, that on the American ships being surrendered through them at the same time; but they refused to give the required bond not to engage in the traffic in the future. Consequently all intercourse with the factories was brought to an end, including the furnishing of food, water, and personal service. The British merchants finally withdrew under the direction of the superintendent of the trade, and established themselves at Hongkong. The Americans accepted a modified form of the bond, and trade was reopened with them. After a time the English traders began to discharge their cargoes through the Americans, so that they did not suffer greatly as a result of their withdrawal.

*Hostilities the
result of
methods used to
end trade*

Out of this controversy over the method of enforcing the prohibitory edicts, together with other difficulties, active hostilities developed. These were confined at first to Canton and its vicinity, but later operations were carried farther up the coast, and war was finally brought to an end only after British vessels had proceeded a short distance up the Yangtse, cutting the eastern part of the Empire in two, thus making Peking realize the gravity of the conflict as it had not done so long as hostilities were confined to Canton.

4. CAUSES AND RESULTS OF THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR

*Opium
considered sole
cause of war by
Chinese*

From the Chinese point of view the sole question at issue was that of the importation of opium, so that their case, they felt, rested on high moral grounds. This view of the struggle was also taken, in the main, in the United States, where the traditional hostility to England still existed. At this time, and for several years afterwards, the Americans viewed Great Britain's every move in China as an expression of an aggressive policy. There were many who regarded the treaty of peace, with its cession of Hongkong, as the initial step toward the dismemberment of China. This conception of an aggressive England, determined to force opium on China, helped to shape American policy from 1842 until the period of the second advance. Public opinion in the United States was greatly and adversely excited by an address which John Quincy Adams made before the Massachusetts Historical Society, and in which he said:

*John Quincy
Adams on the
causes of the
Anglo-Chinese
War*

The fundamental principle of the Chinese Empire is anti-commercial . . . It admits no obligation to hold commercial intercourse with others. It utterly denies the equality of other nations with itself, and even their independence. . . .

This is the truth, and, I apprehend, the only question at issue between the governments and nations of Great Britain and China. It is a general, but I believe altogether mistaken opinion that the quarrel is merely for certain chests of opium imported by British merchants into China, and is a mere incident to the dispute; but no more the cause of war than the throwing overboard of the tea in the Boston harbor was the cause of the North American revolution.⁷

From the English standpoint Adams' statement was correct. The

⁷ Quoted DENNETT, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 107.

opium question was decidedly subordinate to the broader question of the establishment of political relations with the Empire, as a result of which sounder commercial relations might be developed. For it must be remembered that commercial relations were unsatisfactory because of the restriction of the trade to the one port, Canton, and the further restriction that only a selected group of merchants, the *Co-hong*, might be dealt with. Furthermore, as a consequence of the credit nature of many of the transactions between foreign and Chinese merchants, considerable sums were due British traders. These amounts the *Hong* merchants were unable to raise, and the claims were advanced by the British government as another reason for hostilities.

*The English
point of view*

Military operations began with the blockading of Canton by the British, who, however, immediately moved northwards as the instructions of Admiral George Elliot and Captain Elliott, the plenipotentiaries, prescribed. Their orders were to deliver into official hands, for transmission to Peking, a letter from Lord Palmerston concerning the questions at issue. Tinghai, on the island of Chusan, was taken on July 6, 1840. The British thereupon attempted to send the letter from Amoy and Ningpo, but they were unsuccessful. Then the fleet moved directly to the Pei-ho, where communications were finally opened with the Viceroy of Chihli province. After some delay it was decided to transfer the negotiations back to Canton, the seat of the trouble.

*Course of
military
operations*

At Canton negotiations were begun which promised some success; but they were eventually broken off, and hostilities were resumed. In 1841 the British temporarily occupied Canton, but the forces were soon withdrawn on the payment of \$6,000,000, which the Chinese regarded as settlement for the opium surrendered to Commissioner Lin, but which the British seem to have considered as a payment on account of the expenses of the war. The restoration of Canton to Chinese control led to a resumption of trade, although hostilities were continued in the north. Amoy, Tinghai, Chinhai, and Ningpo were all occupied, and from Ningpo an advance was begun toward Chinkiang and Nanking.

Canton occupied

The whole course of the war revealed one of the great weaknesses of China, from which she continued to suffer for many years. The Chinese Empire did not engage in war with Great Britain, but only parts of the country participated in the hostilities, and then only when directly attacked. Until Peking itself became conscious of the dangers resulting from war, it was impossible to reach a satisfactory settlement of the terms of intercourse. If the British had pressed the issue at Tientsin in 1840, instead of allowing themselves to be deflected to the south, the difficulties of the succeeding years might have been avoided.

*War revealed
one of
fundamental
weaknesses of
Chinese system*

Peace negotiations were entered upon after the country had been divided by the British movement up the Yangtse River to Nanking,

*The treaty of
Nanking*

which cut the line of communications from the north to the south. The terms of peace were contained in the treaty of Nanking, signed August 29, 1842. China ceded Hongkong to Great Britain. She also agreed to pay an indemnity of \$21,000,000, \$6,000,000 being in compensation for the opium actually seized at Canton, \$3,000,000 for settlement of debts due the British merchants from the *Hong* merchants, and \$12,000,000 to cover the expenses of the expedition. Five ports—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai—were to be opened to trade, with the right of residence for the foreign merchants conceded, and with the right to appoint at each port consuls empowered to treat with the local officials. The monopoly of the trade given to certain designated Chinese merchants was to be done away with, and a uniform and moderate tariff on imports and exports was to be imposed, the regulations to be drawn up later. It was understood that the duties fixed at this time should not be increased later except by mutual agreement. This schedule of duties was promulgated by the Emperor in the form of a "Declaration" issued on June 26, 1843. Since that time China has been unable of her own will to determine the rates of her import and export duties. So far as the collection of the duties was concerned, however, the British consuls assumed, under the treaty, the duty of seeing "that the just dues and other dues of the Chinese Government, as hereinafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her Britannic Majesty's subjects." The British representative, Sir H. Pottinger, also offered to coöperate in the suppression of smuggling.⁸

*Treaty silent
concerning
opium traffic*

It will have been noticed that the treaty of Nanking was silent concerning what was, from the Chinese point of view, the chief issue of the war. Nothing was said about the opium trade, although the Chinese were forced to make compensation for the opium actually seized. The English negotiator did, informally, express his conviction that China would do well to legalize the importation of the drug and then regulate its admission. This suggestion, which had been made earlier by some of the advisers to the Emperor, was not acceptable to the Chinese representatives, and since England would not undertake to enforce China's prohibition for her, although insisting that no protection or support would be given to Englishmen engaged in the traffic, the treaty was silent concerning the trade.

5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TREATY RELATIONS

*Open Door
principle
accepted by
Chinese at
American
suggestion*

The burden of partially forcing open the door to China fell on England. Other nations, however, immediately prepared to take advantage of the situation thus created. To China herself primarily, and to the United States secondarily, must be given the credit for the fact that the war did not result in Great Britain's securing a monopoly of the new privileges extorted from China. Commodore Kearny, shortly after the signature of the treaty of Nanking, asked the

⁸ DENNETT, p. 165; I, MORSE, pp. 320-21.

Governor of Canton for a declaration that Americans should be given the same rights and privileges as were accorded to England under the treaty. This assurance was given. Later it was found that the Chinese text of Article VIII of the treaty of the Bogue (1843) contained an explanation that the negotiators of the treaty of Nanking had agreed that the five ports opened under that treaty should be free to the nationals of all of the trading Powers on equal terms. Thus the "open door" principle was accepted by China from the first. As to the British responsibility in the matter, a member of the British commission wrote: "The Chinese government promised, on the representation of the American Commodore Kearny, previous to the treaty of Nanking,⁹ that whatever concessions were made to the English should also be granted to the United States. The throwing open the ports of China to Europe and America was not, therefore, the result of our [the English] policy, but had its origin in the anxious forethought of the Americans, lest we might stipulate for some exclusive privileges."¹⁰

While war between England and China was still in progress a movement was set on foot in the United States which led to the appointment of the first American minister to China. Mr. Caleb Cushing, selected by President Tyler for the delicate task of negotiating the first treaty between the two countries, arrived off the port of Macao on February 24, 1844. He was instructed to negotiate with the Chinese officials only on terms of complete equality, to make clear to the Chinese that the United States had no aggressive aims, to make a treaty similar to the British treaty of Nanking, but with fuller terms if possible, and to attempt to reach Peking and place a letter from the President in the hands of the Emperor or, failing in that, in the hands of some high official of the central government. While he did not reach Peking, he did, after some delay, succeed in the negotiation of a treaty. This followed the general lines of the British treaty, but enlarged upon its provisions in several respects, the most important addition being a clear and explicit statement of the principle of extra-territoriality. Article XXI of the treaty of 1844 provided:

Subjects of China who may be guilty of any criminal act towards citizens of the United States shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China, and citizens of the United States who may commit any crime in China shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the Consul or other public functionary of the United States thereto authorized according to the laws of the United States; and in order to secure the prevention of all controversy and disaffection, justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

United States sends Caleb Cushing to negotiate a treaty with China

Principle of extra-territoriality explicitly incorporated in American treaty

⁹ It seems that these representations were actually made about six weeks after the signing of the treaty, although Commodore Kearny was under the impression that it had not been signed. DENNETT, p. 108.

¹⁰ Quoted by FOSTER, J. W., *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, p. 76. But as to the English attitude, see I, MORSE, p. 271. Also Appendix M. Lord Aberdeen to Sir Henry Pottinger, Nov. 4, 1841.

This provision, which related only to criminal cases, was extended to civil cases as well by Articles XXIV and XXV. Consequently, two of the limitations on China's sovereignty which have come down to the present time (i.e., loss of tariff and judicial autonomy), and which the Chinese have long been desirous of having removed, date from the earliest English and American treaties respectively.¹¹

*The French
treaty and
Roman Catholic
interests*

France followed the United States in the negotiation of a treaty. The French treaty contained much the same matter as the other two, but the French envoy, although not through treaty provision, carried the movement toward opening China a short step further by persuading the Chinese commissioner to memorialize the Throne to permit Roman Catholic missionaries to build churches in the treaty ports, and to grant toleration to native as well as foreign Christians. The Emperor accepted the suggestion and extended this limited toleration simultaneously to Protestant missionaries.

*Protestant
missionary work*

The latter had been attempting to establish themselves in the country since 1807, when the Rev. Robert Morrison, sent out by the London Missionary Society, reached Canton. Because of the restricted opportunities at Canton the work had not been greatly extended by 1844. More attention, in fact, was paid to Chinese in the Malay Archipelago than in China proper. However, the Protestant missionary community had enlarged somewhat and a few converts had been won. But the real importance of the Protestant missionary at this time and for the next several years lay in his linguistic rather than in his evangelical work. The commercial and political agents had to rely on him to a large extent for making translations and serving as interpreter, and in this way individual missionaries often came to exert considerable influence. Furthermore, these pioneers in the field, beginning with Morrison, prepared dictionaries to serve their successors, and began the task of translating Western works into Chinese and Chinese works into English, in the former case beginning with religious tracts and gradually including important non-religious works. In this, as in the medical field, where they had also begun work, they initiated what as time went on became a most important contribution to Chinese development as well as to that of the West. Their position became somewhat more tolerable after 1844, as did that of the Catholic missionaries, and the possibilities of their work enlarged as fuller toleration was provided for by treaty in 1858.

¹¹ The English negotiators understood extra-territoriality to be enjoyed by their nationals under the Treaty of Nanking, although it was not expressly stipulated for, and Orders in Council providing for its exercise were soon issued. The detailed provisions in the American treaty were insisted upon as an offset to the advantage gained by Great Britain through the cession of Hongkong. In any case the deficiencies in Chinese administration of justice in cases involving foreigners had been so forcibly brought home to the Americans at the time of the Terranova case (1821) that some protection to foreign life was felt to be absolutely necessary.

For a good brief discussion of extra-territoriality in China from 1844 to the present time, see WILLOUGHBY, W. W., *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, ch. II. For text of the treaty of 1844, see MALLOY, vol. I, pp. 196-210.

The treaty of Nanking, the supplementary treaty of the Bogue, and the succeeding American and French treaties inserted the opening wedge for the development of direct intercourse between the outside world and China, but they left much to be accomplished—for it took other blows, driving the wedge in more and more deeply, before China was actually opened.

*These treaties
the opening
wedge*

This entering wedge was the provision for the opening of the five ports to trade, and for the right to carry on the trade freely without the interposition of a Chinese monopoly. But while this concession had been made by China, under the coercion of British arms, the difficulties in the way of making the concession effective were immediately revealed. In the first place, the Peking government did not thereby abate its feeling of superiority to the outside world. It yielded to the pressure applied, but as soon as the pressure was relaxed it tacitly and openly encouraged those who desired to see the former conditions restored. It yielded in negotiation but tried to recover the lost ground by procrastination in making effective the provisions of the treaties. In the second place, even if the central government had made every effort to live up to its newly assumed obligations, which it did not do, it would have been difficult for it to enforce them in the face of local opposition because of the large measure of autonomy enjoyed by the provinces and the localities under the Chinese system of government.

*Attitude of
Peking not
changed*

At some places no difficulty was encountered in the opening of the port, in providing adequately for the residence of foreigners, and in making the necessary arrangements for trade. At Shanghai, for example, the relations between the foreigners and the local authorities were comparatively amicable from the very beginning. Ground was set aside for foreign residents and every effort was made to facilitate trade. The arrangements for residence made at Shanghai mark the beginning of the system of concessions, or foreign residential districts, at the treaty ports. The original British settlement, into which American traders came, and in which an American consulate was established, became in time, through American insistence, an international settlement. The French insisted on a separate area. From that time to the present the international settlement has been maintained and further extended, with a separate concession beside it for the French. The foreign communities soon came to administer these areas as separate municipalities.

*Foreign
residential
areas set aside
at Shanghai*

At Amoy and Ningpo the foreigners had little difficulty in establishing their position under the treaties, although at Amoy the participation of foreigners in the coolie traffic proved a source of friction, particularly as they attempted to shield natives working for them in it by invoking the extra-territorial system in their behalf. At Foochow the establishment of amicable relations proved more difficult, partly because a profitable trade was slower to develop.

*Relations at
other ports than
Canton
amicable*

But it was at Canton that the chief obstacles were encountered.

*Antagonism of
Cantonese not
abated*

At the other ports there was an interest in breaking down the monopoly of the trade which had formerly been enjoyed by the Cantonese, while at Canton there was an established tradition of superiority and of dictation, together with a more recently engendered popular hostility to foreigners, which made it difficult for the local populace and officialdom to accept the new conditions. Relations were fairly satisfactory as long as Kiying, one of the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Nanking, remained as the Chinese commissioner, for he tried to carry out at least the letter of the treaties; but after his removal not only acute friction but actual strife developed.

*The Chinese
attitude*

The officials tried so to regulate the contacts between Hongkong and the mainland as to strangle the Hongkong settlement. They denied the right of residence at Canton or tried to delay its realization.¹² They would not permit direct official intercourse on terms of equality; they attempted to keep the trade in the hands of an enlarged monopoly of Chinese merchants; and they refused to acquiesce in the extra-territorial provisions of the treaties. On the whole the foreigners and their representatives were conciliatory in their conduct, but individuals on occasion behaved so as to re-arouse Chinese hostility, and the representatives continued to press their claims for a complete fulfilment of treaty provisions.

6. TREATY REVISION

*Desire among
foreigners for
treaty revision*

Furthermore, the passage of time revealed defects in the operation of the treaties which the foreigners were anxious to see removed. The American treaty provided for revision at the end of a ten-year period, and the other Powers could claim a similar right by virtue of the "most-favored-nation" clause in their treaties. The need for revision was urged unsuccessfully by successive American commissioners, who could not even secure an interview with Yeh, the Chinese commissioner at Canton, with whom alone they were permitted to discuss the question. English attempts proved equally fruitless. This question, together with the unsatisfactory relations existing at Canton, finally led to what many believed to be the only satisfactory method of dealing with China—negotiation supported by force.

*The Lorch
Arrow case
leads to
renewal of
hostilities at
Canton*

The crisis was actually produced by a conflict over jurisdiction at Canton known as the *Lorch Arrow* case. The *Lorch Arrow* was a Chinese owned but Hongkong registered¹³ vessel, carrying an English master and flying the English flag. While lying in the river she was boarded by Chinese acting under the Viceroy's orders and twelve

¹² It should be noted, however, that the treaties in the Chinese text did not specify the right of residence *within* the walled city, which is what the foreigners insisted upon at Canton, so that technically the Chinese action was not in violation of the treaties.

¹³ Her registry had expired at the time of the trouble, but this entered into the case only as a subsequent justification for the Chinese action as it was unknown to them at the time. Furthermore she was on her way to Hongkong where her license would have been renewed.

of her crew were removed. The British demanded their return, a demand which the Chinese at first refused and later complied with in an unsatisfactory manner. The dispute continued until it finally led to hostilities at Canton in 1856, and to occupation of the city in 1857. It appeared that the English had become involved in a war with China again, but as a matter of fact the trouble was entirely localized until the foreigners decided again to move north and press the issue of treaty revision at Tientsin. The English remained on as good terms as usual with the Chinese officials and merchants at the other treaty ports, a condition which was reversed when hostilities were suspended and trade was resumed at Canton while the British and French were advancing on Peking.

All four of the states having important contacts with China—England, France, Russia, and the United States—were interested in establishing more satisfactory terms of intercourse. England's policy, conciliatory since 1842, had come after 1856 to be that of forwarding negotiations by the show and application of force, a reversion to the program of 1840–1842. France, as an unimportant trading Power, had indicated that her particular interest in China was that of protecting the Roman Catholic missions for which her envoy had secured a measure of toleration. At the time of the Canton trouble in 1856–1857 the French had a grievance against the Chinese government on account of the "judicial" murder of the Abbé Chapdelaine. He, as was a common missionary habit, had penetrated into the interior and, while favorably received at first, had been seized and finally put to death at the direction of a Chinese magistrate. Efforts to obtain reparation having failed, the French joined the English in the second bombardment and the occupation of Canton. This coöperation was continued when a joint expedition, supporting Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, the British and French plenipotentiaries, was sent north in 1858.

Russian and American ministers accompanied the Anglo-French expedition, but did not participate in its hostile activities because of their explicit instructions to avoid warlike measures. For the policy of the United States continued to be that of peaceful negotiation. Her representatives in China had repeatedly advocated the threat of force to advance American interests, and at this time proposals were made in Washington by the British ambassador for a triple alliance of Great Britain, France, and the United States directed against China. But in spite of the fact that all attempts to negotiate with the Imperial Government without a show of force had been unsuccessful from 1854 to 1858, the United States adhered to its earlier policy. Minister Reed, while instructed to coöperate in all peaceful measures, was also instructed not to join in any hostile demonstrations against China. The Russians were equally enjoined to a peaceful procedure. As a matter of fact, they were applying pressure in the north by their steady advance to the Pacific. This made possible a change in the territorial status on the north when the

*Attitude of
other Powers—
a) France*

*Murder of Abbé
Chapdelaine*

*b) The United
States*

c) Russia

treaty of Aigun (1854) was negotiated by Count Muraviev, named Amurski for his achievements. He secured a delimitation of the frontier by which Russian title to the territories north of the Argun and the Amur to its mouth was recognized, while title to the area between the Ussuri and the sea was left for subsequent determination. All that remained for Count Putiatin, who accompanied the Anglo-French expedition, to accomplish was to secure the less important right to trade with China by sea, and treatment within China equivalent to that accorded to other foreigners.

*The Tientsin
treaties*

*a) New ports
opened*

*b) Revision of
tariff schedules*

*c) Opium
importation
legalized*

*d) Extended
toleration for
missionaries*

England and France, therefore, moved north to Tientsin in force, followed by the American and Russian negotiators, thus dividing the Western states into two groups, since the American and Russian representatives early established close and harmonious relations. It was at Tientsin that new treaties were made (1858) to replace the first agreements. In addition to preserving the gains already made, the English treaty provided for the opening to trade of eleven new ports, including several on the Yangtse River, for navigation of the river to Hankow, and for the residence in Peking of diplomatic representatives. These advantages, under the operation of the most-favored-nation clause in the other treaties, accrued to the other states equally with Great Britain. Provision was also made for revision, largely in the foreign interest, of the tariff schedules, which became fixed at a levy of five per cent *ad valorem* on the basis of the prevailing prices. In this revision a duty was put on the importation of opium, thus legalizing and regulating the traffic. It is interesting to note that the opium question was taken up at this time and that legalization of its importation was secured at the urgent request of the American minister. This constituted a reversal of the earlier American position with respect to the trade in the drug. The American treaty also contained a stipulation for toleration for missionaries and converts without specification of the place where they might live and work, thus for the first time putting their position on a treaty basis. The British treaty contained a similar provision, while that of France stipulated, in addition, for protection for missionaries in the interior. It may be added here that the French convention of Peking (1860) went still further in that it required the Chinese government to proclaim throughout the Empire that missionary activities were permitted and that those who indiscriminately arrested Christians would be punished, and to agree that all real estate confiscated when the Catholics were expelled from China would be paid for. In 1865 the Imperial Government also assented to provisions surreptitiously inserted in the Chinese text of the convention of 1860 granting the right to missionaries to purchase land and erect buildings thereon in all parts of the Empire.¹⁴

The other treaties, completed before the English had finished

¹⁴ DENNETT, TYLER, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, pp. 561-3.

their negotiations, differed from that signed by Lord Elgin in some other details, but principally in that they provided for embassies to Peking rather than for the establishment of permanent missions. But all were put upon an equal basis through the operation of the most-favored-nation principle. While the Americans and Russians were successful in negotiating treaties without a show of force, their experiences with the Chinese, complying so far as possible with all the demands made on them, demonstrated conclusively that the treaties of 1842-1844 would not have been revised if it had not been for the pressure applied jointly by England and France. The British envoy, who had been the most insistent on the right of residence at Peking, was asked to request his government not to insist on an immediate effect being given to the right. Also the attempt was made to secure an exchange of ratifications of the treaty, not at Peking, as provided for by its terms, but at Canton or Shanghai. When this effort proved unavailing the attempt was made to effect the exchange at Tientsin. Finally the English, together with their French allies, again resorted to force and moved directly against Peking. Attempts to obstruct their advance proved unsuccessful. Peking was finally occupied, the Manchu court fleeing north to Jehol, and the summer Palace was destroyed as a measure of retaliation for mistreatment of some prisoners by the Chinese. This was the last forcible step necessary in the process of causing the Chinese grudgingly to admit the foreigner to intercourse on terms of equality.

*Treaty revision
secured only by
application of
pressure*

During the advance on Peking and while the allies, in occupation of the capital, were negotiating with Prince Kung as the representative of the Imperial Government, the Russians consistently posed as the friends of China. When peace was made they secured compensation for their friendship in the form of a cession of the region between the Ussuri and the Pacific to Russia, thus completing the westward movement of that Empire and bringing her into territorial contact with Korea as well as China, and giving her an interest in the islands off the northeastern coast of Asia.

Russian gains

The occupation of Peking and the acceptance of the treaties of 1858 did not cause the Chinese people and the Imperial Government to revise their opinion of the foreigner or of the inherent superiority of China. They had given way under pressure and they had conceded only what had been presented to them as the irreducible minimum in the foreigner's demands. Where force had not been applied they had not voluntarily made any concessions. If after 1860 the government had accepted in good faith the new relationships established, if China had made any effort to acquaint herself with the conditions of the outside world, and had attempted to make use of the opportunities presented to strengthen herself by borrowing from the material civilization of the West, and if she had not attempted again to neutralize the advance made by the Powers, the history of the next

*Attitude of
China after
1860*

sixty years might have been very different. But she did none of these things. Instead of accommodating herself to the new world and the new conditions, she kept her eyes fixed on the glorious past, refusing to accept any of the things offered to her from the West. Instead of treating with the newly-established envoys of the Powers on terms of complete equality,¹⁵ she persisted in small slights that reacted only to her own disadvantage. That the Chinese attitude was not changed was due in part to the circumstances under which China's relations to the West were defined and fixed—circumstances which were certainly not conducive to a free and full acceptance of the new contacts. It was also due in part to the attitude and actions of the Powers after 1860. But whatever the reason for her attitude, the fact remains that China stood to lose more than anyone else as a result of the failure freely to accept the new order, forced on her though it was.

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¹⁵ Representatives of the Powers were established in Peking after 1860, but they were denied direct access to the Emperor. A Board of Foreign Affairs was established in 1860 (*Tsungli Yamen*), not as an independent board, but rather as a group of men representative of the other branches of administration. This board was not designed to promote the interests of China in her contacts with the outside world, but to confine those contacts within the narrowest possible limits.

CHAPTER III

THE FOREIGN IMPACT—1860-1894

I. CONDITIONS ANTECEDENT TO REBELLION

THE end of a dynasty in the Celestial Empire has always been marked by an extended period of internal turmoil. The hand of the Imperial authority has relaxed its hold. Officials have become venal and uninterested in the welfare of the people. The weakening of authority has permitted banditry to increase on land and piracy on the water. Usually the condition of unrest has been aggravated by flood or drought, or both, upsetting the economy of the country, and stimulating organized robbery as a means of livelihood. Secret societies with anti-dynastic aims have sprung up and multiplied. And sometimes there has been an attack from the outside too strong for a decadent rule to withstand. The dynasty has fallen because the "mandate of Heaven" has been withdrawn—the evidence of it being the inability of the Emperor to preserve the domestic tranquillity and to protect the country from external attack.

Indications of approaching end of dynasty in China

2. FOREIGN RELATIONS

All of these conditions, normally antecedent to a change in rule, were present in nineteenth-century China, although the foreign foes of the Manchu Emperor came from distant countries rather than from just across the frontier. By the middle of the century the foreigners had successfully broken down the first barriers, established their representatives in Peking, forced cessions of territory (Hongkong to England and the territory to the north to Russia), and penetrated the Empire beyond Canton for trade and missionary purposes under conditions removing their peoples from the effective control of the Imperial authorities. They had waged two successful wars against the Empire and had occupied the capital, driving the Emperor into temporary exile. They had not, it is true, attempted to take over the government of the country, but had allowed the Emperor to resume his sway.

All of these conditions present in nineteenth-century China

As a matter of fact, the foreigners seemed to assume that the establishment of their legations at Peking, the opening of ports and the consequent enlargement of trade, and the securing of toleration for the missionary, would result in the removal of the psychological as well as the material barriers to free intercourse. What they found was that their presence was still resented, that they had continually to struggle to maintain their newly-won privileges, and that the government and the people alike remained hostile or indifferent to suggestions of further change.

Establishment of legations in Peking did not open China

*Until 1860
pressure on
China had been
locally applied*

From 1842 to 1860 the European Powers had been forced to deal with the local officials at each place where a foothold had been secured to obtain a definition of their rights and position under the treaties. The only official competent to discuss matters of general importance, such as treaty revision, was the one farthest removed from Peking—the Canton Viceroy. Until the movement on Peking, pressure had been applied on local governments when and where it was needed. It was hoped and expected that the establishment of the right of residence at Peking would result in contact with the center of power, so that pressure on the localities would become unnecessary.

*Community of
interest of the
Powers*

In applying this local pressure one state had taken the lead, but the advantages won by her had become common property, and no state had attempted to secure special privileges by pursuing an independent policy. With the possible exception of Russia, the Western Powers had a common aim—that of ending the period of seclusion. From 1860 to about 1875 the representatives of the West at Peking continued to think and act largely in terms of the common interest—the basis of their policy being the wider opening of the breach in the wall of seclusion, but not the destruction of China. Mr. Anson Burlingame, the American representative at Peking from 1861 to 1867, who was largely responsible for the establishment of the coöperative policy in a specific and practical form, gave it a very clear and fair statement.¹

*Burlingame's
statement of
coöperative
policy*

The policy upon which we are agreed is briefly this: that while we claim our treaty right to buy and sell, and hire, in the treaty ports, subject, in respect to our rights of property and person, to the jurisdiction of our own governments, we will not ask for, nor take concessions of, territory in the treaty ports, or in any way interfere with the jurisdiction of the Chinese government over its own people, nor ever menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. That we will not take part in the internal struggles in China, beyond what is necessary to maintain our treaty rights. That the latter we will unitedly sustain against all who may violate them. To this end we are now clear in the policy of defending the treaty ports against the Taipings, or rebels; but in such a way as not to make war upon that considerable body of the Chinese people, by following them into the interior of their country.

*Lack of unity
after 1875*

This policy gradually gave way to one of separate action to secure redress of grievances, or new privileges, so that after 1875 there was not the unity of purpose among the Powers, founded upon a willingness to respect the integrity of China, that the earlier period had produced.

*The audience
question*

The outstanding question at Peking after 1860 was that of securing audience with the Emperor. For almost the entire period under review the foreign representatives were forced to deal exclusively

¹ Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, pp. 859 ff. Quoted in full by DENNETT, T., *Americans in Eastern Asia*, pp. 375-6.

with the members of the *Tsungli Yamen*, a board organized in 1861 to deal with the problems of foreign affairs. This board gradually assumed the appearance of an Imperial Cabinet because of the great importance of its decisions, for it was in connection with treaty enforcement that the central government was forced slowly to a greater measure of interference in the administration of affairs in the provinces, dropping its hortatory rôle and assuming more of a mandatory rule. The members of the *Tsungli Yamen* long stood as buffers between the Emperor and the foreign ministers, doing all in their power to prevent the latter from securing the reception to which they felt that they were entitled and which would have helped to establish relations on a more tolerable basis.

A plausible pretext for delay in the granting of an audience existed in the fact that the Emperor was a minor, and the government was conducted in his name by a regency. When the Emperor attained his majority, in 1873, the audience question was pressed upon the *Tsungli Yamen*. Since there was no further excuse for postponement, the Emperor expressed his willingness to receive the diplomatic corps. But when the audience was granted it took place in the hall where tributary Princes were customarily received, and was, consequently, considered no concession by the Chinese. The only gain made lay in the fact that for the first time the *kowtow*, or nine prostrations, was dispensed with. It was only in 1890, thirty years after the right of residence had been conceded, that voluntary and gracious provision was made for the reception of the foreign representatives on fitting terms and under proper conditions. It is true that another regency intervened between the original reception and the final attainment of the goal, but the fact remains that the minority of the Emperor was taken advantage of by the Manchu government to prevent the establishment of intercourse on a basis satisfactory to Europe and usual among members of the European society of nations.

*Minority of
Emperor a
pretext for delay*

Before China could be considered to have emerged from her seclusion it was also necessary for her to reciprocate the establishment of legations at Peking by sending representatives abroad. This it was to her advantage to do in order that she might present her views on Chinese questions direct to the heads of foreign governments. She did not act, however, until 1877, when the first Chinese envoy to England presented his credentials. Prior to 1877, however, some indications of an intention to treat with the foreigner on his own ground were given. When Sir Robert Hart, head of the Chinese Maritime Customs, returned to Europe on leave in 1866, he took with him an official delegate appointed by the Chinese government. But this delegate "was not commissioned as an envoy, but was charged to investigate and report on what he should see."² Nothing came of this move, for the envoy gave no favorable impression to Europe of Chinese civilization, and in return found nothing favorable to report.

*Chinese
representation
abroad*

² II, MORSE, H. B., *International Relations of Chinese Empire*, p. 187.

*The Burlingame
mission*

In 1867, again on Sir Robert Hart's recommendation, the Chinese government asked Mr. Anson Burlingame, the retiring American minister to Peking, to head a mission to the West. Mr. Burlingame had taken a leading part in bringing about a coöperation of the Powers based upon the preservation of the integrity and the maintenance of the sovereignty of China. The coöperation was largely personal, however, and had partially broken down even before Mr. Burlingame's departure from Peking. He was interested in his new appointment largely because of a desire to establish the policy on a governmental rather than a personal basis. The mission proceeded first to the United States, where it was received enthusiastically by the people and cordially by the government, which was glad to re-endorse its former policy authoritatively in articles supplementary to the Tientsin treaty. It was also well received in England. The French government was less cordial, while Bismarck was rather non-committal in his exchange of views with Mr. Burlingame. Upon the death of the head of the mission in St. Petersburg, the Chinese members returned home.

*Over-statement
of China's
change of
attitude toward
intercourse with
West*

Mr. Burlingame was eminently fitted to arouse the interest of the Chinese in foreign lands, but his oratorical gifts led him into an over-statement of the actual readiness of the Chinese to advance along Western lines, and for that reason he did perhaps as much harm as good. Those familiar with the attitude of the Chinese government as well as that of its officials, must have been amazed to read that China "tells you she is ready to take upon her ancient civilization the graft of your civilization. She tells you she is ready to take back her own inventions, with all their developments. She tells you that she is willing to trade with you, to buy of you, to sell to you, to help you strike off the shackles from trade. She invites your merchants, she invites your missionaries. She tells the latter to plant the shining cross on every hill and in every valley. For she is hospitable to fair argument."³

3. CHINESE EMIGRATION

*The Burlingame
treaty and
Chinese
immigration*

The Burlingame treaty with the United States, in addition to giving more formal statement to the policy of respect for the integrity and sovereignty of China, has importance because it gives to Chinese laborers a treaty right to enter the United States and to receive as fair treatment as that accorded to the citizens or subjects of the most-favored-nation. This treatment was promised just at the time when agitation in California against the Chinese laborer was beginning. The number resident there had increased from about 25,000 in 1852 to 50,000 in 1867, and by 1882 there were 132,000 Chinese on the Pacific coast, drawn or brought there by the demand for cheap labor. At first they were well, even eagerly, received, but as their numbers increased they became more and more unpopular. Legislation

³ Quoted by DENNETT, p. 385

discriminating against them was enacted, and popular hostility was shown by active ill-treatment accorded both by individuals and by mob action. The legislation ran counter to the provisions of the Burlingame treaty, and the treatment of the Chinese laborers certainly conflicted with its guarantees. The agitation finally extended to Congress and resulted in the passage of a measure limiting to fifteen the number of Chinese immigrants who might be brought in any one vessel. The bill was vetoed by the President, who sent a commission to China to secure revision of the immigration clauses of the treaty as a preliminary to the enactment of restrictive legislation. The best that could be secured was a revision giving the right to "regulate, limit or suspend," but not to prohibit, the entrance of Chinese. Those already in the country were to receive most-favored-nation treatment.

Congress immediately (1882) enacted a restrictive measure suspending the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years, but the ill-treatment of Chinese on the Pacific coast continued, giving the Chinese minister one occasion after another to demand redress from the American government. Furthermore, while the Imperial Government was not particularly solicitous as to the welfare of its subjects abroad, it was not strengthened in its regard for foreigners or in its regard for treaties by the action of the United States and the treatment accorded to Chinese resident in California. It was unfortunate that the immigration question should have become acute so soon after the Chinese representative had secured for the Chinese a treaty right of entrance and good treatment.

A more serious and perplexing question than that of emigration to the United States and to British possessions was presented in the sending of Chinese laborers to Cuba, Peru, and other places. While Chinese had long been prohibited by Imperial law from emigrating, some had gone to seek their fortunes overseas at a comparatively early time. At first this emigration was individual and free, as it continued to be to the United States. But after the middle of the last century, as the demand for cheap Chinese labor increased, the contract-labor system developed, and with it grave abuses. Coolies were procured against their will or by false representations; they were packed like sardines on the foreign coolie-carrying vessels, and they found themselves in a condition worse than slavery upon arrival at their destination. Conditions grew so bad that the Chinese government was finally forced to act. France, England, and the United States were willing to coöperate with the Imperial Government to break up the traffic, but most of the contract laborers were being despatched from under Portuguese jurisdiction at Macao. By 1875 the "conscience" of the Western Powers was fully awakened and strong in its condemnation of Portugal for conniving with the traffickers at the point of departure, and of Spain and Peru because of conditions at the destination. The British government in 1874 made representations on the subject to the

*Effect of
treatment of
Chinese in the
United States
on attitude of
Imperial
government*

*The coolie
traffic*

government of Portugal, and in 1875 the authorities at Macao were instructed to forbid the emigration of Chinese under contract as well as all free migration from that place. While this did not immediately end contract migration, it did mark the beginning of the end. Meanwhile Spain had been led, as had Peru, to abate the intolerable condition of the laborers already under their respective jurisdictions.

*Burlingame
mission
designed to
forestall foreign
attempt at
treaty revision*

A result of the Burlingame treaty more beneficial than its immigration clauses was the fact that it prevented the carrying through of a revision of the Tientsin treaties under the direction of the British traders, who were agitating for the complete opening of China to trade. This would have tremendously complicated the problems of the Chinese government, and, because of the extra-territorial status of foreigners, would have been most unwise at that time. Unquestionably one of the motives of the Imperial Government in authorizing the Burlingame mission was to forestall such a revision, or any revision at all. Mr. Burlingame, as a matter of fact, seems to have exceeded his authority in negotiating the Washington articles, judging by the reception of the treaty by the *Tsungli Yamen* and the hesitancy of that body in recommending its ratification. Another important effect of the Burlingame mission was the action of the British and Prussian governments. They declared as their policy for the future that "unfriendly pressure should not be applied inconsistent with the independence and safety of China." The American treaty provided for freedom from interference in the development of China. The Powers, on the whole, followed this policy, which superseded the former policy of coercing local officials, in the development of their interests in China during the succeeding years. Moral pressure on Peking to secure treaty enforcement was substituted for physical pressure on the provinces.

4. ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGNERS

*The Tientsin
riot of 1870*

Individual relations with the Chinese were not more harmonious, as a rule, than official relations. As foreigners spread more widely through the country, and particularly as missionaries went into the interior away from the treaty ports, distrust and hostility showed itself in anti-Christian riots resulting in loss of life and property. One of the worst of these demonstrations took place at Tientsin, where a mob destroyed the Catholic orphanage and cathedral. This was typical of incidents in other parts of the country. After establishing the orphanage and a hospital the sisters found that few children were brought to them voluntarily. Consequently they offered a premium for each child brought in. They also seem to have offered inducements to have children in the last stages of illness brought to them for the purpose of being baptized *in articulo mortis*. Because of this there were large numbers of burials from the orphanage.

These were verifiable facts; and on this substructure of fact, the credulous Chinese built up a superstructure of their own fancy-incite-

ment to kidnapping, mystic rights of baptism, extraction of eyes and hearts, and other horrors, all working them into a frenzy of fear and hatred.⁴

An epidemic which visited the orphanage in the early summer of 1870 and caused the death of between thirty and forty children brought on a crisis.

A massacre may or may not have been premeditated and impending, but it was now inevitable. A half-century of racial antipathy; a decade of national hatred; the gathering growth of anti-Christian feeling, based partly on religious bigotry, partly on superstition, partly on credulity; all these were brought to a common focus, and the growing disorder culminated in three hours of murder, arson and plunder.⁵

Such factors as these made for popular hostility in this case and in others, but one must remember that many of the officials and members of the educated classes disliked the foreigner and all of his works. Instead of investigating and restraining, or protesting to the consuls on the basis of the facts found, local officials in many cases stimulated the people to action which under the circumstances could have but one result—further humiliations for their country. The magistrate at Tientsin, for example, made no apparent effort to allay the hostility of the people, but rather encouraged it.

On the other hand, one can understand and partly justify the Chinese attitude when one considers the arrogance of many foreigners, including some of the consuls. This arrogance was based on their privileges and on the assumption that the Chinese were pagans, which they seemed to think justified any sort of treatment of the common people. Then there was the attempt of some missionaries, more especially the Roman Catholics, to throw the mantle of their protection around their converts in their dealings both with the people and with the officials. Finally, the Chinese naturally, if unjustifiably, blamed the foreigners because men were thrown out of work by the introduction of steamboats on the rivers and on account of other Western innovations.

The Tientsin massacre was a blow directly aimed at France, since she asserted a protectorate over Roman Catholic interests in China and since the mission itself was French, having been established as a result of the French occupation of territory in Tientsin in 1858-1860. For that reason she served drastic demands on China and required immediate acceptance of them. Because of the outbreak of the war with Prussia she was unable to enforce her demands, and finally accepted satisfaction in the form of punishment of those guilty and the despatch of a mission of apology to France. Since this outbreak was, in another sense, simply an exaggerated expression of the general Chinese hostility to foreign missionary activities, the Powers acted unitedly in demanding satisfaction for anti-missionary outbreaks and adequate

*Arrogance of
foreigners
responsible for
antagonism*

*Demand of
Powers for
reparation for
injuries to
missionaries*

⁴ II, MORSE, p. 242.

⁵ Ibid., p. 248.

security for the future. A united front was maintained in spite of the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.

*The Margery
murder*

Another illustration of hostility to foreigners is to be found in the Margery case. Desirous of opening up a route for trade with southwestern China by way of Upper Burma, Great Britain dispatched an expedition of investigation from that region in 1876. In order to facilitate its penetration of Yunnan province, passports were secured from the government of China. Mr. Margery, a young member of the British consular service, was sent from Peking to join the expedition at the frontier of Yunnan. He encountered no difficulty on his way down, but when the expedition had progressed a short distance into Yunnan rumors reached Colonel Brown (the commander) and Mr. Margery that trouble was brewing. The latter, with a party of Chinese, went ahead to investigate the situation, and he, with five of his companions, was set upon and killed. The entire expedition was then forced to retire.

*British
demands in
satisfaction for
murder*

The British minister at Peking, Sir Thomas Wade, received word of the occurrence some weeks later by way of the India Office in London. He immediately remonstrated with the Chinese government, demanding full satisfaction for the outrage and including in his demands extraneous matter such as adjustment of the audience question, and, in fact, a satisfactory settlement of all questions at issue between the two governments. To his demand for an investigation of the murder, in which a British officer should participate, the Chinese soon agreed. But it was necessary for him to leave Peking, taking the legation staff with him, before the Chinese government would consider his other demands. Finally Li Hung-chang, Viceroy of Chihli province, was appointed to negotiate a settlement. This settlement was reached at Chefoo on September 13, 1876. The first section of the Chefoo convention provided satisfaction for the murder of Mr. Margery; the second, for a betterment of the conditions of official intercourse; and the third, for an extension of the trade, including the opening of several new ports. Out of the affair came also the loss of China's claim to suzerainty over Upper Burma.

5. POLICIES AND INTERESTS OF THE POWERS

*Strength of
Powers lay in
unity*

It might have been thought, in view of the attitude of the Manchu government and of the Chinese people toward Europeans, that the Powers would have continued to stand solidly together in the protection of their interests. So long as the diplomatic corps presented a united front to the *Tsungli Yamen* the Chinese government could not afford to refuse redress for grievances flowing from the non-observance of treaty stipulations, etc.; but when England, France, and Russia began to put the advancement of their own special interests ahead of the collective good it weakened the common cause by enabling the Chinese to play one Power against another, and it gave good grounds for the belief that it was not the desire to bring

China into the family of nations so as to promote mutually advantageous relationships which was motivating the foreign states.

From 1844 to about 1875, and especially after 1850, England, France, and the United States, as has already been pointed out, co-operated in the advance on China with a view to breaking down the walls she had erected around herself. Russia worked in harmony with the others on some occasions, but did not hesitate to advance her own interests at the expense of all concerned when that appeared possible. And, if we exclude the cession of Hongkong, which was made a free port, and of the Kowloon territory opposite to it, it was Russia, as early as 1860, which initiated the process of trimming off the edges of the Empire. After the cession of the right bank of the Amur and the territory east of the Ussuri in 1860, no further territorial advance was made for several years, except as the establishment of concessions in the various treaty ports resulted in the limitation of the territorial integrity of China. The next loss was that just noted—the renunciation of suzerainty over Upper Burma in favor of Great Britain. And in 1881 the Chinese finally gave way before the Japanese assertion of control over the Loochoo Islands, a claim definitely maintained after 1875. It was as a result of that claim that war almost came between the two countries in 1874. Some Loochuans, who had been shipwrecked on Formosa, were killed by the aborigines. The Japanese demanded that China act to punish the guilty, and when the Peking government disclaimed responsibility the Japanese sent an expedition to Formosa (1874). A rupture was averted at that time, China allowing Japan to secure her own satisfaction. She refused, however, to acquiesce in the Japanese government's assertion of suzerainty over the Loochoo Islands until 1881.

*Early territorial
losses of
Chinese
Empire*

A more important move on the outlying dependencies of China produced a crisis in 1884-1885, when as a result of war with France the Manchus lost their nominal control of Annam and Tongking. While Annam had its own king and government, it had paid tribute to China regularly since the fifteenth century and intermittently from the period of the Han dynasty. The earliest French interest in the kingdom was manifested at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but no advance toward establishing a territorial footing there was made until the middle of the century. Murders of missionaries which occurred between 1843 and 1851 invited several naval expeditions to secure redress, and finally brought about a joint intervention by France and Spain in 1858. The peace made in 1862, after over three years of warfare, gave Spain a share of the indemnity of four million dollars demanded, but conceded to France, in addition to her part of the indemnity, three provinces in Cochin-China and a promise that the king of Annam would never cede any part of his kingdom to any other Power. A treaty with Cambodia established a French protectorate there at the same time. The advance was continued in 1867, when Annam was forced to cede the three western provinces of Cochin-China to France.

*The French
move on
Indo-China*

*The real
French interest
in Tongking*

The real French interest, however, was in gaining a position from which trade with the southwestern provinces of China could be developed. The natural approach was by way of the Red River in Tongking. A pretext for intervention in that province was presented in 1874 when permission was denied a Frenchman to trade with Yunnan through the use of the Red River route. Gains made through the medium of a "filibustering expedition" were subsequently given up, only to be regained in a different form through the exertion of diplomatic pressure on the Annamese government. Full sovereignty over Cochin-China, right of trade through Tongking to Yunnan, toleration and privileges for Roman Catholic missionaries, and an extra-territorial status for all foreigners, were all conceded in return for protection from foreign aggression and internal disturbance and a remission of indemnities.

*Chinese
opposition
leads to war*

During this time the Chinese government had not failed to protest against the steady French advance, but it had not been in a position to do more. From 1874 to 1881 the Annamese, on their side, sought in various ways to reaffirm the Chinese connection, and in 1881 the Chinese minister at Paris explicitly reasserted the Chinese claim to suzerainty. Chinese irregular troops were drawn into Tongking, and they not only guarded the Yunnan frontier but blocked the Red River route. In 1883 a credit was voted by the French Chamber to send an expedition to Annam and Tongking, with the result that a French protectorate was established over the entire country, foreign affairs being brought completely under French control, and Tongking being placed under a French Resident. Because of this move war broke out between China and France in 1884, when the French forces in Tongking came into collision with Chinese troops.

*Tongking lost
to the Empire*

After hostilities had begun, however, diplomacy was again resorted to, and the Li-Fournier convention was signed. By it the French agreed to respect and protect the southern boundaries of China, while the Imperial Government waived its claim to suzerainty over the disputed territories and sanctioned freedom of trade between Tongking and the southwestern provinces. Because of a misunderstanding over the time of evacuation of the Chinese troops from Tongking, hostilities again broke out and continued in a desultory fashion until 1885. The military operations reflected no great credit on either belligerent and proved entirely inconclusive. Eventually a new agreement embodying the terms of the Li-Fournier convention was drawn up at Paris, through the intermediation of Sir Robert Hart, head of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, and was accepted by both France and China. Another step had been taken toward the restriction of the Chinese Empire to the boundaries of China proper.

6. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS

It would seem that with the problems presented by the foreign

impact the Celestial Empire was confronted with a sufficiently dangerous and perplexing situation. But the picture of the years 1842-1894 would not be complete, nor would it be possible to gain an adequate understanding of later developments, if the internal situation were passed over in silence. The foreign impact was one, but not by any means the sole, indication that Heaven had withdrawn its favor from the Manchus, for internal conditions during the nineteenth century were very bad.

*Internal
conditions bad*

The Emperor Tao Kuang, who "ascended the dragon" in 1850, succeeded to the Throne in 1820. He it was who was forced to consent to depart from the customary policy of seclusion. While that was the most significant event of his reign, it was not the only one that was unfortunate from the Chinese standpoint. A serious drought occurred in 1832, which year also saw an outbreak among the aborigines of three provinces. This uprising had been preceded by one in Formosa and another in Hainan. While all were put down, it was not without some difficulty, and they indicated a measure of dissatisfaction with the Imperial rule.

*Reign of Tao
Kuang
(1820-50)*

Tao Kuang was succeeded by one of his seven sons, who took the reign title of Hsien Feng. The father, while not a man of great ability, had devoted himself to the affairs of state, and he had earnestly, even if unsuccessfully, sought to check the growing corruption and indifference to the public welfare of the officials. Hsien Feng was not only an incapable man, but he was also unwilling to devote his time and his attention to public affairs. He was much more interested in the pleasures of the Palace and in the night life of the capital than in statecraft. Consequently there was not the strong and capable direction of affairs which was needed at a most critical time in the history of the Empire.

*Incapacity of
Hsien Feng*

Hsien Feng died in exile at Jehol in 1860 at the time of the allied occupation of Peking, leaving an infant heir to the throne. As a result of a Palace revolution the Empress-mother, Tzu Hsi, and the Empress-consort, Tzu An, were able to establish themselves as regents during the minority of the Emperor, known by the reign title of T'ung Chih. T'ung Chih died (1875) shortly after attaining his majority in 1873, without leaving an heir, and Tzu Hsi, an able and ambitious woman, succeeded in having another infant chosen as his successor. This necessitated the revival of the regency, which was continued for another period of years, Kuang Hsu (the successor to T'ung Chih) attaining his majority only in 1890. Thus for a period of thirty years the titular rulers of China were children, and the actual ruler was a woman. While Tzu Hsi is one of the remarkable women of history, her previous training and experience had by no means fitted her to lead China to a solution of the numberless difficulties in managing internal affairs and in dealing with the foreign impact. While she had some able official advisers—Prince Kung and Wen Siang in the *Tsungli Yamen* and as members of her Council of State, Li Hung-

*The regencies of
Tzu Hsi*

chang in the Tientsin viceroyalty, in whose hands the control of foreign affairs came more and more to reside, Tsêng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-tang and then Chang Chih-tung in the central provinces—Tzu Hsi allowed the Palace eunuchs to interfere in affairs of state, notably in the making of appointments. This led to an even higher development of the practice of traffic in office, and to a diversion of public funds to uses other than those intended. It also meant the substitution of unofficial and irresponsible advisers for the responsible officials in Peking. Her rule was further marked by an extension of the number of Manchus, as compared with Chinese, in the public services, which ultimately aroused dissatisfaction. The policy of divide and rule was, however, successfully invoked by the Old Buddha, as Tzu Hsi came to be called, so far as distribution of spoils among the Chinese cliques and factions was concerned. But the existence of factions, in Peking as well as in the provinces, prevented a whole-hearted and unified grappling with the difficulties of the times.

*The T'ai P'ing
rebellion*

Among these internal difficulties the most significant was the T'ai P'ing rebellion. The movement, in its political aspects, grew out of small beginnings of a religious character. The original societies formed were "Associations for Worshipping God" (Shang Ti Hui). Since the worship of Shang Ti was a recognized and peculiar function of the Emperor, it was not long until this worship came to be interdicted, although at first the ultimate political aims of the leader of the movement were not set forth by him or appreciated either by the officials or by the majority of the members of the "Associations." The leader of the movement was a native of Kwantung province named Hung Siu-Chuen, who was a scholar by profession and ambition. Hung appeared at Canton at least three times to compete in the provincial examinations and was always unsuccessful, although he had shown great promise in his studies. Following his last appearance he fell seriously ill, being in a trance part of the time. While in this state he had visions which became intelligible to him only as he began to read in a pamphlet, "Good Words to Exhort the Age," which he had received from a Chinese preacher at Canton. His visions, thus interpreted, led him to attempt to found a new religion which had mixed up in it many elements of Christianity, notably an antipathy to idolatry. The Christian elements in his belief were increased as a result of his contacts with a Baptist missionary at Canton, Mr. Issachar Roberts. After winning a few converts nearer home he moved with them into Kwangsi province, where he continued to teach, preach, and have visions. His following increased rapidly, especially after his societies were put under the Imperial ban. Finally, as a result of persecution, and in obedience to his visions, Hung proclaimed himself as the "Heavenly King," and declared his intention of founding a new rule, to be known as the "Perfect Peace" (T'ai P'ing) dynasty. He then began to move north, swelling his following continually, but leaving behind him a trail

of blood and ruin. Finally the T'ai P'ing hordes (called by the Chinese the "long-haired rebels" because of their manner of wearing their hair) reached Nanking, where the "Heavenly King" stopped. A band of his followers moved on northwards and reached the environs of Tientsin, but they were soon forced to return to the Yangtse valley. This marked the high tide of the movement.

Because of the supposedly Christian foundation of the T'ai P'ing belief there was considerable agitation among the Protestant missionaries, as also among many traders, to force recognition and foreign support of the rebels. The Catholics in China, on the other hand, were opposed to recognition because the religion supposedly contained Protestant elements. For some time the British representative inclined toward recognition of the rebels and active intervention against the Manchus, in the hope that the rebels would be more sympathetic toward foreign intercourse. The American official policy, on the other hand, looked rather toward support of the Imperial Government. By 1859, because of successful treaty revision and by reason of a more accurate understanding of the true character of the T'ai P'ing rule, the British accepted the American position and the foreigners united in the endeavor to strengthen the Manchus without officially intervening in the struggle.

*Attitude of
foreigners to
rebels*

Lack of space prevents a more detailed discussion of the rebellion, but attention should be called to some of its significant implications. Such a widespread revolt, continuing from 1851 to 1864, could not have developed if the government had not been extremely weak. And in this case the Manchus showed a complete helplessness, a total inability to maintain their authority. If the T'ai P'ing leader had been able to replace the tottering Manchu structure with something of more promise, the dynasty would have come to an end at that time. But since the movement was purely destructive and no constructive leadership developed, it eventually collapsed of its own weakness.

*Significance of
the rebellion*

There was one factor bringing about the overthrow of the T'ai P'ing movement, however, other than its own deficiencies of leadership. This was the foreign aid that was given to the regular authorities after 1859. When the rebel hordes had reached the Yangtse and driven the Manchu authorities from the central provinces, one administrator remained in the field against them. Tsêng Kuo-fan, an able commander, in his endeavor to restore the Imperial authority, not only organized a much more effective Chinese army, but also drew into his service Frederick T. Ward, an American, who recruited a force led by the more adventurous spirits around Shanghai and took the field under the general direction of Viceroy Tsêng and his henchman, Li Hung-chang. Ward's force was virtually a band of freebooters, who were rewarded with the loot of towns captured from the rebels. In spite of its character, or perhaps because of it, it was uniformly successful against the imperfectly armed and trained T'ai P'ings, capturing one stronghold after another until the death

*Foreign aid in
overcoming the
rebels important*

of its leader in 1862. By that time its value had become so apparent that the Chinese decided to continue it. The English authorities at Shanghai were asked to select a successor to Ward,⁶ and since the foreign Powers had decided that their interest lay in upholding the Manchu authority they nominated Captain Gordon of their own forces to take command. He rapidly restored order and discipline to Ward's force, which had begun to disintegrate after the death of its leader, and it became again the invincible troop, known as the "Ever-Victorious Army." Its victories strengthened the morale of the Chinese forces and as a consequence of this and of the new effectiveness gained through reorganization under Tsêng Kuo-fan's leadership, the Chinese began to succeed on their own account, so that by 1864 the rebellion had been brought to an end.

*Continuing
effects of the
rebellion*

But while the rebellion was not successful, it left its imprint on the country for many years. Devastation and destruction had marked its progress, many of the richest provinces of the Empire having been laid waste. It resulted in a partial or total stoppage of revenue from many of the greatest revenue producing areas in the country for a period of years, and prevented the collection of normal revenues from the devastated regions for a much longer time than the actual duration of rebel control. It threw many people into a condition of poverty, which, as is usual in China, resulted in an increase of brigandage, and made it difficult for the orderly processes of administration to be revived. And, above all else, it revealed the inability of the Imperial Government to carry out its primary duty of preserving peace and order in the country. Such a rebellion, even when unsuccessful, is usually the harbinger of the end of a dynasty. And it is not going too far from the facts to say that the successful revolt against the Manchus in 1911 was begun in the middle of the preceding century.

*Loss of revenue
enhanced
difficulties of
Manchu
government*

Again, this loss of revenue came at a time when the government was assuming increased burdens in order to pay foreign indemnities and for the sake of securing armaments of the new sort that had been brought to the notice of the Chinese with the foreign impact. Deprived for a time of some of the accustomed sources of income, and burdened with increased expenses, the government either had to find new sources or put a heavier burden on those available and in use. Since the sources of revenue had been fixed by the custom of many generations, the latter expedient had to be resorted to, and this naturally led to complaint and dissatisfaction which came to a head just when the foreign Powers were making their advance on the Empire after 1895. It was for that reason diverted, for a short time, from the Manchus and directed against foreigners.

⁶ Another American, Burgovine, was placed in command of the force after the death of Ward. But he developed ambitions inconsistent with his position as a subordinate officer of the Chinese government, so that he could not be continued in a position of command. It was after his failure that Captain Gordon was nominated by the British,

Two by-products of the rebellion of future importance remain to be noted. As the Imperial administration became disorganized or ineffective, no authority remained at Shanghai for the collection of the customs. A foreign service was organized for temporary purposes, and this was later taken over by the Chinese government as one of its own administrative services. An Englishman, Mr. Lay, was first put at the head of the customs. He was shortly succeeded by another Englishman, Sir Robert Hart. While the personnel of the service was foreign, its members were agents of the Imperial Government and not of foreign states. Due largely to the administrative ability of Sir Robert Hart, and to his honesty and devotion to the interests of his employers, the foreign-administered Chinese Maritime Customs has continued to the present time, with the modifications in its control later made necessary by the attitude of the states of Europe.

*Institution of
foreign-staffed
Maritime
Customs service*

The second by-product of the rebellion was the introduction of the *likin* tax as a temporary means of producing revenue. This is an internal transit tax imposed at various points within a province as well as at provincial boundaries. Being extremely flexible and a good revenue producer, it has been continued to the present time. Unlike the institution of the foreign customs, the development of the *likin* tax has been a grave disadvantage to the development of modern China, as it constitutes a serious hindrance to the movement of goods within the country and, for that reason, to the development of trade.

*Introduction of
likin levy*

The suppression of the T'ai P'ing rebellion did not restore peace and prosperity to the country. In addition to numerous smaller uprisings, and to widespread brigandage with which the officials seemed unable to cope, there occurred two other major uprisings. Both of these were expressions of Mohammedan discontent with their treatment by the Chinese officials. Occurring as they did at widely separated places, the one in Yunnan province and the other in the northwest, they were indicative of a widespread dissatisfaction. Although neither attained the proportions of the T'ai P'ing movement, they resulted in the devastation of parts of the country left untouched by that rebellion and consequently added materially to the embarrassment of the Manchus. In addition to its internal consequences, the rebellion in the northwest resulted in a temporary loss to China of the district of Ili, which was seized by Russia, ostensibly for the purpose of holding it safe for China. After the rebellion was crushed the Chinese asked for its return, and, after some evasion, all but a small part of the territory was given up by Russia.

*Mohammedan
rebellions*

Before the country had time to recover from the effects of these rebellions it was visited (1876) by floods in the southern and south-central provinces and by drought in the provinces north of the Yangtse, the drought being accompanied by a plague of locusts. "The floods visited five provinces; the locusts devastated parts of three; and the drought destroyed crops and lives in the whole or

*Effects of flood
and drought*

parts of nine."⁷ The drought continued during the years 1876-1878, and resulted in great suffering because of its duration. Many millions of lives were lost, and in addition the revenue system of the Empire was gravely affected, both because of direct loss of revenue and because of the necessity for devoting funds to relief of the people in the provinces affected. This loss, coupled with that due to the T'ai P'ing rebellion, seriously weakened the ability of the Manchus to preserve their power internally and to protect the country against assaults from the outside.

7. BEGINNING OF CHANGE

Picture not altogether dark

We cannot leave, without further comment, this picture of a China devastated by rebellion, flood, and drought, with weak and incompetent leaders interested more in their own pleasures than in the solution of the problems confronting the state over which they had been called to rule, harassed by the problems of foreign intercourse, and unwilling to accept the new conditions of life in the modern world. We must go on to make certain explanations and to record some tentative experiments in the introduction of new ideas and practices.

Explanation of hesitancy in accepting ideas and practices of West

It has been intimated rather strongly that China, both the government and the people, failed to live up to the treaty obligations assumed under the pressure of foreign force. The fact that the concessions were not made voluntarily, but under compulsion, serves to explain much of their unwillingness to give effect, except so far as they were compelled to do so, to the provisions of the treaties. Other peoples would have acted in exactly the same way under the same circumstances. And it must be borne in mind, in estimating China's actions and her policy, that she had back of her a long tradition of superiority to other nations, and of dictation of the terms of intercourse with the outside world. Such a tradition could not be broken down in a day. Furthermore, the mere fact of foreign military successes did not cause the Chinese to lose their feeling of superiority. Many times in the past foreign arms had been successful against them, but in the long run the Chinese race had proved invincible. This latter consideration helps to explain the unreadiness of the Chinese to recognize the superiority of the material civilization of the West, and the dangers to their own civilization and life developing from the foreign impact.

Political system partially explains failure to enforce treaties uniformly

We must also bear in mind, when considering the good or bad faith of the Imperial Government in giving effect to its obligations, that Peking might command, but that it lay within the discretion of the provincial authorities to execute the command according to circumstances and conditions in the province. In the United States a somewhat similar condition obtains because of the federal system of government. Washington may enter into treaty engagements in

⁷ II, MORSE, p. 308.

perfectly good faith, and yet find extreme difficulty in carrying its agreements into effect uniformly throughout the country. Protection may be promised to Italians, Japanese, or Chinese within our borders, but that protection must be afforded by the local authorities. We have had our own difficulties due to mob action in places as widely separated as New Orleans and San Francisco. The Peking government, to an even greater extent, and with much more justification, might have urged its system of government as an explanation of its inability to afford uniform and adequate protection to foreign lives and property in all parts of China. The truth is that even if the Imperial Government had attempted to carry out its engagements in perfectly good faith, it would have found it extremely difficult to do so uniformly throughout the country. Unfortunately for China, her system of government, and her territorial decentralization, was not sufficiently familiar to Europe, and, even if it had been, the powerful states of the West would not have allowed it to be urged in justification of non-fulfillment of treaty obligations. And of course there was not that good faith on the part of the central government which might conceivably have inclined the foreign representatives to leniency. Peking shielded the official who was responsible for failure to protect the foreigner, instead of being the first to suggest his punishment. Censure came from the Imperial authority only under compulsion.

In further explanation of some of the difficulties that arose between Europe and China it may be pointed out that individual foreigners were not too careful to keep within their treaty rights. Missionaries and traders often went into parts of the country where their presence was certain to be misconstrued and resented. When trouble arose they were given the support of their respective governments without regard to local conditions, and the Chinese government was expected to afford them absolute security even though it was without power to insure it. The extra-territorial system, giving immunity from the operation of Chinese law, also caused complications, often rising out of foreign arrogance, and in these cases the tendency was to conclude, without regard to the facts in the case, that the Chinese were in the wrong.

*Foreign
responsibility
for troubles
which arose*

It may also be pointed out that the Western governments themselves, while insisting on fulfilment by China of her obligations to the letter, did not always trouble to keep within the letter and spirit of the treaties. Attention has already been called to the controversy over the right of residence at Canton, the British insisting on residential areas being set apart for foreign use within the walled city although the treaties did not provide explicitly for this, and to the American attitude toward the immigration clauses of the Burlingame treaty. Another example of the foreign attitude is to be found in the assertion, at Shanghai and other open ports, of a governmental right in the concessions that was expressly repudiated by the treaties, which carefully reserved Chinese sovereignty over the residential areas.

*Disregard of
treaty
provisions by
Powers*

*The work of
missionaries
of fundamental
importance*

When we turn to the positive advances made by China, and to the better side of her relations with the foreigners, the educational work of the missionaries comes first to mind. In addition to their interest in evangelization, the missionaries early realized that China offered a vast field for applied Christianity which would have to be exploited before the peoples could be Christianized on any large scale. Dictionaries had to be compiled and the language learned before any effective evangelical work could be undertaken. This knowledge of the language came to be of great service in the establishment of contacts with the officials and the people. The missionary supplemented and advanced the work of the diplomat, and helped to make possible wider commercial contacts. After they had gained a familiarity with the Chinese language, the missionaries began the work of translating foreign books into the Chinese, and in this they by no means limited themselves to religious literature. Thus educated Chinese at the treaty ports began to gain a better knowledge of the world. Then mission schools were established and through them many Chinese were introduced to the learning of the West more directly than by means of the translated works. All of this began to awaken an interest in non-Chinese societies which could not help but bear fruit.

*Chinese boys
sent abroad for
education*

In 1872 the first Chinese educational mission was sent abroad. A group of thirty boys was taken to the United States under the supervision of Yung Wing, a Yale trained Chinese. This was made possible by the action of one of the more enlightened of the Viceroys, Chang Chih-tung, who had come to see that China could strengthen herself by becoming familiar with the ideas and the devices of the West. The mission was recalled shortly, in 1882, but meanwhile about one hundred boys had some direct contact with the West. This educational mission served to mark a beginning in the breakdown of the intellectual isolation of the Chinese.

*The Tungwen
College
established*

Even before this a school for interpreters, with some foreign teachers, had been established in Peking. In 1865 this school became Tungwen College, with a scientific department added to the language school, and with additions to the foreign staff. Sir Robert Hart, Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs, and a trusted adviser to the Chinese government, was a moving spirit in the establishment of the college, setting aside funds for its maintenance from the customs collection, and (in 1869) securing the appointment of Mr. W. A. P. Martin, an American missionary, as its president. The establishment of Tungwen College, accepting as it did only students with a good Chinese education, was certainly a long step for the Empire to take at that time.

*Move toward
introduction of
Western arms*

The exploits of Gordon's "Ever-Victorious Army" in the struggle against the T'ai P'ing movement aroused an interest in foreign engines of warfare, with the result that the Chinese took tentative steps toward reorganizing the army and building up a navy. Vessels were

purchased from England and other states and they were for a time put under foreign direction. Unfortunately nothing came of this first venture, and the circumstances were such as to prejudice the Chinese against foreign aid and direction. Consequently the fleet actually built up by 1894 had its efficiency impaired because it was kept under exclusive Chinese direction. Furthermore, both the army and the navy offered opportunities for "squeeze" that the officials could not disregard. It thus happened that, while on paper China built up a well-equipped fighting force, when it actually took the field its supplies were deficient or non-existent and the force itself was poorly trained.

The foreign impact began to make itself felt gradually in the economic as well as in the governmental life of China. In 1876 a railway was opened from Shanghai to Wusung. This was only a small project, and even so it was unsuccessful. Owing to the opposition of the official and literate classes it was repurchased by the Chinese in 1877 and the rails were torn up and transported to Formosa, where, together with the other equipment of the road, they were allowed to disintegrate. But in 1887 the Tongshan railway was opened, largely because of the interest of the Viceroy of Chihli province, Li Hung-chang, in the project. This was the beginning of a new development which has continued slowly and imperfectly to the present. But the important thing is, after all, the beginning. In 1882 another venture in the field of communications was made when a telegraph line from Shanghai to Tientsin was opened. In the same decade with these beginnings came the promise of industrial development. The Kaiping mines were opened by Li Hung-chang in 1863, and it was this enterprise which led to the building of the Tongshan railway. The same year saw the organization of the first Chinese steam navigation company, the China Merchants. In this also Li Hung-chang was the prime mover. A little later, in 1890, Chang Chih-tung opened the Han Yang Iron Works, destined to develop into the largest enterprise of its kind in China.

These indications of a willingness to change must not be over-emphasized. They were only indications, and the initiative came from a very small group of officials and gentry. Li Hung-chang in the north and Chang Chih-tung in the Yangtse region were the moving spirits among the officials. But officialdom as a whole remained as conservative and as untouched by the foreign influence as before. The introduction of Western learning met with firm opposition from most of the *literati*, and, of course, by 1894 the "new thought" had not even commenced to penetrate to the masses. It had begun to be realized that China was weak and, for that reason, in danger, but this realization did not bring with it a recognition of the necessity for making institutional changes for the purpose of strengthening the country in the face of the foreign impact. The Western influence did not make itself felt at all in the realm of economic and social organization, and it did not modify Chinese cultural life to any

*Beginnings of
economic
development*

*Country only
slightly affected
by foreign
intercourse*

appreciable extent. Political organization and practices were slightly adjusted to meet the need for diplomatic intercourse, and a tentative movement toward centralization to meet the demand for uniform treaty application was inaugurated. But there failed to appear the rapid movement toward reorganization and change which was so marked in Japan during the same years.

*Respect felt for
potential power
of China by
West until 1894*

One more observation may conclude this chapter. It had been shown that China was unable to defend herself against the military power of the nations of the West; she was weakened by internal strife and by widespread famine conditions, and she offered plenty of excuses for aggressive action by the Powers. In view of these facts it may be wondered why the Powers did not move on her as they had on India, and as France had on Annam and Tongking, and Great Britain on Burma. The explanation lies in the wholesome respect that they had for the potential power of the Chinese Empire, in the fear that existed lest the "sleeping dragon" should be too rudely awakened and should turn and rend the disturbers of its peace, and in the restraints imposed by the coöperative policy. It was realized that China herself had not been touched—that the Empire had not been stirred to united action in its own defense—and it was felt that a united opposition to aggression would be successful. Furthermore, a move to bring China out of her isolation could be more easily justified than an attempt to absorb or divide her. Coupled with this was the fear lest one Power's gain should be another's loss, a possibility which restrained all the Powers. It remained for an Asiatic state to reveal the actual helplessness of the Chinese Empire and to lessen the respect felt for its potential power.

Summary

By way of summary it may be said that by 1894 the process of opening China to foreign intercourse had been begun; that in the development of that process China had been brought under two important treaty restrictions—the imposition of a conventional tariff and the establishment of the extra-territorial system by treaty; that the Chinese Maritime Customs had become a foreign organized and administered service of the Chinese government; that China had lost several of the outlying dependencies over which her control was more nominal than real, but that the territories administered from Peking, or directly supervised by the Imperial Government, had not been touched by the foreign impact; that in spite of several military defeats, and the establishment of relations with the states of the West on a footing of equality, the Chinese had not lost their sense of superiority to the "outer barbarians"; that the process of internal disorganization had set in, but had been temporarily checked; and, finally, that some small and tentative attempts had been made to introduce Western ideas and practices, but that there was no widespread interest in them, and no general recognition of the desirability of institutional reform or reorganization.

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CHAPTER IV

THE OPENING OF JAPAN

I. SIGNIFICANCE OF 1894 IN FAR EASTERN HISTORY

*Course of
development of
Japan to 1894*

THE intricacies in the pattern of Far Eastern history began to appear after the year 1894. It was a war between China and her small neighbor, Japan, which revealed the complete helplessness of China and encouraged the Powers of Europe to believe that she might shortly fall to pieces and be partitioned among them. At the same time an Oriental people was seen to be fully capable of adapting to its own use the material and mechanical elements of Western civilization. By 1894 Japan had completed the period of probation that preceded her complete admission to the modern society of nations. The years from 1853, when Perry arrived in Yokohama Bay, to the end of the Sino-Japanese War witnessed what is usually called the "transformation" of Japan. During this time her political institutions were gradually shaped into the form which has endured with but slight modifications to the present time, and the broad outlines of her modern economic and social institutions became clear. At the same time some indications were given of what her future policies would be as opportunity was afforded for their development.

*Modern Japan
an outgrowth of
pre-Restoration
Japan*

The rise of Japan as a modern Power in such a short period of years and the military achievements of the Japanese in the subsequent war against Russia were not the result, in any real sense, of the occidentalizing of Japan—of any revolutionary transformation of the life of the country. Rather her achievements were made possible because the events and changes of the years following her opening worked a gradual transition from the old order to the new. Modern Japan is the logical outgrowth of pre-Restoration Japan. This being true, it is obvious that only through an adequate understanding of the old Japan can the new Japan be properly appreciated.

2. THE LAND AND PEOPLE

*Extent of
territory of
Japan*

Territorially, pre-Restoration Japan consisted of the largest group of the chain of islands extending from Kamchatka in the north through Formosa in the south. Saghalin was known to the Japanese, but not occupied or actively governed by them; and this was also true of the Kurile Islands, which lie outside Saghalin and serve as stepping-stones from Yezo (Hokkaido) to Kamchatka. Since tribute had intermittently been sent to Japan by the Loochoo islanders, an historical claim to suzerainty over those islands existed, but it was weakened

by a similarly founded Chinese claim. The Loochoo group served as connections between Japan and Formosa, which was definitely under the supervision of China.

A glance at the map serves to indicate clearly the position of Japan with respect to the Asiatic mainland. Only a narrow strait separates her from the Korean promontory, which is the natural Japanese point of entrance to the continent. Even here there is a stepping-stone furnished by the island of Tsushima. This geographical relationship gives a clue to the early as well as the later continental interests of Japan. Through Korea, and perhaps through Saghalin, came some of the racial elements which in combination with others from the south form the modern Japanese. Through Korea as well as more directly from China came much of the old Japanese culture. Religious ideas, art, literature, many of the crafts—all were affected by the proximity of Korea. The greatest pre-modern threat to the independence of Japan developed when the Mongols extended their power over Korea as well as China; and the only extensive early external movements of Japan were directed toward Korea, with China, at one time, as the ultimate objective.

Position with respect to Asian continent

Mingled with the continental there is undoubtedly a Malayan strain in the Japanese blood, carried to the Japanese archipelago probably on the "Black Current," which washes the southern and eastern shores of the country. These outsiders gradually forced the Ainu peoples, the aboriginal inhabitants, to the northernmost island, Hokkaido.

Malayan strain in Japanese blood

This Black Current has served Japan in another way, for it moderates the climate on the south and east in much the same way as the Gulf Stream affects that of the southeastern United States. Unfortunately it cannot serve the entire country because of its extremely mountainous character, which is largely a consequence of the volcanic origin of the land. The numerous mountain ranges serve also to break the territory up into small valleys, which were largely cut off from one another in the days of primitive means of communication. This had important political consequences in the pre-modern history of the country.

Mountainous character of country

The lack of navigable rivers has also affected the development of Japan. There are many small, turbulent streams, but none of great length or of any importance from the standpoint of trade or industry. This handicap to development was, however, partially neutralized by the elongated character of the main islands, which, together with the multitude of small islands and the numerous good harbors, made possible a coastwise trade comprehending the entire area.

Water communications

Turning our attention from the geographic environment to the people, we find that prior to the seventh century Japan was inhabited by a number of groups organized on a patriarchal basis. While there was an Emperor who was nominally the ruler of these groups, practically he was merely one, the strongest, of the patriarchal chiefs.

Patriarchal nature of Japanese society

As the strength of his clan increased or declined, his control was strengthened or weakened. The strongest tendency, under such conditions, was toward decentralization.

*The Taikwa
reform 645 A.D.*

To remedy this condition by counteracting the tendencies toward decentralization a reform (the *Taikwa*) in the system was attempted in 645 A.D. This reform took the direction of the introduction and adaptation to Japanese conditions of the Chinese administrative system. Japanese society was divided, broadly, into two classes—the governing and the governed. The governing classes constituted a bureaucracy made up of the high civil officials. This bureaucracy was supported by grants of rice lands to be held during the tenure of office of the official. At the same time the remainder of the rice lands was divided among the supporting or governed classes, subject in theory to periodic redistribution. Tribute was levied on the rice lands, except those held by the bureaucracy, which were exempt.

*Growth of
territorial
nobility*

Since it was only the rice lands which were so distributed, the other lands were subject to preëemption by those who could make use of and hold them. As a result great estates gradually were built up either by members of the bureaucracy or by others. Because taxes were assessed only on the rice lands, the burden imposed on the holders became heavier as the expenses of the government increased. Even without such increase some of the people found it unprofitable to remain in possession of the lands assigned to them. They may be described, perhaps, as the marginal producers—those who could not make a living and at the same time pay their contributions. These people either offered to give up their lands to members of the governing classes on condition of being allowed to remain in possession, or they merely vacated them, allowing them to be preëmpted by officers of the state. When these lands came under the control of the bureaucrats, they, in turn, were exempt from taxation. This meant that the remaining rice lands had to pay greater contributions to make up the deficit, which, in turn, created another group who could not till their lands profitably—the new marginal producers. As this process went on, coupled as it was with the carving-out of estates from the undistributed lands, a class of territorial magnates with comparatively great resources came into being. At the same time the resources of the central establishment were steadily decreasing, and as a result the territorial nobility became more powerful than the Emperor and the central government.

*Creation of
military class*

Another consequence of this process was the gradual creation of a military class. In order to maintain themselves, men who deserted the land offered their personal services to those who were building up landed estates. The landed gentry, as the acquisitive instinct became developed, found it expedient to maintain large establishments, in the first place in order to defend what they had, and in the second place in order to acquire more land by force. The necessity for defense, again, was two-fold: strife developed among the possessors of land—

between the different clan groups; and the territorial magnates had to ensure themselves against dispossession by the central authority.

In this feudal organization which developed out of the attempt to establish an imported centralized system of administration on the basis of the early purely patriarchal society, there gradually evolved two distinct groups in the governing class—a civil bureaucracy and a military nobility. The former controlled the Emperor and the central administration, while the latter was provincial or territorial. As the resources of the central government declined, the governors sent out to supervise the provinces lost in effective control except as they were supported by the military power, which soon came to constitute the only real authority outside the capital. By the end of the twelfth century this transfer of governing power had been completed, and with it had come decentralization on a feudal instead of a patriarchal basis. From the thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth century the internal history of Japan was characterized by a succession of attempts to unite the country under the direction of the strongest of the feudal lords, who also sought to control the Imperial establishment. After 1192 the Emperor became a puppet in the hands of one after another of the *Daimyo*, or feudal chiefs. He was never displaced as Emperor, but was forced to invest the successful *Daimyo* with the office and title abbreviated to *Shogun* or, in full, “barbarian-quelling-general-issimo.” From this time the government of Japan was military in character.

*Establishment
of feudalism*

The rule of one *Shogun* succeeded that of another until at last a man reached that eminence who was able to consolidate and continue his power by other than military means. Hideyoshi, one of the great figures in the military annals of Japan, died at the end of the sixteenth century in the midst of his unsuccessful attempts to subdue Korea and the Empire of China, and the reins of power fell into the hands of Iyeyasu, one of his supporters. The latter was created *Shogun* by the Emperor in 1603. He was the first in the long line of Tokugawa *Shoguns* who ruled Japan from that time until the restoration of the Emperor in 1867. This unprecedentedly long rule, of over 250 years, by the one clan was possible only because of the development of a system of administration by which the continued power of the Tokugawa could be ensured against the weakness of rulers less capable than Iyeyasu and his immediate successors. The administrative system evolved during the seventeenth century was, with some small changes, that found by the Europeans in 1853.

*The Tokugawa
shogunate*

3. THE PRE-RESTORATION POLITICAL SYSTEM

At the head of the state stood the Emperor. Theoretically he was both its temporal and its spiritual ruler, but, as has been pointed out, since the twelfth century he had “reigned without governing.” He lived in seclusion and obscurity at Kyoto, surrounded by the court nobility (*Kuge*). It was this very obscurity which had preserved since

The Emperor

antiquity the succession in the one line of rulers—that and the practices of concubinage and adoption which between them ensured an heir to the throne.

*The Shogun
and Shogunate*

The actual power was in the hands of the *Shogun*, or rather of the institution, the *Shogunate*. The *Shogun* always sought and received his investiture from the Emperor, preserving the fiction of ruling in his name. The Tokugawa, when they came to power in 1603, divided the territory of those who opposed them among their followers and supporters. Such of the territorial nobles as acknowledged their overlordship were allowed to remain in control of their lands, but the more powerful among them were separated from one another by the interposition of estates or dominions governed directly by members of the Tokugawa clan or their vassals. This helped to secure the *Shogun* against rebellion. Furthermore, the *Daimyo* (feudal lords) were compelled to live part of each year at Yedo, the seat of government of the *Shogun*, and to leave their immediate families there throughout the entire year as hostages for their good behavior and continued loyalty. In addition to this, the principle of "divide and rule" was invoked by the *Shogun* to keep the powerful clans from conspiring to overthrow his power. Traditional clan hostilities, the legacies of the years of inter-clan warfare, were kept alive, so that while many of the clans at heart were opposed to the continuance of the Tokugawa rule, they were too hostile to one another to combine against it.

*Figurehead
system of
government*

But the Tokugawa *Shoguns* themselves did not personally rule the country after the death of Iyeyasu, Hidetada, and Iyemitsu, the first three of the family to gain the position. If the Emperor was merely a figurehead, the *Shogun* was not in a position of much greater personal authority. His powers were put in commission, as one might call it, and he was more often than not a puppet in the hands of his Upper and Lower Councils. They, in turn, were in reality controlled by subordinate office-holders. Professor Gubbins describes the actual condition of affairs as follows:¹

*Described by
Professor
Gubbins*

What for want of a better name may be termed the figurehead system of government is noticeable throughout the whole course of Japanese history and is the natural outcome of Japanese social and political ideas. Real and nominal power are rarely seen combined either socially or politically. The family, which is the unit of society, and not, as with us, the individual, is nominally controlled by the individual who is its head. But practically the latter is in most cases a figurehead, the real power being vested in the group of relatives who form the family council.

As has been said, this condition of affairs extended to the *Shogunate* and Imperial Court as well as to the control of the smaller family groups.

Next to the *Shogun* in theoretical importance came the territorial

¹ *Progress of Japan*, p. 21.

nobility, the *Daimyo*. They ruled over the several *Daimyates*, or territorial subdivisions of Japan, as feudal lords. In reality they were the heads of clans. Their position and power were supported by the *samurai*, the warrior class of old Japan. But here again we find the figurehead system of government, since "with one or two notable exceptions, the *Daimyo* did not administer their fiefs. The administration of these was entrusted to a group of retainers, known as *karo*, who held office hereditarily in their respective clans."² Thus the actual administration of affairs, at the time of the arrival of Commodore Perry in Japan, had passed into the hands of a group of men who may be called the "business *samurai*" of the various clans.

The Daimyo

The *samurai*, as has been said, made up the fighting class of the country. As warriors, occasionally called upon to defend the country itself as well as the interests of their chiefs, they were supported in idleness, except when fighting was in order, by the remainder of the inhabitants. They constituted a very real privileged group by 1853, since the Tokugawa clan, after consolidating its power, had brought both internal and external peace to Japan and had thus rendered unnecessary dependence on the peculiar abilities and training of the *samurai*.

The samurai

4. JAPANESE SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The culture and social arrangements of old Japan present many interesting similarities and contrasts to those of pre-modern China. At the beginning of the modern period each had its own peculiar culture. That of Japan had been tremendously influenced from the continent, but it was by no means a mere importation. Buddhism, for example, was imported into both countries, and into Japan at second hand. But each adapted the Indian system to its own uses, so that the Japanese cults differed widely from the Buddhism of the Celestial Empire. Brought into Japan at an early time, it partly absorbed, partly displaced, and in part left untouched the native *Shintoism* (the Way of the Gods). In turn Buddhism was in part displaced, among the upper classes, by the Confucian philosophers, the study of whose works was revived and encouraged by the later Tokugawa *Shoguns*. The rulers, however, were also patrons of Buddhism, building and endowing some of the most elaborate temples and establishments in the region around and north of Yedo (Tokyo). And Buddhism maintained its supremacy among the common people unchallenged by Confucianism. Neither of these importations served to bring the Japanese under the cultural dominance of China.

Cultural importations from the continent

In China, as has been pointed out, learning was elevated above all things; the *literati* constituted a distinct class, and indeed the highest in the country; and officialdom was recruited from this class. In Japan learning was also respected, but it had to share the supremacy with skill in arms. During the centuries before the establishment of

The learned classes

² Ibid.

peace and order by reason of the long-continued Tokugawa supremacy, the Buddhist priesthood was the custodian of knowledge. From the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, however, with the cessation of internal warfare, the *samurai* became students as well as men-at-arms, and the class became the learned one. A knowledge of the Confucian classics became as much a part of the *samurai* equipment as a knowledge of sword-play. This situation presents a decidedly interesting contrast with that in China, where the learned were the least martial of men.

*Emphasis on
ceremonial in
life*

Both societies emphasized politeness and ceremony in every-day life, particularly among the upper classes. Here perhaps the Japanese went farther than the Chinese, developing elaborate rituals for what to the Westerner are matters of daily routine. The several forms of the tea ceremony are among the better known illustrations of this phase of Japanese life.

*Farmers given
high rank*

In both empires the farmer class ranked next to the top in point of social importance. Rice and sericulture were the most highly developed rural activities in Japan, although barley and wheat were raised on the uplands and often as a second crop after rice; and a variety of vegetables was grown. The tea plant also occupied a most important place in the Japanese economy.

Farms small

Farms in Japan were necessarily small, as they were in most parts of China, and cultivation was very intensive; not even the Chinese excelled the Japanese as intensive farmers. Necessity had also taught the Japanese, as it had their continental neighbors, to make use of all of their waste in replenishment of the soil.

Fishing

An important staple of Japanese diet, even as important as rice, was fish. The juncture of the warm Black Current with the cold Kamchatka current off the coast of Japan provides excellent fishing-grounds. Thus fishing came to be one of the major occupations of the working population.

*The artisans
and artists*

Next to the farmers stood the artisans, in which group might also be included the artists, who were really the best and most self-respecting artisans. Industry was organized into guilds in Japan as in other countries at the same stage of development, but the Japanese guilds did not develop the power that the Chinese guilds had, nor did they elevate the standards of workmanship and produce honesty in trade as they were able to do in China. Individuals had high standards and did superlative work in the more artistic lines, but they were the artists of old Japan rather than the ordinary craft-workers, and they were unable to impress their standards of excellence on their fellows. They were held in high respect as individuals, but the group of which they were a part was held in relatively low esteem. As for traders, they were lowest, except for a few groups of virtual outcasts, in the social scale. This rating, emphasizing the military art and possession of learning, and assigning to a low level the industrial and commercial classes, has an important bearing on the development of

*Standards of
various groups*

modern Japan. The *samurai* had standards of conduct and were held to their observance; the mercantile community failed to develop its own standards. Consequently modern Japanese business has had to pass through a period of world-wide disrepute while attempting to evolve a code of business ethics, but the conduct of military and naval men, and to a less extent of officials, has compared very favorably with that of corresponding groups throughout the world.

This summary view of society in pre-modern Japan would not be complete without reference to the prevailing esthetic tone. Lower and upper classes alike were lovers of beauty—a love created or enhanced by their environment. Ceremonial in the ordinary life of the upper classes was refined to the point of estheticism, as has been pointed out. Much money and labor were devoted to the construction and maintenance of ornate and beautiful shrines and temples in picturesque surroundings, Nikko, Nara, and Kyoto being perhaps the best known examples. The most important festivals were devoted to celebration of the seasonal beauties of nature—the people going considerable distances to observe the cherry and plum trees, and the chrysanthemum, in blossom. The people were greatly interested in gardens, frequently attempting to reproduce natural scenes in miniature on even the smallest plots, and often achieving the most remarkable effects. This estheticism could not help but have an important influence on the character of the Japanese people, on their industry, and on their manner of life. Industrially it reveals itself, for example, in the *cloisonné*, lacquer, and damascene wares.

*Esthetic
emphasis*

5. EARLY FOREIGN INTERCOURSE

While during almost the entire period of the Tokugawa *Shogunate* Japan had lived apart from the outside world, the people had been in contact with foreigners during pre-Tokugawa days. During the sixteenth century foreign traders and missionaries were permitted, and even encouraged, to come to the country. Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, English, and Dutch vessels anchored in Japanese ports, and Japanese vessels went to foreign Asiatic ports. The Jesuits, the Dominicans, and the Franciscans converted the people to Christianity in large numbers, and even some of the feudal lords accepted the new faith. But the time was not ripe then for the perfecting of this intercourse. The conduct of the foreigners themselves, and the condition of the European world, made it seem advisable and necessary for the Japanese narrowly to limit their contacts. Instead of all working together to develop trade relations, the European traders, as in other places, tried to restrict the trade each to his own state. The Dutch warned the Japanese against having anything to do with the Spanish and English, and they in turn worked against the Dutch interests. It was not perceived that the interests of the individual states in the long run were identical. The consequence was that distrust of almost all foreigners developed in the minds of the rulers of Japan. This

*Nature of
sixteenth-
century
relations with
Europe*

distrust was strengthened by tales of Spanish activities in the Philippines, of Portuguese behavior on the China coast, of British and French actions in India, and of Dutch exploits in the East Indies. It was further augmented by what must have appeared to the Japanese as the fratricidal strife among the foreigners—the Dutch and the English fighting the Spanish, and then falling-to against each other, sometimes in Japanese waters.

*Effect of
missionary
activities*

Even these conditions might not have been sufficient to bring about the closing of Japan to foreign intercourse, had it not been for the attitude and activities of the Roman Catholic missionaries. The Christian communities, as they increased in number, tended to withdraw themselves more and more from the effective control of the central government. The possibility of a double allegiance was apparent, appeal being taken to the Pope as against the ruler of Japan. The fear of the development of an *imperium in imperio*, coupled with the growing distrust, brought forth in the seventeenth century the edicts closing Japan to general foreign intercourse and prohibiting Japanese from venturing abroad or from building vessels in which they could engage in foreign trade. Only the construction of craft suitable for the coastwise trade was permitted.

*Seclusion not
absolute*

As in the case of China, this cutting-off of intercourse with the outside world was not absolute. The Dutch, partly because for some time they were not suspected of being aggressive in propagating their faith, and partly because their character was believed to be non-warlike, were permitted a limited commercial intercourse through the port of Nagasaki, with the right to maintain a factory on the little island of Deshima in that harbor; but to preserve this privilege they were forced to submit to many humiliations. And the Chinese carried on a less restricted trade than the Dutch.

6. INTERNAL CONDITIONS DURING TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE

*Effects of long
period of peace*

As a result of seclusion, for more than two hundred years the Japanese were undisturbed by foreign wars or the rumors of war that seem to be bred by contact between states. With this went internal peace. As this peace continued during the years, the hand of the *Shogun* by degrees relaxed its firm grip on the country. A machine had been created which ran on its own momentum, or rather on the momentum given it by the first and the third *Shoguns*, but it gradually slowed up in its operation. If new problems, either external or internal, had been presented, its functioning might have been disturbed. But the other clans singly could not dispute the Tokugawa power, the possibility of coöperation against the *Shogun* had been reduced to the minimum, and the time had not come when Europeans insisted on their right to trade with the Japanese or to make treaties with their government.

The cessation of internal war, however, caused the *Shogun* to

turn his attention more and more to the pleasures of the Palace, with a consequent lessening of interest in maintaining the military strength and efficiency of his immediate following. On the other hand, the arts of war remained the primary concern of the *Daimyo*. As the military power of the Tokugawa declined, the strength of the more powerful of the other clans increased. The inauguration of the period of peace did not lessen the martial ardor of the *samurai*, but their tastes had to be satisfied in petty quarreling and warlike games instead of in actual organized combat. As the relative power of the secretly dissatisfied clans increased, their reluctance to accept the dictates of the Tokugawa also naturally increased in proportion to their feeling of strength. For a long time they were impotent in the face of the system, but as the system decayed the autonomy of the provinces increased. By 1853 this relaxation of the hand of authority had gone so far that there were good prospects for a successful revolt against the *Shogun* if several of the clans could combine and if a good reason for revolt could be found.

*Comparative
decline in power
of Tokugawa*

The *Shoguns* themselves provided the excuse. In lieu of war they had to find other interests for the turbulent *samurai*. This they did by encouraging the development of learning and of every cultural pursuit. The consequent revival of learning took the students at first to the Chinese classics and then to the Japanese past, and this study revealed the extent of the inroads made on the original Japanese culture by the Chinese influence. A revival of the old religion, Shinto, was undertaken. This recalled to mind the Emperor as the spiritual head of the nation and brought to him increased respect. At the same time with the Shinto revival came a development of historical studies, and in 1715 a monumental history of Japan was completed. This work revealed clearly that in actual fact the *Shogun* had usurped powers which had originally been exercised by the Emperor. This point of view was further developed in a history of the *Shogunate* which was completed in 1827. Thus reverence for the institution, the *Shogunate*, was lessened, since it was shown to be misplaced. Scholars began to ask why the Emperor should remain in obscurity at Kyoto—why the *Shogunate* should be maintained. The entire revival of Japanese learning had the natural effect of stimulating two sentiments: that of nationality, and that of loyalty to the Emperor, "of direct descent from the Gods."

*Revival of
learning*

Students were coming into contact with foreign learning as well as reviving knowledge of the medieval Japan during this time of increased interest in things of the mind. Through the Dutch at Deshima knowledge of the outside world was gained. Medical and military ideas especially were modified accordingly, and a few of the people were to some extent prepared for the changes in policy made necessary after the Americans, followed by other foreigners, demanded a wider intercourse with Japan.

*Introduction of
foreign
knowledge*

The "Land of the Rising Sun," it must be recognized, then, was

*Conditions at
time of Perry's
arrival
summarized*

not in the calm and placid state in 1853 that is sometimes indicated. The condition at the time of Commodore Perry's arrival is summarized by Professor Gubbins as follows:³

He found a highly organized community excelling in arts, industries and agriculture, wedded to ceremonial, and permeated by Chinese ideas, with a gift for imitation happily controlled by assimilative genius, and independence of character, and enjoying a system of government very cumbrous, and obscure, and quite unique of its kind. The central authority was nominally vested in a shadowy personage in Yedo, whose exact relationship to a still more shadowy personage in Kioto it was not easy to determine. There was a feudal system under which the daimios ruled their own territories, or under Shogunate supervision, those of their neighbors, certain localities, including what were known as the Shoguns' dominions, being reserved for the direct administration of the Yedo government, and the central authority was exercised by means of Councils of State, and of a vast assemblage of executive and judicial officers. This central authority was weak, and growing weaker, an uneasy feeling was abroad, and the first signs of the troubles which culminated in the downfall of the Shogunate were beginning to show themselves. Clan jealousies and feudal restrictions hindered national progress in many directions, there was much distress and discontent, and the currency of the country was in a state of great confusion. Foreign intercourse was confined to the Chinese and Dutch traders visiting Nagasaki, and, when it was not Chinese, Dutch was the medium of intercourse with the outside world.

7. THE COMING OF COMMODORE PERRY

*Opening of
Japan
inevitable*

The opening of Japan was quite as inevitable as the attempt to break down China's isolation. In the movement that culminated in the opening of Japan the development of better means of communication and the desire for trade were supplemented by the need of mariners, especially those engaged in the whaling and fur-sealing industry in the north Pacific, for places into which they could safely put to take on provisions and to repair damages. Not infrequently vessels were driven ashore by storms off the coast of Japan. Sometimes the survivors were killed and sometimes they were sent out through the Dutch at Nagasaki. But in every case the Japanese steadfastly refused to allow foreign vessels to put into their harbors, and compelled those that were driven in immediately to depart. Sometimes Japanese were blown out to sea in their small coasting craft, and no interest was manifested in the foreign vessels which picked them up and tried to return them to their homeland.

*The American
interest in
Japan*

The position of the Japanese islands in relation to the Chinese coast also made it inconvenient to have her refuse to establish relations of any kind with foreign states. The Americans, in particular, if they were to develop direct communications with China from the Pacific ports by means of steam-propelled vessels, needed coaling stations or ports of call *en route*. Formosa was thought of for this pur-

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

pose, but since the American policy did not include territorial aggrandizement, it seemed more desirable to secure coaling rights in Japan. Thus there were very definite reasons for the interest shown after 1825 in the opening of the islands.

The Perry expedition was not the first modern manifestation of the interest of foreign governments in the condition of affairs in Japan. Russian interest had been shown during the last decade of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century. This interest arose from the geographical proximity of the two countries, which jointly occupied the island of Saghalin, with Russia also claiming the Kurile Islands. In 1792 a Russian expedition landed on Hokkaido with the ostensible mission of returning a party of shipwrecked Japanese sailors, but with the real purpose of establishing relations with the Japanese government. Both this expedition and a second, sent shortly afterwards, were unsuccessful.

Russian attempts to establish relations

The English, in their turn, made several attempts to open the country. They used various pretexts, such as the need for supplies and the making of surveys, to explain their expeditions. But again their real mission was the opening of the country, and they, like the Russians, were unsuccessful. The activities in which they engaged during the years 1833-1860 in China, attempting to force open the door to that country, however, prevented the English from concentrating their attention on Japan.

English efforts unsuccessful

The several earlier attempts made by the United States to establish relations with Japan, dictated largely by the treatment of distressed American whalers in Japanese waters, were somewhat half-hearted, and hence entirely unsuccessful. But finally the Washington government decided to make a determined effort, and engaged in extensive preparations preliminary to the sending of an expedition. The Dutch government, and the other European governments, were notified of the American intention, and the Dutch were asked to furnish such advice and aid as might make the expedition successful. Presents illustrative of many features of Western civilization were prepared. The objects of the Perry expedition were stated in the instructions to be: 1) protection for our shipwrecked sailors; 2) the opening of the ports for the entry of vessels to refit and obtain coal; and 3) the opening of ports for trade.

Preparations for Perry expedition

Commodore Perry sailed from Norfolk on November 24, 1852, and his expedition steamed into Yokohama Bay on July 3, 1853, disregarding all signals to stop until a suitable anchorage had been reached off the little fishing village of Uraga. The appearance of the steam vessels, a new sight to the Japanese, caused great consternation. And the excitement in Yedo, when the news reached the *Shogun's* capital, was no less than that in the village. "The popular commotion in Yedo at the news of a 'foreign invasion,'" says a native writer, "was beyond description. The whole city was in an uproar. In all directions were seen mothers flying with children in their arms, and

Sight of vessels causes intense excitement among Japanese

men with mothers on their backs. Rumors of an immediate action, exaggerated each time they were communicated from mouth to mouth, added horror to the horror-stricken. The tramp of war-horses, the clatter of armed warriors, the noise of carts, the parade of firemen, the incessant tolling of bells, the shrieks of women, the cries of children, dinning all the streets of a city of more than a million souls, made confusion worse confounded."⁴

*Policy of
United States'
government*

In the Perry expedition, as in most American actions in the Far East during the nineteenth century, a distinction must be made between the policies of the American government and those of its agents. Perry's instructions were eminently pacific. Given force, he was to use it only in the last resort and for self-protection. He was to obtain all he could by pacific measures, and he was to emphasize first, the friendliness of the United States to Japan; second, the separation of church and state in the United States, in order to remove the fear that might exist lest the power of the state should be used to force Christianity on the Japanese; and third, the desire of the United States to see peace preserved in the Pacific. But the position taken by the American government was that "no friendship can long exist between them unless Japan should change her policy and cease to act towards the people of the United States as if they were her enemies."⁵ Furthermore:

If such arguments did not secure any relaxation of the policy of exclusion, or even any assurance of humane treatment for seamen, Perry was instructed to "change his tone, and to inform them in the most unequivocal terms that it is the determination of this government to insist that hereafter all citizens or vessels of the United States that may be wrecked on their coasts or driven by stress of weather into their harbors shall, so long as they are compelled to remain there, be treated with humanity; and that if any acts of cruelty should hereafter be practiced upon citizens of this country, whether by the government or the inhabitants of Japan, they will be severely chastised."⁶

*The policy of
Commodore
Perry*

During the voyage Perry had marked out for himself the course he intended to follow in his dealings with the Japanese, and to this plan of action he rigidly adhered. He had determined "to demand as a right, not solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy due from one civilized nation to another; to disregard the acts and threats of the authorities, if in the least respect in conflict with the dignity of the American flag; to practice a little of Japanese diplomacy by allowing no one on board the ships except officers having business, and they only on the flagship; and by personally conferring with no one except an official of the highest rank in the Empire."⁷

Adherence to this program accounts in a large measure for the

⁴ Quoted by FOSTER, J. W., *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, pp. 151-2.

⁵ Quoted by DENNETT, T., *Americans in Eastern Asia*, pp. 263-4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

⁷ FOSTER, p. 152.

success of the Perry mission. If the Japanese had been successful in their attempts to remove the negotiations to Nagasaki, if Perry had been content to treat with subordinate officials instead of holding himself aloof until suitable officers had been sent to confer with him, and if he had not realized when and to what extent to modify his position, the opening of Japan would have been postponed. After being accorded a fitting reception and delivering the President's letter for transmission to the Emperor, Perry acceded to the Japanese request for time to consider the proposals of the American government, stating that he would be back the next spring for an answer, and refusing to go to Nagasaki to receive his answer through the Dutch or the Chinese. He then withdrew to the China coast.

*Reasons for
initial success
of mission*

Owing to the fact that a Russian fleet visited Nagasaki shortly after his departure from Yokohama Bay and that squadrons of other nations, notably the French, were available for service in Japanese waters, Commodore Perry returned to Japan at an earlier time than he had originally contemplated. He was fearful lest he should be forestalled by the Russians and the French if he delayed longer than February, 1854. Upon his return to Yokohama he steamed farther up the bay than on his first visit before dropping his anchors. He was well received this time, and after a period of negotiation succeeded in making a treaty along the lines of his instructions. Two ports in addition to Nagasaki were to be opened to foreign vessels for the purpose of coaling, provisioning, and refitting; the right to appoint a consul to reside at Shimoda was accorded; it was agreed that protection should be afforded to shipwrecked sailors; and "most-favored-nation" treatment was promised. The Perry treaty was the entering wedge, and advantage was taken of the success of his mission by other Powers, England negotiating a similar treaty in 1854, Russia in 1855, and Holland during the years 1855-1857.

*Negotiation of
treaty of
navigation
completed*

8. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

Commodore Perry inserted the wedge, but it remained for another American, Townsend Harris, to establish relations on a firmer foundation. Perry deserves to be remembered for his tact and skill, but it must not be forgotten that his undertaking was supported by force. Mr. Harris, appointed in 1856 as the first American consul to Japan, had no such support. He came to a new land and took up his residence among a people entirely unaccustomed to the foreigner and hostile to him. His position among them was one of complete isolation. The foreign community of a few years later was entirely non-existent. Unable to speak the language of the people among whom he lived and with whom he had to deal, he yet was able finally to overcome their hostility and to inspire their officials with some confidence in his honesty of intention and in his judgment. Further than this, he was able to lead them to see the advisability of still further broadening their contact with the outside world. All of this he accomplished

*Achievements of
Townsend
Harris*

within a period of two years, without the use or the threat of force except as he intentionally played on the fear of the Japanese that England or Russia would send armed expeditions to compel the signing of treaties or to conquer the islands. He was able to reënforce the argument by pointing to the expedition to Tientsin in 1858 and to the consequent presence of foreign forces in Eastern waters. He had little difficulty in showing the Japanese officials that the position of their country would be better under a treaty negotiated with him voluntarily than under one dictated under the shadow of British, French, or Russian guns.

*The Harris
treaty of 1858*

The second step in the opening of Japan came in 1858 with the signing of the treaty of that year. Commodore Perry had secured the elementary privileges of intercourse. Consul Harris regularized the contacts and intercourse of Japan with the outside world. The treaty of 1858 resulted in the establishment of regular diplomatic and consular relations with Japan; it brought about the opening of four additional ports; it made possible the carrying on of trade at the ports opened, instead of restricting their use to the refitting of foreign vessels; and by it the United States offered its "good offices" to Japan in case of trouble with other states. All of these were distinct gains and could have resulted only in good for Japan as well as for Europe and America. Three other features of the treaty were not so advantageous to Japan. Following the precedent set in the China treaties of the same general period, the Harris treaty established a tariff on goods imported into and exported from Japan, and thus it deprived her for the time, as was the case in China, of the right to regulate her trade relations through her own legislation, and reduced her future income at the same time. The duties agreed upon, it should be noted, gave distinct advantages to American as compared with European trade. This was remedied in subsequent treaties when England, France, and Holland secured a lowering of their duties to the American level. This, however, was of distinct disadvantage to Japan, as it reduced her income from foreign trade. In the second place, the treaty provided, against the better judgment of Mr. Harris, for the establishment of the extra-territorial system. And, in the third place, the treaty stipulated for the introduction and free exchange of foreign coins in the country, and for a right of exportation of Japanese coins. This provision led to considerable speculation in exchange, drained specie from the islands, and proved seriously embarrassing to the Japanese. It can be truly said that Mr. Harris acted in good faith in advising Japanese officials to permit the insertion of these provisions in the treaty; and it may have been to the temporary interest of Japan to have been under these restrictions at the outset. But after the reorganization of the country had been undertaken she undeniably suffered from and was humiliated by these provisions, and her outlook was colored by them.

9. INTERNAL EFFECTS OF ENDING OF SECLUSION

When Perry knocked so loudly at the door that the Japanese government could not refuse to hear, a very difficult problem was presented to the *Shogun*. As has already been pointed out, his power had been gradually weakening, and the position of the Emperor had been strengthened by a recognition of the fact that he was the rightful ruler of the country. The policy of seclusion had been initiated by the Tokugawa, but it had become a national policy through its long continuance, and it was, contrary to precedent, given Imperial sanction, in the first years of his rule, by the Emperor reigning at the time of the Perry mission. The Emperor Komei, shortly after 1846, the year of his accession to the throne, instructed the *Shogun* that the traditional policy of seclusion had to be maintained. While this action was unprecedented, it was directly in line with the tendency toward the restoration of power to the Emperor, and because of that tendency it demanded the careful consideration of the Yedo government. When the question of foreign intercourse could not be evaded, the *Shogun* submitted it to the advice of a council of the feudal chiefs. All but a small minority declared themselves in favor of maintaining the traditional policy. So far as their advice was given in good faith, it was determined by a lack of knowledge of the forces to be contended against and of the impossibility of successful resistance. With a larger knowledge of the actual conditions, both internal and external, the *Shogun* and his council at Yedo were forced to side with the minority, and the decision was made to comply with the demands of the foreigners. On the one hand, the government had to reckon with the possible and probable invasion of the country, and with the inability of Japan successfully to resist such an invasion. On the other hand, it faced the certainty that it was giving a powerful weapon to the opponents of the *Shogunate* if the treaties were signed. What appeared to be the lesser of the two evils was chosen.

*Division over
question of
re-establishing
external
contacts*

The opening of the country revealed immediately the weakness of the dual system of government. Perry and other foreign representatives thought that they were dealing with the Emperor, with the titular as well as the real ruler of Japan, when they negotiated treaties with the government of the *Shogun*. Later, when troublesome questions arose, they hesitated to recognize the plea of the *Shogun* that he must refer the matter to Kyoto before he could make a decision, thinking it an indication of bad faith and of double dealing on his part. And each reference to Kyoto revealed more clearly to the Japanese themselves that the *Shogun* was in reality exercising powers which belonged to the Emperor. The very fact that for the first time in generations matters of importance were referred to the Emperor indicated a recognition of weakness on the part of the *Shogun*. If he had acted decisively, as an Iyeyasu might have done, and made his own decisions without consulting the Emperor, simply notifying him of them, the *Shogunate* might have been saved. Or if he had been

*Weakness of
dual system of
government
revealed*

able to make the Emperor see the problem as he saw it, so that the Imperial decision would have been in harmony with the action which had to be taken, the events of the years after 1858 might have been differently shaped.

Change of policy used as weapon against Shogun

But the *Shogun*, doubting his ability to control the country with a strong hand, felt compelled to strengthen his position by invoking the Imperial authority on the question of foreign relations. Unfortunately for him, the court at Kyoto was under the influence of the western clan leaders, and particularly the leaders of Satsuma and Choshu. These clans had long been jealous of the supremacy of the Tokugawa, and they used their influence with the Emperor to embarrass the *Shogun*. Hostile to the foreigner as they undoubtedly were, the western clans were more interested in using the issue of foreign relations to weaken the *Shogunate* than in determining upon the action which would result in the greatest good for Japan. Consequently, during the early period of intercourse, the Emperor insisted upon maintaining the policy of seclusion, and the *Shogun*, although he solicited advice from the Emperor, was forced to go counter to the Imperial commands under the constant and unrelaxed pressure of the Powers. As they came to realize the exact relationship of the *Shogun* to the Emperor, the Powers began to demand that the Emperor himself ratify the treaties. This demand, however, was not pressed until ten years after the first treaty had been made.

Hostility to foreigner

Meanwhile several incidents occurred which had an effect both on foreign relations and on internal politics. The western clans, and all of those who were not self-interested in the maintenance of the *Shogunate*, were hostile to the foreigners. There was division even within the Tokugawa clan, first over the question of the succession to the position of *Shogun*, and second over the advisability of departing from the policy of seclusion. Under the pressure of all these forces the Yedo government alternately blew hot and cold. It promised the Emperor that the foreigners should be driven out as soon as adequate preparations could be made, and it kept assuring the foreign representatives, who were at last installed at Yedo, that it would observe the treaties as soon as it could quiet the populace. Hostility to the foreigners was shown in Yedo as well as in other parts of the country.

The Richardson incident and the bombardment of Kagoshima

In 1862 an incident occurred which brought matters to a head so far as the Satsuma clan was concerned. The Lord of Satsuma was proceeding with his retainers from Yedo to his own dominions. On the road they were traversing an Englishman named Richardson and three companions were riding. Ignorant of the custom of the country which gave the right of way to such elevated personages as the Prince of Satsuma, they affronted his followers by refusing to draw out of the road until the procession had passed. The consequence was that Mr. Richardson lost his life. The British government immediately demanded satisfaction for the affair, and when the *Shogun* proved un-

willing, or rather unable, to afford it, a British squadron bombarded Kagoshima, the Satsuma capital. This revealed to that clan the inferiority of Japanese arms and helped to bring about a reversal of its general attitude toward foreigners. Another effect was to bring home the military weakness of the *Shogun*, a weakness which made it impossible for his government either to chastise its own vassal or to protect him from the foreigner.

The other great western clan, Choshu, was brought to terms by similar means. Under the pressure of the anti-foreign party, and of the court, the *Shogun* had finally issued a secret order for the expulsion of the foreigners. Before the time set for action the Lord of Choshu ordered his retainers to close the Inland Sea to foreign vessels by firing on all that attempted to pass through the straits of Shimoneseki. An American vessel was the first fired upon. The Americans effected immediate reprisal, sending a war vessel to bombard the town. Other merchant vessels were fired upon, however, and a joint expedition was finally decided upon.⁸ The British, French, Dutch, and Americans contributed vessels to make up the expedition, which was completely successful in bringing home to Choshu the superior power of the foreigners.

*Action against
Choshu*

With this demonstration, and the weakening of the anti-foreign attitude of his chief supporters in which it resulted, the Emperor began to waver in his own demand that the *Shogun* restore the old condition of isolation. By this time the foreigners fully realized the weakness of their position in the country so long as it had not received the stamp of Imperial approval, for successive incidents had brought home to them the real nature of the Japanese government. Consequently, in 1866 the British minister, Sir Harry Parkes, offered to remit part of the fine which had been imposed on Choshu by the allied Powers if the Emperor would ratify the treaties. This assent was given finally, and the third step in the opening of Japan had been taken.

*Demand that
Emperor ratify
the treaties*

Meanwhile the internal situation was gradually shaping itself. The country was in a turmoil, and internal disintegration, with the passing of the old order, appeared to be a possibility. Choshu had been intriguing to get control of the person of the Emperor in order to justify a regency under its control—a new *Shogunate*. This attempt was unsuccessful. The order from Kyoto that the *Shogun* should punish Choshu for its action resulted in the assembling of large bodies of men and in the sending of an expedition, but complete success did not result. Some of the wiser heads in the clans were making attempts to bring about a union for the purpose of overthrowing the *Shogun*. Shortly after this union had been effected two new faces appeared. The old anti-foreign Emperor died in February of 1867, and was suc-

*Internal
turmoil*

⁸ By the time the plans for the expedition had matured, its real purpose had changed from that of enforcing treaty rights to that of striking a blow in support of the *Shogun*. See TREAT, R. J., *Early Relations*, ch. 10.

ceeded by one who was not so hampered by the traditions and hostilities of the past. Mutsuhito took as his reign title Meiji ('enlightened rule'), and as his policy the reorientation of Japanese life with respect to the outside world. During the previous year the *Shogun* had died and his successor was also prepared to further the progress of the nation by opening it fully to foreign intercourse.

*The Shogunate
ended*

The accession of a new Emperor provided a logical opportunity for the western clans to realize their object and bring the *Shogunate* to an end. Consequently, in the fall of 1867 a memorial, concurred in by Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen, the western clans, was sent to the new *Shogun* requesting that the actual power be restored to the Emperor. The dangers inherent in the dual system of government at a time when pressure was being constantly exerted against Japan from the outside were emphasized in the memorial. The new *Shogun* was not much inclined to cling to an office which carried with it so much care and anxiety, and he responded to the memorial by abdicating his position.

*Control passes
to Western
clans*

This brought the *Shogunate* to an end, but it did not end the troubles connected therewith. A restoration of power to the Emperor should have put all of the clans on an equal footing before the Throne. Appointments to office should have been equally distributed, and favors should have been impartially bestowed. This was certainly the expectation of the *Shogun*, for otherwise he would scarcely have resigned his power without a fight to secure the future interest of his clan. But this was not the idea of the western clans. Their intention may have been purely patriotic and disinterested, but their actions fail to justify such a conclusion. Offices were monopolized by the western clansmen, and the Tokugawa were pushed into the background. The situation was similar to that existing in the United States when a party which has been long in power goes out of control. The newcomers are favor-hungry, and naturally expect and demand a reward for their long patience. Two hundred and fifty years had passed since the Tokugawa had begun its monopoly, and the newcomers were determined to make good the opportunity offered them, in their turn, to secure exclusive control.

*The Restoration
accomplished*

Judging from all indications the real intention of those back of the "Restoration of Meiji" was not to set up a personal rule by the Emperor in place of the rule of the *Shogun*. Rather it was to replace the Tokugawa as "advisers" to the Emperor. When this was perceived by the followers of the *ex-Shogun* they took up arms in defense of their interests. This uprising was easily put down by the new régime, and by 1869 all opposition had come to an end. The "Restoration" had been effected and the four western clans were in complete control.

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CHAPTER V

JAPAN IN TRANSITION: 1868-1894

I. THE RESTORATION OF MEIJI

Restoration not a sharp break with the past

THE restoration of the Emperor to power as a result of the resignation of the *Shogun* did not mark a sharp break with the past. The feudal régime was left intact. The ideal back of the Restoration movement had been a return to past practices and institutions rather than a reorganization of the country on the basis of new ideas imported from Europe; and those who brought about the return of temporal power to the Emperor considered that the movement meant that they should exercise the power in place of the Tokugawa. The great break had been made by the *Shogun* and his advisers when the policy of isolation was given up, and by the Emperor Meiji and the western clan leaders when foreigners were admitted to Kyoto and the anti-foreign policy was reversed. Foreign policy had been changed radically, but internal conditions had to be shaped, and the new order had to be developed out of the past as the result of a slow transitional process. This transition, in many important respects, is still evident. Striking beginnings, however, were made during the twenty years following the Restoration of Meiji. It is with these beginnings that this chapter is concerned.

Reorganization necessary

The resignation of the *Shogun* left the western clans free to carry out their plan of substituting their authority for that of the Tokugawa, or more accurately, to replace that clan as the chief advisers to the Emperor in the exercise of his powers. The attempt of the Tokugawa to regain a position of equality was ended when the superior power of the new group was revealed as a result of the crushing of the Tokugawa rebellion. But a system had to be devised to replace the *Shogunate* if the new régime was to maintain itself over a long period of time. The *Shogun* had resigned as a result of a temporary alliance of several of the clans, and this alliance had to be maintained or else replaced by something more permanent.

Foreign influence on new institutions

While the new régime was clearly built on the foundations of the past, its construction was just as clearly influenced by the ideas of the West as they came to be more fully appreciated. The chief Western contribution was the idea of a deliberative assembly as a part of the machinery of government. The attempt to work out this idea in the Japanese system by successive adaptations can be perceived in the several changes made during the years of political experimentation. This, in turn, was part of the transitional process, to the description of which attention must now be turned.

It is not necessary to consider the several steps in the organization and reorganization of the new system from 1869 to 1889 except in a summary way. From the beginning the new Emperor allowed himself to be guided by his councillors from the four clans making up the Satcho-Hito combination, i.e. Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa.¹ Under their direction a central organization was created in which use could be made of both the court and the territorial nobility. The leaders worked mostly behind the scenes, exercising the real power, but allowing the more prominent offices to be held by others.

*Four western
clans in control*

The Emperor and the Kuge [writes Dr. McGovern] had been eagerly looking forward to their restoration to power, determined to enjoy their long-lost privileges to the fullest possible extent. The Daimyo or feudal lords who had brought about the change considered that they had no less a right to the fruits of office, and since both parties were no less incompetent than powerful, it followed that both sections had to be appeased by high-sounding names, and yet so placed that they could not interfere with the policy of the Samurai Bureaucrats who were to remain the real masters of the State.²

This was accomplished by making provision for three offices in the central government. The first office, that of Supreme Head (*Sosai*), was awarded to a Prince of the Blood. The second office, made up of Councillors of the First Class (*Gijo*), consisted of members drawn half from the ranks of the court nobility (*Kuge*) and half from the *Daimyo* of the leading clans. This body was intended to be partly deliberative and partly administrative. The third office, the Councillors of the Second Class (*Sanyo*), was made up of five *Kuge* and fifteen *samurai*. Both of these offices were subordinate to the *Sosai*. The most prominent of the Restoration figures attached themselves to the office of the Supreme Head in subordinate positions, but from the beginning they exercised the real power. This organization was changed in the same year (1868) in which it had been established. The authority of these three "offices" was transferred to a body called the *Daijokwan*, or Deliberative Assembly, which consisted of two houses. The upper house, or Council of State, was made up of the former *Gijo* and *Sanyo*, and the lower house, or Assembly, of the representatives of the feudal class. The real power lay in the hands of the Council of State, the members of the Assembly deliberating only on matters sent to them by it. In addition, provision was made for two chief ministers of state and their subordinates, who served as the medium of communication between the *Daijokwan* and the court. This organization had the two-fold advantage of concentrating

*The new
institutions of
government*

¹ A leading spirit in this combination was Kido, a Choshu man. Others were Saigo, Okuba (Satsuma samurai), Itagaki (Tosa), Ito (Choshu), and Okuma (Hizen). Prince Iwakura, representing the court nobility, also played a leading rôle in Restoration and post-Restoration days.

² MCGOVERN, *Modern Japan*, p. 46.

power in one body, and of satisfying the promise in the Imperial oath of 1868 that advice should be taken in administering public affairs.³

2. THE FEUDAL SYSTEM ENDED

Problem of
feudalism

The new régime, working through the *Daijokwan*, was confronted by many important and difficult problems. The most urgent need was that of establishing its authority throughout the country. This brought it squarely against the whole problem of feudalism. No effective centralization of authority could be made so long as the feudal lords stood between the Imperial Government and the individual.

The abolition
of the feudal
system

After the overthrow of the Tokugawa the direct administration of their estates was assumed by the central government. Otherwise the feudal régime remained untouched. The first step looking toward an effective concentration of authority was taken, however, in 1868 when provision was made for the appointment of an Imperial official in every fief. But this did not amount to an extension of the Imperial authority into the fief, for the original clan rulers were left in control. It merely served to accustom them to the presence of the central authority. In 1869 the second step looking toward the abolition of the feudal order was taken. Kido, Saigo, and other leaders of the western clans, having reached an agreement as to the necessity for strengthening the central government, persuaded the Lords of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa to hand over their registers of land and of people to the Emperor, thus restoring his power over their territories. This put those clans openly behind the policy of centralization and enabled the government, a few months later, to take the next logical step of ordering the other clans to return their registers. At the same time the announcement was made that the feudal lords would be retained as governors of their respective domains. In 1871 an Imperial rescript was issued formally abolishing feudalism.

Explanation of
acceptance of
abolition of
feudalism by
territorial
nobles

It is not usually so easy to disestablish a privileged class, and a sort of super-patriotism has been ascribed to the Japanese nobility in consequence of the easy relinquishment of its privileges to the nation. Certainly it was a patriotic and laudable thing for the feudal lords to do, but it can not be wholly ascribed to patriotism. The brains of the government, both central and provincial, were of the *samurai* class rather than of the nobility. The *Daimyo* had long been rulers only in name in their fiefs. It was these *samurai* who, seeing, as a result of the abolition of feudalism, a larger field in which their talents might be displayed, persuaded the four powerful western *Daimyo* voluntarily to surrender their positions as territorial magnates. Their persuasion was rendered more effective by their recognition of the real necessity for the abolition of feudalism and for the

³ This oath and the so-called "constitution" of 1868 will be dealt with in connection with the constitutional movement.

concentration of authority if Japan was to maintain herself in the face of the foreign impact. In other words, self-interest and the national good suggested the same move. The other clans had no alternative but to comply with the demand of the government, supported as it was by the military strength of the four most powerful clans.

Furthermore, the interests of the *Daimyo* were amply protected in the settlements made at the time of the abolition of their privileges. As Dr. McLaren points out,⁴ the settlement made with the *Daimyo* and *samurai* was in the nature of an enormous pension scheme, both classes being guaranteed one half of their nominal revenue. Since the nominal revenue of the *Daimyo* was usually much greater than his real income, this scheme worked to his decided advantage. He no longer had to maintain the provincial administration out of his own purse, but was free to use for his own purposes the entire sum paid him by the government.

*Compensation
to Daimyo and
samurai*

While the settlement was advantageous to the *Daimyo*, the *samurai* did not fare so well under the application of the same principle. Their nominal and real incomes were more nearly identical than were those of the *Daimyo*, and were none too large for their adequate maintenance. Cutting this income in two worked an undoubted hardship on many of them. It is true that the settlement left them free to add to their incomes, but a class maintained in idleness for so many generations found it hard immediately to engage successfully in gainful pursuits. And not only was their income reduced materially by the abolition of feudalism, but special privileges, such as wearing the two swords, which had served to distinguish them from the rest of the populace, were also taken away from them. Thus from the first there was dissatisfaction among the *samurai* class, but they could do nothing for the time except grumble. They had been brought up in a tradition of loyalty to their lords, so that revolt appeared to be out of the question against a decree acquiesced in by the *Daimyo* and bearing the sacred signature of the Emperor. Furthermore, their confidence in the rightfulness of their privileged position had been seriously undermined during the years between the Restoration and the abolition of feudalism. This bewildered state of mind had been created by a change in the public attitude. "The general public, in so far as it took any interest in politics, by a series of inspired articles which appeared in the limited newspaper press of the time had been instructed to regard the *samurai* as a parasitic class 'eating the bread of idleness,'"⁵ and the public attitude could not help but affect the *samurai*.

*Settlement
disadvantageous
to samurai*

In the last analysis, however, the success of the abolition rested upon the power of the government with its conscript army, recruited from all classes and equipped with modern weapons, and supported as it was by the four strongest clans, to crush any opposition to its decree.

*Success of
abolition due
to power of
government*

⁴ McLAREN, *Political History of Japan*, ch. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

Financial
burden of
pension scheme
great

This plan, by which the nobility and the *samurai* were made pensioners of the State, hereditarily in some cases, and during life in others, imposed an extraordinary financial burden on the government, and one that it was not at all prepared to assume. As a matter of fact, ordinary expenses had been increasing rapidly, more rapidly than the income of the government, which had to meet the increased expenditure out of heavier direct taxation of the people, since Japan was prevented by treaty from adding to her revenues by increased customs charges. An attempt was made to secure a revision of the treaties in 1871, but the foreign Powers proved to be unwilling to modify the advantageous commercial position thus secured to them. Consequently, out of an inflexible revenue system the government was hard pressed to find the funds necessary for its maintenance. When to its increasing ordinary expenditures there was added the extraordinary burden of the pensions, its problem became so much greater that it soon appeared to be hopeless of solution.

Commutation
of the pensions

Finally, in 1873, Count Okuma, who had become Finance Minister, resorted to a questionable expedient to save the situation. Upon his recommendation it was decided to commute the pensions. First of all, an optional scheme was tried, applying only to *samurai* with pensions amounting to 100 *koku*, or less, of rice. It was announced in 1873 "that the Government would be willing to commute the pensions on the basis of the market price of rice after the next harvest for a single payment, half in cash and half in Government bonds bearing 8 per cent interest. . . . The commutation was to be made at the rate of six years purchase for hereditary pensions and four years purchase for life incomes."⁶ In 1876 this optional plan of commutation was made compulsory. In its compulsory form it worked real hardship on the *samurai* and caused great dissatisfaction among them. It was, of course, nothing but a scheme for the partial repudiation of the original settlement, and as such it was unjust. But it served to relieve the financial pressure, and, in spite of the hardship it worked on individuals, from the standpoint of the interest of Japan it must be considered a necessary expedient.

3. DIVISION IN THE BUREAUCRACY

The military
bureaucrats
chauvinistic

Another problem confronting the government was of a very different nature, although it also related to the question of general policy. Shortly after the Restoration there appeared a line of cleavage among the supporters of that movement. One element in the revival preceding the Restoration had been the preaching of the doctrine of expansion under Imperial direction. This had served to arouse the latent chauvinism of a large element among the *samurai*. The whole pre-Restoration propaganda had been intensely nationalistic, and, under the circumstances, it is not strange that the expression of national patriotism took the direction of advocacy of Imperial ex-

⁶ Ibid., ch. 3.

pansion. At any rate, among the clique left in control after the accession of the Emperor to power, there was a group, called by Dr. McGovern the "Military Bureaucrats," which advocated the unification and the strengthening of the state by means of foreign wars. Of this group Dr. McGovern writes:

... the Military Bureaucrats were what might be called the Reactionaries, those who regarded the Restoration as a reversion to the past, who looked with suspicion towards ideas imported from the Occident, who regretted the downfall of feudalism, were uninterested in social reform, and looked forward eagerly to Japan's expansion on the Continent of Asia, who desired Korea, Manchuria, and a large portion of China and Siberia. They pandered to the intensely chauvinistic spirit of the nation, and were somewhat impatient of the respect paid to treaties contracted with the Western Powers. This was the prevailing spirit of the large majority of the Daimyo and Samurai, and in the oligarchy was chiefly represented by Saigo Takamori, Goto, Soyejima, and Eto.

The second party, or the Civil Bureaucrats, were those in favor of reconstruction or reform, the introduction of the culture, the efficiency, and the methods of the West. They were opposed to militarism and imperialistic expansion. They desired to foster education, industry and commerce, to codify the laws and to inspire scientific research. . . . This section, which constituted the core of the new Government, and was the party which guided the ship of State through all the troublous waters of the early days, had for its leaders Kido, Okubo and later Ito.⁷

*The civil
bureaucrats
interested in
internal
progress*

The first real clash, on principle, between these two groups in the government came after 1871. In that year some of the inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands were wrecked on the southern coast of Formosa, and were killed by the Formosan savages. The Loochoo peoples had long been considered tributary by both Japan and China. Japan immediately asserted them to be under her protection and demanded from China satisfaction for the murder. This China refused to give on the ground that both parties were under her jurisdiction. When Japan continued to insist, the Chinese government shifted its position, claiming that it had no effective control over the inhabitants of southern Formosa, thus virtually inviting Japan to redress her own grievance. The military party in Japan loudly demanded war on China, a clamor increased in volume because of the attitude of Korea, tacitly encouraged by China, toward Japan. The military group urged the immediate necessity of a Korean expedition. And as the leaders of the "peace and internal progress" party were abroad at the time, the war party had the upper hand in the government. A conflict might have been precipitated if the Emperor had not insisted that no decision be reached until the return from abroad of the mission headed by Prince Iwakura and made up of such of the great leaders as Kido and Okubo. Upon their return a sharp struggle within the bureaucracy took place, with the result that the peace party tri-

*The Formosan
question causes
internal
dissension*

⁷ MCGOVERN, W. M., *Modern Japan*, p. 61.

umphed, but at the expense of the maintenance of the coalition. This division of counsel, coupled with the general unrest incident to the introduction of reforms on a large scale, led to numerous riots and small uprisings. In order to restore quiet the government eventually compromised with the chauvinists to the extent of authorizing a punitive expedition against Formosa, without declaring war on China. This, it may be noted, was following the precedent set by Europe and the United States when action had been taken against Choshu and Satsuma under somewhat similar circumstances. It was also following more directly in the footsteps of the United States, which had sent an expedition to Formosa to secure redress for a similar outrage. The compromise restored temporary harmony in the government at Tokyo, but it had the unfortunate consequence of losing for it the services of Kido, who resigned rather than accept the policy.

*The Korean
difficulty and
the treaty of
1876*

The victory of the peace advocates, somewhat qualified though it was by the later decision on the punitive expedition, enabled the government to carry its program of internal reorganization and reform toward completion. But before turning back to a consideration of that program we may note another incident in the foreign field. Shortly after the Formosan trouble had arisen, another external source of friction developed, this time in Korea. At the time of the accession of Mutsuhito to the Throne the Korean government was notified of the change and invited to resume its allegiance to Japan. This invitation to vassalage was declined, and in 1875 a Korean fort fired upon a Japanese war vessel which was making surveys in Korean waters. This revived the military party in Japan, and war was averted only through the acceptance by the Korean government of a treaty of amity and commerce.

*The samurai
revolt*

This, however, did not fully satisfy the Japanese military party, which had hoped for a war of conquest against the neighboring kingdom. The consequence was that another grievance was added to the list of *samurai* complaints. The announcement of the compulsory commutation policy of the government brought matters to a crisis. Saigo, who had also resigned from the government after the triumph of the peace party in 1872, put himself at the head of the dissatisfied Satsuma *samurai* in 1877 and they rose in arms against the government. The expressed attitude of the revolting *samurai* reveals clearly the feudal conception of the whole Restoration movement. It was urged in justification of the uprising that it was necessary again to resort to force in order to restore power to the Emperor. A careful distinction was made between the Emperor and his government, the *samurai* holding the view that the Imperial powers were being usurped by the government and denied to the Emperor himself, just as had been done during the *Shogunate*. In essence, however, what they were really fighting for was the right to displace those who were advising the Emperor in order themselves to become his advisers. The *samurai* forces proved

to be unable to make any great headway against the national conscript army sent against them, and, with the collapse of the rebellion, the theoretical distinction between the Emperor and the government was overthrown, probably never again to be revived. This success of the government forces also marked the final collapse of the feudal system, and it ensured the advocates of peaceful development complete opportunity to carry their plans into effect.

The revolting *samurai* were right in their belief that the Restoration had not meant the resumption by the Emperor of personal power, for this had never been intended by the leaders in the movement, and it would not have been feasible if it had been part of their plan. On the other hand, the Restoration had not brought political power to the people as a whole or to a large upper class. That had not been intended either by the leaders. What had resulted had been the assumption of power by a small group of leaders from the four clans, as already described. Most of the subordinate positions, also, were filled from these clans. This small group steadily narrowed as a result of such differences of view as that between the Military and Civil Bureaucrats. From the standpoint of the personal exercise of power by the Emperor conditions had not been materially changed by the overthrow of the *Shogun*.

Restoration meant transfer of power from Tokugawa to western clan leaders

But those who had concentrated all power in their own hands, and who felt that it must remain narrowly concentrated if the unity necessary to the reorganization of the country and its preservation from the foreign Powers was to be maintained, soon encountered a new force—the idea imported from the West of popular participation in government—which had to be reckoned with more and more as time went on. In the bureaucracy itself there developed a third group, differing from those designated as the Military and the Civil Bureaucrats, which may be called the Radical group.

Third group in bureaucracy advocates representative government

The Radicals were those who were opposed to the cliquishness of the bureaucracy, and who for various reasons favored the calling of a Diet, to be elected on a popular basis, to which the Ministers of State were to be responsible. Unlike the Radical parties of Europe, which are on the whole tinged with pacifism, the Radicals of Japan sought to increase their popularity with the people by advocating a policy of aggrandizement. This phase of political opinion was represented by Itagaki, and later by Okuma.⁸

Itagaki was one of the original group which had brought about the Restoration, but he was driven into opposition, together with Saigo, at the time of the Formosan trouble. His opposition, however, took a very different form from that of most of the *samurai*. In 1874 he organized an association for the study of political science. Immediately thereafter, in the same year, he and his associates memorialized the Throne asking for the establishment of a representative assembly. From this time on the agitation, which was partly due to

Itagaki starts agitation for assembly

⁸ Ibid.

a real desire for representative government, continued and grew in importance. The memorialists based their petition on the promise made by the Emperor in 1868 to govern according to the wishes of the nation.

This promise was made in the first article of the so-called Constitution of 1868, which article, generally known as the Charter Oath, reads as follows:

*The Charter
Oath of 1868*

The practice of discussion and debate shall be universally adopted and all measures shall be decided by public argument. High and low shall be of one mind and social order shall thereby be perfectly maintained. It is necessary that the civil and military power be concentrated in a single whole, the rights of all classes be assured, and the national mind be completely satisfied. The uncivilized customs of former times shall be broken through, and the impartiality and justice displayed in the working of nature shall be adopted as a basis of action. Intellect and learning shall be sought for throughout the world in order to establish the foundations of the Empire.

What was in the mind of the government when it drew up and promulgated this part of the Constitution of 1868 was very different from that which was demanded by Itagaki in 1874. Undoubtedly the conception of that time was that the feudal nobility should be worked into the scheme of things by means of the establishment of the National Deliberative Assembly. No one would have attempted to maintain that this was an assembly representative of the nation, but through it the feudal governing classes were given an opportunity to express themselves. That it was not intended to do more than this, is indicated by the memorial sent in by Kido upon his return with the Iwakura mission from abroad in 1872. In this memorial he advocated as an entirely new proposal the establishment of representative government. Since he was one of the leading figures in the government at the time when the Constitution of 1868 was promulgated, it must be that he thought something else was meant by the provisions of the Charter Oath.

*Kido
memorializes
in favor of
representative
assembly*

Nevertheless, the position of the government in 1874, with the breakdown of the Satcho-Hito combination, was so weak that an endeavor was made to placate the protestant elements. This was arranged in the Osaka compromise, by which a Senate (*Genro-in*) and a separate Court of Justice were to be established to meet the outcry against the high centralization of power that had been effected, and an Assembly of Prefectural Governors was to be made part of the machinery of government so that the opinion of the people might be obtained. Itagaki and Saigo agreed to come back into the governing oligarchy, the latter being partially satisfied by the agreement on the Formosan expedition, the former by the reorganization of the government. Kido, however, remained lost to the government. Saigo and Itagaki were not satisfied with the manner in which this compromise was carried into effect, and they also soon left the government. The former, as has been noted, shortly took up arms in defense of the

*The Osaka
Compromise*

samurai interest, while the latter returned to the agitation for a representative assembly, since a Council of Governors, all of them appointed by the central government, could not be considered in any real sense an assembly representative of the people. The agitation was so far successful as to call forth another concession in 1878, when prefectural assemblies were constituted to aid the governor and the local authorities in administering the duties of their offices.

These concessions, if such they may be called, served merely to add fuel to the fire. In 1881 the society for the study of political science changed its character and became a party definitely organized to promote the cause of constitutional and representative government in Japan. Other societies for the study of political questions had been formed after 1874 and some of these merged with Itagaki's association to form the *Jiyuto* or Liberal Party. Itagaki became the leader of the party, which was organized as a central association with local divisions.

*Formation of
Liberal Party*

4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

In 1881 Count Okuma, another of the Bureaucrats, came to support the constitutional movement. He had been Finance Minister at the time the commutation of the pensions had been effected and had continued in that position until 1881 when he resigned, ostensibly to protest against the sale to a private company, for a song, of the extensive government development in the northern island of Hokkaido, work which had been undertaken as a stimulus to colonization. The colonization scheme had been a failure, and, after pouring great sums of money into the island, government officials proposed to withdraw and give over the profitable government properties to private interests. Okuma from his position as Finance Minister knew of the proposed deal and denounced it to a huge mass meeting of the people of Tokyo. At the same time he voiced a demand for a representative assembly. Instead, however, of uniting his influence with that of Itagaki and thus concentrating opposition to the government in the one party or group, he proceeded to organize the second political party in Japan, the *Rikken Kaishin-to* or Progressive Party (1882). This illustrates a constant tendency in party development in Japan: the fact that different leaders held essentially the same principles did not serve to unite them in one party, but each leader brought a group of his own followers into a separate organization. Both Itagaki and Okuma were nominally interested in the attainment of the same ends, but one party could not contain the two personalities.

*Count Okuma
joins the
opposition and
organizes the
Progressive
Party*

Following Okuma's withdrawal from the government, an Imperial rescript was issued, in 1881, promising a parliament for 1890 and ordering all agitation for an earlier convocation to cease. This action may be interpreted in two ways. It may be considered as forced by the party agitation and particularly by Count Okuma's somewhat spectacular action, or it may be construed as being the next con-

*Parliament
promised for
1890*

sidered step in the reorganization movement, which merely happened to coincide with the other event. During the two decades following the Restoration the government seemed to pursue alternately a policy of advance and one of restraint. Thus it may be considered to have had in mind the taking of certain steps, regardless of public opinion, but only as the time for them appeared to be ripe. Each advance needed consolidation, which was possible only if agitation for further change were restricted. This alternation is certainly evident. But it might be construed as a policy of making only such concessions as were demanded, and then trying by coercion to stop there. Whichever interpretation is correct, the issuance of the rescript of 1881 was followed by strict repression of anti-governmental agitation. Steps had already been taken to circumscribe the activities of the Radicals. As early as 1875 the government promulgated a drastic press law; it undertook strict supervision of public and party meetings; and in 1883, in consequence of a growing disorder and unrest in the country which the parties were accused of fomenting, it ordered them to disband their organizations. The *Jiyuto* complied in 1884 by formally dissolving, and the Progressive Party came to a natural end because of its inability to maintain its local organizations.

*Preliminary
Study of Western
constitutional
systems*

Quite properly the leaders of Japan felt that it would be unwise to inaugurate constitutional government in a country just out of the feudal condition without careful study and some preparation. Consequently, after it was committed to the advance by the rescript of 1881, it took preliminary steps to carry out the promise at the appointed time. Count (then Mr.) Ito, who had succeeded Kido and his successor, Okubo, as the real directive force in the government, went abroad in 1882 to study Western constitutional systems. He had a definite idea of what must be accomplished with the introduction of constitutionalism into Japan: (1) the constitution must be the gift of the sovereign and must amply safeguard his powers and dignity; (2) it must make provision for a retention of power by those who had seen Japan through the critical period of the abolition of feudalism; and (3) it must meet the demand for a representative assembly. Obviously there was no great need for him to study in any great detail the republican system of the United States or that of France. Neither could the government of England serve as his model, for the English constitution was the result of a long evolution, and was designed to safeguard the people in their rights and privileges rather than to buttress the position of the monarch. But in Prussia Ito found a system of government embodying the ideas and the needs of the Japanese governing clique, and it was the Prussian constitution and government which served as the model for Japan. It is not meant to imply that Ito copied the Prussian constitution, but merely that he found in that country what appeared to be the solution of the problem of continuing the general system evolved after the Restoration and incorporating in it a representative assembly.

*Model for
Japan found in
Prussia*

Count Ito returned from abroad in 1883 and immediately set about the construction of the constitution. By order of the Emperor he was transferred to the Household Department. A bureau for the study of constitutional and administrative reforms was established in connection with that department, and the framing of the constitution was undertaken by the bureau under Ito's direction, and in "absolute secrecy." When work on the constitution had gone far enough, a Privy Council was established (1888) as a part of the governmental machinery. Ito assumed the presidency of the Privy Council, which then undertook the task of revising the constitution. After it had been ratified by that body, it was promulgated by the Emperor. Thus it can be seen that there was no consultation of the party leaders in the framing of the instrument, but that it was largely the work of Ito, revised under his supervision by the other leaders in the oligarchy.

*Method of
framing the
constitution*

Meanwhile other steps had been taken to pave the way for the establishment of constitutional government. In 1884 the nobility was reconstructed; five orders were created, and five hundred patents of nobility issued. In establishing these orders the Prussian model again was followed, the ranks established being Prince, Marquis, Count, Viscount, and Baron. This step was taken in order to make due provision for the upper house which was provided for in the constitution. Then in 1885 the executive system was remodeled by the establishment of a Cabinet to replace the Council of State which had been the governing body almost since the Restoration.

*Reconstruction
of nobility*

5. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1889

The constitution was actually promulgated in 1889. Those who were in control and who knew of its nature must have realized that it would not meet with the approval of the party leaders, for they ordered all newspapers to refrain from unfavorable criticism of it for a time (on the pretext that an opportunity should be afforded for its careful examination), and the known radical papers were suppressed.

*Unfavorable
criticism of
constitution
prohibited*

The new constitution⁹ was built upon a combination of the Restoration idea that the Emperor was the source of all power and the dispenser of all favors and the feudal idea that the real power was exercised for the Emperor by others, either agents or agencies. The first chapter is devoted to the position and powers of the Emperor, "sacred and inviolable." He is characterized as "the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them according to the provisions of the present constitution." In addition to determining the organization of the several administrative services, appointing to and removing from both civil and military office, and fixing the salaries of officers, both civil and military, he exercises the supreme command of the army and navy, determines

*Constitutional
position of the
Emperor*

⁹ The translation used here is found in WILLOUGHBY AND ROGERS, *An Introduction to the Study of Government*, Appendix.

the organization and peace standing of the army and navy, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties. All laws are made by the Emperor with the consent of the Imperial Diet, and after that consent has been given in the form of legislation the law must receive the Imperial sanction and promulgation before becoming effective. This sanction and promulgation do not have to be, and are not, given as a matter of course. Furthermore, a very wide ordinance power is retained by the Emperor, although "no ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws."

*Council of
Ministers and
Privy Council*

In exercising these powers, however, the Emperor acts through two constitutional advisory bodies, the Council of Ministers and the Privy Council, both of them established before the promulgation of the constitution. Chapter 4 of the constitution is devoted to these two bodies. While seventeen articles are necessary to describe the powers and position of the Emperor, only two are required for the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and the Privy Council, since their position had already been fixed by Imperial ordinance. Both bodies were composed of Imperial appointees, and, under the constitution, the responsibility of the Cabinet (according to the interpretation of Ito) is solely to the Emperor.

*The Elder
Statesmen*

Thus far we have been describing those features of the government, as provided in the constitution, which were merely projections of the political and administrative system which had been evolved after the Restoration—an Emperor exercising his powers through a bureaucracy. Later an extra-constitutional feature more strongly suggestive of the feudal age was added in the form of that unique body, unknown to the constitution or laws of the Empire, known as the Elder Statesmen (*Genro*). This group, made up of the men leading the nation during the transition period, came to possess great power. It deliberated on questions of war and peace and all great questions of policy, and advised the Emperor on the choice of men for Cabinet position. In all of these matters it came to have the determining voice.

The Diet

The new feature of the constitutional system was the representative assembly, the Diet. Its powers, functions, and relations to the other parts of the system are set forth in the third chapter of the constitution. The Japanese Diet is made up of two houses: the Upper House, consisting of Peers sitting either by right or by election from their class, and of Imperial nominees; the Lower House, consisting of members elected by the qualified voters. The details concerning the composition and choice of members of the two houses are to be found in Imperial ordinances supplementary to the general provisions of the constitution. All laws, to be effective, must receive the assent of the Diet, the two chambers acting separately. Full control over the meetings of the Diet is vested in the Emperor. He can summon it in regular and special session, prorogue it within certain limits of time, and dissolve the House of Representatives, which brings about a prorogation of the Upper House. However, the Diet must be convoked

every year for a three months' session. Its principal function is to deliberate on matters submitted to it, giving or withholding its assent, although bills may originate in either house.

The section on finance (Chapter 6) is one of the most instructive and interesting in the document. The control of the purse is carefully withdrawn from the House of Representatives, which, however, must give its assent before the budget proposals become effective. The tax system of the country had been evolved before the constitution came into being, and so the provision is made merely that the Diet must assent before new taxes are imposed or the old ones modified. Further than this, an independent source of revenue is provided the government in administrative fees and other revenues having the nature of compensation, since these are expressly exempt from the scrutiny of the Diet. Concerning expenditure article 67 provides: "The expenditures already fixed and based upon the powers belonging to the Emperor by the Constitution (such as salaries), and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that relate to the legal obligations of the government, shall neither be rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the government"; and article 68: "In order to meet special requirements, the government may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a continuing expenditure fund, for a previously fixed number of years." Also the next article provides for a reserve fund for contingent expenses, and, finally, article 71 provides that the budget of the ensuing year shall be continued in case the Diet fails to enact the budget presented to it by the government. Thus the sole power of the Diet is to prevent increases in expenditure.¹⁰

The constitution contains three other chapters. One relates to the judicial power (Chapter 5); the second chapter sets forth the rights and duties of subjects, which are of the usual sort, but it should be noted that all rights of subjects are qualified by their guarantee "subject to law"; and the last chapter (7) contains supplementary rules, the most important having reference to the amendment of the constitution, which is reserved to Imperial initiative.

6. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

The new system came into full operation in 1890 with the convocation of the first Diet. Immediately the future line of division became apparent. The parties controlled the House of Representatives, while the Cabinet was controlled by the clan leaders. It soon became

¹⁰ Prince Ito's view of the budget is sufficiently interesting and instructive to deserve quotation. It was that "a budget is simply a sort of gauge to be observed by the administrative officials for a current year. . . . It is to be borne in mind that a deficit rather than a surplus is, in fact, to be expected from a budget that has been accurately prepared. If the Ministers of State are not required, merely because they have not been settled in the budget, to make outlays that are unnecessary, neither are they forbidden by the constitution to make outlays exceeding the appropriations or not provided for in the budget, that may be necessary on account of unavoidable circumstances." STEAD, *Japan by the Japanese*, p. 57.

Finance

*Other provisions
of the
Constitution*

*The first Diets,
controlled by
the parties, in
opposition to
Cabinet*

evident that the Diet had been given sufficient power to enable it to obstruct but not to control, and no provision, save resort to the Imperial rescript, had been made for a composition of differences between the two branches of the government. The clan leaders either had to control the Diet or govern in spite of its obstruction. The only alternative was one that had never been contemplated, the recognition of Cabinet responsibility to the House of Representatives. The bureaucrats had one weapon which they frequently used in the struggle for control—they could dissolve the House and then attempt to influence the electorate to return members favorable to the government. But uniformly during the first four years of government under the constitution the Cabinet was confronted by a House removed from its effective control. During these four years three ministries were formed, under Yamagata, Matsukata, and, finally, Ito, the framer of the constitution. And during the same period the Diet was twice dissolved, in 1891 and again in 1893. The struggle invariably centered around the budget. Over it ministries fell and Diets were dissolved. Ito, in order to bring temporary harmony, was forced to ask for an Imperial rescript ordering the Diet to give way to the government, and finally he resorted to the questionable expedient of a foreign war to rally the parties to the support of his government.

7. FOREIGN RELATIONS

*Non-political
changes before
1894*

But before turning to the war of 1894-1895 between China and Japan it seems advisable to survey very briefly certain non-political changes in Japan. Among these are the relations of Japan with the European Powers; her expansion during the period under review; and the economic, social, and military reorganization undertaken.

*Early attempts
at treaty
revision*

It will be remembered that the treaties negotiated by Japan in 1858 and thereafter left her with serious restrictions on her judicial and fiscal autonomy. All of her European contacts and many of her internal decisions between 1870 and 1894 were conditioned by this fact. The Iwakura mission was sent abroad in 1871 in order to secure a modification of the treaties. When the mission returned it reported not merely its lack of success but the long preparation that must be undertaken by Japan before she could hope to regain her freedom of action. Before judicial autonomy could be regained it would be necessary to reorganize her administration of justice so as to afford adequate protection to foreigners under a legal system which conformed to European ideas rather than to the feudal and patriarchal traditions of the Japanese. Before Japan could secure the right to impose her own customs charges the European nations would have to be assured that they would have free access to the country for purposes of trade, and that customs charges would not be fixed with a view to a return to the earlier condition of restricted intercourse. Consequently the several features of the internal reforms, both political and judicial, which were actually carried to completion by 1894, were

*Judicial reform
precedent to
treaty revision*

made necessary by the desire to secure a revision of the treaties, if for no other reason. In addition to the political reorganization just described, the Japanese began the work of building up civil and criminal codes, and of elaborating a judicial system along European lines. By 1890 the new codes had received the sanction of the Emperor and the new judicial system had come into being. In the main the codes and the judiciary were modeled upon those of France and Prussia, legal advisers from both countries having assisted in their preparation.

Meanwhile, as the work of reform had proceeded, several attempts had been made to secure a revision of the treaties. In 1882 the Foreign Minister entered upon negotiations at Tokyo with the Powers. As a preliminary move an organized effort was made to introduce European dress and pastimes with a view to showing the West that Japan was occidentalizing her life. Just as agreement on revision appeared to be in view the negotiations were brought to an end by a popular agitation against the establishment of "Mixed Courts" as part of the agreement. The foreign Powers, in order to protect the supposed interests of their nationals, had demanded that courts composed of Japanese and foreign jurists should hear disputes to which foreigners were parties. This was a concession in which Japanese public opinion would not acquiesce. The next attempt was made by Count Okuma in 1888. This time, instead of negotiating collectively with the treaty Powers, he undertook to secure a revision of the treaties one at a time. He was able to carry through a revision of the treaty with Mexico, which had few interests to protect, and with the United States, although the latter revision was to become effective only after similar treaties had been negotiated with the other Powers. But the other states demanded concessions, as before, and again the mob prevented action. Success was finally attained in 1894, when England, the foremost among the trading Powers, agreed to a revision of her treaty, to become effective in 1899.¹¹ The "humiliation" of the "Mixed Court" was waived by England so that public opinion in Japan was satisfied, even though the revision was not to become effective at once and was made contingent on the successful operation of the judicial system. The United States agreed also to revision of its treaties, following the English leadership but at the same time fulfilling its own policy, which had looked toward revision at an earlier period. The other states also revised their treaties in the course of the next three years.

Before 1894 Japan had begun to round out her frontiers. The Formosan affair, already referred to, had resulted in the relinquishment by China of her claim to suzerainty over the Loochoo Islands. In 1878, as a result of negotiations with Russia, Japan gave up her claim to the southern half of Saghalin in return for a recognition of her title to the southern Kurile Islands. This was done under com-

*Continued
negotiations for
revision*

*Territorial
adjustments*

¹¹ This time negotiations were transferred from Tokyo to London in order to eliminate the influence of the Tokyo mob.

pulsion, as Japan had as good a claim to both as any other Power. In 1876 she extended her Empire to include the Bonin Islands.

8. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

*General factors
governing
transformation*

Paralleling the political developments and diplomatic achievements of the decades following the Restoration, were significant economic, social, and military changes. In fact, in the economic field in particular, there were effected the beginnings of a real transformation rather than a mere reorganization. Before tracing the changes made, however, we should call attention to a few important features of the transformation movement. In the first place, one should note the lead taken by the government, for otherwise one would receive a wrong impression of what went on. In the second place, the deliberate and systematic way in which changes were made is significant. And in the third place, it is of interest to note the extent to which the needs of Japan as construed by the government were elevated over the interests of individuals or groups.

*Foreign study
encouraged*

Even before the Restoration, when foreign travel was forbidden, individuals had begun to go abroad to investigate at first hand Western ideas, institutions, and methods. After the Restoration the obstacles in the way of foreign travel were removed and students were sent to Europe and America. Furthermore, as the work of reorganization was actively undertaken, commissions were sent to the West to investigate special phases of European life. And until foreign-trained Japanese advisers were available, foreigners were drawn into the service of the government in various advisory capacities. Experiments were freely made and errors revealed by experiment were as freely corrected.

*Education
early made
compulsory*

In no field of activity is the spirit of new Japan more clearly revealed than in education. As early as 1872 the Japanese adopted the principle of compulsory elementary education and made a start in the establishment of a system of public schools. In the development of the system three distinct foreign influences show themselves. The American system of primary and secondary education was introduced in a modified form; the French university organization was adopted; and the German emphasis on vocational education was reproduced.

*Outline of
educational
system*

Beginning at the age of six, both boys and girls were required to attend school for four (later increased to six) years. During these years they were taught the usual elementary subjects, with as much emphasis on character development as on mental training. Elementary education was extended over eight years, divided into two parts of four years each. Secondary or middle schools were designed to give special training to those who would go no farther, and to prepare students for entrance to the university. To train the large numbers of teachers required for the elementary schools, normal schools were established. Then, as the need arose, a number of special schools such as commercial institutes were organized.

The education of girls differed but little from that of boys in the first years of school, except for an emphasis on the qualities of the home-maker. This emphasis became stronger in the later years, intellectual training being subordinated to it, and until 1902 no provision was made by the state for university training for women. The provision made for girls in the public school system from the first, however, is significant of a changing point of view.

Education of girls

It is also significant that public education should have been so earnestly and comprehensively introduced into Japan from the beginning of the new era. The activity in this particular has kept her abreast of the most advanced Western nations and has been partly responsible for her unusually rapid economic progress. Naturally, many mistakes were made, school laws had to be altered several times, and much of the training was superficial. But with all of its deficiencies the system must be considered remarkably good when the newness of the problem and the immensity of the task are considered, and when the other problems demanding simultaneous solution are recalled.

Educational emphasis significant

The development of journalism in Japan may be noted at this point as naturally as at any other. Education was under government control, although there were numerous private schools, the establishment of which was encouraged rather than discouraged. But the many newspapers and magazines which came into existence owed less than nothing to government aid. Since almost all of them which were interested in politics were opposed to the government and were extremely critical of it, they had a precarious existence. Suspension of papers was common, the fines imposed on them were large, and jail sentences for their editors became extremely numerous. In spite of these handicaps the number of daily papers increased, and toward the end of the period under review some of them had attained a sound financial basis. Magazines of a non-political nature found it easier to establish themselves, and every realm of interest was represented in their company. There was even a Japanese "Ladies' Home Journal."

Development of the press

The new rulers of Japan also undertook military reorganization. A nation with a strong military tradition would naturally not underestimate the necessity of modernizing the military establishment. As has been pointed out, some of the clans had imported Western arms before the Restoration, and some study had been made of military tactics by the Dutch scholars. At first the new Imperial Government had to rely on troops furnished by the western clans. Immediately, however, it began the organization of an independent force. Universal service was introduced and the army nationalized in 1873, and this non-*samurai* disciplined force showed its mettle in putting down the Satsuma *samurai* rebellion. Not only did the government introduce universal military service, eliminating feudal and class ideas, but the army was equipped with modern weapons and trained under French and, after the Franco-Prussian War, German direction.

Military reorganization

Steps were also taken, so far as the national finance permitted, to build up a navy. Here there was nothing upon which to build, except perhaps a national aptitude, for the Japanese had been restricted for generations to the use of small vessels in their home waters. Again they chose the best foreign aid, going to England for officers to advise them on naval matters, and securing from the British the vessels which they could not build in their own newly-established shipyards.

Communications
improved

Perhaps it is not so remarkable that the leaders of modern Japan, in view of their national traditions, should have interested themselves in education and in military reorganization. But it is remarkable that they should have seen clearly the need for systematic economic development. As part of the political program may be considered the establishment of a postal system to replace the former courier service, and the introduction of the telegraph (1868) for governmental and then for commercial use. And while improved transportation facilities were of use to commerce and industry, the railroad was also important as a unifying and nationalizing agency. The first railroad, eighteen miles in length, was opened to traffic in 1872. Railroad construction was undertaken almost exclusively by the government until after about 1887, when private enterprise was definitely encouraged. By 1894 there were 2,118 miles of road constructed and in operation. This enterprise unquestionably aided in the development of commerce, just as it helped to bring the peoples of the different clans into more intimate contact with one another.

Economic
reorganization
participated in
by the
government

But it is more difficult to explain, except in terms of sound foresight, the changed attitude toward what had been the lowest class above the *pariah*. The end of feudalism resulted in a fusion of all classes of commoners, and the policy of the government was to direct the energies of the *samurai* and former nobles into commercial and industrial undertakings by insisting on their respectability. Where the government led it was expected that the people would follow. The government not only built railways, but it went into the shipping business, at first as a stockholder in various companies, and then by subsidy. It took the initiative in forming exchanges of various sorts, including one to end the European control of foreign trade. It fostered the textile industry in several ways: the product of the Japanese loom was presented to the world at several international expositions; model factories, with modern machinery, were established under government auspices; internal exhibitions were held to popularize the native product; and permanent commercial museums were established in various centers. A study of various types of raw cotton was made, with the result that Japanese cotton was rejected as inferior and foreign cotton was imported on a large scale. The formation of new trade associations to replace the old guilds was encouraged. This is merely exemplary of what was done in the development of all kinds of industry. It should be said, however, that the real expansion of Japanese industry dates from the end of the war with China. It has

taken a long time to build up business standards, both of excellence of goods and honesty in representing them to the purchaser, for, as has been pointed out, such standards were not developed in old Japan, where sharp practice was the rule rather than the exception in business.

Another important task confronting the government after 1868 was that of currency reform. Gold and silver were both used as media of exchange, and in addition both the *Shogun's* government and the several *Daimyo* had issued currency. The relation between gold and silver coins, furthermore, was such that it was possible for foreigners to import their silver, exchange it for Japanese silver, as guaranteed in the treaty of 1858 and subsequent agreements, use the Japanese silver to exchange for gold, and profitably export the gold. As a result gold was drained from the country. The only solution here was treaty revision, and control of exchange. Again, in 1868 the government had insufficient revenue to meet its needs, even after the taxation system had been revised, and this led to the issue of large amounts of inconvertible paper. The problem was further complicated by reason of the non-existence of adequate banking facilities.

Currency reform

The first step in the solution of the currency and banking problem was taken in 1872 when, upon Ito's recommendation, regulations for national banks on the American plan were promulgated, these banks being given the power to issue inconvertible notes. The First National Bank was established in 1873, two families being ordered to participate in financing it. At first the development was slow, and in 1876 there were only four banks. In that year the regulations were revised, permitting the conversion of notes into currency, with the result that development was accelerated. By 1879 there were in existence 151 National Banks with deposits of almost twelve million *yen*. This expansion led to further increases in the issue of inconvertible notes, which was also one result of the increased expenditure made necessary by the Satsuma rebellion. This currency expansion led to higher prices and to considerable distress among the people. The problem of redemption of the paper money was considered by successive Finance Ministers during the late 'seventies and the early 'eighties. And finally, after 1885, provision for redemption was made and a convertible currency was established. The country continued, however, on a silver basis until after 1896, when the payment of the Chinese indemnity made possible a change to the gold standard.

*National
banking system
instituted under
government
regulation*

Meanwhile the defects in the system of National Banks led to the establishment, in 1882, of a central institution, the Bank of Japan, as the chief fiscal agency of the government. After the establishment of the Parliament bills were introduced at successive sessions providing for the ending of the National Banks as such through their transformation into private institutions. This provision was finally made in 1896. After the establishment of the Bank of Japan, and as the purposes of the government were not served by the National Banks,

*Special banks
established*

separate institutions for special purposes were organized. The first was the Yokohama Specie Bank, established in 1887, for the purpose of financing foreign trade and controlling the foreign exchange business. Subsequently, after the war with China, the Hypothec Bank and forty-six industrial and agricultural banks were established, and as time went on other special banks, such as the Bank of Formosa and the Hokkaido Colonization Bank, came into existence. Thus, gradually, by a trial and error method, a satisfactory financial and banking system was evolved as part of the process of bringing into being a new Japan.

Other changes
mentioned

There is not space to describe the systematic efforts to improve agriculture, to colonize the Hokkaido, to reconstruct local government, and to accomplish the manifold other tasks which were undertaken. Nor is it possible to paint the darker side of the picture, for there was a dark as well as a bright side. There were comparatively few major scandals, but there were few exceptions to the rule that men in high office created large fortunes for themselves. As the new parliamentary system went into effect there was widespread buying and selling of votes. And it must be recognized that the nation as a whole lagged behind its leaders. There was no national propulsion toward change, and there was much latent dissatisfaction with the creators of new Japan.

But with full recognition of all deficiencies it may truly be said that:

Crisis of
transition
period passed
by 1894

By 1894 the crisis of the transition period had passed. The government had been completely reorganized and a constitution had been given several years of trial. An army and navy had been built up after approved Western models. A modern school system was in successful operation. Tariff and judicial autonomy were on the point of being granted. Industry and commerce were giving promise of vigorous life. The reorganization was not complete and its fruits were only beginning to be seen, but in the main the shock caused by internal adaptation to the modern world was over. From 1894 on, the reorganized Japan was to expand and take her place as an equal and increasingly important member in the family of nations.¹²

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CHAPTER VI

THE CONTEST FOR KOREA

I. PRE-MODERN RELATIONS OF CHINA AND JAPAN WITH KOREA

*Korea the focal
point of China-
Japanese
relations*

THE historical relations of Japan and China all center in Korea, and it was in and over Korea that they first came into serious conflict in the modern period of their history. From this conflict developed consequences of grave significance, not only for the parties immediately concerned, but for the entire world. The earlier struggles over Korea had involved only the immediate participants, but, with the coming of Europeans to the Far East, changes in the relative position of the Celestial Empire developed European consequences. This was particularly true because of the gradual Russian territorial expansion to the borders of the Chinese Empire and the Korean Kingdom. Back of Russia lay the other Powers with interests which were inevitably affected by any changes involving that territorial giant.

*Early Korean
contacts with
China*

The pre-modern relations of Korea with her neighbors can be sketched in a few words. Her geographical position explains much of her history. Marked off from Manchuria only by the Yalu River as a natural frontier, and stretching almost due south from Manchuria toward Japan, with only a narrow strait separating her from the Japanese islands, Korea inevitably found that the threads of her history were inextricably interwoven with those of her two immediate neighbors. From the time when the hordes of Genghis and Kublai Khan swept over China from Mongolia through the Manchurian gateway, Korea had been in intimate contact with China. And it was only natural that the Mongol invasion should make its approach to Japan through Korea, first subjecting the latter kingdom as a preparation for the attempted conquest of the former. From that time Korea paid tribute to China and her kings received their investiture from Peking, although this relationship of suzerain and vassal was disturbed temporarily during the sixteenth century by invasion and conquest from another direction.

*Subjugation of
Korea by
Hideyoshi*

Then Japan, in her turn, had visions of empire, and, under the great commander Hideyoshi, attempted to establish herself on the Asiatic continent. China was her objective, just as Japan had been the objective of the Mongol rulers of China. And again, as a preliminary step to operations against China, the Japanese found it necessary first to subjugate the Koreans. In spite of the resistance of Korea, later aided by China, the kingdom was overrun by the Japanese. But, just as the sea had saved Japan from the earlier attempted invasion of her shores, so it prevented Hideyoshi from carrying his operations

farther than Korea. The Korean fleet, well commanded at first, was able so to obstruct the transportation of troops and supplies that his armies could not maintain themselves. Upon his death the expedition was given up. Shortly thereafter, as has been pointed out,¹ the Tokugawa clan established itself in power in Japan and intercourse with the outside world was cut off. This brought to an end, for a time, the contact of Japan with China through Korea. The only permanent result of the invasion was the maintenance of a colony of Japanese at Fusan, just across the channel from Shimonoseki, and a devastation of Korea from which she never fully recovered and which left the people with a feeling of hatred and fear for the Japanese.

Shortly after the evacuation of Korea by the Japanese armies the Manchus established themselves in China. From Peking they reasserted successfully the former Chinese suzerainty over Korea, and the relationship then re-established was formally continued until after the war with Japan in 1894-1895.

*Reassertion of
Chinese control*

So far as the non-Chinese world was concerned, Korea, after the invasion of the Japanese, became the most secluded of the Far Eastern nations. For a time its government sent tributary missions to Japan as well as to China, but these were gradually discontinued as Japan retired into herself. The Japanese colony at Fusan remained, but it was virtually cut off from contact with the homeland. There were no other contacts. The Chinese kept the door ajar at Canton and the Japanese did likewise at Nagasaki, but there were no openings except for the Chinese into Korea. She well deserved the name, the "Hermit Kingdom."

*Korea closed
to all but
Chinese*

As she was the most closely sealed, so Korea was the last of the Far Eastern countries to be opened to foreign intercourse. This was, of course, partly due to her relative unimportance and to her geographical position, which did not bring the Western nations into contact with her until they had knocked successively at the doors of China and Japan; but it was also due, in part, to the fact that she had so cut herself off from the outside world that very little was known of her. It was not until thirty years after the first treaties had been negotiated with China and twenty years after the Perry expedition to Japan that the first treaty was made with the government of Korea, and then it was not a Western but an Eastern state which penetrated behind the Korean barriers.

*Korea the last
Far Eastern
country to be
opened*

2. THE OPENING OF KOREA

France was the first to try to force open the door into Korea. In 1866, after French Catholic missionaries who had been carrying on their activities in that country in secret had been murdered, together with some of the native priests and converts, the French government sent a naval expedition to secure redress for the murders. The expedition was able to force a landing on the coast, but the Korean govern-

*French attempt
to open Korea*

¹ Chapter IV.

ment refused to enter upon any negotiations. Since the French admiral did not dare, with the force at his disposal, to move into the interior even the short distance to the capital, he was compelled finally, in the face of the resistance of the Koreans and the refusal of the government to negotiate, to depart without having fulfilled his mission. That nothing was done subsequently to advance French interests in the peninsula may be explained by a desire to concentrate efforts on expansion on the southern borders of China. It was in 1867 that three provinces of Cochin-China were occupied.

*The American
attempt*

In the same year (1866) an American vessel, the *Surprise*, was wrecked on the Korean coast. The American sailors, however, did not fare so badly as had the French priests, being well treated while in the country and finally being sent out by way of Manchuria. But another American vessel, the *General Sherman*, was not so fortunate. While she was stranded in a Korean river, some of her crew became involved in a brawl on shore. They were rescued, but the vessel itself was set upon and destroyed. Eight of the crew were killed and the remainder made prisoners. Some years later (1871) an American expedition was sent to ascertain the facts in the case and to restore any of the prisoners still living. As in the case of the French expedition, little trouble was found in effecting a landing after the forts at Kianghwa had been destroyed. But again the Korean government refused to open negotiations, and the expedition had to withdraw without having accomplished its mission of establishing some sort of contact with Korea.

*The Japanese
succeed in
negotiating a
treaty*

Four years later a Japanese vessel was fired upon while cruising in Korean waters. This aroused great popular excitement in Japan. The *samurai* were restless and getting out of hand. They had wanted war in 1872 at the time of the Formosan difficulty and had not been satisfied with the mere sending of a punitive expedition to Formosa. Consequently when a legitimate grievance was presented in 1876, the cry for war arose again even more strongly. Before taking action, however, the Japanese government found out that China would stand aside and let Japan redress her own grievance. With this assurance she prepared to send a naval expedition to Korea. This attempt was more successful than the French and American attempts had been, perhaps because Korea was beginning to be aware of the ever-pressing forces from the outside, which had already broken down stronger barriers to intercourse than she could hope to erect. At any rate she signed, under compulsion, a treaty of amity and commerce with Japan on February 26, 1876. The Japanese showed themselves willing learners, for they imposed on Korea terms very similar to those contained in their first treaties, including a modified form of extra-territoriality. The most significant clause of the treaty, however, was the declaration in the first article that "Korea, being an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as Japan."

At the time when this treaty was signed there was a mutually

*The position of
China in Korea*

respected, even though nominal, historical bond between China and Korea. The actual connection was not at all close, as the Manchu government had long ceased to interfere in the affairs of the Korean kingdom. But, in spite of the Chinese inactivity, the custom of sending tribute to Peking was maintained, and the king of Korea received his investiture from the Emperor of China. There was no reason for the assertion by China of her historical position as suzerain until other states developed an interest in Korea. But then, if she expected to preserve her position, she should, before serious complications arose, at least have attempted to secure a definite recognition of her overlordship. Ample opportunity was afforded for this when China was asked to intervene to secure the redress of grievances by France, the United States, and Japan. The opportunity, in each case, was not seized at all or was only partially utilized, and the reasons were invariably the same. The Chinese government, not having fully accepted intercourse with the West for itself, did not want to see it established with Korea. Above all, China was not willing to assume the responsibilities in Korea which would have devolved on her if she had asserted too definitely her claims as suzerain.

It was a grave mistake for China to allow Japan to undertake to secure for herself redress for the wrong done by firing on her vessel. The same mistake had been made repeatedly in other places in order to save the Imperial Government from temporary embarrassment, and always with unfortunate consequences from the standpoint of preserving China's authority as suzerain. Her passivity led to equally disastrous results for her in Korea. In spite of repeated attempts to repair the initial blunder by a reassertion of her authority and its actual enlargement, China gradually found Korea slipping from her grasp as had Upper Burma and what has since come to be known as French Indo-China. The mistake had been made by China. It was left for Japan to take full advantage of it. This she did by insisting that Korea virtually repudiate the bond by declaring herself an independent state with full sovereign rights. Korea, as well as China, soon saw the error, but neither was able to rectify it.

*Initial mistake
made by China
weakened her
position*

The success of the Japanese in establishing relations with Korea led to a renewal of the American effort to negotiate a treaty. At the same time China had begun to feel that it would be desirable to neutralize the Japanese influence at Seoul by a widening of Korea's external contacts. As early as 1879 "Li Hung-chang gave the considered advice to a high Korean official that 'as poison must be met by antidote,' the only way to combat Japanese intrigue was to conclude treaties with Western powers."² China's interest in the matter was definitely aroused, when, in 1880, the American Commodore Shufeldt attempted to get in touch with the Korean government by invoking the aid of Japan. Viceroy Li thereupon invited Commodore Shufeldt to visit him at Tientsin. Since his response from the Japanese

*Other treaties
negotiated*

² MORSE, *International Relations*, vol. 3, p. 9.

had been unsatisfactory, he accepted the invitation and also Li Hung-chang's offer of his good offices in opening up relations with Korea. A treaty was finally negotiated at Tientsin in 1882, the Chinese Viceroy serving as the intermediary. England, Germany, Italy, Russia, and France also entered into treaty relations with Korea in the succeeding four years.

These treaties all followed the Japanese precedent, recognizing the government of Korea as that of a fully sovereign state.

*Treaties
based on
independence
of Korea*

"However, the European powers evaded a settlement of the question of independence by commissioning their envoy at Peking to be also their representative, under various titles, at Seoul; but the United States, influenced by the waiving of responsibility at Peking, followed Japan in commissioning to Korea a minister plenipotentiary, independent of the legations at Peking and Tokyo, a procedure which was highly gratifying to Japan."³

Furthermore, when China attempted to regain ground thus lost by demanding that the Korean envoy sent to Washington in 1887 should communicate with the American government through the Chinese legation, the Secretary of State insisted on dealing with him directly as the representative of an independent state. The American treaty itself varied from those with the other Western states in that it contained a provision similar to that in the Harris treaty, offering the good offices of the United States, in case they should be needed, to compose disputes between Korea and other Powers. On this provision the Koreans came to rely as a last resort when the struggle for possession of the country entered upon its final phases, but they failed to understand that both parties to a dispute must accept the offer of "good offices," or action taken would constitute intervention. This was not made clear to Korea, China, or Japan.

3. INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN KOREA

*Progress under
first ruler of
reigning
dynasty*

The Korea opened to foreign intercourse was in such a deplorable condition that it invited rather than repelled foreign interference. The reigning dynasty, the House of Yi, had been established more than five centuries before the opening of the country. The first ruler made certain notable improvements, including a clean sweep of the incompetent, corrupt, and Buddhist dominated officialdom. A phonetic alphabet had been evolved, although it proved to be impossible to introduce it among the men in place of the Chinese system of writing, and it was finally relegated to exclusive use by the women. Movable metal type was cast. "Art, literature, science, economics, agriculture and every form of human activity felt the impulse, and

³ Ibid., p. 9. Commodore Shufeldt had, however, in an exchange of letters with Li, stated that he had secured the assistance of China in negotiating the treaty because Korea was her dependency, and he transmitted to Washington a letter from the Korean king in which he affirmed this dependency. These letters, unfortunately for China, had no official value. For a discussion of the whole question, see DENNETT, pp. 454-64.

before long the former degraded condition of the people was transformed."⁴

Unfortunately the founder of the dynasty was succeeded by weaker rulers. And during the sixteenth century factionalism, which came to be the bane of Korea, developed. This division into factions weakened the initial resistance of the Koreans to the Japanese invaders at the end of the century, but factionalism might have been replaced by a more unified spirit if they had been repulsed without Chinese aid. However, although the Japanese hosts were ultimately withdrawn, even while the second attempt at conquest was going on, the party spirit was revived and was never thereafter displaced.

*Factional
division*

Korea had never fully recovered from the devastation of the country by the Japanese. But internal conditions more than the terrible loss of life and destruction of property explain the lack of recuperative ability. More and more after the sixteenth century the country became divided into two groups, the exploited people and the exploiting court and officialdom. The nobles and officials, in turn, may be broadly divided into those in power and those out of favor and struggling to get into power. Constant intrigue, supported by assassination, marked this struggle. No man's life or property was safe, no matter how high his rank, except as he was able to cling to public office. And, among the masses, there was no incentive to improvement. If a man were a successful farmer or merchant and had begun to accumulate a surplus, he was certain to have his property taken from him by the tax-gatherer or by means of an enforced loan to a noble or an official. Consequently a premium was put on living up to one's income, or on concealing the fact of prosperity by living as though impoverished. Certainly thrift and development were not encouraged. The people lived in mud hovels, under extremely unsanitary conditions. They put their surplus on their backs or in their stomachs, or kept it in careful concealment. There was wealth in the country, as was evidenced by the ability of the Koreans to undertake enterprises demanding considerable capital when it became safe to admit its possession; but the appearance of the country could only lead to an impression of great poverty.

*Retarded
development of
country
explained*

There was a careful gradation of rank, and privileges, such as the use of the donkey or the chair, were apportioned according to position in the social scale. Among the ruling class there was considerable extravagance and ostentation in living. And always rank and power were shown by a disregard for the personal rights of the people.

*The privileged
class*

However, just as in China, there was one relief from actions and exactions of officials when they became intolerable. Local riots were common as means of redress. If the people rose against an official and drove him out, the government promptly replaced him, seldom attempting to keep a particular official in place against an active expression of popular hostility. However, the new appointee would

*Rioting the
only means of
popular protest*

⁴ HULBERT, *Passing of Korea*, p. 93.

only be sufficiently regardful of the desires of the people to prevent rioting, so that, while the worst actions were punished, uprisings did not serve to secure good government. On the whole the people acquiesced passively in the system, since they could find no substitute for it.

*Family the
basis of social
organization*

From the standpoint of her social institutions Korea was organized on the basis of the family, with the concomitant of ancestor-worship. There was a premium put on male children, as in other Oriental countries, and the position of women was low, when judged in comparison with either Japan or China. While at one time Buddhism had been very strong, after the fifteenth century it had been largely displaced by Confucianism, which, however, had not been highly developed. So far as the people had any religion, it was demonism, which had permeated and degraded Korean Buddhism where it had not displaced it.

Economic life

Most of the people were farmers, cultivating, in the main, rice, which, together with fish, constituted the staple in the diet. Millet and other cereals and some varieties of vegetables were grown in addition to rice. Trade was carried on mainly by wandering peddlers, and there was only a limited and extremely primitive industry. The very flourishing ceramic industry of an earlier time had been destroyed when the Korean artists and artisans had been transplanted to Japan with the withdrawal of the invaders at the end of the sixteenth century. The industry in Korea never recovered from the blow thus struck. It proved profitable to Japan, however, for it laid the foundations for the development of the well-known Satsuma ware.

4. THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF KOREA

*Factions divide
over questions
of foreign
relations*

It was this impoverished, misgoverned, faction-disturbed country, so long a hermit kingdom, which was destined to bring its two more powerful neighbors to blows. Even in that event factionalism played an important part. Just as the Western states were beginning to manifest an interest in the "Land of the Morning Calm," in 1863, the ruler died without issue. As a result a twelve year old boy ascended the throne, his father, best known as the Taiwunkun, becoming the Regent. One of the first acts of the Regent was to marry his son to his wife's niece, a member of the Min family, hoping in that way to consolidate and perpetuate his own power. The King was a weak character, easily influenced by those about him, and his father, a man of very strong will, would have continued to dominate him if the Queen had not chosen to assert herself. After the King had attained his majority a bitter struggle commenced between the Min faction, led by the Queen, and the Yi family, consisting of the blood relatives of the King and headed by the Taiwunkun. It was fundamentally a struggle for power, and it was only the chance of the foreign impact which led to a division over the question of foreign policy. The Queen's faction became the party of progress, advocating the opening

of the country, and the ascendancy she gained over the King resulted in the reversal of the anti-foreign policy of the Regent, the making of the treaty of 1876 with Japan, and the establishment of a Japanese legation at Seoul.

But in 1881 there came a famine with resulting hard times for all. The agents of the Regent busily worked to undermine the Queen, whispering that the hard times were caused by the opening of the country to foreigners, and that they would continue until the former seclusion had been restored. The people in the capital became inflamed and riots occurred. Finally a mob moved on the palace to murder the Queen. After invading the palace grounds they were turned in the direction of the Japanese legation. The minister and his suite, together with the civilian Japanese who had been fortunate enough to reach the legation safely, cut their way through the mob, worked their way out of the city, and finally reached the sea. Some three weeks later the Japanese minister returned to Seoul with a strong military escort and demanded suitable reparation for the outrage. His demands for "the punishment of the murderers, the honorable burial of the Japanese dead, and indemnity of 400,000 *yen*, and further privileges of trade for the Japanese"⁵ were all conceded by the Korean government.

*Attack on
Japanese
legation*

At the same time China asserted her right of interference as the sovereign power and virtually kidnapped the Regent, who was responsible for the entire affair. He was taken to China, where he was kept as a prisoner for some years. By this time Chinese policy had changed; she suggested the ratification of the American treaty, and inaugurated a more positive Korean policy.

*Chinese
intervention*

This did not end the difficulty, but it did serve to inaugurate a new phase of the old struggle between China and Japan. In 1883 the Tientsin Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, in whose hands the Emperor of China had placed Korean affairs, sent Yüan Shih-k'ai (later President of the Chinese Republic) to Korea as the representative of the sovereign power. From this time China attempted to assert herself more and more in Korean affairs and to bind that country ever more closely to herself. One method used for promoting a closer relationship was to bring into a partial union the Chinese and the Korean maritime customs. Li nominated a foreigner to serve as adviser to the Korean government, and one of his first moves was to organize a Korean customs service with himself at the head. Later, upon his removal, an attempt was made to promote a union of the two services by appointing an inspector from the Chinese service as head of the Korean customs. It was expected that he would take his direction from Sir R. Hart and would look after the interests of China. At the same time the Imperial Resident at Seoul, Yüan Shih-k'ai, asserted his precedence over other foreign envoys at all court functions, and kept in intimate touch with the Korean government in all of its

*Attempts to
strengthen the
Chinese
connection*

⁵ McKENZIE, *Korea's Fight for Freedom*, pp. 26-27

affairs. And, finally, one result of the invasion of the Japanese legation in 1882 was the decided strengthening of the Chinese influence at the court, even though the Japanese were successful in pressing on the King their demand for reparation.

*Japan supports
party of
progress*

On the other hand, if the Chinese influence was strong the Japanese endeavor to undermine that influence was constant. The former struggle for power between the Yi and the Min factions changed its character slightly after 1882, becoming a contest between two groups, one of which desired to modernize the country after the fashion of the changes made in Japan, while the other represented the old order and desired to see as few changes as possible made. The latter group, headed by the Queen, who had lost her desire for change, controlled the government and was supported by the Chinese Resident. The Progressives looked to the Japanese legation for counsel and active aid.

*Progressives
gain control
with aid of
Japanese*

In 1884 the struggle came to its inevitable conclusion—an attempt by the “outs” to gain control by murdering the leaders of the opposition—the usual way in Korea. The Progressives worked out their plans carefully, probably in consultation with the Japanese minister. The plan was to arrange a dinner to celebrate the inauguration of a new postal service. During the course of the dinner a fire was to be reported at the Palace. This would give an opportunity to strike down the reactionary ministers as they rushed out of the banqueting hall. All went according to plan up to a certain point. The cry of fire was raised, and one of the ministers rushed out and was attacked. He was able to get back into the hall, however, and give the alarm. The conspirators then rushed to the Palace and persuaded the King and the Queen to come with them for safety. They were surrounded by Japanese and Koreans in the employ of the Progressives. Under compulsion the King reorganized the government and issued a number of edicts looking toward the transformation of Korea, on paper, into a modern state.

At this stage of the affair the Chinese took a hand.

*Chinese support
Koreans in
attack on
Japanese*

The Chinese Resident, Yüan Shih-k'ai, with the Chinese guard stationed there since 1882, proceeded to the palace to protect the King, but found it occupied by the Japanese envoy and Japanese troops. The Chinese troops opened fire on the Japanese, and a general commotion followed, in which the civil inhabitants of Seoul joined. The Japanese then fought their way out of the city and down to Chemulpo, where they were received on a Japanese steamer. China was then in the midst of the Tongking trouble, and could not oppose Japan, whose special ambassador, Count Inouye Kaoru, supported by a strong naval force, obtained full reparation by a convention signed on January 9th, 1885. By this Korea agreed to apologize and punish the rioters; to pay \$30,000 indemnity; and to construct barracks for the Japanese legation guard.⁶

All of this the Korean government had to concede in spite of the fact

⁶ MORSE, p. II.

that Japan had fomented the trouble by her intrigue with the Progressives, to whom she had promised and given active support up to the time of the Chinese intervention.

The trouble between China and France over Tongking was settled in 1885, and China was free to turn her attention to her interests in Korea. She was not, however, in a position to embark on a war against Japan, even though she underrated the strength of the Japanese. Neither did the Japanese want war over the question, since the peace party was still in control of the government and had not yet carried to completion its work of political reorganization. Both countries wanted time before they entered upon a final struggle for control in Korea. Thus it was possible for them to agree upon a *modus vivendi*, which was embodied in a convention drawn up at Tientsin by the two most eminent statesmen of their respective countries, Viceroy Li Hung-chang for China and Count Ito for Japan. By this convention both parties agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea within four months; Korea was to be left free and encouraged to reorganize her army under foreign direction, which should be neither Japanese nor Chinese; and, in case it should become necessary for either party to send troops to Korea in the future, previous notice in writing of its intention to do so was to be given, and the troops thus sent were to be withdrawn as soon as the trouble causing their despatch had been settled.

*The Tientsin
Convention*

This convention cannot but be considered as a partial diplomatic victory for Japan, since it limited the freedom of China to take action which was perfectly within her right if she was to be regarded as the suzerain power, and consequently it advanced the Japanese contention that Korea was an independent state. The end and aim of Japanese policy since the negotiation of the treaty of 1876 had been to establish this contention, and it was the independence policy of the Progressives which led to their receiving Japanese support. They desired to throw off the Chinese connection because they considered it an obstacle to reform, but they failed to perceive that Japan's ultimate aim was not a really independent Korea, strong and able to protect herself, but a state independent of external control because of the aid and support given it by Japan, for which aid the Japanese might demand a *quid pro quo* in the form of rights of supervision.

*Convention a
diplomatic
victory for
Japan*

Although the Tientsin convention strengthened Japan's contention on paper, in reality the Chinese, for two reasons, were stronger at Seoul after this "oriental general election" of 1884 than they had been before. In the first place, the progressive group was eliminated from the Court, some of the leaders being killed by the mob and some of them, including the chief conspirator, Kim Ok-kuin, escaping to Japan, where they were given asylum. In the second place, the part the Japanese had played in the affair had aroused the latent popular hostility to them. This showed itself by the placing of more reliance on the Chinese.

*Position of
China
strengthened*

*Introduction
of Russian
influence*

The provision in the Tientsin convention for the reorganization of the Korean army under foreign direction had already been carried into effect by the employment of Russian officers, who were introduced into Korea at the suggestion of the foreign adviser, Mr. von Mollendorf. He made the suggestion in 1884 in order to offset the growing power of Japan. But, in return for lending Korea officers to train her army, Russia was to receive the use of Port Lazareff for her navy. This gave her a comparatively ice-free naval base.

Japan saw in it (the granting to Russia of the use of this port) a threat directly across the Sea of Japan; to China it appeared to endanger the independent existence of Korea, and therefore China's suzerainty over the kingdom; and England had to face a disturbance of the Asiatic equilibrium in favor of her principal rival in Asia, while at the same time France was still occupying the Pescadores, and relations between China and Japan were strained.⁷

To restore the balance, England occupied Port Hamilton, "an anchorage in a group of islets off the southern coast of Korea, strategically placed to watch the movements of Russia, Japan, and China, as they might effect Korea." China and Japan, both fearful of the Russian menace, composed their differences temporarily, and China demanded that the agreement with Russia be cancelled. Mr. von Mollendorf, who had advised it, was dismissed from the Korean service and an American took his place. All who were appointed to advisory position in Korea thereafter, or who were put at the head of the Korean customs, which was made more and more an independent but subsidiary branch of the Chinese customs, were advised to remember that "in all that concerns Korea, the one point to start from is that Korea *is* China's tributary, and that China *will not only* fight anybody rather than give up her suzerainty, but will be forced to absorb Korea if troublesome scheming goes on there."⁸ The Chinese Resident, Yüan Shih-k'ai, probably under instructions from Li Hung-chang, also took every opportunity to assert China's superior position.

*Chinese and
Japanese
intrigue*

As a result of the Chinese activity there rapidly developed friction between Yüan and the American who had been installed at Seoul as adviser to the Korean ministry of foreign affairs. The latter, Mr. Denny, who had never been in the service of China, felt that it was his first duty to advance the movement toward Korean independence. This led ultimately to such friction with Yüan Shih-k'ai that one of them had to go. Mr. Denny agreed to withdraw (1889) on certain conditions, one of which was the recall of Yüan. These were agreed to, but the recall of the Resident was postponed on account of the growing friction with Japan.

During the five years, from 1889 to 1894, [writes Mr. H. B. Morse]⁹, Russian plans were in abeyance, the Platonic support given by Amer-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸ Sir R. Hart to Mr. Merrill, May 29, 1880. Cited, MORSE, p. 16.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

ica to Korean independence was no longer in evidence, and China and Japan were left face to face at the Court of Seoul. The party of content, those who supported the existing administration, who desired to maintain the Chinese connection, who wished to keep things as they were, found their support at the Chinese Residency; the party of discontent, the "Young Korea" party who demanded reform, those who leaned toward Japan as a country which had modernized her outward form, and away from China and her antiquated system, all these found support at the Japanese legation. All the forms of oriental intrigue were adopted—demonstrations, denunciations, palace cabals, assassinations of ministers, revolts in the provinces—but in none was any proof ever obtainable of the agency of the side which would be benefitted. Plotting and counterplotting, charge and counter-charge, advice and counter-advice, all were poured into the ears of the distracted puppet king, until nothing was left but the final arbitrament of war.

5. THE CAUSES OF THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR (1894-1895)

The immediate cause of the war which broke out in 1894 was the growth of rebellion in Korea and the inability of the Korean government to maintain its authority against the rebels. The Tong-haks, a sect which had sprung up in Korea in 1859 and which was founded on a combination of elements of the three Oriental religions—Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism—petitioned in 1883 for a reversal of the decree which had branded their leader as a sorcerer and heretic, and for tolerance of the sect.

The Tong-haks

There was a decided anti-foreign feeling among the Tong-haks, as was evidenced by statements of their leaders, and by placards denouncing foreign ideas which were put on some of the American mission buildings in Seoul. Partly because of the anti-foreign spirit in the movement the government declined to receive the petition. Following this there were constant reports of unrest in some of the provinces, and eventually there came an open outbreak. The government seemed unable to cope with it, and finally requested the aid of the suzerain power to put it down. This aid had already been offered by the Chinese Resident, and had even been urged on the government. "The Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, only sent these troops after long hesitation, the Chinese resident at Seoul having first requested his interference about a month ago. He insisted on an express request from the King of Korea, so that the responsibility for the movement should rest on him."¹⁰ About fifteen hundred troops were sent to Asan from Wei Hai Wei, and *after*¹¹ this action had been taken the Japanese were notified, and were informed that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the occasion for their presence in Korea had passed.

Rebellion causes China to send troops to Korea

The Japanese countered by sending large detachments of troops to Seoul by way of Chemulpo. By the time the Chinese troops had reached Korea the revolt had been put down by the Korean army, and

Japan's forces augmented and demand made for reform

¹⁰ Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, appendix 1 (N12), p. 20.

¹¹ The Tientsin convention provided for *previous* notice. Li Hung-chang claimed to have been informed that notice had been sent from Peking before the troops were despatched.

the need for their services had passed. China, however, refused to withdraw her force until Japan had recalled hers from the country. The government of Korea began negotiations with both countries to bring about the evacuation of the kingdom, but during the course of the negotiations both sides augmented rather than reduced their forces. Japan proposed to China that the two countries should unite in pressing reform on the Korean government. China refused to act with Japan in the matter, taking the attitude that both should withdraw and allow Korea freedom of action in determining upon reform. Japan, in turn, refused to consider the Chinese proposal for simultaneous withdrawal as a preliminary to reform proposals, even though it was supported by the diplomatic and consular body at Seoul. Japanese opinion had been inflamed by the sending of troops by China without the giving of *previous* notice as provided for by the Tientsin convention. And it had already been aroused by the murder at Shanghai of the Korean arch-rebel, Kim Ok-kuin, and the action of the Chinese government in sending the body in state to Korea, where it was beheaded and quartered, the parts of the body being exhibited throughout the country as a reminder of the fate which befell traitors. Japan seemed determined on war, and the continued maintenance of the troops of the two countries in Korea could not but eventuate in war. Each side, however, wanted to evade the responsibility for the commencement of hostilities. The overt act was finally committed when Japanese war vessels fired upon the Chinese troop-ship, the Kowshing,¹² which was bringing re-enforcements to the force at Chemulpo. This brought the period of negotiation to an end.

*Japan's policy
directed toward
severing of
Chinese
connection*

Before tracing the course of the war, and considering its results, we must attempt to discover why Japan wanted war, if such was really the case, since the answer to this question may shed some light on subsequent Japanese policy in eastern Asia. The statement is sometimes made that all of Japan's wars in the modern period of her history have been defensive, but it is hard to see how the war with China can be so considered. It arose, to be sure, over Korea, the "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." A foreign Power actually in the control of Korea, if aggressively inclined, would be able to threaten seriously the integrity and the peace of Japan. But China was not actively in control of the kingdom; her position as suzerain had long been nominal rather than real, and had not been utilized to enable her to dictate the internal arrangements of the Korean state. She began to interfere actively in Korean affairs only when even this nominal relationship was threatened by Japanese policy. This policy was directed from the beginning toward the detachment of Korea from the Chinese connection, apparently, from the Chinese point of

¹² The fact that the Kowshing was a British chartered steamer and was flying the British flag caused considerable discussion of Japan's action.

view, in order to replace it with a Japanese connection which, in turn, would be detrimental to China's interest.

But while China's nominal control of Korea cannot be considered immediately to have menaced the safety of Japan, there is more substance to the Japanese argument that internal conditions in Korea made her a "nuisance" and, for that reason, a danger to the bordering states. The chronic condition of unrest in the provinces and of turmoil at the court could not but arouse the displeasure of a neighbor trying to keep her own house in good order. Furthermore this state of unrest in Korea directly invited continual interference from the outside by stronger Powers than Japan and China.

*Korea a
"nuisance"
because of
internal
conditions*

Russian expansion to the Pacific had already brought her into contact with Japan in such a way as to awaken the Japanese government to the danger of allowing Russia to establish herself as close to the Japanese islands as Korea. In 1884 Russia had revealed her interest in that country by undertaking a reform of the Korean army. The request for the use of Port Lazareff indicated the Russian objective. Thus in order to forestall Russia it was necessary for Japan to establish herself securely in the peninsula. But China, prior to the war with Japan, was also mistrustful of Russia. One way of meeting any threat to Korea from the north would have been to strengthen the Chinese connection rather than to break it down.¹³ Russia and Japan, if the Japanese policy of establishing Korean independence proved successful, would meet at Seoul on terms of equality in the struggle for control, whereas the Chinese position had long been acquiesced in. Of course China might ultimately develop aggressive tendencies, as she had in the distant past, and thus prove as much of a menace to Japan as Russia, and fear of the future may have determined Japan to secure her interest by her own action. There were two ways of doing this: (1) they could establish the independence of Korea and then insist on a reorganization of the country and modernization of its political system that would enable Korea to maintain her independence by herself and remove the excuse for foreign intervention on the ground of bad internal conditions; or (2) they could, after breaking down the connection with China, establish Japanese control over the peninsula. From the beginning Japan insisted on the necessity for reform, and gave her active support to the reform party; but after both China and Russia had been eliminated from the country, Japan actually proceeded to carry out the second policy. Whether she had this in mind from the beginning, it is impossible to say; but it is possible to establish the fact that much of the disorder in Korea during the years after 1876 was the result of Japanese, countered by Chinese, intrigue. And it was this disorder which Japan used as the excuse for her interest in Korean affairs.

*Fear of
Russian
control of
Korea*

Another possible reason for Japan's interest in Korea was eco-

¹³ Except as it may be considered that China was herself so weak and backward that she would be unable to defend either Korea or herself from external aggression.

*Japan's
economic
interest in
Korea*

conomic. The kingdom produced a considerable amount of rice, but its export was forbidden since it furnished the most important item in the diet of the people. A dominant Japan could use Korea for the purpose of enlarging the food supply of the Japanese people. As a matter of fact, in 1894 the Korean government had been persuaded by Japan to suspend the decree forbidding the export of rice, and Japanese agents had purchased every cattle of it that could be secured, much to the dissatisfaction of the Korean people, who had to pay higher prices. Further than this, the Japanese had developed shipping and trade interests in Korea very rapidly, controlling forty per cent of the imports in 1894, and an even larger proportion of the shipping. Thus there was presented a valuable market, still largely undeveloped, which the Japanese undoubtedly desired to control. And they had absorbed the European doctrine that political ascendancy in a country must be secured as a preliminary to the establishment of a safe economic position. This, again, may represent a point of view toward the continent which gained a hearing later than 1894, or it may have had an important bearing on Japanese policy at that time. At any rate it deserves consideration in any estimate of the causes of the Japanese determination to fight for Korea.

*Desire for
continental
expansion a
factor*

In evaluating Japanese policy after the opening of Korea we must bear in mind also that the doctrine of continental expansion had been preached as part of the pre-Restoration program. One of the most active leaders in the campaign which ultimately undermined the *Shogunate* was Yoshida-shoin, who was an expansionist of the first water. His school harked back to the sixteenth century and the Hideyoshi campaign against Korea and China, and urged the overthrow of the *Shogunate* and a concentration of power in the Emperor as a preliminary step to the establishment of Japanese power on the continent through the conquest of Korea. Among those who sat at his feet were Prince Yamagata and Count (later Prince) Ito, the former one of the organizers of the modern Japanese army, and the latter the father of the Japanese constitutional system. Count Ito, it is true, had been one of the leaders of the peace party in Japan during the transition period, but this did not mean that he had forgotten the teaching of Yoshida. It meant that he believed it necessary for Japan to strengthen herself at home before undertaking any continental adventures. That he believed Japan sufficiently transformed by 1894 to develop a strong continental policy, is perhaps open to question. He was firmly seated in power so long as the peace party remained in control, and for that reason he might have wished to avoid the war, had it not been for the new forces which appeared in Japanese politics with the promulgation of the constitution.

*Political
conditions in
Japan an
explanation of
war policy*

But the years 1890-1894 revealed the inability of the oligarchy to control Japan effectively in the face of the opposition of the political parties in the Diet. Prince Yamagata, leader of the war party, tried and failed, and after the Matsukata ministry had re-

signed, Ito himself had undertaken to run the governmental machine. In order to carry on he was forced to resort to the Imperial Rescript, and yet that only temporarily ended the opposition of the Diet to his government. It was necessary for him to acknowledge that the system he had provided could not function in the face of the development of the political party, and that the oligarchy must retire into the background, entrusting power to the parties, a solution which would not be accepted by the other clan leaders; or to ask for a revision of the constitution such as would enable the government to be carried on without the Diet; or, finally, to find some method of overcoming the opposition of the parties to his government. In those circumstances the most feasible method of rallying the nation to the support of the government was to resort to a foreign war.

The opportunity was presented by the action of China in sending troops to Korea without a previous notification to Japan. The people were ready and clamoring for war. There was only one drawback—war meant that the Civil Bureaucrats would be pushed into the background, at least temporarily, and that the power of the Military Bureaucrats would be enhanced. The former had to gamble on their ability to restore themselves to power after the war had been brought to a conclusion. This chance Count Ito took rather than face the certainty of seeing his constitutional structure broken down by the assaults of the parties. The Sino-Japanese War was caused by the condition of Japanese politics, coupled with the centuries-old interest of Japan in Korea as the gateway to continental expansion, supplemented by a national fear lest Korea should come under the control of some strong foreign Power, and by a budding interest in control of the resources of the peninsula and in Korea as a market.

*Summary of
causes of war
from standpoint
of Japanese
policy*

China, on her side, accepted the possibility of war and by her actions transformed a possibility into a certainty. There were several reasons for her attitude. Fundamentally her whole policy after 1876 was directed toward correcting the mistake made when she allowed Japan to redress her own grievances against Korea and to negotiate a treaty on the basis of independence. This error was not repaired as a result of the introduction of the Western Powers into the kingdom on the same basis. England by her subsequent actions sought to strengthen China as the suzerain, but the policy of the United States supported that of Japan. Consequently China sought to revive her pretensions by continued interference in Korean affairs, an interference which was welcomed by the conservative party. Her actions were certain to result in conflict with Japan if that state carried into effect its program. To the extent that China opposed Japanese policies in order to maintain her claim to suzerainty, she must accept responsibility for the conflict of 1894-1895.

*Chinese
responsibility
for war*

Aside from the Korean policy, Chinese action may also be explained in terms of internal politics. There was an anti-Li party at Peking which sought to weaken his influence by attacking his Korean

*Peking politics
also explain
China's policy*

policy as weak. This clique was willing to resort to war if thereby his dominance might be weakened. Its members were ultra-conservative and consequently anti-foreign. They believed China to be strong and thought it possible to restore Manchu prestige by a successful war against Japan, which they considered weak. Li Hung-chang himself was supposed to have strengthened China's army and so he was not in the best position, even if he believed it, to proclaim China's weakness and inability to sustain a foreign war, especially against a Power considered in every way inferior. Thus his position at Court depended upon putting up a bold front to Japan. He had evaded the issue with the Chinese war party in 1884-1885 by counseling patience until his army reorganization had been carried to completion, and until the Tongking trouble had been ended. These excuses for postponement did not exist ten years later. Thus we see that, while Japan was determined on war, China was not in a position to go to the limit in the search for a peace formula.

6. THE COURSE OF THE WAR

*Military
strength of
China*

It seemed presumptuous for Japan to challenge the Celestial Empire to combat—a case of the giant and the dwarf, if size of territory and population and greatness of resources are considered. To superficial observers it seemed that such a war could have but one outcome, an overwhelming defeat for Japan. The American minister at Peking in a despatch to the State Department summarized the general attitude well: "The army of Japan upon a war footing is only 120,000 men, while the Viceroy Li alone has 50,000 foreign drilled troops armed with modern arms, and of fine discipline and efficiency. Besides these there are many thousand foreign-drilled troops in other parts of the Empire, and a practically inexhaustible supply of the old fashioned native soldiery."¹⁴

*China weak in
comparison
with Japan*

To say that the course of the war surprised all but the informed few, is to put it mildly. China did have an inexhaustible supply of men, but she had no modern army worthy of the name, and her navy, on paper greatly superior to that of Japan, proved entirely unable to cope with the Japanese navy. Japan had thoroughly reorganized and modernized her fighting services, from the standpoint of both training and equipment. Nothing less than the best that she could get had satisfied her. China, on the other hand, had reorganized part of her military establishment, but had been satisfied with inferior instruction and equipment, the difference in cost between old and discarded weapons and the newer types of armament going to line the pockets of officials and their friends, from Li Hung-chang down. Consequently the greater resources of China proved to be more than neutralized by the superior training of the Japanese and the better weapons with which they were supplied. The difference in training was especially

¹⁴ Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1894, append. 1, no. 17 (p. 24).

noticeable in the leadership of the Japanese forces on both land and sea. They were masters of modern tactics and strategy. China was further handicapped by the feeling south of the Yangtse River that the war was the private affair of Li Hung-chang, or, at the most, of the north. The southern Chinese navy refused to participate in the struggle, and the governors whose territories were unaffected failed fully to support the Imperial cause. The reasons for this attitude have already been referred to. The consequence at this time was that the war was carried on largely between Japan and the followers of Li Hung-chang.

The lessons of their own earlier conflicts with Korea and China had not been lost on the Japanese. Before sending troops into Korea in large numbers, the navy went into action in order to secure communication with the home base. The Chinese fleet was defeated off the mouth of the Yalu, and again, towards the end of the war, at Wei Hai Wei, where it had put in for refuge.

*Chinese fleet
defeated*

After control of the seas had been established, Japanese troops began to pour in large numbers into Korea, where they quickly made themselves master. The King was forced to issue a number of edicts changing the entire governmental system, and modernizing, on paper, the economic and social life of Korea almost overnight. From Korea the Japanese forces pushed on into Manchuria, driving the Chinese forces before them. When they were on the point of invading China proper, the Manchu government indicated its desire to open negotiations for peace. Overtures were made at first through the United States, which had been entrusted with the care of the interests of each belligerent in the other country. Before Japan would consent to begin conversations, China was forced to sue directly for peace through the American minister, her first intimations having been of a willingness to accept the good offices of the United States. Japan delayed the opening of negotiations as long as possible in order that the Chinese fleet at Wei Hai Wei might first be disposed of, and so that Formosa might be occupied by the force sent to effect its conquest. The government consequently declined to treat with the first Chinese mission, taking exception to the credentials given the negotiators, and insisting that an official be appointed of sufficiently high rank to ensure the acceptance by the Manchu court of any engagements he might make without reference of details back to Peking.

*Japanese
occupation of
Korea*

7. THE TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI

Brought to a proper humility by the disaster of the war, the Emperor finally appointed Li Hung-chang, restored to his dignities,¹⁵ to negotiate the peace. Shortly after negotiations had been begun at Shimonoseki an attempt was made on his life by a Japanese fanatic.

*The terms of
peace*

¹⁵ After the first disaster of the war he was deprived of the Peacock Feather and the Yellow Jacket, and removed from his post at Tientsin, although he was forced to continue his direction of the war.

This delayed negotiations, but resulted in advantage for China, as Japan modified her peace demands in order to show her regret for the injury to China's foremost statesman. The terms finally agreed upon at Shimonoseki and embodied in the treaty of peace were as follows: China recognized definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea; she was forced to "cede to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty" (a) that part of Manchuria lying east of the river Liao (Liaotung) and south of a line from the junction of the rivers Anping and Yalu, by Fenghwang-cheng and Haicheng, to Yingkow, (b) Formosa, and (c) the Pescadores group; an indemnity of 200,000,000 *taels* was to be paid by China, and Wei Hai Wei was to be occupied by the Japanese until this indemnity had been paid, and until a satisfactory treaty of commerce was signed and ratified; and, finally, four new ports were to be opened to foreign trade,—Shasi and Chungking on the Yangtse River, and Soochow and Hangchow on the Grand Canal—and the direct waterways leading to them were to be opened to traffic.

Nature of territorial losses

Of these conditions, the cession of Formosa and of the Pescadores group and the recognition of Korean independence merely carried a step further the process already described of trimming off the fringes of the Empire, and China had already been accustomed to the assumption of indemnities and to the opening of ports under pressure. But the cession of the Liaotung peninsula threatened Manchuria, the home of the ruling family, and brought a foreign Power very close to Peking itself. Consequently this demand must have greatly alarmed the Chinese government, and might have brought it to the point of continuing the war, if it had not received some assurances of support which would neutralize the fact of the cession.

Danger of intervention suggested to Japan

That there might come European intervention, if the turn of the conflict should seem to invite it, had been apparent from the outset. Japan's success and her presence on the continent would tend to upset the Asiatic equilibrium. The advance actually made had the effect of throwing Japan into the pathway of Russian expansion. Furthermore, England had come to base her policy on the preservation of the territorial integrity of China. In fact, from the first, Japan had been fearful of British intervention in favor of China. This danger of intervention the American government had called to the attention of the Japanese in the following words: "If the struggle continues without check to Japan's military operations on land and sea, it is not improbable that the powers having interests in that quarter may demand a settlement not favorable to Japan's future security and well-being."¹⁶

The intervention of the Three Powers

In the interests of other states lay the Chinese assurance that the Empire would be saved from the imposition of too harsh terms. Li Hung-chang may not have had definite promises of foreign support and intervention, but he undoubtedly had good reason to believe that

¹⁶ Quoted by DENNETT, p. 499.

Russia, for one, would not acquiesce in the establishment of Japan on the mainland in such a position as to prevent or limit Russian expansion. The one provision of the treaty of Shimonoseki which would have this effect was that ceding to Japan the Liaotung promontory. To this provision there came objection even before the exchange of ratifications of the treaty. Russia, joined by France, her European ally, and also by Germany, presented a demand to Japan that the Liaotung territory be restored to China. The reason given for the demand was that the proximity of the territory to Peking made its possession by any Power other than China a perpetual threat to the Chinese capital. In the face of superior and overwhelming force Japan gave way, receiving in lieu of the territory an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 *taels*.

The Russian action did not surprise greatly Japanese statesmen, nor did the support given to Russia by France, her ally in Europe; but the Japanese were unable to understand and never forgot the support given to Russia at this time by Germany. It was clear that Russia stood to lose by the entrenchment of Japan so close to Peking, since Russia and Japan were not, and, by the nature of their respective interests and policies in the Far East at that time, could not be expected to be, on friendly terms. But Germany had no territorial interests in eastern Asia, and it seemed like a gratuitous insult for her to aid in depriving Japan of a part of the fruits of her victory. It could be explained at that time only by a desire on the part of Germany to cultivate Russia by supporting her in the Far East in order to advance German interests in Europe.

*Japanese
reaction to
intervention*

On the other hand, the Japanese were pleasantly surprised by the attitude of Great Britain throughout the war and at the time of the intervention. As the struggle progressed the British position came close to being sympathetic to the Japanese, and the British government, although it advised Japan to accede to the demand of the three intervening Powers, did not itself raise any objection to the terms of the treaty. The British attitude at the time, together with the increased good will shown by the revision of the Japanese treaty in 1894, seemed to indicate a change in the Far Eastern policy of the British Empire.

*The British
attitude*

In spite of the intervention, however, the final effect of the war was to demonstrate beyond all doubt the weakness of China, to strengthen Japan immeasurably in the eyes of the world, to change the course of development in the Far East, as a consequence of the revelation of the weakness of China and of the strength of Japan, and to give to Japan far more than she had hoped to obtain at the outset—Formosa and the Pescadores, in addition to the recognition by China of the complete independence of Korea. The Japanese war party was disappointed in that the Empire was not extended to include continental territory, but that dream was not given up because of the temporary set-back resulting from the Three-Powers' intervention.

*War
demonstrated
weakness of
China and
strength of
Japan*

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CHAPTER VII

CUTTING THE CHINESE MELON

I. CONSEQUENCES OF WAR OF 1894-5

THE Sino-Japanese War marked a reversal in the relative positions of China and Japan in the Far East. Before the war the Western nations had respected the potential if not the actual power of China, and had patronized Japan. After 1895 but scant respect was paid to the Chinese Empire, which had shown itself not only weak in a military sense, but lacking in that national consciousness which rallies a people behind its government in the face of the foreign foe. One effect of the spirit of localism, made glaringly apparent during the course of the war, was the lack of ability, or even desire, to concentrate the entire strength of the nation against the Japanese. Further than this, the lack of integrity of the officials, as well as their inefficiency in the face of modern conditions, was completely revealed. The stock of Japan, on the other hand, took a sudden rise. Her army and navy received nothing but the highest praise from foreign critics, and it was conceded that they made Japan a factor which could not be disregarded in the future politics of the Far East. The war marked the reception of Japan as an adult member of the society of nations. No longer could the West dictate the terms of its intercourse with her. Even if the treaties with Japan had not been modified prior to the outbreak of hostilities, they would have had to be revised in her favor after the signature of the treaty of Shimonoseki.

*Enhancement
of prestige of
Japan and
decline in
respect for
China*

Nevertheless the war, successful though it was from the Japanese standpoint, did not leave Japan a primary force in the Far East. The Great Powers were led to respect her but not to concede her a determining voice in continental politics. She was taught her place for the time being by the Three-Powers' intervention in favor of China.

*But Japan not
a primary factor
in Far East*

2. RUSSIA MOVES SOUTH

The period from 1895 to 1902 was one of Russian domination. China had a wholesome respect for the power of her great neighbor—a respect which had been not a little tinged with fear as Russia had pressed in from the west and down from the north. But any conception that Chinese officials may have had of Russia as the state to be dreaded was changed for a few years after the war with Japan. Russia had taken the lead in averting the danger and humiliation that would have come from the establishment of Japan in Manchuria and close

*Russian
ascendency at
Peking*

to Peking, and she further intimated that she would stand between China and future encroachments on the part of the Japanese. Consequently Russian influence became predominant at Peking. This influence was strengthened by the support given Russian policy by the French minister. Incidentally France herself benefited materially by the alliance with Russia, since it gave her diplomats a standing at the *Tsungli Yamen* which otherwise they would not have had. Germany, the third party in the intervention, had a claim on the gratitude of the Chinese government, and, by working partly with Russia and in part with British financiers, she was able in due course to reap the reward for her action.

*Decline of
English
influence*

With the enhancement of Russian influence at Peking, however, that of Great Britain declined. Almost single-handed England had opened China to foreign intercourse. From 1860 until 1895 the British minister had taken the lead in all movements designed to make that intercourse more satisfactory and profitable to the states of the West.¹ England was still the greatest trading Power in 1895 and thereafter, and yet her political influence during the critical period from 1895 to 1901 was less than it had ever been. This was partly due to her preoccupation in other parts of the world, but it was also due to her inability to obtain support from any other legation and to the negative character of her policy. France and Russia were working together to promote their interests, and China's most prominent statesman had swung over to the Russian side. Germany was desirous of strengthening her position, which could best be done by utilizing first Russia and then England, but not by taking a permanent stand with the latter. And the United States was too preoccupied with Cuban developments and too little interested in the Far East in 1895 to develop a positive plan of action.

*Russo-Chinese
alliance*

Shortly after the signature of the treaty of Shimonoseki Russia moved to strengthen her new position as the protector of China. Partly from considerations of internal politics and partly because of its friendly relations with Russia, the Manchu government sent Li Hung-chang to St. Petersburg to represent China at the ceremonies of May, 1896, attendant upon the coronation of the Czar. Count Witte, the eminent Russian statesman, urged upon the Chinese plenipotentiary, during his stay in the Russian capital, the negotiation of a treaty of alliance.² He pointed out that the danger to China had been averted only for the time, that Russia was desirous of giving China effective aid in case her territory were again menaced, and that it was advisable for China to give Russia the right and the means to aid her effectively in time of need. His argument convinced Li Hung-chang so completely that before he left St. Petersburg a secret treaty

¹ Except during the period of service at the legation of the United States of Mr. Burlingame, when the leadership passed for a time to the Americans.

² See *Memoirs*, ch. IV, for detailed account.

of alliance was initialed.³ The alliance was directed specifically against Japan, the High Contracting Parties agreeing to support each other reciprocally, making war and peace in common, in the event of Japanese aggression in eastern Asia, whether against Russian or Chinese territory. In time of war China agreed to allow Russia freely to use her harbors and other facilities. This guarantee of protection for China against a possible Japanese attack was given by Russia in return for the right to project the Trans-Siberian Railroad across northern Manchuria directly to Vladivostok.

Pursuant to the terms of a supplementary convention, Russia chartered a private corporation known as the Russo-Chinese Bank, to which China entrusted the financing of the Manchurian section (called the Chinese Eastern Railway) of the Trans-Siberian. This bank became the chief instrument for the Russian penetration of Manchuria. As described in its charter, it was to be an agency for "the collection of duties in the Empire of China, and the transactions relating to the State treasury of the respective place, the coinage, with the authorization of the Chinese government, of the country's money, the payment of interest on loans, concluded by the Chinese Government, the acquisition of concessions for the construction of railways within the boundaries of China, and the establishment of telegraph lines."⁴ Thus although organized and controlled under Russian law, the Russo-Chinese Bank was to serve as the fiscal agent of the Chinese government in addition to undertaking the work of financing railroads and other projects in Manchuria. The first railroad concession falling to its lot was one for the construction of the Chinese Eastern. For this purpose it organized a construction company which had the right to construct and operate the road and to control properties, such as quarries, necessary to its construction. In addition, the company had administrative rights in the railway zone. The concession was to run for eighty years from the time of the completion of the road, when it was to revert to China without payment. She reserved to herself, however, the right to redeem the road at the end of a period of thirty-six years, "but the terms of the redemption were so burdensome that it was highly improbable that the Chinese government would ever attempt to effect the redemption. It was calculated that should the Chinese Government wish to redeem the road at the beginning of the 37th year, it would have to pay the corporation, according to the terms of the concession, a sum not less than 700 million rubles."⁵

The terms of this concession were extremely favorable to Russia, but the right to build the Siberian railroad to Vladivostok across northern Manchuria would have been advantageous under almost any conditions. It not only gave a direct route, cutting off the wide detour which would have been necessary had the road been completed en-

*Russo-Chinese
Bank and the
Chinese Eastern
Railway*

*Advantages of
Chinese Eastern
Railway
concession*

³ It has also been charged that Li Hung-chang's venality explained his action in entering into the agreement.

⁴ WILLOUGHBY, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, pp. 296-7.

⁵ WITTE, *Memoirs*, p. 95.

tirely in Russian territory, but it also injected Russian economic influence into northern Manchuria.⁶ The entire railroad project seems to have been economic in its origin—part of Count Witte's statesman-like plans for the industrial development of Russia. The Siberian railroad justified his expectations from the outset. Peasants began to settle the country on either side as the road was constructed section by section, and trade developed with the settlement of the territory. That Manchuria might be similarly developed under Russian direction and to her economic advantage, was far from improbable. And Russia would gain as much from the development as if it had come in her own territory. Of course, in addition to the economic motive back of the Trans-Siberian Railroad there was also the strategic. The railroad would serve to unify the Russian territories more effectively than was possible in any other way. But, so far as Manchuria was concerned, Alexander III, the initiator of the project, and Count Witte, had in mind an economic penetration rather than a territorial gain for the Russian Empire.

3. THE GERMAN ADVANCE

The so-called "battle of the concessions," however, was inaugurated by Germany rather than by Russia. She had determined to insist on adequate recognition by China of her aid in securing the retrocession of the Liaotung peninsula. In the spring of 1897 she intimated to the other Powers her desire to secure a coaling and naval station on the coast of China, and began to make surveys with a view to fixing upon a suitable port. However, before acting, it was necessary to find a suitable pretext. This was afforded by the murder of two German priests in Shantung province. Within a period of two weeks after the murder the German government had served demands on the *Tsungli Yamen*, including: 1) a ninety-nine year lease of Tsingtao and an area comprehending the entire bay of Kiaochow; 2) the sole right of railway construction and the exploitation of the coal mines of Shantung province; and 3) the payment of an indemnity and the expenses of the naval expedition which had occupied Tsingtao prior to the serving of the demands.

These demands were substantially accepted by the Chinese government and embodied in the agreement of March 6, 1898. The area surrounding Kiaochow Bay was leased, provisionally, for a period of ninety-nine years to Germany, the Emperor of China, while retaining title to the territory, agreeing not to exercise his sovereign rights therein for the period of the lease. Germany, on her side, reserved the right to restore the territory to China at any time and to secure, as compensation, a station at some other point on the coast. The territory was never to be sublet to any other Power. Instead of exclusive railroad

⁶ Art. 10 of the Chinese Eastern agreement provided that goods imported into or exported from China or Russia overland via the railway should pay according to the treaty tariff, with a deduction of one-third from the tariff rates. It was expected that this would stimulate trade.

*German
demands on
China open
scramble for
concessions*

*Terms of
agreement of
March 6, 1898*

and mining rights in the province, specific concessions for the building of roads and the opening and operation of mines were given to Germany.⁷

4. THE "BATTLE OF THE CONCESSIONS"

The granting of these demands meant a serious disturbance of the balance of power in the Far East in favor of one state. Consequently all the others moved immediately to secure their separate interests. Russia occupied Port Arthur and demanded a lease of the tip of the Liaotung promontory (the Kwantung area), including Port Arthur and Talienwan, for a period of twenty-five years; an extension of the concessions of the Russo-Chinese Bank to include a projection southward to Port Arthur of the Chinese Eastern Railroad; and mining rights in southern Manchuria.

*Russia acquires
Port Arthur*

This led England to request the lease of Wei Hai Wei for the period of the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. She also demanded from China a declaration that she would not alienate to any Power the provinces bordering on the Yangtse River; a promise that an English subject should hold the post of Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs so long as British trade supremacy was maintained in China; and a lease of the territory on the mainland opposite Hongkong.

British gains

France had already, in 1895, secured a statement from China that she would not alienate to any other Power the island of Hainan. She had also gained a concession in the matter of customs charges on goods entering China from the French dependencies in the south;⁸ a priority in the exploitation of the mines of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces; and permission to extend the Annamese railway into Chinese territory. In 1897-1898 she further advanced her interests by securing a non-alienation agreement covering the provinces bordering on Tongking; by demanding and receiving definite concessions for the building of railroads in Yunnan province; by the gaining of a lease for ninety-nine years of Kwangchou Bay; and by securing from China a promise that whenever a separate postal service was established the Imperial Government would be "willing to take account of the recommendations of the French Government in respect to the selection of the Staff." Japan, in her turn, asked for an agreement from China not to alienate to any other Power Fukien province, which lies opposite Formosa. All of these demands were acceded to by the Chinese government, but when Italy requested a lease of Sanmen Bay it screwed up its courage to the sticking point and refused to grant it. This brought the "concession grabbing" to an end for the time being.

*France advances
her position*

*The Italian
demand for a
leasehold
refused*

⁷ China agreed, however, to call upon Germany first in case she needed foreign money for the development of Shantung province, and to purchase materials from Germany, provided, in both cases, that Germany's terms were as favorable as could be obtained elsewhere.

⁸ The regular maritime customs charges were to be reduced by four-tenths.

5. SPHERES OF INTEREST

*Delimitation of
spheres of
interest*

So quickly had these developments come and so little resistance had the Imperial Government been able to make, that the end of the Chinese Empire apparently might come at any time. The first step looking toward the partition of such a state as China is likely to be the marking out of the country into spheres of special interest, and these several agreements between the Powers and China resulted in the application of that term to various parts of the Empire. Thus Manchuria was said to be Russia's sphere of interest, Shantung the sphere of Germany, etc. The term, "sphere of interest," as applied to China, carries primarily an economic significance.

Its essential element [says Overlach]⁹ is a negative one; namely, the term expresses the principle that no other power except the one in whose favor the "sphere of interest" exists shall be permitted to acquire concessions or to exert any control or influence whatsoever—not to speak about military occupation—at the same time giving the privileged power a monopoly of the right to seek concessions. This privilege, however, does by no means entitle its holder to any positive exercise of influence within the sphere which would change the sphere of interest to a sphere of influence. For the latter term, which has never been used officially, as far as China is concerned, suggests a certain degree of authority or control, either financial or political, exercised by a foreign power within a certain territory.


*Logical
conclusion of
establishment
of spheres*

The great danger to a country such as China is the possibility that, as a result of the development of exclusive interests in one section by any one state, there should be found an excuse for the establishment of a measure of control, either political or financial, thus translating the "sphere of interest" into a "sphere of influence." After the latter is established, it is likely to be but a short step to the assertion of a "protectorate" by the gradual enlargement of the powers of control. The logical conclusion of the development of the "sphere" conception is, through the gradual introduction of political control, complete absorption of the territory concerned into the empire of the state first asserting therein its priority of economic interest. That this would have been the ultimate fate of China, had not the development of "spheres of interest" been checked at an early stage, cannot be doubted.

*Basic elements
of sphere of
interest*


The assertion of claims to "spheres of interest" in China was commonly based on a series of less inclusive concessions, which have already been described. First we have the leasehold on the coast, giving a presumptive claim to the hinterland in the event of the actual partition of China. When a Power secured a leasehold, however, it also secured, as a rule, certain economic concessions in the region, either in the hinterland of a leased area or in a specified region in which no lease had been demanded. These concessions, as has been pointed out, consisted of rights to finance the construction of, and to

⁹ OVERLACH, *Foreign Financial Control in China*, p. 5.









construct, railroads with materials furnished from the state of the concessionaire, and in some cases to operate the railroad after its completion; and of the right to exploit the mineral wealth of the region. And in the third place, we have the non-alienation agreements regarding various sections. These also were usually joined with economic concessions granted in the provinces, which the Chinese government promised not to alienate to any other Power.

All of this was accomplished by agreement between China and the European state concerned in each case. It still remained for it to make good its claim to a "sphere of interest" against the other Powers. This produced the fourth type of agreement and the real establishment of a "sphere." The first three did not prevent China from making other agreements, if she could, giving to third parties specific concessions in the area marked off as a "sphere." In fact it was to her interest to do so in order to make clear her title to the territory. Consequently each one of the Powers proceeded to secure from the others the fullest possible recognition of its exclusive interest in the area claimed by it for exploitation.

*Inter-Power
agreements
essential to
establishment
of sphere*

In pursuance of the Siam Convention of 1896, France and Great Britain had agreed to share any special privileges that either secured in Yunnan and Szechuan provinces. In 1898, however, France asserted her superiority of interest in the provinces bordering on Tongking, including Yunnan, when she secured a non-alienation agreement from China respecting them. She also gained for her nationals then, and by an earlier agreement, the right to construct railways in Yunnan. Great Britain quietly acquiesced in this change in status, seeking compensation in the Yangtse valley. Thus there was a tacit recognition given to the French claim to a "sphere of interest" in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kueichow provinces. Kwangtung also fell within the group of provinces which China agreed not to alienate, but owing to the British ownership of Hongkong, and the extension of her interest in eastern Kwangtung by the lease of the Kowloon territory, Kwangtung province may be considered as divided, only the western part of the province falling within the French sphere. Szechuan may also be considered as a field for joint exploitation. Since Great Britain was the only other Power with an interest in southwestern China, with British recognition of the priority of her claim France may be considered to have safeguarded herself from encroachment on her sphere.

*Franco-British
adjustments*

The chief international interest lies in the agreement reached between Great Britain, on the one hand, and Russia and Germany, on the other, concerning the Yangtse valley, Shantung, and Manchuria. When Great Britain demanded the lease of Wei Hai Wei, on the northern coast of Shantung province, she was careful to assure the German government that she had no intention of encroaching on the German preserve in that province so far as the seeking of economic concessions was concerned. In 1898 a further understanding as to railroad concessions in China was reached directly between English and

*The Anglo-
German
agreements*

German financiers. This agreement defined the British sphere of interest so as to include roughly all of the provinces drained by the Yangtse River and its tributaries, with certain exceptions giving Shantung railroads the right of connection with the Yangtse lines. Shansi province, subject to a reserved right of connection, also went to the British. The German sphere was defined to include the Yellow River valley, including specifically Shantung province, subject to certain rights of connection. Each agreed not to compete for concessions in the other's sphere.

The Scott-Mouravieff agreement

Russian-British differences were composed by the Scott-Mouravieff agreement (1899), by which Great Britain agreed not to go north of the Great Wall in search of railroad concessions, while Russia agreed, for her part, to respect the British sphere in the Yangtse valley.

6. ATTITUDE AND INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

Revival of interest in the Far East

These agreements would have left China helpless if the Powers making them had observed them in good faith, and if all the Powers had been similarly committed to respect these claims to "spheres of interest." But the United States had not taken part in the scramble of 1897-1898, although she was just reawakening to the importance of questions of foreign politics. Intermittently the United States had manifested an active interest in the Far East. At the time of the opening of China she was the second trading Power at the port of Canton. Her share in the opening of Japan has already been described. After the American Civil War, however, the active interest of the United States in the outside world, including the Far East, was greatly lessened as attention came to be concentrated on domestic development. But during the years 1865-1898 the American nation went through a transformation, emerging an industrial rather than primarily an agricultural state. By the 'nineties this industrial progress had gone so far that many Americans felt that foreign markets were needed to absorb the excess production of industry, and capital had been accumulated, it was felt by many, beyond the ability of the home field to absorb it. Joined with this purely economic interest in the outside world, there came an added interest in international relations due to the war with Spain. That war left the United States with a territorial stake in the Far East, the Philippines, making her an Asiatic Power. All of this produced an interest in the question of China beyond that which would normally have been manifested.

Three alternative courses of action presented to the United States

When the "battle of the concessions" began, and during its course, the United States was engaged in the war with Spain and could take no direct action. Taking stock of the situation as it had developed up to 1899 from the American standpoint, it would seem obvious that three alternatives were presented to the government of the United States: it might recognize the advances made by the Powers in China and do nothing, allowing the spheres of interest to

ripen in the natural way into protectorates, with the consequent ultimate exclusion of American trade from China; it might enter into the competition and try to stake out a sphere for American exploitation; or it might try to safeguard American commercial interests within the spheres of the Powers. Given the widespread belief in the United States that it would be necessary for American industry and capital to go abroad, the first alternative was impossible of acceptance, since China seemed to offer one of the greatest potential markets and fields for investment in the world. The second alternative was equally unacceptable. The American policy in the Far East had been fixed traditionally as non-exclusive. In none of its dealings with Far Eastern states had the government of the United States sought to secure special privileges for itself or for its nationals. It had always demanded "most-favored-nation" treatment for itself, and had been willing to see any advantages it secured extended equally to all trading powers. It was willing to compete, but the terms of competition had to be equal and non-discriminatory. This had been true of its relations with Latin America as well as in the Far East. Consequently, for the United States to attempt to get a slice of the "Chinese melon" would have been for it to make a violent departure from its past policy. The departure would have been even more marked if adopted in China than if adopted elsewhere, because after 1842 the government of the United States had almost uniformly urged the necessity of maintaining the territorial integrity of China. For a long time it had been fearful lest England should add materially to her colonial territory at the expense of the Celestial Empire and had scrutinized carefully and critically every move the English made in the Far East. Later, when Burlingame was minister, he, and through him the United States, took the lead in establishing a policy of coöperation founded upon a common recognition of the need for strengthening and preserving China as a state.

The third alternative remained, but it had to be given some concrete expression. The general lines to be followed were clear. The broad interest of the United States continued to be the preservation of China from territorial disintegration. But a series of moves had already been made in the opposite direction, and it would take more than wordy protests to restore to the Chinese Empire control of the territory lost through the leasehold agreements, and to persuade the European states to relinquish the economic privileges secured at the same time. If there had been the will to act, this might have been accomplished by a union of forces on the part of the trading states, England, Germany, the United States, and possibly Japan. But Germany had played a prominent rôle in the scramble for concessions, and so had England, by the time the American government awoke to the necessity for action. England did semi-officially express the desire for coöperation, but on the basis of a joint control by the coöperating Powers of the Chinese army and of the finances of the country. Such a

*Third
alternative
accepted and
policy
established
independently*

coöperation was not acceptable to the United States, so that Secretary Hay was compelled to formulate a policy independently. This policy was outlined in the famous "Open Door" circular.

7. THE POLICY OF THE "OPEN DOOR"

On September 6, 1899, notes were sent for transmission to the governments of England, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, and Japan, asking each to give "formal assurances and lend its coöperation in securing like assurances from other interested Powers, that each, within its respective sphere of whatever influence: First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory it may have in China. Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese government. Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances."¹⁰ Thus the policy of the United States was to accept the existing status, including the claims of the several states to spheres of interest, and the establishment of the leaseholds, and to secure a definition of the attitude of each within its sphere so as to insure therein complete equality of commercial opportunity for the citizens of the United States. The "open door" policy was one of commercial self-interest, and as actually formulated and expressed it was not in any direct way founded upon the desire to preserve the independence and the integrity of China. It accepted the sphere of interest conception and might be construed to accept also the logical end of the development of the conception, annexation of Chinese territory, provided American trading rights in the annexed region were fully safeguarded.

The two conceptions,—that of "spheres of interest" and of the "open door" or equality of commercial opportunity,—are, however, fundamentally inconsistent and incompatible. The chief purpose of the establishment of a sphere of interest is to secure, as far as possible, exclusive rights to obtain concessions for the building of railroads, the opening of mines, and the industrial exploitation of the region marked out.¹¹ Furthermore, as the sphere of interest merges gradually into a sphere of influence, or into a protectorate, the state gaining political control almost invariably uses its control or influence to monopolize the economic development of the area so far as it can with

¹⁰ V, Moore's Digest, 535. (Taken from note to German government.)

¹¹ To this should be added the desire to establish a claim to the territory in case of a possible partition of China among the Powers.

*Terms of the
"Open Door"
circular*

*"Open door"
and "sphere of
interest"
conceptions
antithetical*

profit to itself. In other words, the "open door" policy, if it is maintained, works a limitation and modification of the sphere conception and ultimately demands its own extension to include the preservation of the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of such a country as China, in order to preserve equality of commercial opportunity.

Two Powers were primarily interested in safeguarding China as a whole as a market for their goods and as a field for the investment of their capital. The interest of the United States lay in the future, as her actual trade interests in China were not so great in 1899 as to demand strong action for their preservation. On the other hand, British commercial interests were actual rather than potential, immediate rather than lying in the future. These interests were not confined to one part of the Empire, but had been developed in the north and the south as well as in the central part of the country. Consequently Great Britain stood to lose more by a restriction of her trade to one part of the Chinese Empire than she stood to gain by a recognition of the priority of her interest even in such a vast region as that comprised in her sphere. This the British traders in China clearly recognized. The British government, however, let the opportunity for an effective protest against the staking out of "spheres" pass and then tried to protect itself by demanding compensation. The South African trouble, coming to a crisis just when it did, the trouble with France over Egyptian affairs, culminating in Fashoda, and the desire to conciliate the German government, all played a part in weakening the British resistance to the China policy of the several continental European states at this time.

*Similarity of
British to
American
interest in
China*

But when the American government took the stand it did, the British, recognizing in the Hay proposals a revival of their own China policy of the years 1860-1885, gladly gave the promises requested, stipulating, however, that their promises be considered to be conditional on similar promises being made by the other Powers.¹² The German government had already indicated its intention of allowing the Chinese tariff to govern the importation of goods into its leasehold, negotiating to that end with the Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs service. It gave freely the other pledges requested. France, Italy, and Japan also gave full assent to the Hay proposals.

*Attitude of
Powers other
than Russia*

Russia, however, while couching her reply in terms that enabled Secretary Hay to consider it an acceptance, did not give as unequivocal pledges as did the other governments. Preliminary steps had already been taken to incorporate Talienwan into the Russian customs union, and Port Arthur had been closed to the vessels of countries other than China and Russia, and was rapidly being turned into a strongly fortified naval base. Thus, while Russia took steps to make Talienwan

*The Russian
"acceptance"*

¹² This condition was also put by the other Powers on their acceptance of Secretary Hay's proposals.

a free port so far as its being opened to trade was concerned, she merely promised that if "at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by customs limits from other portions of the territory in question, the customs duties would be levied, in the zone subject to the tariff, upon all foreign merchandise without distinction as to nationality."¹³ "Foreign" meant non-Russian, so that the statement cannot be construed as other than an equivocation. Furthermore, nothing was said in the Russian reply as to the Russian attitude or policy with regard to railroad rates and the other matters mentioned in the Hay circular.

*Chinese
"balance of
power" theory
proved effective*

The acceptance of the Hay principles by the Powers temporarily checked the movement toward the partition of China at the first stage of its development. The reaction of the Chinese government and people toward this foreign aggression, however, brought the question of the extinction of Chinese national life again to the front. The lesson of the Sino-Japanese War and the years immediately following was, fundamentally, that China must so reorganize herself that she could successfully defend herself against attacks from the outside. The government's policy in the past had been to rely for the defense of the country upon the lack of harmony of interest among the European Powers. Russia's aggressive tendencies, for example, would be held in check, it was thought, by Great Britain. One Power could be so played off against another as to safeguard China. This "balance of power" theory, however, broke down in the face of the revelation of China's weakness, and of the bringing into play of the sphere conception. A Russian alliance, it is true, was accepted to secure China against Japan. But the German demand for a leasehold, and the acquiescence of the other states in the advance she made, changed the situation materially. The Russian alliance did not cover European aggression, and China found no one to give her active support in the face of the German threat. The "balance of power" idea was invoked, certainly, but to the entire disadvantage of China, since each Power demanded compensation for gains made by the others in order that the "balance" should be preserved. Ultimately the action of a foreign state, the United States, did bring some external support to China, but only after the active contestants had stopped to take stock of the situation.

8. THE "HUNDRED DAYS" OF REFORM

*The leaders in
the reform
movement*

These successive shocks, coupled with the gradual infiltration of new ideas, produced a reform party and gave it its brief moment on the metropolitan stage. Almost all of the advocates of reform came from the Yangtse and southern provinces. The individual reformer who came to be best known outside of China was Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a revolutionary Cantonese whose father has been represented to have been a Christian convert, and who not only was himself a Christian

¹³ V, Moore's Digest, 545.

but also had been educated along Western lines at foreign institutions in Canton and Hongkong. Dr. Sun led a revolutionary attempt against Canton in 1895, which was unsuccessful and as a result of which he had to flee the country with a price on his head. A more important figure in the early reform movement, however, was K'ang Yu-wei, known at the time as the "modern sage." He also was from Kwangtung province, but he differed from Dr. Sun in that he was not a revolutionary but advocated the gradual establishment of a constitutional monarchy and immediate reform of the existing machinery of government. Among the officials two stood out prominently as interested in reform. These were the Yangtse Viceroys, Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-yi. The former attracted much attention to the need for reorganization by his book "Learn,"¹⁴ which committed him definitely, for the time, to the cause of reform. Many of the younger officials, both Manchu and Chinese, also sympathized with the advocates of change, at least until they perceived that reform could come only at the expense of the privileges of the official and literate classes.

The reform party, Cantonese in its leadership and principal support, would not have been able to inaugurate its program when it did, however, if it had not been for conditions at the Imperial Court. The Emperor, Kwang Hsu, had attained his majority some years before, and the "Old Buddha" had retired to the Summer Palace. But the change in control was more nominal than real. Most of the important officials looked to her in her retirement for direction, and she did not hesitate to interfere in affairs of state when she felt moved to do so. The most important faction at Court, the so-called "northern party," did not conceal its belief that she should resume the Regency. The other, or southern, party, headed by the Emperor's Grand Tutor, seemed to its leaders to be losing ground in 1898. For some years this group had been moving away from the Empress-Dowager and toward support of the Emperor. Its Peking leaders were not reformers, but they were gradually forced into support of the reform movement as part of the struggle to maintain themselves in the contest for power at the Court.

The Emperor himself showed leanings toward reform after the war with Japan. He then revealed an interest in Western ideas, institutions, and practices which indicated that he would not be difficult to convert if once brought into direct contact with the leaders of the party of change. This was not accomplished until June, 1898, when K'ang Yu-wei was introduced to the Emperor by his tutor, Weng Tung-ho, who was probably led to take this step because of the death of Prince Kung, his strongest supporter in the clientele of the Empress-Dowager. Prince Kung was a leading Manchu statesman of moderate views, who served for many years as a "balance wheel" at

*Court conditions
favorable to
reform*

*The Emperor
interested in
reform*

¹⁴ Translated as *China's Only Hope*.

Peking, restraining both the Empress and the Emperor from following extreme counsels.

*Reform edicts
issued*

The Emperor came under the dominance of K'ang Yu-wei immediately and embarked at once on a program of reform under his direction. During the summer of 1898 a number of edicts¹⁵ were issued making changes in the educational and examination systems, establishing a translation bureau, abolishing numerous sinecures, promoting reorganization of the military forces, and undertaking numerous other reforms.

*The movement
crushed*

From the first there was serious opposition to the activities of the Emperor. As time went on the opposition became more intense, and finally the Empress-Dowager was moved to intervene. The reformers had feared this possibility, and they now urged the Emperor to safeguard himself and the cause by moving against the Old Buddha. Toward the last he was persuaded to act. Yüan Shih-k'ai, former Chinese Resident at Seoul and later President of the Chinese Republic, who was supposed to be sympathetic to reform, was called into the councils of the reformers, was appointed as Viceroy of Chihli province, and was instructed to proceed to Tientsin, put himself at the head of the troops there, march on the Summer Palace, and seize the Empress-Dowager. Instead, he united forces with the then Viceroy, Jung-lu, a blood brother of his and a strong supporter of the Empress-Dowager, and under her orders seized the Emperor, who was kept in virtual imprisonment until his death ten years later. This brought the first attempt at reform to an end. K'ang Yu-wei escaped from Peking and took up his residence in Japan, whence he carried on a campaign for the introduction of constitutional monarchy into China. Many of his followers also escaped, but others were captured and killed. The entire period of reform extended over just one hundred days. Its failure threw control into the hands of the conservatives and paved the way for a fundamentally different reaction to the situation.

*Causes of
discontent*

The reform movement had reacted against the ineffectiveness of Manchu rule in the face of the changed conditions of life and the active aggressions of the Powers. Discontent had been manifested almost from the beginning of the century. It was especially pronounced during its third quarter, when only their own ineptitude and foreign support of the Imperial Government prevented the T'ai P'ing leaders from overturning the dynasty. Rioting, piracy, brigandage—all of these were present on a wide scale in the last half of the century. The government had suffered defeat at the hands of foreign states in 1842, 1858-1860, and 1884-1885. Finally it proved unable to preserve its dominions even against invasion by the Japanese. The officials were corrupt or incompetent or both; funds which should have been used for national defense had been diverted to private uses and court pleasures; offices were bought and sold, the traffic leading

¹⁵ List of edicts given by MORSE, vol. III, pp. 137-9.

direct to the Chief Eunuch and through him to the Empress-Dowager. The indictment of the Manchus as rulers, and of their officials, was severe and deserved, and the swelling tide of discontent should have been directed against them. But the actions of the foreigners from 1896 to 1899 redirected popular hostility. The first internal reaction to the "cutting of the Chinese melon" was the attempt to strengthen the power of China to resist external encroachments by reorganization and reform on Western lines. This movement failed, as has been pointed out, by reason of the internal conditions that had made it possible. When the conservatives came back into control they had only one solution to present—a restoration of the former condition of isolation. "Get rid of the foreigners and all difficulties have been overcome," became their slogan. It is easy to see, when the events of the years 1840-1899 are recalled, why they were able to divert attention from the shortcomings of the rulers by stimulating anti-foreignism.

9. THE BOXER MOVEMENT

As a matter of fact, they had only to take advantage of an already marked popular feeling. The year 1899 saw anti-foreign outbreaks in all parts of the country. The previous actions of the Powers would serve fully to explain these outbreaks, but it may be well to examine the causes of friction more closely to see why they became as much anti-Christian as anti-foreign. The obvious explanation would be that the foreigners called themselves Christians and that the missionary work in the interior emphasized this relationship. But the initial outbreaks were caused by and directed against native Christians even more than foreigners. Thus one explanation of the growth of hostility is to be found in the status and conduct of the convert and in the missionary's position with respect to him and to the non-Christian. The converts were considered renegades who sought foreign aid and a privileged status by embracing Christianity. They not only practiced strange rites, which in itself aroused occasional antagonism, but, of much more importance, they abandoned some of the ways of the past, and showed insufficient respect for the teachings of the sages. This was considered a direct consequence of their acceptance of foreign teachings. Of still more practical importance, they often refused to help defray the expenses connected with village entertainments and festivals, putting the refusal on the ground that the festivals were pagan and offensive to their new belief. Since these celebrations were community affairs, and since they constituted one of the few forms of relief from the general monotony of village life, it is not surprising that any opposition to them created friction. Furthermore the withdrawal of support by some increased the financial burden for the others. In addition to this, it may be suspected that in his contact with his fellows the convert on occasion assumed an attitude of superior morality on account of his new faith. Where

Causes of anti-Christian and anti-foreign feeling in China

1. Attitude of and toward the convert

this was the case it could not help but be offensive to those who felt no inferiority attaching to them for clinging to the old and tried beliefs.

2. *Belief that
Christian rites
were inhuman*

Added to these causes of friction was the popular belief, still strong in 1900 in the interior parts of the country, that the Christian indulged in strange orgies and inhuman practices, such as plucking out the eyes of children. The fact that such charges were found baseless wherever investigated did not detract from their force in arousing hostility to Christians.

3. *Attitude of
Roman Catholic
prelates*

But perhaps as serious as any cause of trouble was the fact that the Roman Catholic priests often, and Protestant missionaries sometimes, intervened in litigation in behalf of their converts, seeking to throw the mantle of the special position of the foreigner around them. The priests went a step further and demanded magisterial honors in their intercourse with officials. This added to the hostility of many officials and aroused that of others, causing them to connive at persecution of converts and attacks on missionaries.

4. *Aggressions
of the Powers*

Thus it is easy to explain the outbreaks of 1899-1900 in terms of the private as well as the public relations of Christians, both native and foreign, and the Chinese. Join to this the aggressions of the Powers and the fear thereby engendered of the partition of China, and the development of anti-foreignism is readily understandable. Of course the movement of the Powers on China was checked in 1899, but as the attempt was made in that year and in 1900 to put into effect concessions secured earlier, the consequences of the events of 1897-1898 were driven more fully home to the people.

*Unrest in the
provinces*

The initial unrest showed itself first in the provinces, although the situation in Peking became so serious in 1899 that the legation guards were augmented for a time. Chinese friends told the foreigners openly that there was a concerted move on foot to eliminate them and their influence from the country. They refused to heed the warnings, however, regarding such action as inconceivable. Protests of course were addressed to the *Tsungli Yamen* against occurrences in the various parts of the country. But no serious attention was paid to the storm clouds which were gathering until May, 1900, when a stronger force than before was brought to Peking to guard the legations.

*The Boxer
movement in
Shantung*

The anti-foreign movement gained greatest headway in Shantung province. Report after report came to the legations in Peking of outrages committed by organized groups, of which the strongest and best known was the "Society of Harmonious Fists" or Boxers. Boxerism spread from Shantung to Chihli province, and early in 1900 members of the society began to practice their rites in Peking. From their first appearance they had strong support at the Court, as also among the officials in the provinces, but it was not until the siege of the legations had commenced that the Court finally threw its official support to the side of Boxerism. The formal relation of the

government to the inception of the movement has never been fully established, but that it was committed to Boxerism in its final stages is perfectly clear.

As the Boxers assumed more control in Peking the legations were put in what may be described as a state of semi-siege, communication with the outside being largely cut off. In consequence of this the attempt was made to bring in an additional force for the protection of foreigners. While Admiral Seymour's column was on the road from Tientsin the decision was made by the commanders of the foreign squadrons which had been sent to north China, the Americans alone dissenting, to force the road to Tientsin. The Taku forts were consequently bombarded. This precipitated in fact a state of war between the foreign governments and China and had much to do with bringing the Imperial troops and the Court into open coöperation with the Boxer forces. It was largely responsible, for that reason, for the failure of the Seymour expedition to reach Peking. It also reacted to the disadvantage of those in the legations, since the semi-siege conditions were thereafter transformed into a fully organized attack on the legations.

*Siege of the
legations*

The siege of the legations continued from June to August, 1900, when an allied expeditionary force relieved the beleaguered foreigners. This produced the collapse of Boxerism throughout the country. The officials of the Yangtse region and the southern provinces had refused to participate in the movement and had kept down manifestations of anti-foreignism in the face of Court orders to "drive the foreigners into the sea," so that it was only the north over which the allied expedition had to gain control. Consequently the uprising of 1900 cannot be considered a truly national movement.

*Collapse of
Boxerism after
relief of
legations*

10. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BOXERISM

When the allied troops approached Peking the Court fled from the capital, as it had in 1860 under similar circumstances, and the foreigners were left in control. The question of the future of China was thus raised again in an acute form. There seemed to be presented to the foreign Powers three possible alternative policies. They might complete the partition of China along the lines indicated in the years after the war with Japan; they might establish a new dynasty with international support; or they might bring the Manchus back to Peking and support them in an attempt to reorganize, modernize, and strengthen the government.

*Determination
of future of
China in hands
of Powers*

The United States took the lead in persuading the other states to accept the third alternative, thus adding eleven unearned years to the life of the dynasty. Even before the movement on Peking had commenced, Secretary of State John Hay, in a circular letter to our representatives abroad, declared that: "the policy of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity,

*The American
policy as stated
by Secretary
Hay*

protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with the Chinese Empire."¹⁶ He also declared for coöperative action by the Powers to reach a settlement with the Chinese government. This declaration of policy was a complete reversion to that established in 1857 and given formal expression in the coöperative policy of Anson Burlingame. The American principles were accepted by the other states, which proceeded, after the relief of the legations, to formulate their demands on the Chinese government in common, although not in entire harmony. It was this lack of harmony, rather than the unwillingness of the Chinese to reach a settlement, which protracted the negotiations into the summer of 1901, when the Boxer protocol was finally signed and the trouble officially brought to an end.

*The terms of
the Boxer
settlement*

The net results to China of her attempt to get rid of foreigners were: 1) the acceptance of an indemnity charge of 450,000,000 *taels*, secured on the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle, which seriously complicated her financial problems; 2) the raising of the customs charges to an effective five per cent, solely in order that she might be able to meet the indemnity payments, and a change of the duties from an *ad valorem* to a specific basis; 3) the punishment either by death or in other ways of some of her officials; 4) the permanent quartering of foreign troops in her capital as legation guards, and the foreign policing of the area from Peking to the sea; 5) the establishment of a Foreign Office to replace the *Tsungli Yamen*, and a revision, in the foreign interest, of the ceremonial to be used in case of audiences with the Emperor; 6) the suspension of the examinations for five years in all cities where anti-foreign outbreaks had occurred; and 7) the prohibition of the importation of arms for two years, extended by two-year periods if and as long as the foreigners desired. These were among the formal terms of settlement.

*Other
consequences*

From the point of view of future development the collapse of this conservative reaction to the movement of the Powers on China had the further important consequences of inaugurating an era of conservative reform in the endeavor to strengthen China and preserve the dynasty, and of producing a significant redirection of the European impact on the Celestial Empire.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

I. RUSSIA AND JAPAN NATURAL ANTAGONISTS

*Russia
confronts Japan
in Manchuria
and Korea*

TEN years after the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan, the latter found itself engaged in war with a much more powerful antagonist. Japan's success, instead of leaving her supreme in Korea, had the effect of substituting for the decaying Chinese Empire in the struggle for control at Seoul a far more dangerous opponent. Russian influence was injected into Korean affairs immediately after the signature of the treaty of Shimonoseki, and Japan found herself forced to share the position of dictator to the Korean government with that ever-expanding Power. Furthermore, the aftermath of the war, the struggle for concessions in China, had resulted in the establishment of a claimed sphere of interest for Russia in Manchuria, and the leasing of a port and the building of a strong naval base in the Liaotung peninsula, so located as to enable her to threaten both Peking and Seoul. This Russian advance was of such a nature as seriously to alarm Japan, causing her inevitably to become the primary opponent of Russia in the Far East.

*Method of
treatment of
questions at
issue*

It is to this developing conflict of interest that we now turn our attention. As indicated, it involved two separate regions—Korea and Manchuria—and it will be best to treat the problems centering in these two areas separately. It will be most convenient, and will furnish the clearest approach to the problem, if we consider first of all the interests of Japan and Russia in Korea and Manchuria; then trace the development of Russian interests and policy in Manchuria in some detail and indicate the various steps taken by the Powers to check her move southward from Siberia; and finally turn our attention to the struggle of Japan to maintain herself in Korea.

2. THE STATUS OF MANCHURIA IN 1900

*Character of
the country*

It will be of advantage, however, preliminary to this, to consider the status of Manchuria in the Chinese Empire before it became a center of international interest. Situated in the northeastern part of China, although cut off from the eighteen provinces of China proper by the Great Wall, it includes a total area of 365,000 square miles, lying within the parallels of 39° and 53° 30' north. The climate is very cold in winter and hot in the summer, becoming ever more rigorous as one moves northwards. In spite of the severe climate, however, most parts of the region are very productive. The principal

crop in 1895 was the soya bean, large quantities of which were exported south into China. It was only after 1890 that Japan began to import Manchurian beans, the bean being used for food purposes, the oil for sauces, and the cake for fertilizer. From that time she became an increasingly important market for it. In addition Manchuria produces millet, *kaoliang*, wheat, and other cereals. By 1900 it was already evident that the country could be looked to as a great granary for the future. In addition to its agricultural productivity Manchuria possesses tremendous wealth in timber and is rich in minerals, including coal, iron, and gold. Such a domain was well worth a struggle to gain or to retain.

From the point of view of politics and government Manchuria differed from Korea in that it was an integral part of the Chinese Empire, governed directly from Peking. Furthermore, since the ruling dynasty in China had come from there, the territory had a peculiar interest for them. Because of this interest the Manchu policy had long been to keep their Chinese subjects out of the region north of the Great Wall. But by 1900 this policy had broken down and settlers from Shantung and Chihli provinces had populated the land so extensively that the Manchus were decidedly in the minority. It is to these Chinese immigrants that credit must be given for the economic development of the country.

*Government
and settlement
of Manchuria*

From every point of view, then,—legal title to the territory, predominance of population, and credit for economic development—Manchuria was as much a part of China as any of the eighteen provinces. Russia, in other words, was seeking, after 1895, to detach part of the Chinese Empire, and Japan was playing the game of China so far as she was interested merely in checking Russian aggression.

*Manchuria an
integral part
of China*

The region which aroused so much interest after 1900 was divided into three parts for governmental purposes. In the south was Fengtien province, including, prior to 1898, the Kwantung, or Liaotung, promontory. This was the most thickly settled and the most highly developed part of Manchuria, and had been brought under the usual Chinese civil administration. To the north lay Kirin province, less settled and kept under the Manchu military régime; and still further north lay the almost totally undeveloped province of Hei-lung-kiang. The movement of population was naturally from the south northwards and was, no less naturally, a gradual one. It was, however, a Chinese movement, as no Russian settlers had come down from the north, across the Russian frontier, except as they were brought in to serve the railway or as soldiers. This remained true even to the time of the outbreak of war with Japan.

*The three
Manchurian
provinces*

3. RUSSIA IN MANCHURIA

The Russian interest in Manchuria and Korea must be considered, therefore, as political and strategic rather than economic. Prior to the occupation of Port Arthur and Dalny (Talienwan), there was, to

*Russian interest
in Manchuria
political*

be sure, an economic motive underlying the Russian advance. Russian policy during the years from 1896 to 1899 was designed to facilitate the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad by securing a right of way across northern Manchuria, and to bring about a peaceful economic penetration of China. Back of this economic penetration, however, there was a political motive. Russia had no great trading or financial interests urging that the government secure privileges for them. But the government was interested in the building of railroads and the furtherance of other Russian interests in Manchuria and China in the hope that ultimately, upon the disintegration of the Chinese Empire, or even without its complete disintegration, large sections might be brought into the Russian state as a result of a previous economic attachment to it.

*Russian policy
aggressive*

After the scramble for concessions began, however, the idea of peaceful penetration gave way before the prospect of an immediate partition of China among the Powers. Instead of living up to its expressed intention¹ of protecting China, the Russian government acquired Chinese territory—by lease only, it is true—and instead of utilizing her new territory for commercial purposes she proceeded to make of Port Arthur the strongest naval base in the East, closing it altogether to commerce, although leaving Dalny a commercial port. From this time Russian policy in Manchuria became more and more one of direct aggression, marked by the attempt to assume governmental functions. That this was not altogether to the liking of some of the Russian statesmen is revealed by Count Witte in his Memoirs. But he also shows that political expansion was behind the several Russian moves on the Manchurian chess-board. Russia wanted the Liaotung peninsula in order that she might have a warm-water port for the use of her fleet; she built railroads in Manchuria with the domination of that area in view; and after 1900 she tried in every possible way to detach Manchuria from the control of Peking. In short, her policy was one of deliberate aggression on a state to which she was united by a mutually defensive alliance.

*Korean policy
of Russia
equally
political and
aggressive*

If the Russian interest in Manchuria was, at least in its origin, partly economic, in Korea her policy was entirely political. She had no trading interests there worth mentioning and no territorial contact with Korea except that at the southern end of the maritime province. Furthermore, she had no goods for which a market was necessary and no surplus capital demanding an outlet under the national protection. Any moves Russia made to establish herself in Korea must be considered as signs of an aggressive intention, and of an aggression in no way necessitated by the economic needs of the Russian Empire.

4. THE JAPANESE INTEREST

While the primary interest of Russia was in Manchuria, that of Japan was in Korea. In that country she had built up substantial com-

¹ The obligation had only been assumed to protect China against Japan, but China was justified in assuming at least that Russia herself would not try to seize her territories.

mercial and financial interests. And, as has been pointed out, she had a natural self-protective interest in preventing Korea from falling into the hands of any other Power, especially such a strong and naturally expansive state as Russia. The comparison of Korea with a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan had real significance when the hand holding the dagger threatened to be that of Russia.

*Japan's interest
in Korea
defensive*

The Japanese economic interest in Manchuria was, prior to 1905, potential rather than actual. The Japanese had begun to import the principal Manchurian product, the soya bean, and far-sighted Japanese statesmen undoubtedly appreciated the future possibility of drawing raw materials, as well as an enlarged supply of foodstuffs, from Manchuria. But at the beginning of the present century the food problem in Japan had not become acute and industrial development was just commencing. This development had been stimulated by the war with China and still further advanced by the indemnity payment secured as one of the conditions of peace. In the four years following 1900 Japan certainly began to show signs of change from an agricultural to an industrial base, but it was particularly after the war with Russia that the tendency became marked. Thus Manchuria was not an area in which Japan had existing economic interests of any importance. Her potential interest, however, would help to explain the Japanese attitude toward the development of Russia's exclusive policy.

*Potential
economic interest
in Manchuria*

It is also necessary to guard against reading into the Japanese policy in 1904 the interest (which developed later) in Manchuria as a colonizing area in which a surplus population might be settled. Both economic interest and the need of an outlet for her surplus population may perhaps be accepted in partial explanation of Japan's policy after 1905, but they did not greatly influence it during the development of the conflict with Russia.

*No colonizing
interest in
Manchuria in
1900*

There were two much more fundamental reasons for Japanese action up to 1905. As early as 1895 the Japanese government had shown a desire to expand territorially on the Asiatic mainland when it had demanded the cession of the Liaotung peninsula. This indicates an aggressive tendency, which was restrained only temporarily by the Three-Powers' intervention. Japan wanted a foothold in Manchuria just as much as Russia did and possibly for the same reason—empire building. But since she could not hold it she was content to accept the *status quo*. The establishment of Russia in Manchuria, however, disturbed that status and at the same time threatened Japanese security. Every advance made by Russia brought her into closer contact with Korea and, through Korea, with Japan. Aggressive Russia on the Korean border and at Port Arthur menaced Japan indirectly through a threat to her position in Korea and directly because of her closer proximity. Consequently, while Japan could afford to forego Manchuria, which she would have liked to possess herself, rather than embark on an expensive war for its control, she would

*Russian
advance
southward made
Japanese
opposition
inevitable*

fight rather than see a strong European Power entrenched therein, unless at the same time her position in Korea were fortified. In pursuance of this policy she showed a willingness to compromise with Russia, in order to avoid war, if Russia would recognize her supremacy in Korea; this compromise Russia rejected. It must be observed, therefore, that it was the Russian advance toward the south which made war with Japan inevitable, even though it is true that Japan had an ultimate interest in Manchuria similar to that of Russia.

5. RUSSIAN POLICY IN AND AFTER 1900

The interests of Russia in Manchuria in 1900, at the time of the Boxer uprising, may be briefly summarized, since they have already been partially described. As a reward for her leadership in the intervention which had restored the Liaotung peninsula to China, Russia had been granted the right to construct the Trans-Siberian Railroad across northern Manchuria from the Chinese village of Manchuli to Vladivostok. By a later convention she had been given, in addition, the right to drop a branch of this line southwards from Harbin to Port Arthur. China's participation in the construction and operation of these roads was limited to the investment of five million *taels* in the Russo-Chinese Bank, which was brought into being in 1896 under a Russian charter to finance the construction of the railroad, and to the appointment of the president of the railroad company. The duty of the president was to supervise the operations of both the bank and the company to see that they did not overstep the bounds of their authority under the concession agreements.

The Russo-Chinese Bank was purely a Russian concern so far as its incorporation and control were concerned. In addition to financing the various projects conceded to it by the Chinese government, it was empowered to bring into being a corporation for the construction of the railroads and for their operation after completion. The company building and operating the Manchurian section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad was known as the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and that for the building of the southern projection, as the Manchurian Railway Company. Both were controlled and directed by the Russian government as Russian concerns. The money for the financing of the roads was found by the bank, not in Russia, which was borrowing largely abroad for her own needs, but in France. The investor was protected in his rights by a Russian government guarantee instead of by a mortgage on the railroad properties. The other functions of the bank have already been sufficiently described. China was placed under an obligation, by the terms of the several agreements, to protect the railroad properties, but the company had the right to acquire lands necessary for their construction and effective operation, and had "the absolute and exclusive right of administration of these lands."

In addition to these railroad rights in Manchuria, Russia had the lease in the Liaotung peninsula which has been mentioned. This

*Summary of
Russian
interests and
rights in 1900*

*Russo-Chinese
Bank and the
railway
companies*

she had demanded even though she had previously pointed out (at the time of its acquisition by Japan) that the control of this territory by a foreign Power constituted a direct threat to Peking and could not be tolerated. Giving back the territory to China was hard for Japan, but having Russia step into her shoes so soon afterwards created a dangerous situation for her, especially when that Power began immediately to fortify Port Arthur so strongly as to signify an intention of remaining there for a longer period than the twenty-five years of the leasehold. A commercial port under Russian control in the Liaotung peninsula was bad, but a strong naval base was infinitely worse.

*The Russian
leased territory*

It was particularly after 1900, however, that Russia displayed her true intentions in Manchuria. At the time of the Boxer trouble in China unrest developed in Manchuria. Brigands became even more active than usual. The same anti-foreign spirit developed that showed itself in the south, and the Boxers themselves put in an appearance. Consequently Russia took steps to protect her interests by throwing troops into Manchuria to guard the railroad. While the Powers were sending their expedition to relieve the Peking legations, in which expedition Russia took part, Russian troops were spreading out over Manchuria from the railroad zone as a center. The Chinese authority was supplanted for the time by the Russian military command. The other Powers were informed that the Russian occupation was only temporary, since it was made necessary by the inability of the Chinese government to control the Boxers and brigands, and that the troops would be withdrawn and Chinese control restored as soon as protection could be afforded to foreign, i.e. Russian, interests.

*Military
occupation of
Manchuria in
1900*

In November of 1900 an agreement was reached between the Russian commander and the Chinese Viceroy (Tsêng-Alexieff Convention) by which the southern province (Fengtien) was to be restored to the Chinese civil administration on condition that the Chinese soldiers should be disarmed and disbanded, that all munitions of war should be given up to the Russians, and that all fortifications not in the control of Russia should be demolished. Russian troops were to be withdrawn, however, only when the pacification of the province, in the opinion of the Russian government, had been completed. Law and order were to be maintained by the local police, with Russian aid if necessary. It is obvious that pacification could not be successfully brought about by a local police, when order had not been maintained by the police and the military in combination, and that the forced disarming of the Chinese troops meant continual unrest in the province which would give Russia the necessary excuse for its continued occupation. This convention was not concluded with the Imperial Government but with a local official, and it was never ratified. But its publication caused a stir abroad, and this led to a second denial by Russia that she had any aggressive designs in Manchuria. In this denial, however, the Russian government insisted that before it could

*The Tsêng-
Alexieff
Convention*

evacuate Manchuria it would have to receive effective guarantees from China against a renewal of the disorder which had led to the intervention.

*Negotiations
for evacuation
(1901-2)*

Negotiations for the evacuation of Manchuria continued during 1901 and 1902, Russia always conditioning her withdrawal on the acceptance of terms by China which would strengthen Russian political influence there and would make inevitable a second intervention and permanent occupation.

*American policy
in 1900 in
opposition to
that of Russia*

Meanwhile there had been other indications of Russian policy. The Boxer outbreak reached Peking in June of 1900. By August the Powers had relieved the legations, and, since the court had fled to Hsianfu, had assumed complete control in north China. This presented an extremely favorable opportunity for the extinction of China by completing the process of division of the Empire among the Powers along the lines marked out in 1898. The United States, however, immediately announced its continued adherence to the policy of the "open door," and further declared its belief that the Powers should open negotiations with the Chinese government on the basis of the maintenance of the independence and territorial and administrative integrity of the Empire. During the negotiations which followed the suppression of the Boxer uprising the United States consistently maintained this attitude, protesting against the Russian occupation of Manchuria, and against the acceptance by China of such conditions of evacuation as those contained in the Tsêng-Alexieff agreement. This protest was reaffirmed from time to time after the signature of the Boxer protocol when later Russian demands made protest necessary.

*Anglo-German
agreement of
1900*

The Russian policy in Manchuria also led Great Britain and Germany to draw together in alarm at the threat from the north. In 1900 they reached an agreement, to which they invited the adherence of the other Powers. By this they were committed to maintain the *status quo* territorially in China, without seeking to take advantage in their own interest of the disorganization of the Empire; to work for the opening of the entire Empire to the trade of all nations; and to concert the necessary measures for the protection of their interests in case any one state attempted to change the *status quo* in its own interest. The effectiveness of this agreement in checking the Russian advance in Manchuria was decidedly lessened, however, by the construction put upon it by Germany, restricting its scope to include only the eighteen provinces. The agreement, none the less, may be regarded as having been the salvation of China. It was, of course, not altruism which prompted this action, but rather a recognition by the trading Powers that their interests demanded the preservation of China, and the fear felt by all that an attempt at partition would result in a grave international crisis.

*Weakened by
restriction to
eighteen
provinces*

For Russia conditions after the Boxer uprising offered an exceptional opportunity to fish in troubled waters. Following precedent,

she attempted to promote her interests at the expense of China by posing as a friend. After seizing the railroad from Shanhaikwan to Tientsin against the protests of the Americans and the British, she proceeded to insist upon the evacuation of North China by the allied troops before the signature of the peace agreement between China and the Powers. She withdrew her legation to Tientsin, and she urged the return of the Chinese Court to Peking, and absolute non-interference by the Powers in the internal affairs of the Chinese Empire. Naturally she made, so far as this policy was concerned, a distinction between China and Manchuria, insisting that the Manchurian settlement must be the concern solely of herself and China. It may be seen that her intention was to secure herself in Manchuria and strengthen her footing at the Court by appearing otherwise as China's defender against the other Powers. This time, however, she was not so successful as she had been in 1860, when she had secured the Primorsk as a reward for mediating between China and the Anglo-French occupiers of Peking. The Chinese were coming to recognize Russian friendship as a dangerous thing to encourage. And when peace was actually made it was found that Russia had not allowed her consideration for China to go to the length of preventing her from receiving the lion's share of the indemnity of 450,000,000 *taels*.

Russian pose of friendship for China not so successful in 1900 as in 1860

After the Boxer uprising had been put down in North China, it soon became apparent that Russia had no intention of retiring from Manchuria except on her own terms. She professed one policy to the Powers, the United States, England, and Japan, who repeatedly protested against the continued presence of her troops north of the Great Wall, but continued steadily to press her terms on Peking. What she desired to do was to present the protesting states with the accomplished fact of an agreement with the Imperial Government of China. This she expected to accomplish by insisting that Manchuria was a subject for negotiation only between the Powers concerned—herself and China—and then after securing an agreement to her demands she intended to insist that China as an independent state had the right to make any agreements she liked. She felt confident that no Power would be sufficiently interested or would have the power to make an issue of the matter. That this interpretation of her policy is correct is shown by Count Lamsdorff's reply to Secretary Hay's protest against Russia's demand on China for exclusive privileges in Manchuria. Lamsdorff stated that "negotiations carried on between two entirely independent states are not subject to be submitted to the approval of other Powers." China, however, under pressure from, and with the assurance of the support of, England, Japan, and the United States, refused to accept the successive conditions laid down during 1901 by Russia for the evacuation of Manchuria.

Russian endeavor to separate Manchurian and Chinese questions

6. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT OF 1902

Then in 1902 an event took place which had an immediate effect

The German initiative in instituting negotiations

on Russian policy and ultimate consequences of great significance. This event was the signature of the Anglo-Japanese agreement. Conversations looking to the conclusion of an agreement respecting their interests and policy in the Far East were begun at London early in 1901. The initial suggestion that negotiations be undertaken came from Germany rather than from either Japan or Great Britain, and was for the making of an alliance among the three Powers. The exact reason for the German proposal is not clear, but she had been co-operating with England financially in the years after 1895, and had entered into an agreement with her in 1900 to protect the *status quo* in China. Consequently it would seem that there was at Berlin a recognition of the similarity of German and British interest in the Far East. Furthermore, after 1900 there was an influential group in Germany interested in bringing about a *rapprochement* with England. But the constant shifting of German policy at this time is indicated by her insistence on restricting the scope of the 1900 agreement to exclude Manchuria from its guarantees. She showed indications of wanting to coöperate with England, but not to the point of antagonizing Russia. And English and Japanese interests could be protected only by adopting a strong attitude toward Russian Manchurian policies. Thus while Germany, for whatever reason, made the suggestion, the negotiations for an alliance were carried to completion with little attempt to draw her into them.

One group in Japan sought alliance with Russia, another with England

In Japan, after the war with China, there were two conceptions of the proper policy to be pursued. One group thought that the best way for Japan to protect herself against the Russian advance was to enter into an alliance with Russia, reaching an agreement with her as to their respective interests in the Far East. The other party inclined toward an alliance with England as the most logical and desirable step to be taken. Among the believers in the desirability of an alliance with England was Count Hayashi, the Japanese minister at the Court of St. James. After the suggestion had been made by the German Ambassador that an agreement might be reached so far as England was concerned, Count Hayashi asked permission from his government to commence informal conversations with the British Foreign Office. These informal discussions eventually were changed into official negotiations, and were carried to a successful conclusion by the end of January, 1902.

Importance of alliance to Japan

The making of an alliance with one of the strongest of the Western states marks a milestone in the development of Japan as an Asiatic Power. It was the first treaty of alliance in modern times between an Occidental and Oriental state in which the two parties were on a footing of equality. More conclusively than any other accomplishment it marked the recognition of Japan and her elevation to a high seat at the Asiatic council board. More immediately important for Japan, however, was the fact that the alliance made it possible to take the necessary steps to protect her interests against Russia. In 1895

she had been forced to recede from the continent at the dictation of the Czar's ministers. In 1904 she would have had to give way again if it had not been for the protection afforded by British support.

That Japan should have wanted an alliance is readily appreciated; but why England should have departed from her policy of refusing to make permanent alliances by entering into an agreement with an Oriental state, is not at first glance obvious. Her interests were menaced by the Russian advance, which could have no other effect ultimately than to lessen the British trade opportunities in Manchuria. But she had recognized the superiority of Russian interest there by the Scott-Muravieff Convention of 1899 in return for a recognition of her position in the Yangtse provinces. It must be recognized, however, that her participation in the scramble for concessions was a departure from her former China policy. That departure was made necessary by the preoccupation in Africa, both in the north and the south, which made it impossible for her to assert herself in the Far East in opposition to the other Powers. Her African difficulties had been largely brought to an end by 1902, however, so that she was free to turn her attention again to China. And between 1899 and 1902 had come the Boxer rebellion, and the Russian move southward which, if allowed to become an accomplished fact, would strengthen her at Peking. Furthermore, Russia had not respected the spirit of the agreement of 1899. Belgian capital, well known to represent Russia and France, and actively supported by Russo-French diplomacy, had secured a concession for the construction of a road from Peking to Hankow in the heart of the Yangtse region. This projected Russian influence so far southward that it caused British diplomacy immediately to become apprehensive concerning India. It also brought Russia and France close to union of their respective spheres of interest. Such a union would have meant the end of the Chinese Empire, since both Powers had political rather than strictly economic aims in their respective spheres. These developments had caused Downing Street to return to its original China policy.

*England
opposed to
Russian
advance*

But in order to make that policy effective a combination of forces was required. First of all, England tried Germany, but found that she was not willing to antagonize Russia.² France was an ally of Russia, and was herself interested in the further development of the sphere of interest conception. The United States and England had identic interests, but those of the United States were potential, and she was already showing that she could not be relied upon to do more than protest against changes in the *status quo*. Further than this, she would not have been willing to tie herself to any Power even to accomplish her own ends. This attitude she carried to the extent of refusing to participate in joint protests against the Russian policy, although she

*Need for ally
in opposition
to Russia*

² Furthermore, Anglo-German relations in Europe were becoming strained, and England was the only Power in Europe without assured support. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was a significant play on the world stage as well as on the Far Eastern stage.

did send identic notes on several occasions. Japan alone was left. And the interest of Japan in checking Russia was even greater than that of England. Consequently, after considerable hesitation, Great Britain broke from her isolation and signed an agreement which put her behind Japan in case the latter became involved in war with the Russian Empire.

*Terms of the
agreement of
1902*

The preamble of the Anglo-Japanese agreement stated the general policy of the High Contracting Parties to be the maintenance of the *status quo* and of general peace in the Far East through the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea. In the first article recognition was given to the fact that British interest was primarily in China, while Japan, in addition to her interest in China, was peculiarly interested in Korea, these interests in both cases, however, being non-aggressive in character. Each recognized the right of the other to take the steps necessary to the protection of its interests. If, in the defense of its interests, one of the parties to the agreement became engaged in war with another Power, the other would maintain a strict neutrality, and would use its best endeavor to prevent the other belligerent nation from securing support. In case any other Power should join the enemy of one of the members of the alliance, the other agreed to come immediately to its ally's assistance, making war and peace in common with it. The alliance was to run for five years, and, if not denounced at the end of that time, was to continue for a period of one year beyond the time of its denunciation. Thus the agreement meant that Japanese and English diplomacy would work hand in hand at Peking to check Russia, failing in which Japan would oppose her in the field while England prevented Russia from securing active support from any other Power.

*Franco-Russian
alliance
extended to
Far East*

Russia and France replied to the challenge by announcing that, while they were in sympathy with the purpose of the Anglo-Japanese agreement—the preservation of the independence and the integrity of China and Korea—they had agreed to extend the scope of their alliance to cover the Far East. France, however, seems to have let it be known that she would actively support Russia in case war broke out only if the peace were disturbed in Europe.

*Modification
of Russia's
Manchurian
policy—the
Convention of
1902*

But in spite of this tacit acceptance of the challenge, Russia immediately modified her policy in Manchuria by accepting the proposals made by China for the evacuation of her territory. These proposals, as finally embodied in the Manchurian Convention of 1902, provided for a complete evacuation of Manchuria within eighteen months, south Manchuria to be evacuated at the end of six months, central Manchuria at the end of twelve months, and the entire territory to be restored to China's control at the end of the period. Some conditions, relating to the method of withdrawal and to the protection by China of Russia's interests, were attached to the agreement to leave, but the joker in it lay in the proviso that Russia would

withdraw "provided that no disturbances arise and that the actions of other Powers furnish no obstacle." So long as the Russian troops remained, the prevention of disorder was sure to be difficult, and Russia might easily so construe the actions of other Powers as to give an excuse for the non-fulfilment of the engagement.

As a matter of fact, Russia herself acted in such a way as to justify charges of lack of good faith in the fulfilment of her obligation. Southwestern Manchuria was duly evacuated, but the troops, instead of being withdrawn from Manchuria, were merely concentrated in other parts of the province. Barracks were constructed along the railroad to make provision for them, and Russian action indicated that use would be made of them as railroad guards. In other words, Russia indicated that she would fulfil her engagements only so far as she was compelled to do so by an unremitting pressure strong enough to prevent her from defying it. This pressure had to be supplied by other Powers than China, as the Imperial Government could not enforce the terms of the agreement against her northern neighbor.

*Indications of
bad faith in
fulfilment of
terms of
Convention*

7. THE KOREAN QUESTION

Besides this indication of bad faith in Manchuria, Russian action in Korea and particularly on the Korean border was becoming alarming. In order to understand this, we must turn to the second field of conflict of Russian and Japanese interest.

During the war with China, and for a short period following that struggle, Japanese interests were in the ascendancy at Seoul. During this time the Japanese acted as masters in the Korean kingdom, and they used their mastery to transform Korea, on paper and overnight, from a misgoverned Oriental despotism into a modern state. Because of the resistance this policy encountered from the Queen and her adherents, the Japanese were led to instigate, and actively participate in, a midnight attack on the Palace, with the result that the Queen, as the focal point of opposition to their policy, was murdered.

*Japanese
ascendancy in
Korea in 1895*

This action aroused the Koreans, but they were unable to retaliate immediately. In 1896, however, an uprising occurred on the northern frontier which caused the sending of troops out of the capital city. At the same time a detachment of Russian marines arrived in Seoul from Chemulpo. On the day following the arrival of the Russians the King of Korea fled in disguise from the Palace to the Russian legation, where he was received and given asylum. For a short period the government was directed from the Russian legation. Japanese ascendancy, after an eminently successful war, was replaced by that of Russia. She had her own policy to blame, of course, but Russian control was no less distasteful for that reason. In the summer of 1896 Japan abandoned her claim to supremacy in Korea and made an agreement (the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol) with Russia by which the two parties were put upon a footing of equality in the kingdom. Both parties agreed: (1) that, withdrawing their forces from the

*Russia supports
the Korean
King against
Japan*

*Russian-
Japanese
equality
established by
Yamagata-
Lobanoff
Protocol*

peninsula, they should allow Korea, so far as possible, to police her own territory; and (2) that they should unite in pressing financial reforms on the Korean government, and that, if it needed foreign money to carry out the indispensable reforms, the two governments should "of a common accord render their support to Korea." During the time of her ascendancy, however, Russia had secured for herself two concessions, a valuable timber concession on the Yalu River which became of great importance later, and a mining concession on the Tumen River.

*Violation of
terms of
agreement by
Russia*

Before the ink was fairly dry on the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol Russia began to violate its terms. Instead of allowing Korea to reorganize her army unaided, Russia introduced into the kingdom advisers to aid in its organization along Russian lines, and she attempted to obtain control of Korean finance.

*Nishi-Rosen
Convention*

As a result of her policy a reaction against Russia set in in Korea, and this brought with it a strengthening of the Japanese position. In the face of the apparent bad faith of Russia, Japan instituted new negotiations with her. Made more conciliatory by her policy in Manchuria, and by the lease she had secured from China in the Liaotung peninsula, which could not but be objectionable to the Japanese, the Russian government agreed, in 1898, to a redefinition of its position in Korea. Recognizing the sovereignty and independence of Korea, each contestant for power agreed not to assist Korea in the reorganization of her army and her finances without having reached a previous agreement with the other party; and the Russian government agreed not to impede the development of Japanese commercial and industrial interests in Korea. This convention (the Nishi-Rosen Convention) remained as the formal basis of Russian and Japanese policy in Korea from 1898 to the outbreak of war.

*Establishment
of Japanese
supremacy in
Korea*

But while this agreement had been reached, it did not settle the Korean question. Russia remained intermittently active there, pressing demands for concessions on the government and trying to secure a port for her use. Japan worked feverishly to strengthen her position and to check the successive moves made by Russia, and in both aims she was largely successful. The Japanese population increased by leaps and bounds, trade developed enormously, and large sums of money were invested in the Korean railways and other utility enterprises. The only serious competitors to the Japanese were the Americans, and even this competition did not seriously check the establishment of Japan, by 1904, in a dominant economic position. Five years from the signature of the Nishi-Rosen Convention found the Japanese Foreign Minister able to say with truth: "Japan possesses paramount political as well as commercial interests and influence in Korea, which, having regard to her own security, she cannot consent to surrender to or share with any Power."³

³ ASAKAWA, *Russo-Japanese Conflict*, p. 298.

8. FUSION OF KOREAN WITH MANCHURIAN QUESTION

This position of predominance had been achieved by the time when, in 1902-1903, the Manchurian and Korean questions became fused. Among other expedients resorted to by Russia to dispose of her troops in Manchuria without withdrawing them to Siberia was that of sending them into the Yalu River region as woodcutters to make use of the timber-cutting concession gained in 1896. This concession, by its terms, had lapsed, since Russia had made no attempt to develop it during the five-year period specified in the agreement. This did not, however, prevent her from insisting on its revival. Her insistence was the firmer because the Czar himself had become interested in it, and since he had been persuaded that no effective opposition could be made by Japan.

*The Yalu
timber
concession*

Japan's Korean and Chinese policies had been kept distinct up to this point. Her policy had been to defend her interests in Korea by her own independent action, and to coöperate with other Powers in Chinese affairs. Now she recognized that she must reach some sort of agreement with Russia which would take both regions into consideration. In 1903 the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg was instructed to ask the Russian government to enter upon discussions with a view to a complete definition of the eastern interests of the two states. Russia agreeing, Japan submitted a series of proposals as a basis for discussion. These proposals may be summarized as follows: (1) that both countries agree to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the "open door" principle in those countries; (2) that Russia recognize Japan's special interests in Korea, and concede her right to develop those interests further, and to give advice to the Korean government in the interest of reform, and that, in return, Japan recognize Russia's special railway interests in Manchuria and concede her the same right of future development within the limitations of the first stipulation. The Russian counter-proposals provided: (1) for a mutual agreement to respect the independence and integrity of Korea, omitting the similar Japanese proposal as to China; (2) for a Russian recognition of Japan's superior interests in Korea, and of her right to assist in reforming her civil administration; (3) for an engagement by Russia not to interfere with the development and protection of Japanese commercial and industrial interests in the kingdom; (4) for a mutual agreement not to fortify on the coasts of Korea so as to menace freedom of navigation in the Straits of Korea, or to use any Korean territory for strategical purposes; (5) for the erection of the portion of Korea north of the thirty-ninth parallel into a neutral zone; and (6) for "recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest." In other words, Japan was to allow Russia a free hand in China and Manchuria, while Russia was to allow Japan to develop only industrial and commercial inter-

*Japanese
proposals for
settlement of
conflicting
interests*

*Russian
counter-
proposals*

ests in Korea, a development which Russia had previously shown herself powerless to prevent.

*Final
concessions of
Japan*

The final Japanese proposals conceded a little to the Russian position, mainly by making the limitations on her action in Korea applicable to Russia in Manchuria, and by recognizing not merely the Russian railway interests in Manchuria but also all of that territory as outside Japan's sphere of interest. Russia, however, refused to recede from her original position until too late. Japan severed diplomatic relations, and the war began in February 1903.

9. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

*War fought on
Chinese territory*

It would be interesting, if space permitted, to dwell on some of the many interesting features of the war. Here was a war fought entirely on the territory of states not parties to the struggle, which made necessary some sort of agreement as to the exact status of Korea and China. The position of the former was easily defined. Japan occupied the peninsula immediately upon her declaration of war, and secured a treaty of alliance from the Korean king. The United States, however, took the lead in the endeavor to protect China by securing the agreement of the belligerents to localize hostilities to Manchuria. If Russian policy had been different from 1896 to 1904, she might easily have averted some of the naval disasters of the war by drawing China in under the terms of their alliance, and making use of her port and other naval facilities. The alliance must be considered to have lapsed, however, as a result of the systematic aggression of the one "ally" on the other. Consequently, under the pressure of foreign opinion, both parties agreed to respect the neutrality of China outside of Manchuria. Each accused the other of violating its pledges from time to time, but on the whole Chinese territory was respected.

*Czar's
assumption
that decision
for war or peace
rested solely
with Russia*

Throughout the last stages of negotiation the autocratic Czar of All the Russias apparently assumed that the decision for war or peace rested with him alone—that the Japanese would accept whatever concessions he chose to make rather than resort to war. This feeling, coupled with faulty advices as to the state of Japan's military and naval power, help to explain the fact that Russia resorted to actions which could only result in war and yet made no military preparations for that eventuality.

*Internal
conflict at
Russian Court*

But beyond this, a satisfactory explanation of the entire Russian policy requires a recognition of the internal conflict at St. Petersburg. Three programs were competing for the favor of the Czar. The Minister of Finance had one program—that of peaceful penetration of Manchuria and China by means of the railway and of capital—which has already been outlined, together with the steps taken to put it into effect after 1895. After 1898 appeared the group, identified in view with and represented by the adventurer Bezobrazov, who urged a program of economic activities supported by force. And finally there was the military-naval group, who were interested in securing

a Korean port and in gaining military control of Manchuria. The third group was primarily responsible for the throwing of such large bodies of troops into Manchuria in 1900 and for the seizure of the Peking-Mukden railway north of Tientsin. Of course the interests built up in furtherance of Count Witte's program gave the necessary excuse for military intervention. The navalists were also responsible for the contradictions between diplomatic professions and military and political actions (1900-1902), the responsible ministers often being uninformed concerning actions of the military commanders in the Far East which belied their professions, and certainly being unable to control them.

After 1902 the Bezobrazov group, which had been intermittently active since 1898, became dominant in the councils of the Czar, their ascendancy being signalized by the dropping of Count Witte from the ministry. Their program involved a combination of pressure with extensive economic adventures, such as the use of the Yalu timber concession. It was this intensification of economic activities both in Manchuria and in Korea, coupled with the indications of bad faith in fulfilment of the Manchurian Convention of 1902, and the dilatoriness of Russia in responding to the Japanese proposals for a definition of interests in Korea and Manchuria, which so alarmed the Japanese government that it took the decision as to peace or war out of the hands of the Czar.

*Final
ascendancy of
Bezobrazov
group*

It would also be interesting to dwell on the attitude of the Western states toward the two belligerents. Here only a bare summary may be made. England, of course, was committed to "keeping the ring" for Japan, financing her and generally acting as a "benevolent" neutral. Had it not been for the Anglo-Japanese agreement, and an early intimation from President Roosevelt that the United States would not tolerate intervention, Japan would almost certainly have faced a continental European intervention in support of Russia. As it was, both France and Germany went as far as they dared, without an open departure from neutrality, in support of Russia—France because of the alliance, although she was not at all pleased to see Russia exhausting herself in the Far East and thus weakening her position in Europe, and Germany because she had been steadily encouraging the Russian move eastwards. The people of the United States were entirely sympathetic to the Japanese, as was also President Roosevelt, although neutrality was carefully maintained.

*Attitude of
other states
toward
belligerents*

At first sight the war appeared to be between two entirely unmatched antagonists, another case of the giant and the dwarf. But the dwarf was prepared and the giant was not. Japan had begun to concentrate on naval development, using part of the Chinese indemnity for that purpose, immediately after the peace of Shimonoseki, while still not neglecting her army. Consequently, she had a well-trained army and an efficient navy to meet the forces of Russia, more formidable on paper, but poorly led and ill-disciplined. Again Japan

*Military and
naval successes
of Japan*

began by naval operations to secure her communications. Then she commenced to push the Russian armies back from one position to another until, with the fall of Port Arthur after a long siege and the display of heroism on both sides, and the defeat of Russia at the Yalu and again in the battle of Mukden, Manchuria had been cleared of the Russian invader as far north as Mukden.

10. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH

*Peace
negotiations
instituted*

The war had been a series of uninterrupted successes for Japan, but it had involved great loss of life and a very heavy drain on the national treasury. Furthermore, she had not begun to touch Russia, not even having driven her back on to her own territory, and not having been able to destroy her armies. When President Roosevelt, at the request of Japan, offered his "good offices" to the belligerents in the spring of 1905, the Japanese government, recognizing its inability to continue the struggle much longer, but without giving evidence to its opponent of its weakness, consented to enter upon peace negotiations with the Russians. The Russian government, on the other hand, was desirous of continuing the struggle until it had regained the ground lost, but it was not in a position, because of internal conditions and also on account of its financial weakness, to refuse to go into conference with the Japanese. Accordingly Viscount Komura met Count Witte at Portsmouth early in 1905. The Russians hoped that the Japanese, flushed with victory, would make demands which could reasonably be refused on grounds that would make the opinion of the world more favorable toward Russia and would rally the Russian people to the support of the government in a continuation of the war.

*The Japanese
demands*

Apparently this is just what the Japanese did. They demanded: 1) the recognition of the supremacy of Japan in Korea—a recognition which they had already secured from England in the revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance effected toward the end of the war; 2) the transfer to Japan of the Russian interests, including the leasehold and the railroad, in south Manchuria; 3) the surrender to Japan of all Russian war vessels interned in neutral ports during the war and the limitation of Russia's Far Eastern naval force; 4) an indemnity to cover the cost of the war; 5) the grant to Japanese subjects of fishing rights off the coast of Siberia; and 6) the cession of Saghalin to Japan. In her counter proposals Russia accepted some of these demands, but refused absolutely to consider the limitation of her navy, the demand for an indemnity, and the cession of Saghalin. Continued negotiations failed to bring the two parties to an agreement in spite of the pressure which President Roosevelt exerted on both sides. Finally they came together in what was expected by the Russians to be the last meeting of the conference. At that meeting Russia offered to cede half of Saghalin to Japan in lieu of an indemnity, expecting that the Japanese plenipotentiaries would refuse, since Japanese public opinion seemed

*Only partially
acceptable to
Russia*

to be insistent on the latter. To the surprise of Count Witte, the Japanese delegation announced that it was instructed to waive the demand for an indemnity and that the Russian offer would be accepted. Nothing remained for Count Witte to do but to sign the articles, to his own personal satisfaction, but to the dissatisfaction of his government.

The Portsmouth Treaty, signed on September 5, 1905, provided: (1) For recognition of Japan's "paramount political, military and economic interests" in Korea; (2) For transfer of the rights of Russia in the Liaotung peninsula to Japan; (3) That the southern section of the Manchurian railway be ceded to Japan; (4) That the portion of Saghalin south of the 50th parallel be ceded to Japan; (5) That Russia and Japan should withdraw their troops from Manchuria but retain railway guards; (5) That neither Japan nor Russia should obstruct "any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria"; (7) That railways in Manchuria be exploited purely for commercial and industrial, and in no way for strategical purposes—except in the Liaotung peninsula.⁴

*Summary of
provisions of
Treaty of
Portsmouth*

Thus the war resulted in a second advance of the Japanese position in the Far East. This time Japan gained the position on the mainland, once secured and then lost, which had been the goal of her policy in the sixteenth century. And she secured far more than her responsible statesmen thought possible at the time of the outbreak of the war. Taking up arms to defend herself against the menace of a strong and aggressive Power, she had effectively displaced that Power, leaving Russia, as the result of her activity, only a foothold in northern Manchuria. Supported during the negotiations preceding the war, and during the struggle, by her alliance with a strong Occidental state, she had carried through an advantageous revision of that alliance. Entering upon a contest to prevent the domination of Korea by Russia, she so effectually disposed of her second opponent in that land that she was able to throw her protection over the kingdom merely as a preliminary step in the direction of its annexation. Since she had attained and gone beyond her objectives, the war must be considered, from that point of view, a complete success for Japan. The question remained as to what use she would make of her new position.

*Results of war
to Japan*

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CHAPTER IX

FINANCIAL IMPERIALISM IN CHINA

I. METHODS OF CONQUEST OF CHINA

IN HER earlier contacts with other peoples and states China had repeatedly been conquered by military means. But the Chinese had then proceeded to conquer the victor by assimilating him—by causing him to accept the culture of China, both in its political and in its economic and social manifestations. This was possible for two principal reasons: 1) because the invaders were invariably not so highly developed as the Chinese, except in the art of warfare; and 2) because, in the process, the invaders came in person to establish themselves in the Celestial Empire, so that peoples met peoples and the stronger and more highly developed impressed their standards on those of a lower civilization.

*Early conquests
effected by
military means*

In the modern period the conquest of China has proceeded by very different means. True, force was either actually present or close in the background as Europe advanced into the East; but European peoples did not come to China in great numbers, nor did their governments attempt to gain physical control of China proper. Nevertheless a very real conquest of China has been going on since 1900. The agencies of control have been less tangible than armies, thus more insidious and, ultimately, more to be feared. To the Chinese, the process has been that of being gradually enfolded in the invisible tentacles of an octopus—European finance. The foreign customs were pledged as security for the Boxer indemnity and for other charges; provincial revenues were hypothecated; the salt tax was reorganized and brought under foreign administration because pledged as security for loans made to the government by foreign capital; the arteries of communication—the railway trunk lines—were built with borrowed money, and were subject to varying degrees of foreign control during the period of the loans. These were some of the concrete manifestations of the growing foreign financial control of China which would ultimately mean the extinction of the state.

*Modern conquest
through finance*

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine briefly the establishment of this control through finance—financial imperialism. The field of inquiry is thus narrower and more definite than an investigation of the economic interests of the European states and the United States in China. Financial imperialism is but a phase of the larger economic imperialism, but in China, prior to 1914, it was politically the most important phase.

2. EARLY WESTERN INTEREST IN CHINA

Treaty
stipulations
those necessary
to protect
commerce

It has already been made clear that the chief early interest of the Western nations in the opening of the Chinese Empire was a commercial one. England, as the chief trading state, took the lead in breaking down the barriers to commercial intercourse. As a rule the rights and privileges demanded for foreigners were those considered necessary in order to enable them to carry on their trade more profitably, with perhaps a secondary interest in the missionary and his work. How far this was true of the attitude of any given Power, depended on whether its interest was purely economic or commercial or chiefly political or territorial. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the Powers showed an interest in the development of exclusive positions in parts of the Empire, and this interest, though given an economic expression, was largely political in its nature. But throughout the modern period of their intercourse with the Far Eastern countries, profit for the Western states lay at the back of the development of policy. As Overlach truly says:¹ "This, then, is the point of extreme significance, namely: that the bottom idea of all treaty stipulations and agreements as to intercourse, customs, extra-territoriality, spheres of interest, railway concessions and control was not the welfare of the people of China, but the profit and ease of doing business by the people of the west."

Expansion and
change in
character of
foreign trade

It is impossible to assign these prescribed conditions of intercourse as the sole, or even the most important, causes of expansion of the trade sought by Europe, except as the treaties did broaden access to the country by the opening of new ports and by somewhat insuring the trader against the operation of hostile local opinion. But whatever the causes, foreign trade increased greatly after the ratification of the Tientsin treaties, and that without developing serious fear of foreign control of China. The total imports increased from 69,329,741 *taels* in 1867 to 447,100,791 *taels* in 1905. Exports expanded less rapidly, but still substantially, from 57,895,713 *taels* in 1867 to 227,888,197 *taels* in 1905.² The import figures are especially interesting as indicating the growth of a larger market for Western manufactured goods. It was the opium traffic which had turned the trade balance against China at the time when the country was opened by treaty. In 1867 opium still accounted for forty-six per cent of the total imports, while in 1905 the percentage had been decreased to seven and a half. This represented only a slightly decreased actual importation. The failure of the opium trade to expand was largely due to an increase in domestic production rather than to a change in the moral attitude of the traders. It had, however, come to be recognized that the traffic did retard the development of legitimate trade by exhausting the purchasing power of the Chinese. Importation of cotton

¹ *Foreign Financial Control in China*, p. 272.

² MORSE, *Trade and Administration of China*, 312-327. The chart opposite p. 297 is also worth consulting.

manufactures, including yarn, increased from 21 to 40 per cent of the total imports, metals from 2 to 10 per cent, and sundries from 20 to 40 per cent from 1867 to 1905, while woollens fell from 10 to 1 per cent. Turning to exports we find a similar change, although perhaps one not so striking. Tea accounted for 59 per cent of the exports in 1867, silk and its products for 34 per cent, and sundries for 7 per cent. In 1905 tea had declined to 11 per cent of the total, while silk and sundries accounted for 31 and 58 per cent respectively. The same year found China with an adverse trade balance of slightly over 219,000,000 *taels*, due to an increased use of Western products disproportionate to the enlarged demand for Chinese commodities. Indian and Japanese competition, together with that of Ceylon, decreased the market for Chinese teas; Japanese and European competition made inroads on the silk market; and while new commodities, listed as sundries, appeared in the trade, the demand for them was not great enough to restore the balance which remained steadily against China.

During this period, since the Powers were primarily interested, as has been pointed out, in the development of trade, the traders had considerable influence in the shaping of policies. The governments of England and the United States, for example, were under a constant pressure and criticism from the China traders, who almost uniformly wished to proceed faster and farther than their governments. But while policy was influenced it was not controlled by the traders, nor was trade used unduly to develop and advance purely political aims. The diplomat did, however, in China as elsewhere, come to be more and more involved in the pressing of claims of an economic character and to be less and less concerned with purely legal and political relations. And as financial, or investment, interests began to appear, particularly after 1895, the union of finance and diplomacy became very close, with sometimes the one taking the lead and sometimes the other. This fact makes necessary a preliminary examination of the relationship with a view to ascertaining its justification as well as its essential nature, before we attempt to trace the growth of foreign financial interests in China.

*Influence of
traders on
China policy
of Powers*

3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCE AND DIPLOMACY

True diplomacy may be defined roughly as the art of maintaining relations of friendship and understanding between two states, and of promoting the legitimate interests of the one in the other. In the advancement of these interests, if friendship is to be maintained and understanding to be developed, a careful distinction must be made between illegitimate and proper interests. By a proper interest should be understood one the promotion of which will result in mutual advantage.

*Definition of
diplomacy*

Trade, if developed on the basis of reciprocity, is entirely legitimate and necessary, and diplomatic agents can and should attempt to secure the right to buy and to sell by showing the advantage

*Reciprocal
advantages of
trade*

of extended relations. They should be alert to safeguard trade interests against discrimination in favor of others. Again, a country such as China may be in need of foreign capital for its development, and the foreign representative should consider it to be part of his duty to ensure the capital of his state a complete equality of consideration for investment, and should see to it, as far as possible, that the interests of investors from his country are properly safeguarded.

But when the diplomatic agent begins to exert pressure on the government of a politically backward country such as China to secure a monopoly of trade or investment privileges for the nationals of his state, or when he brings pressure to bear to force conditions of trade which are wholly disadvantageous to the backward state, or when he seeks to coerce that state into borrowing on terms less advantageous than could be secured elsewhere, it must be considered that he is over-stepping his true position. In the long run such activities do not advance the real interests of either state.

Furthermore, when the lead is taken by diplomacy in securing privileges which are not being requested by the traders, or, more particularly, by finance, then there is justification for thinking that there is a motive behind the act which is political in its character and not purely economic.³ In other words, when there is a proper relationship established between business and diplomacy, the latter should be used to advance the legitimate interests of the former rather than to bring them into being in order to utilize them for its own ends.

If this point of view is correct, then the diplomatic activity of the several Powers represented at Peking should have been closely proportioned either to their trading or investment interests in China or to pressure exerted by national trade and finance on the government to secure its aid in the establishment and development of commercial and financial undertakings. Otherwise it is fair to assume a political motive back of diplomatic action.

When we look to trade we find that, prior to 1905, it was not considered necessary to keep separate record of the commerce of the states of continental Europe, except Russia, with the Chinese Empire. In the customs reports they were grouped together as a trading unit. The greatest trading Power in 1900 was Great Britain. Japan came second, both as to imports and exports, with the United States third. Russian trade amounted to about half that of the United States, while that of Germany and France, together with all of the other states of continental Europe, in total of imports and exports, was very little greater than that of the United States. In 1896 the trade of these several states with China was considerably less, the activities

³ Of course diplomacy may and should turn the attention of national trading and financial institutions to a field hitherto neglected by them, and take the lead in that way. What is meant is the practice of extorting concessions for its nationals which they are not in a position to use.

Diplomatic pressure to secure economic privileges for nationals

Diplomacy should only be used to promote legitimate economic interests

Diplomatic activity at Peking proportioned to trade and investment interests of Powers

Ranking of Powers from standpoint of trade interests

of the years from 1896 to 1900 having brought a slight proportional increase.

When we turn to their diplomatic activity, however, there is a different story to tell. The most active Power at Peking was Russia, supported by France. The least active in pressing its claims on the Chinese government was the United States. And it was not the desire to promote trade relations which was the most marked feature of the pressure on China during those years and immediately after 1900. The reason for this is, perhaps, the fact that political ends could not be so readily advanced by the promotion of trade. Consequently it is to finance that we must turn to estimate the position and the policy of the Powers.

Diplomatic activity not proportioned to trade interest

Beyond this, however, in estimating the relationship between finance and diplomacy, it is necessary to try to ascertain whether the latter was merely making use of the former, or the reverse, if we are to gain an adequate understanding of the international situation. Too often, in the case of countries such as China, diplomatic pressure has been exerted to introduce national finance into the country. It is hoped then to utilize it in order to afford a pretext for later intervention on the ground of the necessity for protection of the initial investment. As a result of this intervention further privileges have been secured, whether or not they could be utilized, and thus a broader ground has been laid for intervention. Perhaps as a result of an intervention some measure of political supervision, especially of finance and of the protective services, might result. In other words, the ultimate aim of this apparently peaceful economic penetration of a backward country may have been political rather than economic. And where the initiative has come from government rather than from finance, there is more likely to be a political motive involved than when the initiative has come from finance.

Political rather than economic penetration the aim

4. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S FINANCIAL PROBLEM

Before proceeding further we must observe certain special characteristics of the financial problem in China. In the first place, China was entirely, and still is largely, dependent on foreign capital for her development and for meeting the increases in her governmental expenditure which necessarily arose from the imposition of indemnity payments. For developmental purposes there has been no domestic money market, not because there has been no available capital in China, but because of lack of confidence in the government as an agency for the construction of railroads and the opening of mines—the two great fields for the use of capital. There has also been a lack of familiarity with and confidence in the stock company as a form of organization capable of drawing into one set of hands large amounts of capital. To meet increased public expenditure there has been an inflexible revenue system, and one not easily changed, since it was founded on immemorial custom. Taxes on land and the production

Dependence on foreign capital for development

Inflexible revenue system

of salt could produce greater revenue only by an increase in the rate, which, of course, would meet with serious popular resistance. Furthermore, whereas modern states find the foreign customs the chief flexible source of income, China, because the rates were fixed by treaty, could not meet her new needs by an increase in the charge on goods imported into the country. Finally, it was impossible to produce increased revenues by a reorganization of the collection of the existing taxes, because of official interest in the possibility of "squeeze." Consequently, in spite of the fact that per capita taxes in China were comparatively small, the Empire had to depend on the foreign money market to take care of its immediate governmental needs, and to provide for the great developmental undertakings such as the construction of railways.

Impossible to distinguish between public and private obligations

In the second place, as will be readily appreciated, if the obligations of the Chinese government are carefully examined, it is almost impossible, because of the intimate relationship between foreign finance and diplomacy, to distinguish between China's public and private obligations.⁴

Special national financial agencies given exclusive support of Powers

In the third place, it must be noted that special national agencies have almost exclusively enjoyed the support of their governments in seeking concessions and in other ways securing the right to aid in the financing of China.

Thus Japanese loans have been made, for the most part, through the Yokohama Specie Bank . . . and a syndicate consisting of the Bank of Taiwan, the Bank of Chosen, and the Industrial Bank of Japan. . . . British financial interests have operated through the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and the British and Chinese Corporation, formed, in 1908, by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the trading firm of Jardine, Matheson and Company. German financial interests have operated in China through the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. Russian financial interests have employed as their agency the Banque Russo-Asiatique, earlier known as the Banque Russo-Chinoise. France has used the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, and, in association with it, the Credit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris, and other banks. Belgium has used the Société Belge d'Etudes de Chemins Fer en Chine. American interests, for the most part, have acted through a banking group (originally constituted by J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, the First National Bank of New York, and the National City Bank of New York), the International Banking Corporation, and Lee, Higginson and Co.⁵

Thus, in some cases (as the Crisp Loan) it has been impossible for responsible financial concerns to participate in the financing of China because they could not secure the support of their governments, since such support had already been promised exclusively to other institutions or groups. This has had the effect of restricting China's access, on competitive terms, to the loan markets of the world.

⁴ MACMURRAY, *Treaties, etc.*, vol. 1, pp. xiv-xv.

⁵ WILLOUGHBY, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, pp. 485-86.

5. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF POWERS (1895-1908)

With this introduction it is possible to turn to the financial activities of the Powers after 1895. A survey of these activities may be conveniently divided into two periods, the first extending from 1895 to 1908, a time of intense competition among the several Powers, and the second including the years following 1908, when the Powers showed an increasing realization of the dangers of an unrestricted competition, and, as a result of this appreciation, tended to coöperate in the development and economic and financial exploitation of China.

*Division of
survey*

Prior to the war with Japan, China had no appreciable foreign debt. The war, however, resulted in her agreement to pay an indemnity of 230,000,000 *taels*. Immediately Russia came to her aid, as she had in the matter of the cession of the Liaotung promontory, and offered the Imperial Government a loan out of which to meet the first payments on the indemnity. This loan of four hundred million francs, while made by Russia and France jointly, was almost entirely subscribed in France. It was secured on the Maritime Customs receipts, and by a Russian government guarantee. Russia had no money to lend, but was willing to guarantee the loan because of the effect it would have on her position at Peking.

*Russian loan
to pay war
indemnity*

The British immediately pressed on the Chinese government a loan to meet the second instalment of the indemnity, to the amount of sixteen million pounds.⁶ This was an Anglo-German loan and marks the beginning of coöperation of English and German finance in Chinese affairs. In 1898, when the final instalment was due, the Anglo-German financiers were forced to compete with the Russians and French, both groups strongly urging their claims to consideration on the Chinese government. The former were successful, although offering less advantageous terms, because of the strong pressure brought to bear on China from the British legation. No government guarantee, however, was involved in the Anglo-German loans, which must be considered as more nearly financial in their ends than the Russo-French loan. It was, nevertheless, the desire to combat the Russian influence which caused the British government to insist that her financiers should have the privilege of helping China out of the difficulties created by the war with Japan. It has already been seen that both groups reaped an abundant reward for their benevolence when it came to the scramble for economic privileges in the Empire during and after 1898.

*Anglo-German
loans*

The next great public debt fastened on China resulted from the failure of the Boxer movement, the indemnity imposed amounting to 450,000,000 *taels*. The security taken for this charge was: the unpledged balance of the Maritime Customs, increased by the raising of the tariff charges to an effective five percent; the revenues from the native customs administered in the open ports by the Maritime Customs service; and the revenues from the Salt Gabelle. The Mari-

*Boxer
indemnity*

⁶ Also secured by the Maritime Customs and certain provincial likin.

time Customs were taken as security for these early debts primarily because it was a service efficiently organized and administered under foreign supervision.

*Other
governmental
loans*

It was not until 1911 that China was again forced to borrow for governmental purposes. But with the (uncompleted) currency loan of that year and the reorganization loan of 1913, following the revolution of 1911, she began increasingly to seek funds abroad for general administrative purposes. Consideration of these loans, however, will be postponed for the present, since they fall within the second period, that of international coöperation.

*Loans for
construction of
railways*

While governmental loans were important, the principal field for foreign finance lay in securing and utilizing railway concessions. It was through railway construction that the Powers hoped effectively to penetrate and develop the areas claimed as spheres of interest, and it is in the control provisions of the various loan agreements that the policy and intention of the several European states are most clearly revealed. So far as the primary interest of a state was purely financial and economic, the control provisions in its railway contracts were designed merely to afford ample security to the bondholders. Where, on the other hand, the interest was partly or wholly political, more extensive control was demanded. These control provisions, whether of the one sort or the other, were five in number. They involved: 1) supervision of construction of the road; 2) a national priority in the purchase of materials; 3) audit, or other supervision of expenditure; 4) actual operation of the road during the life of the loan; and 5) administration of the railway zone and police rights therein. In some cases the roads themselves were pledged as security for the loan, whether with or without the above-mentioned control provisions. In other cases the loan was secured by a general Imperial Government guarantee, and by the pledging of certain revenues for the repayment of the loan together with the interest on it.

*Control
provisions*

*Examples of
roads controlled
for political
purposes*

As examples of roads which provided for control of operation for strategical or other political purposes, may be mentioned the Russian and Japanese lines in Manchuria, the German Tsingtao-Tsinanfu line in Shantung province, and the French system in Yunnan and Kwangsi provinces. The several loan agreements for these systems contain all five of the provisions described above. They were constructed, and have been operated, under the supervision of the foreign governments concerned rather than by the Imperial Government of China, and the nature of the transaction in each case warrants the conclusion that the foreign government was interested in the loan for its own purposes rather than on behalf of national finance. In other words, the loans were not made primarily as good investments, nor were the roads constructed for the sake of the advantage derived from the sale of materials to be used in building them or because of the profits that would be made out of their operation. In some cases it was apparent that the roads would not be immediately or even for a long

time profitable, and the railway tariffs were not fixed with a view to profit but were established for political reasons.⁷ Furthermore, the above-mentioned governments, in addition to specific concessions, sought continually to secure a general monopoly of construction in their respective spheres, with a view to determining the course of development of those areas. In consequence of this China has been greatly handicapped in the development of her communications along national lines.

As examples of roads the control provisions concerning which, although extensive, were designed primarily to afford security to the investor, may be mentioned the Peking-Mukden, the Shanghai-Nanking, and the Peking-Hankow railways. In each of these cases the security for the loan was the railway properties, which, upon default, might be taken over and administered in the interest of the bondholders. They differed from the French, Russian, and Japanese lines chiefly in that the construction and supervision of the operation of the roads lay in the hands of corporations which were not under the direct control of foreign governments and were not in a position, under their agreements, to shape the policies of the railways along non-commercial lines. The roads themselves were the properties of the Chinese government rather than of foreign governments.

*Examples of
roads controlled
to secure
interests of
investor*

The groundwork for the construction of these railways was laid in the years from 1898 to 1900, and the concessions obtained were, on the whole, in the respective spheres of interest of the Powers. Consequently they served to emphasize the division of China into spheres. Each Power sought to strengthen itself in its sphere by keeping out the others, either by direct agreement, or by pressure exerted at Peking to prevent the granting of concessions to nationals of other states. We have already referred to the agreements reached between Great Britain, on the one hand, and France, Russia, and Germany, on the other, providing for a mutual respect for each other's priority of interest in a specified region. These agreements were, on the whole, lived up to by both England and Germany. Russia, however, as has been indicated, tried indirectly to force her way into the British sphere by utilizing Belgian capital, and France tried to project her influence northwards into the Yangtse provinces.

*Spheres of
interest and
railway
concessions*

American interests secured only one concession for the construction of part of the rail system of China during this early period, and this one American capitalists failed to utilize. An Anglo-American syndicate, headed by Senator Brice, sought in competition with the Belgian interests for the right to construct the road from Peking to Hankow. When China granted the concession to the Belgian interests she compensated the Americans by a concession for the line south from Hankow to Canton. In this way it was hoped to introduce a disinterested influence into the construction of her main north-and-south artery. But, although the concession agreement provided

*The American
concession*

⁷ This was true of the French, Russian, and Japanese systems.

specifically that control in the enterprise should not be allowed to pass from American hands, Belgian interests did gain control through purchases in the open market, and in 1903 the concession was cancelled, although control had been regained through purchases made by J. P. Morgan and Company.

*Subsequent
interest of
United States
in Manchuria*

After this failure American interest next manifested itself in Manchuria, which, even after the Russo-Japanese War, continued to be the international storm center.

*The Harriman
project*

At the conclusion of the war with Russia the statesmen of Japan were undecided as to their future policy in Manchuria. When Mr. Harriman, the American railroad magnate, approached the Japanese government with a proposal to lease the South Manchurian and operate it as part of a projected round-the-world system, a preliminary understanding was reached which was embodied in the Ito-Harriman agreement. But when Count Komura, the chief Japanese plenipotentiary, returned from Portsmouth, he strongly opposed any Japanese withdrawal from Manchuria. As a result of the opposition which developed, the agreement was not carried into effect, the cancellation being put on the ground that the road did not become the property of Japan until after China's consent to the transfer from Russia had been obtained.

*Use made by
Japan of rights
acquired from
Russia*

Then Japan embarked on a systematic development of her newly acquired holdings. First of all, she undertook negotiations with the Chinese government to secure its acquiescence in the transference of the Russian rights and interests to Japan. This agreement was embodied in the Komura treaties. But these treaties also carried secret annexes by which China bound herself not to grant any concession for the construction of a railroad in Manchuria which would parallel or compete with the South Manchurian system. As it was later interpreted and used, this secret agreement denied the right of foreign (non-Japanese) capital to enter South Manchuria for the purpose of financing railway construction, giving Japan a virtual monopoly there. In addition to this the Japanese used their control of rail communications to advance their business interests at the expense of other foreigners doing business in Manchuria. In the first place, the commercial port, Dairen, was for some time closed to all but Japanese goods and vessels. From Dairen the goods were carried on the Japanese-controlled railway to points in the interior, although the railway was supposedly being used at the time only for the evacuation of troops and for other military purposes. In this way Japan attempted to establish a market for her goods before admitting her foreign competitors. Furthermore, rebates on the railroad were given to Japanese goods; the Japanese demanded exemption from the operation of the Chinese consumption taxes; and, in general, they indulged in many of the practices which they had objected to and protested against in the Russian action in Manchuria prior to the war and in the German action in Shantung, on the ground that such practices

constituted a violation of the doctrine of the Open Door. From the administrative side Japan balanced an efficient administration by continued encroachments on and offences against the Chinese position outside of the railway zone, and in the zone she made herself supreme so far as China was concerned.

Japan's use of her position and rights in Manchuria made some of the Chinese officials desirous of introducing non-Japanese capital north of the Great Wall in order to emphasize the fact of Chinese sovereignty. Consequently in 1907 an agreement was reached between the Manchurian Viceroy and Mr. Willard Straight, the American Consul-General at Mukden, for the financing of a Manchurian Bank with American capital. This bank was to serve as the fiscal agent of the Manchurian government, and was to participate in financing railway construction. The panic of 1907 in the United States, however, prevented even consideration of this project. Later in the year British capitalists were interested in, and secured a concession for, the construction of a railway from Hsinmintun to Fakumen. Japanese opposition to this concession developed immediately, based on its violation of the terms of the annexes to the Komura treaty. The British legation was unwilling to support its nationals in ventures north of the Great Wall in the face of Japanese opposition, and the project was not carried through. In 1908, however, negotiations were begun again between the Chinese government and Anglo-American financiers for the financing of a line from Chinchow to Aigun. This concession was pushed by the American government and was secretly ratified by the Imperial Government of China in 1910.

*Chinese seek to
introduce
American
capital into
Manchuria*

6. THE KNOX NEUTRALIZATION PROPOSALS

After securing the ratification of this concession-agreement the State Department made a move looking toward the clarification of the whole situation in Manchuria, when Secretary Knox made his famous proposal for the neutralization of the railroads in Manchuria. These proposals, it was felt, were justified for two reasons. In the first place, the Chinchow-Aigun concession had given American interests a tangible basis in Manchuria, so that the United States was not coming forward entirely as a disinterested outsider. She had something to give up in return for concessions from the other interested Powers. This was the real justification for pushing the Chinchow-Aigun negotiations. In the second place, Mr. Harriman had revived his round-the-world transportation project in 1909, just before his death, because of an intimation from Russia that the Czar's government would be willing to consider the lease or sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was well known, on the other hand, that the Japanese government was in considerable financial straits, and it was felt that Japan might be willing to dispose of her South Manchurian holdings if Japanese interests were not thereby sacrificed. Consequently the Knox proposals were not so ill-advised as has sometimes been represented.

*Justification of
Knox proposals*

*Criticism of
methods
employed to
secure assent
to proposals*

The methods employed to secure assent to them were, on the other hand, extremely ill-advised. In the first place, the intimation from Russia should have been followed up and a promise to sell the Chinese Eastern secured. This would have made it possible to bring a more effective pressure to bear on Japan to induce her to internationalize the control of the South Manchurian. It might also have prevented Russia from opposing the American policy because of the offense to her pride due to the fact that it was apparently assumed that she would assent to a policy which had Anglo-American support. It would have been more expedient to have approached England only after negotiations had been instituted with Russia and then with Japan. In any case, when England did not respond warmly to the American proposals, other support should have been sought before proceeding further, except as it may be assumed that the American government was more interested in focusing attention on the real Manchurian aims and intentions of the Powers than in successfully carrying out its own plans.

*Nature of the
proposals*

Briefly, the proposal was that an international syndicate should be formed to make a large loan to China so that she might buy out the Russian and Japanese interests, and that the Manchurian railways should be neutralized and internationally administered during the period of the loan. In sounding out the British attitude toward the proposal Secretary Knox suggested that if the British government was not willing to support the larger project, it might at least join the United States in supporting diplomatically the Chinchow-Aigun scheme, in the development of which other Powers might be given a share.

*The British
reply*

The British reply was disappointing in that it intimated that the British government felt that the time was inopportune for the making of such far-reaching proposals, and in that it suggested that the Japanese be invited to participate in the Chinchow-Aigun concession because of their peculiar interest in Manchuria. Thus instead of supporting the American position that Manchuria was a proper field for the activities of non-Japanese finance, the British government accepted the Japanese contention that South Manchuria was an exclusive Japanese preserve so far as investment rights and railroad development were concerned.

*Japan and
Russia refuse
assent*

The Japanese and Russian governments finally gave a categorical refusal to consider the American proposals, the wording of their answers being so similar as to indicate a prior agreement. It is interesting to note that the refusal of both countries was put, in part, on political and strategical grounds, indicating that the two governments construed their interests in Manchuria to be political and not purely commercial and financial. In opposing the Chinchow-Aigun concession both Japan and Russia produced secret agreements with the Chinese government by which it agreed not to undertake railway developments in Manchuria without first consulting Russia if north

Manchuria was affected, or Japan if the projects involved the territory south of Changchun. In the face of the open Russian opposition and the Japanese expression of a willingness to participate on entirely unacceptable terms, the Chinchow-Aigun concession was allowed to lapse.

The total effect of the Knox activity is summarized by Mr. Millard in the following terms:⁸ 1) The right of China to decide upon the course of railway development within her territory was denied by foreign nations. 2) Certain foreign nations declared that their strategical and political interests must be considered as paramount in planning a railway system within China's territory. 3) Certain foreign nations asserted the right to decide who would finance, construct, and operate railways within China's territory and to veto arrangements in regard to these matters which China wishes to carry out. To these may be added two other effects; 1) Great Britain reversed her policy, returning to the sphere of interest conception and partially repudiating the principle of the Open Door, of equal opportunity in its enlarged conception. 2) Japan and Russia drew together in defense of their exclusive and preferential interests in the Manchurian provinces. In 1907 they had entered into a political convention in which each agreed to respect the Manchurian rights of the other so far as they were not inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity, and they recognized in general the independence and territorial integrity of China and the Open Door principle and agreed to sustain and defend them. But in 1910 Russia and Japan entered into both a public and a secret convention defining their respective spheres in Manchuria, agreeing not to interfere with each other in developing their positions within their spheres, and stipulating for concerted action in case their special interests in Manchuria were threatened. The 1910 conventions contain no acceptance of the principle either of equal opportunity or of the integrity of China.

*Effect of
American
activity*

7. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN FINANCE

In a sense this Knox proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways was but a part of a general movement toward financial coöperation in China. The British objection to a discussion of the internationalizing of the Manchurian lines rested partly on the fact that the Powers were then engaged in working out arrangements for coöperating in the building of railways in western and southern China. Finance was rapidly finding out the difficulties of competition for concessions, and governments apparently were beginning to realize that there was room for all in the financing of the great trunk lines of China. They were coming to perceive that competition had the effect of playing into the hands of China by securing her more favorable terms in the making of loans than could otherwise have been obtained.

*Movement
toward
coöperation in
railway finance*

⁸ MILLARD, *Our Eastern Question*, p. 25.

The Tientsin-Pukow railway project

Thus when a road was projected from Tientsin to the Yangtse River, England and Germany competed for the right to finance it. Both nations had a claim to participation, because the road penetrated their respective spheres of interest. The Germans proved agreeable to the granting of more favorable terms to China than the British (who insisted on the usual financial control provisions), but British diplomacy was stronger at Peking than that of Germany. Furthermore, the hands of both parties were tied by their agreement to respect each other's spheres. Finally, since both recognized the desirability of constructing the road, an agreement was reached by which they shared in the undertaking, the Germans gaining the right to construct the section from Tientsin to the southern border of Shantung province, while the British were to complete the road to its juncture, at Pukow, with the (British) Shanghai-Nanking railway. The competition, however, had resulted in China's securing the elimination of many of the usual control provisions. The road itself was not made the security for the loan, certain provincial revenues being pledged as the security. Consequently the road would not have to be administered in the interest of the bondholders. In fact, the construction and operation of the road was to be in the hands of China herself, although she agreed to appoint British and German engineers for their respective sections. Furthermore, there was no provision made for supervision of expenditure of the loan funds.

Weakness of control provisions

Tientsin-Pukow terms came to be synonymous with terms favorable to China for railway loans. Many foreigners, however, were skeptical as to the advisability of this weakening of the control provisions of the loan, and were particularly dubious about eliminating the right to supervise expenditure. And it must be admitted that this skepticism was somewhat justified by the event. It proved to be necessary to float a supplementary loan to complete the road, owing to the high cost of construction under Chinese control, for there was much squandering of funds.

The Hukuang railways project

For some years prior to 1908 there had been intermittently discussed the project of constructing a road south from Hankow to Canton, and westwards from Hankow into the great province of Szechuan. These discussions were renewed in 1908-1909, primarily in order to reach an agreement as to the measure of control which should be insisted upon, in the light of the Tientsin-Pukow experience, in the making of future loans. France and England, and, still earlier, the United States and England, had been interested in these two roads. In 1908 Germany also turned her attention toward them, and it was as a result of her activity that British, French, and German financiers and government officials undertook conversations in the hope of finding a basis for coöperation in the undertaking by reconciling their respective claims. Just when they had reached an agreement the American government interfered in the interest of American finance. When diplomatic action at Peking failed to achieve any results,

President Taft took the unusual step of cabling the Regent, requesting that Americans be admitted to participation. The basis for this request was the old concession of 1898-1903. After the intervention of President Taft, an American group was allowed to participate and the Four Powers Banking Group came into being. In order to show its real desire to extend the operation of the coöperative principle the American government at this time invited the other three Powers to join it in making a loan for currency reform in China, a project in which the United States had been given an exclusive interest. However, work on the railway project and the issuance of the currency loan were both retarded by the revolutionary developments of the year 1911 and thereafter.

8. EFFECTS OF REVOLUTION AND EUROPEAN WAR

The revolution brought with it new financial problems for the Chinese government, and as a result it began to look to foreign sources for funds for general administrative purposes. On account of its immediately pressing needs and because of the large sums ultimately required, the Chinese government turned to the International Syndicate for advances and began to negotiate with it for a comprehensive loan to be devoted to reorganization and reconstruction purposes, giving the syndicate, in return for its advances for immediate needs, an option on the comprehensive loan. When the new Republican government began to negotiate for this loan it found that the syndicate (extended to include Japan and Russia because of the political character of the loan contemplated) insisted on adequate provision for control of the revenues to be pledged as security. In consequence it tried to gain the necessary funds outside of the Six Power Group, but was unable to do so as the several national groups had the exclusive support of their respective governments. Finally, in 1913, agreement was reached on the Salt Gabelle as the security for the loan, and provision was made for its reorganization under foreign supervision.

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 interfered with an extension of the financial operations of the first consortium. The American group had withdrawn from participation in the reorganization loan because the State Department under the direction of President Wilson refused to pledge its support to the members of the group, taking the stand that "the conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this Administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to these conditions."⁹ After the outbreak of war German interests became inactive. And finally consortium advances on the loan came almost entirely from Japan. Additional loans for governmental purposes, as they became necessary, were also made by Japa-

*Reorganization
loan*

*Withdrawal of
United States
from
Consortium*

*Effect of war
on Consortium
activities*

⁹ From President Wilson's announcement, reproduced in WILLOUGHBY, *Foreign Rights and Interests*, p. 501.

nese agencies acting independently, and, on a small scale, by American interests. Thus group action gave way to separate action until the revival and reorganization of the consortium at Paris, this time as the result of American initiative.¹⁰

*Effects of war
on railway
construction*

The same reversion appeared in the railroad field. Contracts made after 1912 provided for the construction of over six thousand miles of road with foreign funds. A little less than a third of this mileage was granted to British financial institutions, the terms providing, among other conditions, for the employment of a British engineer-in-chief, chief accountant, and traffic manager, and for the pledging of the road as security for the loan. The Russians and Japanese¹¹ extended their railway interests in Manchuria, north and south, on the usual terms. The German contracts in Shantung for the Kaomi-Yih sien and Tsinan-Shuntetu roads (1913) were transferred to Japan and later by her to the second consortium. The French were awarded concessions of almost two thousand miles carrying them northwards through Szechuan, Shansi, and Shensi provinces to an ultimate connection with the Peking-Kalgan road. Except for the northwestern extension of French interests, all of these concessions fell within the claimed spheres of interest of the respective Powers. When an American concern, the Siems-Carey Company, secured contracts for fifteen hundred miles of construction in 1916, it found the old sphere conception fully revived. This made it a problem for the Chinese government to mark out the lines for American construction so as to meet the objections raised by the several interested Powers.

*Peculiar
problems of
railway
administration
due to foreign
influence*

Due to the war-time and post-war financial conditions, little has been done toward completing these lines. The contracts have served principally as barriers to the undertaking of work by others than the concessionaires, and to that extent have hindered rather than helped the development of an adequate system of rail communications in China. By 1925 there was upwards of seven thousand miles of line in operation. This must be considered a good total in view of the general obstacles to construction, and it must, on the whole, be recognized that China has been materially benefited by the enlargement and improvement of her means of communication in spite of the introduction of foreign influence with the many problems and dangers presented by it. The dangers have been pointed out, and some of the problems may be stated very briefly. The conditions under which loans were granted have been so different, and the provisions for the supervision of construction have been so varied, that a non-uniform gauge has resulted. Some of the roads have the standard gauge, the Russian roads use the five-foot gauge, and the French roads the meter gauge. This has prevented a satisfactory utilization of rolling stock

¹⁰ It seems advisable to postpone further discussion of the financial problem in China after the Revolution to succeeding chapters, since it can be most easily followed in connection with the discussion of the evolution of the political system after 1911.

¹¹ Japanese interests are more fully discussed in Ch. 14.

and stands in the way of the administration of the roads as a unit. Then there is the very serious problem presented by the variety of administrations, with the Chinese Ministry of Communications unable to control all of the roads effectively. These and other administrative problems rising out of the conditions of financing and constructing the Chinese system have been attacked and partially solved by the institution of "conferences," which have sought to work out coöperatively a uniform system of operation. Representatives of the non-government as well as the government lines have participated in these conferences. In spite of the handicaps presented by the political disorganization of the years 1916-1926, and the interference of the military with the normal operation of the railways, their financial condition has steadily improved with their more extensive use.

*Interference of
military
authorities
with railways*

So far as equipment and general maintenance are concerned, however, military interference and internal turmoil have resulted in deterioration, which naturally affects the foreign investment and may easily lead to serious difficulty in the future both for China as a borrower and for the foreign interests concerned.

9. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD AND INTEREST IN RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

Before concluding this discussion of financial imperialism in China it is proper to consider the general effect of the activities of the Powers on Chinese opinion. First of all, we must remember that China was totally unable to finance the construction of railways, the opening of mines, and the general industrial and political reorganization of the country. This fact necessarily modified the Chinese attitude from time to time as it was brought home to the educated classes. With this modification in mind, however, it may be said that the attitude of the Chinese people was determined by their fear of foreign financial control of their country.

*Chinese reaction
to attitude of
Powers*

During the years after the war with Japan the Chinese little realized the significance of the process of economic penetration which was being provided for by the agreements entered into from 1896 to 1900. The use made of the Manchurian railway by the Russians, however, awakened many of the officials to the danger to the state inhering in the foreign-controlled railway. Consequently there came a period when the Chinese were unwilling to accept foreign loans. The concentration of attention on the developing conflict between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria also led to the cessation of loans.

*Growing
realization of
significance of
foreign-
controlled
railway*

After the Russo-Japanese War the Chinese awakened still more fully to the gravity of the situation. The war promoted the movement toward internal reform, one phase of which was the attempt to develop a national system of communications. Immediately before and after the conflict in Manchuria the attempt was made to construct provincial railways out of locally subscribed funds. This, in the long run, would have had the effect of retarding the unification of the

*Development
of rail
communications
part of reform
program*

country, and the more capable of the Imperial officials soon perceived this fact. The perception of the possibility and the necessity for unification of the country by means of the construction of railways under the control and direction of Peking led to the elaboration of a program of railway nationalization. The coöperative attitude of the Powers fitted in perfectly with this policy as it provided Peking with the necessary funds for the construction of the great trunk lines, from which feeders could be thrown out gradually as opportunity offered.

*Influence and
interest of the
provinces*

Provincial opinion, however, had to be considered, and the gentry in the provinces were afraid of the gradual development of an international control of China through control of a centralized system of communications. Furthermore, the provinces had to be considered so far as they had invested in local railway undertakings. Their natural tendency, too, was to fight centralization unless they stood to profit by it. It was from this direction that part of the opposition which has been connected with the revolutionary movement of 1911, such as the insurrection in Szechuan province, came.

*Factors making
difficult the
inauguration
of policy of
centralization*

Fear of foreign financial control, the natural centripetal tendency in the country, and the interest of the gentry in securing favorable terms for themselves in giving up to the central government their provincial railway investments—all conspired to make more difficult of execution the policy of centralization determined upon in 1907-1909.

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CHAPTER X

REFORM AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA

I. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH REFORM WAS UNDERTAKEN

THE internal history of China during the decade following the signature of the Boxer Protocol presents two patterns which are distinct and yet closely interwoven. The first is that of reform and the second that of revolution. And through both runs the thread of international relations. Since the narrative will be clearer if the two patterns are kept distinct, we shall attempt first to trace the development of the Manchu reform program up to the outbreak of the revolution in October of 1911, and after that has been done we shall try to picture the larger background of the revolution. It will then be possible to consider the revolution and the history of the eventful years following the abdication of the Manchu Emperor.

*Separate
consideration
of reform and
revolutionary
movements
advisable*

To preserve the sequence, a brief recapitulation may well be undertaken at this point. In the first chapter a summary description of the political organization of China was given. Two of its features, it will be remembered, were the decentralized territorial system resulting from the high development of provincial and local autonomy, and the inflexible revenue system which could not be readily adapted to meet the new burdens on the state resulting from unsuccessful war and from the attempted introduction of such Western inventions as the steam engine. Succeeding chapters indicated the reaction of China to the contact with the West, particularly her failure to strengthen her political system, her military organization, and her economic life so as to enable her to protect herself against those who, because of her weakness and economic backwardness, became her despoilers. Such limited reorganization as had been attempted had been only partially successful because of the innate conservatism and feeling of superiority of the officials and the gentry, and, so far as it related to military and naval reform, had been largely neutralized by the widespread system of "squeeze." As a direct consequence of her weakness and the unwillingness of her officials to recognize the changed conditions, China lost most of her dependencies, suffered repeated defeats, both military and diplomatic, the most humiliating being that administered by Japan, and was finally threatened with partition along the lines marked out in 1897-1898. This could not help but engender dissatisfaction with the reigning dynasty. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the foreign impact synchronized with bad internal conditions, partly the result of famine, piracy and

*Summary of
development
to 1900*

brigandage, and widespread rebellion. For these internal conditions, as well as for external aggression, the dynasty was held responsible. Consequently by 1900 it was presented with the alternatives of reform or elimination, because of its inability to fulfil its obligations to the country. We have briefly described the attempt at reform, as it was made rather impulsively in 1898, and the overthrow of the reformers, as well as the successful attempt to divert the discontented elements into the channel of anti-foreignism. The failure of Boxerism made almost inevitable a renewal, in a more conservative way, of the attempt to preserve the dynasty by reform of the governmental system.

That this attempt was to be made was clearly indicated in an edict issued in 1901 by the Empress-Dowager from Hsianfu, whence the Court had fled as the foreign expeditionary force approached Peking. Parts of the edict deserve quotation as predicating the course of events of the next few years.¹ "Looking at the matter broadly, we may observe that any system which has lasted too long is in danger of becoming stereotyped, and things which are obsolete should be modified. The essential need which confronts us is at all costs to strengthen Our Empire, and to improve the condition of our subjects. . . . The Empress-Dowager has now decided that we should correct our short-comings by adopting the best methods and systems which obtain in foreign countries, basing our future conduct on a wise recognition of past errors." In order to placate those who had objected to the K'ang Yu-wei reforms, the edict then pointed out that the objects of the Empress-Dowager were fundamentally different from those of the 1898 reformers. "Their main object is not reform but a revolution against the Manchu Dynasty," while the Old Buddha's object was to preserve the dynasty. Furthermore she intimated that she was interested not in making radical changes, but in reality was merely aiming at removing evil growths from the age-old system. "The teachings handed down to us by our Sacred Ancestors are really the same as those upon which the wealth and power of European countries have been based, but China has hitherto failed to realize this, and has been content to acquire the rudiments of European languages or technicalities while changing nothing of her ancient habits of inefficiency and deep-rooted corruption." The whole edict was primarily devoted to the important work of convincing the conservative officials that it would be safe to inaugurate a program of change under the supervision of the Empress-Dowager, although a similar program proposed by the Emperor had been properly condemned as revolutionary.

Upon the return of the Court to Peking the reform era was inaugurated and an opportunity was afforded for judgment as to the sincerity of the Empress-Dowager. It is obvious that changes could be made only with the coöperation of the officials of the metropolitan

*Reform edict
of 1901*

*Reforms
contemplated
differentiated
from those of
1898*

*Yüan Shih-k'ai
and Chang
Chih-tung
leaders in
reform*

¹ The following excerpts are taken from the translation given by BLAND AND BACKHOUSE, *China under the Empress-Dowager*, pp. 419-424.

area and the provinces, and two of these stood out as honest supporters of progress. Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had served as Chinese Resident at Seoul until 1895, and who had thereafter been Judicial Commissioner of the Metropolitan province, Junior Vice-President of the Board of Works, and Governor of Shantung during the Boxer uprising, was appointed Viceroy of Chihli province at the end of 1901, when he was also made Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent. It was under his direction that many of the changes in the central administration were carried out. He also showed his interest in army reorganization. The other leading advocate of reform was Chang Chih-tung, who as the Hukuang Viceroy dominated reform in the provinces up to the time of his death. While Yüan was primarily interested in political and military reorganization, Chang would seem to have been principally concerned with the strengthening of the economic foundations of the state.

2. THE FIRST PERIOD OF REFORM

The first concrete interest was manifested in military reform. Until after 1895 China had no real modern national army, her military forces consisting of the Banner troops, and of the Green Flag or provincial troops.² The latter were in reality provincial constabulary and were organized and controlled by the provincial officials. After 1895 an attempt at reorganization was made but without permanent effect. In 1901 an Imperial edict again ordered reorganization, which was begun in Chihli province by reason of the interest of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Between 1903 and 1906 he created a model force of six divisions. Four of these were transferred in 1906 to the then established Ministry of War, and a plan was projected for the formation of a National Army of thirty-six divisions. In 1907 it was ordered that this program should be completed by 1912. The real advance in program came as a direct result of the interest created by the war between Russia and Japan. By 1911 progress had been made in this part of the reform program, and it will be interesting subsequently to note how the partial formation of a modern army affected the fortunes of the Manchus.

A second and more fundamental reform was inaugurated in theory in 1905, when by edict the age-old examination system was abolished. This struck a blow at the heart of the old order, for it forecast the end of the dominance of the classical tradition and the putting of a premium on knowledge of Western subjects. It meant immediately a paper rather than a real change, but it was no less significant for that reason. Previously permission had been given to Imperial Clansmen and Nobles to send their children abroad for education. These successive acts, coupled with the action of the United States in returning a portion of the Boxer indemnity and the decision to use it for

² Li Hung-chang was supposed to have a modern force under his direction, but it could not be considered as constituting a modern or national army.

Military reform

Examination system abolished

Interest in study of Western subjects

educational purposes, and with the successes of Japan in the war with Russia, gave a tremendous impetus to the interest in foreign study and led many to go abroad for that purpose. The consequences of this movement will be indicated when we attempt to picture the background of the revolution.

*Other changes
contemplated*

Among other changes predicated or actually undertaken were a removal of the ban on intermarriage of Manchus and Chinese; an attempt at the abolition of official sinecures; some reorganization in the central administrative system, mainly by changing the names of various offices, consolidating agencies and redistributing functions; and the active encouragement of railroad building, the undertaking of mining operations with Chinese capital, and the construction of arsenals.³

*Influence of
Russo-Japanese
war on reform
movement*

After the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan, which was fought almost entirely on Chinese territory, the reform movement was accelerated and, moreover, took on the character of real institutional change. The victory of a reconstructed Oriental state over a powerful Occidental antagonist created active and widespread interest in reform as the earlier defeats of China had not done. A reference to the reform edicts of 1898 will indicate how closely the changes proposed from 1901-1905 paralleled the earlier program, and will consequently serve to show how little growth there had been in appreciation of the necessity for fundamental reconstruction of the political system. After 1905 the movement began to look toward the ultimate introduction of constitutional government into China. And there began also a conscious effort to centralize authority—to break down the autonomy of the provinces by means of the establishment of a national system of rail communications, which would ultimately make possible a more effective supervision over them. It must be here pointed out, however, that the policy of railway centralization was adopted only after several years had been given over to an attempt to finance and construct railways by and in the provinces with local funds. This question of railway policy acquired major importance as the revolutionary movement developed, and will be discussed more fully later.

3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

*Idea of con-
stitutionalism
imported from
Japan*

The idea of constitutionalism as a panacea for the ills of the state was, in large part, an importation from Japan. Prior to 1890 that country had been considered weak, and the Japanese had been looked down upon as an inferior people. Then suddenly China had been forced to revise her impression of her neighbor. First Japan showed herself to be stronger than China, and then she successfully challenged the great European Power, Russia. The chief secret of the newly-acquired strength of Japan was felt to be her introduction of Western

³ Social and general economic changes of this period will be discussed later in another connection.

methods of government. And, since it was after the establishment of the Japanese constitution that the strength of the Island Empire was first revealed, the belief was natural enough. Furthermore, all the great European states except Russia, as the edict accepting the report of a commission sent abroad in 1905 to study Western forms of government pointed out, had constitutions. And Russia had just been defeated by the first Asiatic state to establish a constitutional system. The conclusion seemed to be perfectly obvious.

The report of the commission also indicated to the Empress-Dowager that the Japanese had found it possible to continue, through constitutional forms, the old absolutist system of government. There was no reason apparent to her why the same result might not be achieved in China. Thus she said: "As for ourselves, it is necessary at present to make a careful investigation into the matter, and prepare ourselves to imitate this government by constitution, in which the supreme control must be in the hands of the Throne, while the interests of the masses shall be given to the elect, advanced to such position by the suffrage of the masses."⁴

*Absolutist
system to be
continued
under
constitutional
forms*

It is certainly questionable whether the autocratic Tzu Hsi would have even contemplated seriously the establishment of a constitutional system if she had thought that it would introduce any real limitation on her own power, or that it would affect the Manchu supremacy. But to recognize that fact is not to impugn the motives of the Court and the reform party among the officials. The constitution itself, it was their honest belief, was what would serve to strengthen China, just as it had Japan, even though the old system really functioned under and through the new forms. Their knowledge of Western systems of government was slight, and their understanding of the tendencies in political development after the principle of popular participation has been admitted was just as limited. So there may well have been honesty of intention in the attempt to establish a constitutional form of government in China while maintaining the autocracy. It was only after 1910, when the ultimate end of the movement began to be made apparent, that the Manchus laid themselves open to the charge of insincerity and double-dealing.

*Limited
understanding
of nature of
constitutional
government*

Had it not been for the revolutionary year 1911, the great year for modern China might have been 1908, for it was then that the government took the first steps toward the establishment of a constitutional régime. The Throne promulgated the "principles" of the constitution, announced a definite program of gradual progress, leading up to the calling of the National Parliament within nine years, and sanctioned regulations governing the provincial assemblies which were to be called into being within a year.

*Importance of
steps taken in
1908*

It is only necessary here to note the point of view expressed through the "Principles of the Constitution." It was identical with that originally expressed by the Empress-Dowager. A quotation from

*"Principles
of the
Constitution"*

⁴ *China Year Book*, 1912, p. 353.

the edict accepting the "Principles" will serve to illustrate it. The foreign nations which "have established their constitutions under influences from above have first determined the ultimate authority of the Court, and thereafter there has been granted to the people the advantage of inquiring about the affairs of government. . . . In most of the nations in which the constitution has been granted from above the origin of all powers is in the Court. The Parliament must grow out of the constitution, not the constitution out of Parliament. The government of China is to be constitutional by imperial decree."⁵ Consequently the primary emphasis was laid on securing the powers of the Throne in order to ensure that "the Ta Ts'ing Dynasty shall rule over the Ta Ts'ing Empire for ever and ever, and be honored through all ages." This was not a very good start, it must be recognized, toward convincing the country of the sincerity of Manchu professions, but it was, nevertheless, a distinct step in advance.

*Nine-year
program of
reform*

The setting-up of a program of gradual reform extending over a nine-year period was an indication of wisdom rather than of bad faith. It revealed a perception of the fact that China was not prepared for a representative system of government and that the foundations should be carefully laid before the superstructure was erected. Of course it could also be interpreted in another way—as providing a breathing space for the Manchus, during which they could revivify their rule. During the period each year was to witness certain changes such as the introduction of local self-government, law reform, census-taking, police reorganization, the extension of the educational system so as gradually to reduce illiteracy, the introduction of a budget and auditing system, and the issue of constitutional laws, Imperial House Laws, and parliamentary laws. The whole program was to culminate in the establishment of a Parliament and the organization of a Privy Council and a Cabinet in the ninth year. Certainly all of these reforms were necessary and, if carried out in good faith, would have served as foundations for the new régime. However, because of the confusion of the years after 1908, coupled perhaps with a lack of real interest in reform, many steps in the program were taken only on paper.

*Provincial
assemblies
established*

A third important advance, promised in 1907 and incorporated in the program of 1908, related to the establishment of provincial assemblies as a preliminary step to the convocation of a National Assembly. This promise was actually carried out when the former were convened in October of 1909. The members were selected by electoral colleges composed of representatives chosen by a carefully restricted electorate, and the powers and functions of the assembly were limited with equal care. The regulations governing them stated that "it must not be forgotten that all deliberative bodies are restricted in their functions to debate. They have absolutely no executive powers."⁶ And in the main they could only debate propositions sub-

⁵ "Amer. For. Rel.," 1908, incl. 1 in no. 1005, p. 192.

⁶ From translation of regulations given "Amer. For. Rel.," 1908, incl. in no. 989.

mitted to them by the Viceroy or Governor. The intention obviously was to create agencies for the ascertainment of public opinion rather than governing bodies. As such they would have served to indicate the sincerity of the rulers while not unduly interfering with them. Unfortunately for the Manchus, however, the assemblies immediately began to give voice to provincial grievances, serving as focal points for the expression of unrest and dissatisfaction. They united in pressing for a shortening of the period of preparation before the establishment of a parliament; they expressed dissatisfaction with the Imperial Government's railway policy; and they asserted themselves in the actual development of provincial policy, many times in opposition to the Governor or Viceroy. Their activities outside the range of their legal functions were so noteworthy that it may be said that in some of the provinces they were in a fair way to establish themselves in a controlling position. After the outbreak of the revolution they served in some cases as an agency of direction. On the whole they facilitated the revolutionary development instead of helping to retard it.

In yet another direction the year 1908 was of outstanding importance, for within a short interval of time both the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager died. The death of Kuang Hsu was not especially significant, but the death of the Empress-Dowager at almost the same time removed from the helm the strong hand of a truly remarkable woman who had ruled China since 1860. When the Emperor died the Old Buddha, not anticipating her own early end, provided for the accession of another minor to the Throne, with Prince Ch'un named as the Nominal Regent. Her death left him in a position of real rather than nominal authority.⁷ The Regent was a well-meaning man, but had not sufficient knowledge or strength to cope with an increasingly difficult and complex situation. Nor was there at Peking any man of sufficient wisdom and ability to deal with it. The one strong man of progressive tendencies who might have saved the Manchus was sent into retirement in 1908 in fulfilment of a last request of the Emperor. Yüan Shih-k'ai had incurred the undying enmity of Kuang Hsu as a result of his participation in the coup d'état of 1898. In consequence of this the Emperor demanded, on his death bed, Yüan Shih-k'ai's life. Moreover, Yüan Shih-k'ai had the strong man's usual quota of active enemies at court, and the death of Tzu Hsi removed his principal supporter. Prince Ch'un did not feel free to accomplish his death, but he did give him leave to go into retirement. "He has now, however, been seized with a disease in the feet which makes it difficult for him to move about and thus renders him unfit for the performance of his duties. We therefore Decree that as a mark of compassion he shall forthwith vacate his posts and retire to his native place for the purpose of treating his

*Death of
Emperor and
Empress-
Dowager*

*Forced
retirement of
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

⁷ Which, however, he had to share with the widow of Kuang Hsu, the new Empress-Dowager.

complaint."⁸ With him went out of public life many of the able officials with whom he had surrounded himself.

*Reform to be
continued*

Thus simultaneously the two principal figures of strength at Peking were lost to the government, and with their passing a question was automatically raised as to the future of reform. This question was answered in an edict of November 25, 1909. "We will reverently obey the edict issued on the first day of the eighth moon last year." Reform was to be continued but without a strong central direction, and, in the result, in such a manner as to justify the belief that only constantly applied pressure would avail to secure the realization of the 1908 program.

*"Paper"
nature of many
reforms*

The new régime continued the issuance of proclamations instituting, by edict and in most cases on paper only, changes in the system of local government and enlarging educational opportunities. There was, however, a tendency then, as also later under the Republic, to consider the reform accomplished with the publication of the edict. And so far as the central government assumed a merely hortatory rôle, it laid itself open to the charge of lack of sincerity. On the other hand, since many of the changes could be inaugurated only with the coöperation of provincial officials, the Peking government may deserve only part of the blame.

*Convocation of
National
Assembly*

One major change which passed beyond the paper stage, the establishment of provincial assemblies, has already been noted. Another was the convocation of the National Assembly in October, 1910. This body was so constituted as entirely to warrant the belief that it would be essentially conservative, seeing "eye to eye" with the government. One-half of its membership was selected by Imperial appointment and the other half was elected by the provincial assemblies. Since the members of the latter were chosen indirectly on the basis of a carefully restricted electorate, the provincial representatives should have been little less conservative than the Imperial nominees. But actually the history of the National Assembly resembled that of the provincial bodies. It asserted itself from the beginning in opposition to the government. It took up and pressed the case for an earlier promulgation of the constitution than was contemplated in the nine-year program, securing a promise of the shortening of the period of preparation to five years, with the establishment of a parliament in 1913. It attacked the policy of the government in financial matters and on questions of administration, and was prevented from impeaching the Council of State only because of concessions on the point at issue. It demanded, in the spring of 1911, the creation of a responsible cabinet and forced an acceptance of the principle before its adjournment. All of its activities indicated its intention of keeping the government in the path of reform, and even of modifying and enlarging the reform program. These intentions, it may be noted, were indicated before the outbreak of rebellion

⁸ KENT, *Passing of the Manchus*, p. 43.

in the Yangtse provinces, and there is therefore reason to believe that the Chinese autocracy would have been transformed gradually into a constitutional monarchy had it not been for the revolution. Developments in the fall of 1911, however, were so entirely controlled by the condition of revolution that they must be treated in connection with it. Consequently it now becomes necessary to estimate the causes of the revolution as a preliminary step to the consideration of its events.

4. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF REVOLUTION

Underlying every movement of the kind in China there has been the population problem, growing out of too great a pressure of peoples on the means of subsistence. "A nation which implicitly believes, and unanimously acts on the belief, that a man's first duty in life is to provide as many male heirs as possible for the comfort of himself and of his ancestors, inevitably condemns vast masses of its people to the lowest depths of poverty, and condemns the body politic to regularly recurring cataclysms."⁹ The cycle begins with an equipoise of population and food supply. Given normal conditions of production, the number of people rapidly increases. As the equilibrium is upset some are inevitably condemned to starvation or to outlawry. Since the number of brigands and pirates increases with population expansion, the public peace becomes increasingly disturbed as part of the survival struggle. If the government is strong and efficient, many of the brigands are caught and killed, and the ultimate trouble is postponed. However, normal conditions give way to abnormal because of flood or drought. A larger number die of starvation or become outlaws. If outlawry is controlled by the strong hand of authority and there are many deaths, the equilibrium may be partially restored and rebellion averted. If authority is weak there may ensue more or less widespread rebellion, and out of the resulting conflict there may come a restoration of the equilibrium. In either case the solution is only a temporary one.

It has already been pointed out that the Manchu authority had been steadily growing weaker during the nineteenth century. The T'ai P'ing rebellion was put down only with foreign aid. But its destructiveness to human life temporarily checked population expansion, as did the two Mohammedan rebellions and numerous smaller uprisings. It was only a check, however, even though supplemented by famines such as that of 1878, which, it was estimated, took over nine million lives. All of these crises were tided over, partly because most of them were localized. The increase in population went on in spite of them, and with it the usual increase in unrest and discontent. In 1910-1911 normal conditions of production were again disturbed by floods in the central provinces "the worst in forty years. . . . millions of people were made homeless and the ruin of their crops in the

*Population
problem*

*Increase of
population
in spite of
operation of
natural checks*

⁹ BLAND, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China*, p. 14.

two former Provinces (Anhui and Kiangsu) for the third time in five years, added the horrors of famine and pestilence. The Provinces of Shantung, Chekiang, Kiang si and Hupeh also suffered, some from floods, and some from droughts, so that in the seven provinces affected a total of 600,000 families or 3,000,000 people, were actually starving and dying. . . . Discontent in such circumstances is easily swollen into a rage of rebellion."¹⁰ It may be pointed out also that the foreign-introduced idea of the sanctity of human life led to more energetic famine-relief measures than would have been taken in pre-modern days. Consequently people avoided starvation, but their lives were not subsequently put on a normal basis. Thus many more were preserved to serve purposes of rebellion than would usually have been the case.

Population
pressure not
relieved by
extensive
migration to
under-populated
areas

This pressure of population might have been relieved by other means than starvation or the violent deaths incident to rebellion. The surplus people of the eighteen provinces might, for example, have migrated to the greatly underpopulated parts of the Empire or to foreign countries. One serious impediment to migration, however, lay in the necessity of keeping up the worship at the ancestral tombs,—for "it is the duty of every man to sacrifice at stated intervals at his ancestral tombs and to be buried, in due season, with his fathers. Thus the great bulk of the population has for centuries been rigidly localized."¹¹ Another thing which, until after 1900, localized the population was the difficulty of movement from place to place. In spite of these impediments, however, population had begun to move into Manchuria from Chihli and especially from Shantung provinces. Many who moved northwards in the spring returned home after the harvest, but increasingly large proportions remained to find homes and found families in Manchuria. Nothing probably accounts for this movement to a greater extent than the building of the Peking-Mukden and the other Manchurian railways. This improvement in communications had not extended very far into the northwest, another colonization area, at the time of the revolution, and as a result there had not been so extensive a movement into the other dependencies, although there had been a slight migration to them from neighboring provinces.

Overseas
emigration not
sufficient to
care for surplus

In the same way some of the overflow from the southern provinces, notably Kuantung, had begun to seek an outlet overseas. The Cantonese were more venturesome by disposition than their fellows north of the Yangtse and they had been longer in contact with the outside world, a contact which tended gradually to draw them outside of the homeland. Reference has already been made to the coming of the Chinese laborer to the Pacific coast of the United States, and to the cooley traffic at Macao. The latter was broken up and the

¹⁰ BROWN, *The Chinese Revolution*, pp. 3-4. It is interesting to note the coincidence of the famine and active revolutionary areas.

¹¹ BLAND, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

United States closed its doors to the Chinese by the exclusion acts of the 1880's and 1890's. The total number of immigrants to the United States between 1830 and 1911 was slightly over 300,000, a few over a thousand having entered in 1911. Denied admission to the United States, the Chinese turned to Hawaii, the Philippines, the Malay archipelago—Singapore, the Federated Malay States, etc.—and Canada. Immigration to Hawaii was soon prohibited and the exclusion acts were extended to the Philippines in 1902. Canada enacted a \$500 head tax on entering Chinese in 1903, which served to restrict immigration there. Singapore and the Federated Malay States by 1911 had received about 1,300,000 Chinese, but all in all the number of overseas Chinese at that time must have totaled well under two and a half million. This was a drop in the bucket so far as taking care of the surplus population in even Kuangtung was concerned. It did help out in another way, however. The Chinese abroad were able to send comparatively large remittances home and thus added to the resources of their families. The revolution was aided materially by the wealth of the overseas Chinese also, for they subscribed most liberally to the cause.

It is clear, however, that neither by colonization nor by emigration was the problem being solved, any more than it was by famine and rebellion, for the total population is estimated to have increased from over 377 millions to over 430 millions between 1885 and 1911. Thus by the latter year the pressure on the food supply had become acute enough, coupled with the famine conditions of 1910-1911, to furnish the material for a widespread revolt.

*Pressure acute
by 1911*

Another economic factor was finance. Expenses had been steadily mounting after 1900 because of new expenditures made necessary by the reorganization program, including the paying and equipping of the model army, the construction of railways, and the establishment of new educational institutions. The payments on the loans to meet the Japanese war indemnity had to be made, as did the much heavier payments on the Boxer indemnity. These absorbed virtually the entire revenue from the customs and from some other revenue services, thus withdrawing them from use in meeting the general expenses. Consequently the tax levies became increasingly heavy and new charges had to be made. This substantially increased the volume of discontent and dissatisfaction with the dynasty.

*Heavier
financial
burdens produce
discontent*

5. INFLUENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

This economic unrest created a receptive state of mind for the message of those who were true revolutionaries rather than discontented subjects. There had been a revolutionary party among the Chinese since the expulsion of the reformers in 1898. The reform and revolutionary elements were largely concentrated in Tokyo and they maintained distinct programs. The reformers, headed by K'ang Yu-wei and his leading disciple Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, preached the doc-

*Two groups of
revolutionists*

trine of constitutional monarchy, which, as the constitutional movement developed under the Manchus after 1905, made them merely advanced advocates of the theoretical Manchu program. Their activities during the first decade of the century, however, undoubtedly helped to bring into existence the sentiment for constitutional reform which expressed itself through the provincial and national assemblies and acted as a strong propulsive force on the Manchus. The revolutionaries were led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and had frankly anti-dynastic aims. They were definitely organized by 1905, when they took the name of the *Tung Meng Hui* (Alliance Society), were responsible for sporadic outbreaks in 1906, 1907, and 1910, and took the initiative in transforming the outbreak of 1911 into a revolution.

For a time the revolutionary ranks were recruited from among the overseas Chinese, among whom Dr. Sun traveled extensively, preaching the doctrines of the society. But after 1905 the field in China was more intensively cultivated. Converts were made among those who had been or were affiliated with one or more of the several secret societies which had a perennial existence south of the Yangtse. Effort was concentrated on the new model army, whence recruits to the anti-Manchu, or at least the reform, cause were enlisted in comparatively large numbers, especially in the divisions which were centered at Hankow and Nanking. Not so much progress was made among the northern soldiery.

A third center of revolutionary propaganda was among the new student class. After 1900, and particularly after 1905, large numbers went abroad to study. Some went to America and Europe with the expectation of devoting several years to a mastery of Western learning. But many more went to Japan, where, in many instances, they fell into the clutches of those who promised to conduct them along the royal road to Western learning, preparing them in the new subjects in a few weeks. Since their sole object was to equip themselves for government position in the shortest possible time, many of the Chinese students preferred to work in these mushroom schools which were organized "for Chinese only," rather than to spend several years in the regular Japanese institutions. And since they could secure diplomas by the payment of fees they had time to spare, in the use of which they were often brought into contact with the exiled revolutionists. Upon their return to China they usually found that there were no positions open to them, in spite of the possession of foreign diplomas. Thus they were furnished with a grievance against the government, and were very susceptible to the continued revolutionary propaganda. While their learning was, at the best, superficial, the fact of their foreign experience gave them a certain position which made them effective centers from which revolutionary doctrines might be spread. Thus, in addition to the exiled leaders in the revolutionary movement, a native local leadership was gradually built up. While some of the returned students undoubtedly had a thorough

*Conversions to
revolutionary
cause*

*Revolutionary
ranks recruited
from among
students*

grounding in the new learning, many more of them had only a phrase book knowledge of republicanism and all of the things which were so soon to become of real importance. The significance of Young China thus lay not so much in its enlightenment as in its discontent with the political *status quo*.

The relation of the student to the revolution would not be completely revealed without mention of the influence of the mission schools, which were even more materially adding to the ranks of Young China by sending out their graduates year by year. It is not to reflect on their standards to say that many of their graduates were dissatisfied with their prospects and that they were ready converts to the cause of revolution without having more than a surface knowledge of the problems connected with the successful operation of a representative system of government. But the fact is significant that the student class, with its peculiar position in China, was sufficiently imbued with new ideas by 1911 to swing into the revolutionary movement with almost its full force. It is also significant that many of the radicals in the first assemblies set up during and after the revolution had been either graduated from or had spent time in study in the mission schools. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that, as the government attempted to put its new educational program into effect after 1905, it was forced to turn to the mission schools and the returned student group for its teachers. Thus their zone of influence was appreciably widened as a direct result of the Manchu reform activity.

*Influence of
mission schools*

6. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF REBELLION

We may note, in passing, the importance of improved communications through the extension of the postal, the telegraph, and the railroad systems in facilitating the spread of revolutionary doctrines and the making of revolutionary plans, and we may call attention to the rapid growth of a vernacular press, which was concerned principally with discussion of reforms, and which openly, although cautiously, followed the lead of the revolutionary and reform papers published in Tokyo and brought clandestinely into China. The most radical papers were distributed from the foreign concessions in such places as Shanghai and were consequently not under the control of the Chinese government.

*Improved
communications
facilitate
spread of
revolutionary
ideas*

These were among the more fundamental factors which produced revolution rather than abortive rebellion on a restricted scale. A more direct and immediate cause, as well as the actual occasion for rebellion, was an outgrowth of the Peking government's railroad policy during the years from 1909 to 1911. As a reaction to the concession-grabbing period there came, following a distinct lull, a pronounced movement looking toward railroad construction on a provincial rather than a national basis, with a financing of enterprises with Chinese rather than foreign funds. The fundamental question

*Policy of
railway
centralization
a cause of
revolt*

*Activity of the
provinces after
1905*

was that of centralization as against decentralization. But the advocates of a decentralized system did not have to defend it on its essential merits, for the problem was complicated by the fear of foreign control through the financing of a national system. The demand for provincial control was the central feature of a "Rights Recovery" movement which developed after 1905. One of the leading advocates of the enlargement of China's railway system was the Hukuang Viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, but he perceived the dangers in the concessions policy and advised that control should be vested in the provinces. Thus it was largely because of his insistence that the Hankow-Canton trunk line was turned over to the provinces concerned for construction and that the same policy was followed with respect to the Hankow-Szechuan road. The Chêkiang railroad bureau was also able to prevent the construction of the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo railway as a national enterprise, although the Peking government was compelled to borrow the money for it from the British and Chinese Corporation in fulfilment of a promise made in 1898.

*Provincial
control felt to
be unwise*

By 1909 not only the central government but Chang Chih-tung as well had come to perceive the unwisdom of the policy. In the first place, the large sums necessary could not be found in the provinces. In the second place, the money actually collected tended to disappear without an equivalent part of the railway program being realized, for there was much diversion of funds to other uses, and "squeeze" was prevalent. Consequently if the vitally necessary trunk lines were to be built, the central government would have to take them in hand again. And in the third place, the relation of communications to the strengthening of the authority of Peking became clearer to those in power. The death of Chang Chih-tung in 1909, before the new policy could be put into effect, was unfortunate as he had the confidence of the provinces, whereas the man appointed as President of the Board of Communications did not. Before his death, however, preliminary negotiations for foreign financing and supervision of construction of the Hukuang railways had been undertaken.

*Provincial
interests in
Hukuang
project to be
purchased*

Sheng Hsuan-huai was appointed President of the Board of Communications early in 1911 and the policy of centralization was actively put into effect. As the first step, negotiations with the Four Power Banking Group for a large loan for the construction of the Hankow-Canton and Hankow-Szechuan railways were carried to completion. At the same time a \$10,000,000 loan for currency reform and for industrial development in Manchuria was negotiated. As a preliminary step to the realization of the purposes of the railway loan it was necessary to reach an agreement with the provincial interests affected. The conclusion of the loan agreement had been followed by protests from the provinces through which the roads would pass and by riots in some places, so that it was necessary for Peking to go as far as possible in placating the gentry in the provinces. The solution adopted for Kuangtung, Hunan, and Hupeh provinces was to

exchange interest-bearing government bonds for the railway shares to their full value, except in Kuangtung, where the shares were at a discount of over fifty per cent. There interest-bearing bonds were to be issued to sixty per cent and non-interest-bearing bonds for the remaining forty per cent of the shares. "In view of the complicated nature of the situation, and of the fact that each one of the railway companies was virtually bankrupt, the government proposals appeared to be not only reasonable but generous."¹² For the Szechuanese, however, the government proposed redemption only of the sums actually expended for railway purposes rather than the amount subscribed or collected by special tax levies. Fourteen million *taels* had been subscribed. Of this sum, half was supposed to be available for subscription to government bonds, industrial needs in the province or return to the shareholders. Almost half of the remaining seven million *taels* had been lost in the Shanghai rubber boom through the speculations of one of the managers.¹³ The government consequently proposed to give bonds to the holders of securities in the Szechuan enterprise to the amount of about four million *taels*. Protest was immediately made against this settlement by means of memorials presented to the Throne through the Viceroy. The protest stage was succeeded by one of passive resistance. "Shops were closed, employees struck, students refused to attend the schools and colleges, payment of taxes was refused."¹⁴ The arrest of some of the leaders in the movement of opposition led to an attack on the Viceroy's *Yamen* and to active resistance. This was in September, 1911. Instead of using all available force to put down the uprising the Imperial Government resorted to a policy of "pacification," which, while it might ultimately have been successful, was too slow a process for the times. This policy may have resulted both from a feeling of weakness and from the recognition that the Szechuanese were not alone in their opposition to the policy of centralization. Furthermore, the government may have been influenced by the distrust of Sheng Hsuan Huai, who, though a man of great ability, had a somewhat unsavoury financial reputation as a result of his management of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company and of some of his previous posts held under the adroit Li Hung-chang. It was felt that it was somewhat inconsistent for him to suggest penalizing the gentry of Szechuan because of speculation and misuse of funds by the managers of their enterprise.

*The
Szechuanese
object to
proposed
settlement*

7. THE REVOLUTION OF 1911

The revolt in Szechuan was not anti-dynastic in motive, and so the revolution is not dated from its outbreak but from the aftermath of an accidental bomb explosion which took place in Hankow on October 10, while the attempt at pacification was going on in the

*The Wuchang
outbreak*

¹² KENT, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

great western province. Upon investigating the place where the explosion occurred, the police found it to be the headquarters of a revolutionary group engaged at the time in the making of bombs, and they secured lists containing the names of local revolutionaries. This led to the arrest and execution of several members of the group. As a result of this and of the fear of further action, the troops at Wuchang, just across the Yangtse, broke out in revolt, forcing their commander, Colonel Li Yuan-hung, to assume the leadership. He himself had not previously been won over to the revolutionary cause, but after accepting the command he proved to be one of the most trustworthy of the republican leaders. After some fighting the Wuchang troops, augmented by recruits from the countryside, gained control of Hankow and Hanyang as well as Wuchang, thus establishing themselves in the largest center in central China.

The flame of revolt spread rapidly up and down the Yangtse and to the south. In the north, Shantung province declared its independence for a time, although soon returning to the Imperial fold, and there was disaffection in parts of Chihli, principally among the troops. However, the northern Imperial forces on the whole remained loyal and the situation was kept well in hand north of the Yangtse river, except in Shensi province. The entire movement had the appearance of a series of spontaneous independent revolts rather than of a well-planned and coördinated revolution. This is partially accounted for by the revolutionary strategy which was, apparently, to try out the revolutionary sentiment at various centers, trusting that ultimately the flame would spread. Thus there had been an earlier outbreak at Canton which had been put down without spreading. It is also to be explained by the fact that the adherents of revolution had necessarily been brought together into local rather than national groups and had been forced to lay their plans on a local basis. And it is also claimed that plans had been made for a concerted effort at a later date so that, when the discovery came at Hankow, the action taken, although necessary, was premature so far as the plans of the other groups were concerned. However this may be, the fact remains that there was no common direction of the revolution until at a comparatively late time. The original leadership was centered at Wuchang, although it had no effective control over activities elsewhere. Finally steps were taken to coördinate the movement by requesting the "independent" provinces to send delegates to Wuchang to serve as a revolutionary council, and a pact was subscribed to which served as the basis of the instrument later adopted at Nanking as the provisional constitution of the Republic.

Meanwhile the revolt had reached Shanghai, where a "Military Government" was set up. This government immediately asserted the right to speak for the entire revolution. Wu T'ing-fang, formerly minister to the United States, assumed the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs and issued a manifesto setting forth the aims of the

*Spread of the
revolt*

*"Military
Government"
at Shanghai
assumes
direction of
revolution*

revolution and appealing for foreign sympathy. This group also demanded that the Powers preserve neutrality, threatening not to recognize the validity of loans made to the Imperial Government in the event of its overthrow. The pretensions of the Shanghai government soon brought it into conflict with that at Wuchang, especially over the control of peace negotiations with the Imperial Government when the stage of negotiation was reached, and it was only the self-effacing character of Li Yuan-hung, who allowed the direction to pass to the Shanghai group, which prevented a break in the revolutionary ranks. One reason for their assertiveness undoubtedly was the fact that they were determined to insure control of the new régime by Cantonese, for the leaders at Shanghai were from Canton while those at Wuchang were from the central provinces.

At this point it is necessary to turn our attention back to Peking. The story of reform was left with the adjournment of the National Assembly in the spring of 1911. The Assembly reconvened on October 22, ten days after the Wuchang outbreak. Its first act was to secure the dismissal of Sheng Hsuan-huai, thus taking its stand with the provinces on the question of railway centralization. It then opened an attack on the government because of its failure to constitute a real Cabinet, as it had promised to do before the summer. The promise had been carried out merely by changing the name of the Grand Council to that of Cabinet. The Assembly formulated three fundamental demands for the acceptance of the government. These were that a capable and virtuous person be immediately appointed to organize a responsible Cabinet, from which members of the Imperial Family should be explicitly excluded; that an amnesty should be proclaimed for all political offenders, including the exiled reformers of 1898; and that a constitution should be framed only after consultation with the assembly. Added weight was given to these demands by reason of the spread of the rebellion and by a refusal of troops stationed at Lanchow, on the Peking-Mukden railroad, to entrain for the south until they had been acceded to. They were all three accepted in a series of edicts issued on October 30. A new set of "Constitutional Principles" was drawn up by the Assembly and received the Imperial approval November 3. Briefly, they created a constitutional monarchy of a very limited sort, the Emperor being assigned much the same position as that enjoyed by the English king. Thus, by the beginning of November, the Manchus, under the double pressure of the assembly of their own creation and of the anti-dynastic revolution, had agreed to give up the substance of power in the endeavor to retain the Imperial title.

While making these concessions the Regent had also taken steps to put down the rebellion by other means. The first step in that direction was the recall of Yüan Shih-k'ai to office. This was done only after it had become apparent that no one else was strong enough to deal with the revolution. He was recalled on October 14, but on

*Developments
at Peking*

*Yüan Shih-k'ai
recalled*

the plea of a continuation of his old trouble, which he had been sent home to cure, and of other ailments, he declined to return to official life until October 27. Negotiations during this interval resulted in acceptance of his terms, which amounted to conferring the powers of a dictator on him. In addition to being made the Hukuang Viceroy he was given supreme command of the army and navy and, on November 8, he was elected Premier by the National Assembly.

*Yüan's aims
and tactics*

His primary object was apparently to secure a settlement which would retain the monarch while depriving him of all power. There has always been doubt as to his desire to preserve the Manchu dynasty, but the available evidence seems to indicate that he was loyal to the Emperor so far as the latter was willing, in good faith, to accept the status of a constitutional ruler. Certainly he did not believe then, or later, in the feasibility of a republic for China. To bring the rulers to an acceptance of the status he had in mind, it was necessary that the rebellion should continue to make some headway. On the other hand, it was necessary to bring the revolutionaries to an acceptance of the same status by a manifestation of the Imperial strength. Only by accepting some such hypothesis as this is it possible to explain the failure of the Imperial troops to follow up advantages which they won in the fighting around Hankow.

*Military
operations*

From the military standpoint it is only necessary to say that the Imperial troops on several occasions demonstrated their superiority of leadership, of training, and of equipment, over the revolutionary army led by Li Yuan-hung, joined shortly by Huang Hsing, one of the original revolutionaries. When Yüan made up his mind to fight, his troops gained one success after another, and yet they were never allowed to push forward to a decisive victory. The other place where active organized fighting took place was at Nanking. There an old-school commander named Chang Hsun assumed control and remained faithful to the Manchus after the revolutionists refused to buy his support because his terms were too high. Nanking was defended for some time, but finally was occupied by the republican forces and was made the temporary southern capital.

8. NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE

*Peace
negotiations
instituted*

While Yüan Shih-k'ai had been directing hostilities at Hankow he had also been attempting to open negotiations with Li Yuan-hung. As a result of Imperial successes the latter consented to discuss terms of settlement at the end of November. The Shanghai government, however, insisted that the conditions of peace must be negotiated with it. Yüan at first refused to deal with it, but finally consented since General Li accepted it as entitled to speak for the republican forces. T'ang Shao-yi, an American educated Cantonese who had been Yüan Shih-k'ai's ablest lieutenant before 1908, was appointed as the Imperial delegate to confer with Dr. Wu T'ing-fang,

another Cantonese, who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Shanghai government.

Before the negotiations were brought to a conclusion delegates from the rebellious provinces, mainly self-selected, although some were chosen by the provincial assemblies and some were appointed by the military governors of the provinces so controlled, had met at Nanking and assumed the supreme direction of the revolution. Li Yuan-hung had taken the initial steps to bring this council into being and it was completed as to membership, and its meeting place changed to Nanking, at the instigation of the Shanghai government. After meeting it elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who had just returned to China, as the provisional President. It was with this government that peace negotiations were finally concluded.

*Nanking
Assembly
constituted*

Space precludes a detailed consideration of the negotiations. It may be said, however, that the republicans included as their primary demand an end of the monarchy and the acceptance of the Republic. They did suggest the submission of the question of the form of government to a National Convention, but when the Imperial Government agreed to this the two sides failed to unite on a method of bringing such a convention into being and the project failed. The republicans then returned to their original position. The Imperial delegate seems to have immediately accepted the suggestions of the southern representative as to the advisability of ending the Manchu monarchy and to have thereby disqualified himself to represent the northern interest. Later he became a leader of the southern party.

*Revolutionary
demands*

As negotiations continued, the necessity for a settlement became increasingly apparent to both sides. Both the imperialists and the republicans were weak financially. The Peking treasury was empty, and it had been necessary for Yüan to force the Regent to contribute from the Household treasure to pay the troops. And Nanking had no treasury and no treasure. Both were prevented from financing themselves from foreign sources by reason of the financial neutrality agreed to by the Powers. If peace had not come, however, it is possible that the loan embargo might have been lifted in Yüan's favor, since the foreign representatives looked upon him as the strong man capable of preventing a possible eventual chaos. The republicans were financed at first through the generous subscriptions made to the cause by overseas Chinese, and out of such provincial revenues as were at their command. They also received some funds from non-official Japanese sources, and were able to negotiate a few loans on the security of some semi-public enterprises such as the Hang Yeh-p'ing iron and coal corporation. But all of these sources of income had been largely exhausted by the end of the year. Consequently acute financial embarrassment rather than the strength of either side ultimately forced a settlement.

*Financial
weakness of
both sides
forces
settlement*

Yüan Shih-k'ai began the last stage of the negotiations by attempting to secure good terms for the Manchus, who were gradually

*Position of
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

brought to an acceptance of the necessity for abdication, and to strengthen his personal position. About the middle of January Dr. Sun Yat-sen, seemingly on his own initiative, telegraphed Premier Yüan, offering him the presidency if he would accept the Republic and consequently the necessity for abdication. The Manchus countered by elevating him to the rank of Marquis. He did not openly accept the former offer, but he did decline, four times, the Manchu tender.

9. THE SETTLEMENT

*Abdication
terms*

The final terms of settlement were agreed to and the abdication edicts issued on February 12, 1912.¹⁵ The dynasty abdicated in consideration of: 1) a good financial settlement; 2) the promise of security for members of their race, and of the Imperial Household; and 3) provision for the upkeep of the Imperial tombs. By the terms of one of the edicts the Emperor transferred power to Yüan Shih-k'ai, rather than to the southern government, thus putting him in a strong position in the eyes of the common people. The exact words of the edict, in translation, were: "Let Yüan Shih-k'ai organize with full powers a provisional republican government, and confer with the Republican Army as to methods of union, thus assuring peace to the people and tranquility to the Empire, and forming the one Great Republic of China by the union as heretofore of the five peoples, namely, Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans, together with their territory in its integrity." Dr. Sun, for the Nanking Government, responded to this part of the edict that "the Republican Government cannot be organized by any authority conferred by the Ch'ing Emperor. The exercise of such pretentious power must surely lead to serious trouble." Yüan, however, assured Dr. Sun that he did not intend to take advantage of the wording of the edicts, and the Republicans accepted his assurances. The wording was not changed and the "serious trouble" which Dr. Sun foresaw came in due course.

*Yüan elected
President*

The negotiations with the "Republican Army" were completed by the resignation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen from the provisional presidency, followed by the election by the Nanking Assembly, upon his advice, of Yüan Shih-k'ai as the first provisional President of the Republic of reunited China. This action was a compromise pure and simple, since the southerners did not trust the new President and had justifiable doubts as to the sincerity of his action in accepting the Republic. Since they were not prepared to fight to secure his elimination, however, it was a necessary compromise. A consideration of its consequences will be a central feature of the next chapter.

*Abdication
closed period
in China's
history*

A long chapter of Chinese history was thus closed with the abdication of the Manchu rulers and the formal ending of the Ta Ch'ing dynasty. They had wielded the vermilion pencil since 1644 and had

¹⁵ See *China Year Book*, 1913, pp. 481-4, for translation of the abdication edicts.

contributed much brilliance as well as several shadows to the history of China. While the Republican picture of systematic Manchu misrule was far from accurate, it must be recognized that the dynasty had clearly exhausted the "mandate of Heaven" and had been preserved in power for over half a century by the lack of an adequate and acceptable alternative to their rule. Whether the Republic presented a satisfactory alternative time alone could show, and it would be deeds and not manifestos which would count.

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CHAPTER XI

THE RULE OF YÜAN SHIH-K'AI

I. REVIEW OF CONDITIONS AT INAUGURATION OF REPUBLIC

A BRIEF review of internal conditions at the time of the inauguration of the republican form of government will serve as the best introduction to what may be called the Yüan Shih-k'ai era.

*Large bodies
of men under
arms*

First of all, it may be pointed out that both in the north and in the south there were unusually large bodies of men under arms, for both the Imperialists and the Republicans, by wholesale enlistments, had added materially to the regular national and provincial forces. North of the Yangtse River, which may be taken as the dividing-line between the conservative and more imperially-minded and the radical and republican sections, the control of the military forces was centralized under the new President, since his leadership was accepted by their commanders. These northern forces consisted of the old so-called "model army" and also of the greatly enlarged provincial forces. Civil government had been replaced by military rule, in large part, but the authority of Yüan Shih-k'ai was clearly recognized. The coördinating agency south of the Yangtse was the Nanking Council, but the provincial and local authorities, largely self-constituted, were more nearly autonomous than in the north, their allegiance to Nanking being nominal rather than effective. The basis of their power, just as in the north, was command of troops, and the customary civil authority had ceased to function except as far as it had put itself on a military basis. It may be said that the provincial assemblies continued to function in several of the provinces, but the effectiveness of their control may be questioned. As for the governors of the provinces, they had become or had been replaced by military governors or *Tutubs*.

*Uncertainty
as to effects of
revolution*

The people were left in a condition of uncertainty as a result of the revolution. The mere change in the form of the state did not alter economic conditions and the restlessness growing out of them. Good harvests alone could serve that purpose. Nor did the victory of republicanism solve the problem presented by an unduly expansive population. But the change to a Republic did have certain effects on the people. The conventional grooves of allegiance and loyalty were disturbed, for the masses were asked to render obedience to a régime which was more or less of an abstraction, instead of to an individual concretely personifying the state. It remained to be seen what effect this would have on their willingness to obey their new officers. Furthermore, the shibboleths of the revolution had been

translated for the masses into the conception that republicanism meant an end to tax levies and to every repression of the individual. This interpretation had been strengthened by the action of the Shanghai government in declaring a remission of taxes, as well as by the relaxation of control incident to revolution. This point of view complicated the problems of restoring order and of financing the new régime. Again, in the revolutionary area, the overthrow of the Dynasty was construed as a decided victory for the principle of provincial autonomy, and yet, just as centralization had been forced on the Manchus, so it was a necessity for the Republic. This meant that the new rulers in the end would encounter the same hostility as had the Manchus.

From the national standpoint the possibility was present that the compromise by which Yüan Shih-k'ai had been accepted as President would lead to trouble. The north looked to him as its leader and misunderstood the nature of a parliamentary regime. The south distrusted him and the revolutionary leaders accepted him only because of his control of the northern soldiery, because of his recognized administrative ability, and because of his standing with the Powers.

*Yüan's election
a compromise*

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

This distrust, and also the natural desire of the south to dominate, was indicated by the insistence of the Nanking Council that the capital should be moved from Peking to Nanking, the claims of Hankow having been presented and waived in favor of Nanking partly for sentimental reasons, and that the President-elect should come to the southern capital to take the oath of office. When Yüan hesitated, a delegation was sent to wait on him and urge him to carry out his promise to come south. While this delegation was in Peking an opportune mutiny of troops took place, marked by burning and systematic looting. The President's relation to the mutiny is not clear. It was charged that he engineered it to substantiate his claim that he did not dare leave the north. In support of this view it may be pointed out that the mutiny occurred among troops previously and subsequently held under rigid control, and that the force was under the immediate and personal command of the President. On the other hand, it coincided in point of time with outbreaks among the soldiery at several important centers in the north. However this may be, it served to convince the emissaries from Nanking that the President could not safely leave for the south immediately, and he was duly inaugurated at Peking on March 10, 1912. As a further result, the legislative body was convened in the old capital on April 29, and Peking continued as the seat of government. Thus the first success rested with the President, for undoubtedly his position would have been much more precarious if the government had been moved to one of the centers of revolutionary strength.

*Peking
continued as
seat of
government*

Another and more important evidence of this mistrust is to be

*Council
continued
as legislative
organ*

found in the temporary constitution adopted by the Nanking Council on the very day that Yüan was taking the oath of allegiance and of office. Under this instrument final supremacy was lodged in the legislative assembly to be constituted under provision of electoral laws to be framed and promulgated by the Council. Until these laws could be devised and elections for a national Parliament held the legislative power was to be exercised by a Council made up of five members from each of the provinces and dependencies except Chinghai, which was allowed one. Since each province was to decide for itself how its delegates were to be chosen, it happened that some were selected by the provincial assemblies, some were appointed by the military governors and some merely took it upon themselves to represent their provinces.

*Constitutional
position of the
President*

The executive power was lodged in the hands of the President, but every executive act was to receive the counter signature of the appropriate Cabinet Minister. The members of the Cabinet were to be appointed by the President, but only with the consent of the Council. The usual powers of an executive were given the President, but financial arrangements, treaties, and administrative regulations had to receive the assent of the legislature to be valid. He was, in other words, to be controlled by his Cabinet, over which the legislature was to have supervision and ultimate control. The model for the executive office was clearly the French presidency, and the apparent intention was to legislate Yüan Shih-k'ai out of power by virtually putting the presidential office into commission. The only drawbacks to this plan proved to be two very important ones—the failure of President Yüan to recognize the validity of the limitations put upon him as head of the executive, in which refusal he was tacitly encouraged by the diplomatic corps, and the incompetency of the Council and, after it, of the Assembly.

*Two major
problems
confronting
government*

The two major problems confronting the newly-established Republic were the reconstruction of the old administrative and governmental machinery both at Peking and in the provinces, and the finding of ways and means of financing itself.

*Provincial
administration
not changed*

Yüan Shih-k'ai had declared his attitude toward provincial administration even before his election as provisional President. On February 13 he announced the continuation in office of those who actually held position, whether they had gained power as agents of the Imperial Government or of the revolution, and he ordered them to carry on as usual. Part of the mandate ran:

All of the affairs to be transacted by the various governmental offices, all of the responsibilities to be assumed, and all of the public funds and public property should be carried on or properly taken care of as before and no negligence will be tolerated. . . . All of the military and police regulations of the old regime should be enforced as usual; thus may power be unified and order preserved. In the event

of any one making trouble under whatever pretext, to disturb the peace, he is to be dealt with according to law.¹

This, in no uncertain terms, announced to the country that the new régime accepted as its primary obligation the preservation of peace and order. The continuance in official position of those who held power gave them more of a legal title to rule and brought them under the theoretical supervision of Peking. From another standpoint it meant, roughly speaking, that the President had men in high position in the northern provinces who were loyal to him rather than to the Republic, while in the southern provinces the officials were supporters of the republican principle and of the radical party which disputed Yüan's supremacy at Peking.

Another step forward was taken with the construction of a Cabinet. T'ang Shao-yi, one of the President's protégés in Imperial days, and the Imperial Peace Commissioner in 1911, was appointed Premier. This was a selection eminently satisfactory to the Nanking Council, as T'ang had established close relations with the Cantonese in the Shanghai government, and was even then preparing to throw in his lot with the radical party—the *Tung Meng Hui*. But when it came to the completion of the Cabinet, there was difficulty in securing the Council's assent to the President's nominations. The most serious opposition, for obvious reasons, was to his selections for the Ministries of War and Finance. The Premier was finally forced to go to Nanking to negotiate about them directly with the Council. The result was a compromise with the balance of advantage resting with the President. His first choice, Tuan Chi-jui, was confirmed as Minister of War, and Hsiung Hsi-ling, a Hunan man who had been an active revolutionary, became Finance Minister.² As an offset to the appointment of Tuan the President agreed to name the revolutionary leader, Huang Hsing, as Resident-General of Nanking, with supreme command over the southern armies. The other members of this first Cabinet either were members of the *Tung Meng Hui* or had no party affiliation which would make it difficult for them to co-operate with the National Council. With the legalization of the position of the provincial officials, the adoption of a provisional constitution, and the organization of a Cabinet, and after the legislature had convened at Peking, the provisional republican government may be considered to have been fairly established and the new régime brought under way.

*Construction
of Cabinet*

3. THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM

Turning, now, to the second major problem confronting the republican government, that of finance, we find one much more difficult of solution. As has already been pointed out, the national treasury was empty, and it would take time and the restoration of

*Attempt to
fill empty
treasury by
borrowing*

¹ The entire mandate is translated, *China Year Book*, 1913, pp. 486-487.

² He was not, however, the first choice of the Council.

order in the provinces before tax collections could be expected to approach the normal. Consequently the President was confronted with the necessity of borrowing both to meet immediate administrative expenses and to finance the disbandment of the swollen military forces, as well as to effect a general administrative reorganization. The way was prepared for this when the Powers, after the Emperor had abdicated, intimated that the ban on loans had been lifted. Negotiations were immediately instituted with the members of the Four Powers Banking group for a large administrative loan. The group had been expanded to include Japan and Russia, although they were borrowing rather than lending nations, and England and France had to agree to help them float their respective shares of the loan. The reason for their inclusion was political, and was due to the fact that the loan proceeds were to be used for general governmental purposes, and the loan was to be secured by the pledging of parts of the revenue system of the Republic. They were also included as a means of reënforcing the financial monopoly of the group.

*Monthly
advances
secured*

To meet the most pressing needs, the group bankers agreed to make monthly advances in February and March, in return for which the President gave them on March 7 a "firm option" on the comprehensive loan of \$125,000,000 for reorganization purposes, provided their terms were as favorable as could be obtained elsewhere.

*Belgian and
Crisp loans*

In spite of this undertaking, and only six days after it had been entered into, the government concluded an agreement for a loan of £10,000,000 with an Anglo-Belgian syndicate. The International Loan Group, charging bad faith, immediately suspended negotiations with the Premier, who, however, secured the ratification of the Belgian loan agreement by the Nanking Council at the same time that he was seeking to persuade it to accept the President's Cabinet nominations. Upon his return to Peking, however, he found that he would have to resume negotiations with the Six Powers Group, as he could not find the sums needed elsewhere. Consequently he was compelled to accede to the demand that the Belgian agreement be cancelled except in so far as the advances already made were concerned. A subsequent attempt to secure funds outside the group failed when the governments concerned brought pressure to bear on Mr. Crisp, who had ventured, as an independent financier, to make a loan agreement with the Chinese government, and forced him to cancel his agreement. Thus by reason of its own necessity and its inability to secure funds elsewhere because of the virtual monopoly of support given by England, France, Germany, the United States, Japan, and Russia to the financial institutions included in the group, the Chinese government was finally compelled to accept the terms offered by the international syndicate in spite of the opposition which developed.

*Objection to
loan terms*

This opposition, centering in the legislative body, was based upon the demand of the bankers for reorganization, under foreign direction, of the Salt Gabelle, which was to serve as the principal security for

the loan, and that for supervision of expenditure of the loan funds. These conditions, unobjectionable in themselves in view of past experience with Chinese officialdom in financial matters, were opposed as driving in still further the wedge of foreign financial control. It was pointed out that they were as objectionable as any suggested during Imperial days and that the new, enlightened, and republican, régime did not deserve the treatment justly meted out to the corrupt and backward Manchus. This position was also taken by President Wilson, who withdrew official and exclusive governmental support from the American bankers, partly on the ground of the monopoly character of the groups, and partly because the loan conditions unduly impaired the administrative integrity of China. The loan contract consequently was entered into with a Five Powers Group.

The negotiations were completed by the end of 1912, and the agreement received the assent of the Council. Since this was made much of later, it may be well to point out that at the time many of the *Tung Meng Hui* members were away campaigning for election to the new Parliament, and that the measure was put through a rump legislature largely by bribery. Furthermore, after China had assented to the terms of the contract, the Powers fell into a dispute over the apportionment of adviserships among the participating states, and it was not until the spring of 1913, as the new Parliament was convening, that the agreement was put into its final form and duly signed.

*Agreement not
completed until
April 1913*

4. CONFLICT BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND ASSEMBLY

The newly elected Assembly was a much more difficult body for the President to deal with than the Council which sat in Peking during 1912. The members of the latter had been divided into many groups, three of which were of importance, but none of which had an absolute control of the legislature. One group was, on the whole, conservative, and consequently it generally supported the President. A second was representative of the more radical elements of the south. And the third, holding the balance of power, had no definite point of view in parliamentary matters. This situation was of advantage to the President since, by playing off one group against another, and by occasionally using money to convert the third element to his point of view, he was generally able to find enough votes to support his policies. It was thus that he was able to secure assent to the loan agreement.

*Groups in the
Council*

This must not be taken to imply, however, that Peking was placid during the life of the Council, for quite the contrary was the case. Trouble developed, for example, between the President and the Premier, since T'ang Shao-yi was as determined that the Cabinet should be the real executive as Yüan Shih-k'ai was determined that he would not permit himself to be relegated to the background.

*President vs.
Cabinet*

On June 15 the Premier suddenly resigned and retired from Peking

*Cabinet
reconstruction*

to Tientsin. The real reason for his resignation was that he thought he could force the President to construct a party rather than a non-party Cabinet. In this the *Tung Meng Hui* members of the Council supported him. The President refused to accept the principle of party government and, after a severe contest, reconstructed the Cabinet under the presidency of a non-party man, Lu Chêng-hsiang, with the *Tung Meng Hui* excluded from participation.

*Attempts to
impeach the
President*

The antagonism between the radical party and the President was further increased when, in July and August, two prominent revolutionaries were seized and shot, the charges against them being preferred by Vice-President Li Yuan-hung.³ The Council, refused proofs of their guilt, threatened to impeach the government, but was unable to carry out the threat, since the conservative members absented themselves, preventing action on account of the lack of a quorum. Subsequent attempts to impeach were similarly prevented, but the fact that they were made indicates the lack of harmony at Peking, and the outcome of each trial points to the strength of the President.

*Newly elected
Parliament
controlled by
radicals*

The Parliament which met in 1913 presented a much more difficult problem, since it was controlled in both branches by the radical party, which had reorganized in August 1912 in order to carry on the contest against the President more effectively, amalgamating with several other factions under the name *Kuo Min Tang* (nationalist or democratic party). Consequently Yüan Shih-k'ai had to face a united and much more formidable opposition than before. Of the method of election of members of the Assembly it is only necessary to say that it was fixed by election laws passed by the Council in August; that the members of the Senate were chosen indirectly, either by the provincial assembly or by electoral colleges, six being selected by an electoral college of overseas Chinese; and that the House of Representatives consisted of members chosen theoretically by direct vote of the people but actually indirectly, with every eight million people being entitled to one representative, but with every province, regardless of population, having at least ten.⁴

*Kuo Min party
loses first
contest with
President*

In spite of its reorganization and of its success in the elections the *Kuo Min* party lost in its first opposition to presidential policy. It protested vehemently against the signature of the Reorganization Loan Agreement before it had been submitted to, and had received the assent of, Parliament, but Yüan Shih-k'ai maintained that the constitutional requirements had been observed since it had been accepted by the Council; and the diplomatic body, when appealed to directly, took the position that it was empowered to deal with China only through the President, and consequently the agreement was signed by the representatives of the financial groups.

³ Elevated to that position by the Nanking Council at the time when it elected Yüan President. He was also acting as the Hukuang Viceroy.

⁴ For detailed analysis, see VINACKE, *Modern Constitutional Development in China*, pp. 141-147.

This action strengthened the position of the President in two ways. In the first place, it gave him the moral support of the Powers. It indicated clearly that they preferred to deal with the "strong man," capable of affording security for an investment, rather than to strengthen the cause of parliamentary government by insisting upon the observance of the constitutional provision by which all loan agreements had to receive the assent of the Assembly before becoming effective. In the second place, the President was strengthened by being furnished the financial means to enable him to consolidate his power. The major portion of the proceeds of the loan, it is true, was devoted to paying off existing foreign obligations, returning the funds already advanced, and making up arrears in payment of interest and principal on the Boxer indemnity, but the remainder was available for use by Yüan Shih-k'ai.

*Position of
President
strengthened*

Strengthened by the loan, the President proceeded to the task of consolidating his power. Parliament continually struggled against this, opposing all suggestions, whether good or bad, emanating from the President's office. By doing this, instead of attempting to develop a constructive program of its own, the Assembly gained the name of a purely obstructive body, active only in interfering with the President who was attempting to restore peace and order in the country. In spite of this opposition at Peking, Yüan Shih-k'ai gradually gained the upper hand in the provinces. He used every possible means to assert and consolidate his authority—gradually displacing troops and commanders in central and southern China with those faithful to himself, maintaining agents everywhere to keep him informed of conditions and sentiment throughout the country, and even resorting, according to his opponents, to assassination for political purposes, the murder at Shanghai in March, 1913, of Sung Chia-jen, one of the *Kuo Min* leaders, being the first in a series of acts of violence for which he was held responsible.

*Consolidation
of power
undertaken by
President*

Finally, in the summer of 1913, he removed the *Kuo Min* military governor (*Tutuh*) of Kiangsi province, ostensibly in pursuance of his declared policy of substituting civil authority for that of the military. The policy undoubtedly was sound, but it looked bad to have him put it into effect only where his opponents were in power, and that is precisely what he had done. Failing to check him at Peking, the radical leaders had been laying plans for another "revolution" to complete the work begun in the first. This activity was probably well known to the President, so that when his appointment of a Civil Administrator for Kiangsi, followed by the removal of the *Tutuh*, precipitated a crisis, he was not caught unprepared. The consequence was the "Summer Revolution" of 1913, an uprising in the Yangtse valley, which merely served to exhibit the weakness of the opposition and the strength of the President. It was suppressed with remarkable ease, and was actually of material advantage to Yüan, because it enabled him to send more of his troops south to strategic locations,

*"Summer
Revolution"
of 1913*

and because it gave him an excuse to drive some of his opponents from the country and later to order the dissolution of the *Kuo Min Tang* itself as a treasonable organization on the ground that some of its leaders had been implicated in the revolt.

Before this was accomplished, and with it the virtual dissolution of the Parliament, the legislature completed part of the permanent constitution on which it had been at work since its convocation. The attempt to frame a permanent instrument of government to replace the Nanking (provisional) constitution was one endeavor of a constructive character which must be set down to the credit of the Parliament. If it had concentrated its efforts so as to complete it within a few months, it might have strengthened itself in the eyes of the country. As it was, it paid only intermittent attention to the work of constitution-framing until after the end of the rebellion. Then, seeing the hand-writing on the wall, the Assembly hurried to complete the document. It was being framed by a large committee of members selected by each House, and this committee met, interestingly, at the Temple of Heaven to engage in the work of laying the theoretical foundations for the Republic. The committee carefully refused to allow the President to participate or to influence its work, not even consenting to hear his views as to the needed governmental machinery. This of course did not tend to produce a better understanding between the executive and the legislature.

Yüan, however, was interested in consolidating his position through election as permanent President, and he urged, bribed, and cajoled the Assembly into passing the section dealing with the presidential office. Then, under the double pretext of celebrating the anniversary of the revolution, and of securing recognition from the Powers,⁵ he carried through his election as permanent President. Three ballots were necessary before this was accomplished and, had it not been for bribery and coercion, it is possible that Li Yuan-hung would have been elected instead of Yüan Shih-k'ai. However that may be, he was elected, and on October 10, 1913, he was inaugurated as the first permanent President of the Chinese Republic, thus further strengthening his position in the eyes of the people.

The constitution drafting committee passed the entire draft of the permanent constitution on October 26, but before it could be formally accepted by Parliament that body had ceased to exist. Of the new constitution it need only be said that it continued the limitations on the executive provided for in the Nanking Constitution, and, in addition, provided for a permanent legislative committee which was to supervise the executive when Parliament was not in session.

The new constitution was immediately denounced in a flood of telegrams from officials in the provinces, possibly at the suggestion

⁵ The United States alone among the Great Powers had recognized the Republic. England had withheld recognition pending settlement of the Tibetan question.

*Work on
permanent
constitution*

*Yüan Shih-k'ai
elected as
permanent
President*

*Draft of
permanent
constitution
adopted by
committee*

*Dissolution of
Kuo Min Tang*

of the President, and in some cases the dissolution of Parliament was demanded. These protests, together with the implication of the *Kuo Min Tang* in the "Summer Revolution," were used by Yüan Shih-k'ai to justify his next moves. On November 4, 1913, with the concurrence to his Cabinet, he ordered the dissolution of the *Kuo Min* party as a seditious organization. This almost automatically brought about the dissolution of the Assembly for lack of a quorum, and while never formally dissolved, it was indefinitely suspended by a presidential mandate issued on January 10, 1914. This virtually ended the parliamentary régime in China, although its fiction was carefully preserved by the President for a year.

The people, it may be noted, showed their complete indifference to the change in governmental status by raising no objection to the dissolution. The idea that the Republic, and with it representative government, was founded upon an active popular desire and interest, was shown to be nothing more than a theory developed for revolutionary purposes. Of course some explanation in justification of the popular attitude may be made, but it is not entirely complimentary to the Assembly. Put in a strong position by a constitution of its own making, that body had shown itself to be entirely obstructive rather than constructive, and it was more than suspected of corruption. It had developed no plan of reorganization of its own to substitute for that of the President to which it raised objection. It had enacted no legislation for the benefit of the country. It had appeared to be a worse than useless cog in the machine and, for that reason, it had not endeared itself to thinking people. Yüan, on the other hand, had been active in the development of a constructive program. Further than this many argued that he had a legal right to effect changes in the governmental system as long as he maintained China as a Republic, for he had been commissioned by the Manchus to organize a republican form of government for the country.

*Indifference of
people to
dissolution*

In defense of the Parliament the fact may be noted that it was controlled by inexperienced young men, intolerant of the old régime and its officers by reason of their training. They needed time in which to temper their ideas and to evolve satisfactory methods of parliamentary action. Yüan Shih-k'ai made no greater allowance for their impulsiveness and inexperience than they made for his effort to keep the administrative machinery running. The intolerance of inexperienced reformers was met by the intolerance of the tried administrator for the projects of the untried. Furthermore, the attitude of the so-called democratic states, from the very beginning, constituted a hindrance to the establishment of a satisfactory parliamentary régime. It is strangely true that the democratic governments of the West have been suspicious of democratic experiments in regions where their nationals have built up property interests, and that they have invariably sought a strong man with whom to deal. The "slap in

*Reasons for
failure of
Parliament*

the face" administered to the parliamentarians early in 1913 had much to do with the Parliament's failure to maintain itself.

5. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT

After the dissolution of the Assembly, Yüan Shih-k'ai proceeded to work out his own conception of a republican régime, one adapted to a country accustomed to personal rule and with a population of a low degree of literacy. On the whole his system embodied the ideas of Dr. Goodnow, an American who was one of his foreign advisers. The latter suggested that China was ready only for a dictatorship, tempered by the existence of an advisory assembly which should be constituted largely by appointment and which should represent group interests rather than individuals. These views coincided with the President's conceptions as well as his interest. Thus during the early part of 1914 it became clear that China had reverted to the status of about 1909 so far as her political life was concerned, and that the attempt would be made to develop from that point. The chief difference was that she had a dictatorial President rather than a weak Emperor, and consequently it was probable that her evolution would be even slower than might have been expected under the Manchus.

The first step toward establishing the new régime was taken in January, immediately after the suspension of Parliament, when a hand-picked Political Council was constituted. Under its advice the President then brought into being a Constitutional Council, which met for the first time March 18, 1914. Its chief function was to revise the Nanking Constitution so as to give a constitutional status to the new order. This it did by framing what came to be known as the Constitutional Compact, China's second provisional constitution. Under the Compact all power was concentrated in the hands of the President, who was to be elected for a ten-year period, with the right to extend his own term of office if he saw fit, or virtually to name his own successor.⁶ The Cabinet was replaced by a Secretary of State, appointed by and responsible to the President, together with heads of departments or boards. The legislature was to have strictly advisory powers,⁷ and a Council of State was to serve as the sole advisory body until the creation of the *Li Fa Yuan* (legislative assembly), and was thereafter to have the sole right to recommend constitutional changes. A reference to the "constitutional principles" of the Empress-Dowager will serve to show the similarity of the President's ideas to those of the earlier period of constitutional development.

Under the Constitutional Compact the President proceeded to govern as the dictatorial "strong man," whom China was assumed

⁶ This was provided for in the Presidential Election Law.

⁷ This was the only part of the proposed organization which was never carried into effect.

Reversion to
status of 1909

Constitutional
Council
constituted and
Compact
adopted

to need. He ruthlessly removed his political opponents where he was able to reach them, and those who, while outwardly friendly, were strong enough conceivably to oppose him in case matters were pushed to the extreme, were concentrated in Peking where he could closely supervise their actions. In spite of the paper developments toward a modified constitutionalism, China was governed during all of 1914 by terrorist methods. Spies were everywhere and no man dared to express his thoughts freely; the press, outside of the foreign concessions, was muzzled; and political assassinations became even more common. And yet it must be recognized that the people, on the whole, were not dissatisfied. Order was being restored gradually, and with it a more normal life; the sort of personal rule thus instituted was something they were accustomed to; the reëmphasis which Yüan laid on the Confucian morality, and the resumption of the Confucian worship furnished a link between past experience and the new order; and the Republic, with a fiction of representative government, was preserved. It was only the political "outs" who were dissatisfied. The masses had no concern with forms of government and methods of political action so long as they could sow and reap, and provide for the needs of their ancestors and for their own needs as potential ancestors. The revolution had disturbed them temporarily with its ideas of liberty, freedom from taxation, queue cutting, the end of foot-binding, and, in general, Westernization of the country. But, even so, the villagers had been very little disturbed. The new ideas had gained a real foothold only in the vicinity of the treaty ports, and China, as represented by the villages, acquiesced readily enough in the régime set up by Yüan Shih-k'ai, the holder of the Imperial mandate to institute a Republic, and the properly elected President. Thus, by the end of 1914, the President seemed to be securely entrenched in control, and, in all probability, he might have continued to rule as dictator if he had been content with the substance of power.

*Method of
government
under the
Compass*

But there were foreign foes as well as domestic opponents to reckon with. Shortly after the founding of the Republic trouble had developed in Mongolia, and an independent Mongol government had been proclaimed. There had been a growing dissatisfaction with Chinese rule for some time as a result of the encroachments of Chinese settlers and the attempt to extend the governmental system of China proper to parts of Mongolia, an attempt which threatened the rule of the Mongol nobility. There seems also to have developed a nationalist movement which helped to strengthen the other separatist tendencies. Added to all of this was an active Russian intrigue against the Chinese rulers, Russia's interest being in establishing checks on the northward movement of the Chinese. It is not possible here to do more than note the consequences of this state of affairs. On December 1, 1911, the Chinese authorities were forced to withdraw from Mongolia and an independent government was instituted.

*The question of
Mongolia*

During 1912 China attempted, with partial success in Inner Mongolia, to reestablish her authority. But in November Russia recognized the Urga government and concluded an agreement with it. Negotiations subsequently ensued between Russia and China and Mongolia and China to secure a definition of the position of the area. China and Russia, without the participation of the Government of Outer Mongolia, concluded a convention on November 5, 1913, by which the autonomy but not the independence of Outer Mongolia was recognized, China continuing as the suzerain. On June 7, 1915, a tripartite agreement was reached by which Outer Mongolia accepted the terms of the Sino-Russian Convention. Under the circumstances this agreement was a diplomatic victory for Yüan Shih-k'ai, but it was only a partial one, since it signalized, together with the 1913 agreement, the formal recognition of a Russian interest in Mongolian affairs.

*Trouble in
Tibet*

At the same time Tibet revolted against the authority of China. The Chinese garrison at Lhasa revolted at the time of the revolution, the outbreak being marked by such excesses that the Tibetans rose and drove the Chinese out of the country. They later celebrated their triumph by concluding, as an independent people, an agreement with the Mongolian government on January 11, 1913. After the establishment of the republican régime at Peking, steps were taken to restore Chinese authority in Tibet, but the British protested against any effort, by military means, to reestablish China's control. This led to fruitless negotiations during 1913 and to a tripartite conference in 1914, out of which came an agreement providing for: 1) the complete autonomy of Tibet proper; 2) the right of China to maintain a Resident at Lhasa with a suitable guard; and 3) a semi-autonomous zone in Eastern Tibet in which China would occupy a stronger position.⁸ This agreement, however, was never ratified, and the end of the Yüan Shih-k'ai régime came before any solution had been found. Thus British action with respect to Tibet had the same embarrassing consequences for the Republic as Russian intrigue had in Mongolia.

*Internal
consequences
of Japan's
advance
(1914-15)*

But the most serious situation developed out of Japanese participation in the World War. In the first place, the Japanese advance on Tsingtao put China as a neutral power in an anomalous position. A partially satisfactory way out was found in the proclamation of a war zone and the attempt to restrict Japanese military movements to this zone. At the beginning of 1915, since all reason for hostilities had ended, the zone was declared abolished. Following this action on the part of China, and using it as a pretext, Japan served her Twenty-one Demands on the President. These need not be discussed at this point, but the internal consequences of Japan's action must be referred to in order to make the story of the Yüan Shih-k'ai era complete. The demands, when they became known, aroused a widespread hostility to Japan, and developed a united support of the President in his resistance to the Japanese pressure. This support was manifested

⁸ *China Year Book*, 1916, p. 606.

through the organization of national societies, the collection of funds, by widespread popular subscription, for the defense of the country, and the expression of loyalty on the part of leaders who had been in opposition to Yüan Shih-k'ai. All of this was assumed by the President to indicate his personal strength in the country, although it was, fundamentally, an expression of an incipient nationalism, awakened by the most dangerous single attack yet launched on the integrity of China.

6. THE MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT

During the course of the negotiations it seems to have been intimated to Yüan that Japan would be sympathetic to the reestablishment of the monarchy, provided the aspirant to the Imperial position was favorably inclined toward her, and would give concrete evidence of his favor by the granting of the Japanese request, embodied in the demands, for a dominant position in the country. It is well known that the leading Japanese statesmen had never looked with favor on the Republic and had hopes of its early demise. It is true that the 1911 and also the 1913 revolutionists had received aid and support from unofficial Japanese sources, but this was indicative of interest, not in the radical cause, but rather in the production of disorder in China. However, while not hostile to the monarchical principle, Japan not only distrusted Yüan Shih-k'ai but also feared him, because he seemed capable of restoring China to her natural position of strength in the world, and because he had been in opposition to Japan's continental program since his Korean days. Consequently it was not considered to Japan's interest to see Yüan Shih-k'ai made the permanent ruler, unless and until he became more sympathetic to her. When the monarchical suggestion was made it was a bid for Yüan's support. This he refused to give, even in exchange for such a *quid pro quo*. But he seemed to consider that the expressions of opinion in China in his favor as the defender of the country were such as to make it an opportune time for him to establish himself as the founder of a new dynasty.

*Japan
favorable to
reestablishment
of monarchy*

During the spring and summer of 1915 societies were formed, headed by men close to the President, to cultivate an opinion favorable to the restoration of the monarchy. The most influential of these was the *Chou An-hui* (Peace Preservation Society). The moving spirits in this organization were Yang Tu, a member of the Council of State, and Liang Shih-yi, head of the Bank of Communications and leader of the strong Communication's clique in Peking, both intimates of President Yüan Shih-k'ai. As the agitation reached the stage of open discussion, an expression of opinion, of an academic sort, as to the proper form of government for China was obtained from a former legal adviser to the President, Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, who was visiting in Peking. In his memorandum Dr. Goodnow expressed the opinion that "the monarchical system is better suited

*Activities of
Chou An-hui*

*The Goodnow
memorandum*

to China than the Republican system. For if China's independence is to be maintained, the government should be constitutional, and in consideration of China's conditions as well as her relations with other powers, it will be easier to form a constitutional government by adopting a monarchy than a Republic."⁹ Three conditions must be observed, however, the writer went on to point out, before such a change should be instituted. Adequate provision for the succession should be made; it must be certain that the people would acquiesce in the change and that the Powers would not oppose it; and definite provision must be made for the progressive development of constitutionalism in China. This memorandum was used as the basis for the continued monarchist agitation.

*The argument
against the
reestablishment
of monarchy*

When opposition began to develop it established its theoretical position on a counter-argument prepared by the noted Chinese scholar, Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao.¹⁰ He had been one of the 1898 reformers, had stood for constitutional monarchy up to the organization of the Republic, and had supported the President in the overthrow of Parliament and the establishment of the dictatorship. Consequently he could not be accused of undue radicalism. His argument ran that the time for unsettling the country by a change in the form of the state had passed, that the Republic should be accepted as a fact, and that every effort should be bent toward a reorganization of the government so as to restore peace and order and give an efficient administration. Furthermore, he pointed out that Yüan Shih-k'ai had been given a term of office long enough to enable him to accomplish this work, and that if ten years were not sufficient, his term could be extended for another ten-year period.

*President back
of monarchical
agitation*

However, the President himself was back of the agitation and the machinery was all under his control. Undoubtedly inspired by him, the Council of State memorialized in favor of the restoration of monarchy, saying that the people demanded it and that he, as President, was bound to follow the direction of public opinion. At first Yüan appeared reluctant and refused to consider making the change. But, instead of ordering agitation for it to cease, as he must have done if he had been sincere, he merely directed the Council of State to give the matter more careful consideration. Since it continued to insist on the desirability of restoring the monarchy, he finally gave in, with an appearance of extreme reluctance.

*Convention of
Citizen's
Representatives
in favor of
monarchy*

In order, however, to keep up the pretense that he was merely carrying out the will of the people, President Yüan directed that steps should be taken to enable the people to express themselves formally on the contemplated change. Machinery had already been perfected and set in motion to bring into being a representative assembly as provided for under the terms of the Constitutional Compact, and this machinery was speeded up so as to establish, at an

⁹ *National Review* (China), Aug. 28, 1915.

¹⁰ For translation of his pamphlet see *WEALE, Fight for the Republic*, Ch. X.

early date, a "Convention of Citizen's Representatives" to pass upon the question of a change in the form of the state. This Convention was duly convened, and it registered a unanimous verdict in favor of monarchy. This unanimity of opinion was due to the fact that careful instructions as to the voting were sent out from Peking; the ballots were prepared and marked in advance; the members of the Conventions had to sign their ballots; the meeting halls were surrounded by soldiers with fixed bayonets, and soldiers were in the meeting rooms; and each ballot was scrutinized before the voter left the hall. Consequently it is not a matter for wonder that the representatives were unanimous in their desire for monarchy and for Yüan Shih-k'ai as Emperor.

Before the movement had gone very far foreign disapproval of the proposed change was voiced. On October 28 Great Britain and Russia united with Japan, at the latter's suggestion, in tendering advice against making the change. The United States refused to add its voice, on the ground that only China was concerned with the form of her government. The opposition was put upon the ground that it was unwise to disturb an existing equilibrium and to stir up trouble when the international situation was so unsettled. A further protest was voiced in November, this time France and Italy joining with the other three in making it.

*Powers object
to change*

Yüan replied that nothing would be done except with the full support of public opinion. When the second protest was made he was able to point to the affirmative vote of the Convention as indicative of popular approval of the change. Furthermore, he was sufficiently convinced of his ability to control any opposition which might develop to give assurances to the Powers that there would be no serious trouble. No further action was taken by the Powers, although Japan indicated that information at her disposal led to the belief that the southern provinces would not passively acquiesce in the reestablishment of monarchy. The next few months revealed the fact that Japan was better informed as to the possibility of opposition than was the Emperor-elect.

*Yüan convinced
that no
opposition
would develop*

7. "CANCELLATION" OF MONARCHY

While plans for the coronation were being perfected, revolt did break out in the extreme southwest. On December 23 a memorial against the change, and a demand for the cancellation of the monarchy, was sent to Peking from Yunnan province. When this demand was not complied with, the standard of revolt was openly raised. In spite of every effort put forth by the government—and it may be noted that it was almost uniformly successful from the military standpoint—the revolt spread until province after province had declared its independence of Peking. The revolutionists at first demanded the cancellation of the monarchy, the restoration of the Nanking constitution as the basic law of the Republic, and the reconstitution of the 1913 Assembly.

*Revolt in
southwest*

Monarchy
given up

In the face of this opposition, and of defection in the ranks of his own followers in the north, Yüan Shih-k'ai weakened to the extent of declaring that he would give up the idea of restoring the monarchy, saving his "face" by stating that he had been misled in his belief that it was the wish of the country that he should ascend the Dragon Throne. This indication of weakness, instead of satisfying the republicans, merely emboldened them to extend their demands to include the complete elimination of Yüan Shih-k'ai from Chinese politics. This, for a time, he refused to consider, although he further temporized by reviving the Cabinet and ostensibly transferring the executive power to it and handing over control of the military establishment to the Minister of War. Ultimately, however, he was forced to give in and consent to retire from office. Just when agreement was imminent the controversy was settled unexpectedly by the death, on June 6, 1916, of the President. Thus the period of the first reaction against true republicanism came to an end as a result of the elimination of the "strong man" who had been looked to by so many as the only person capable of bringing stability to China.

Death of
Yüan Shih-k'ai

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CHAPTER XII

GROWTH OF MILITARY POWER IN CHINA

I. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT AFTER DEATH OF YÜAN SHIH-K'AI

THE events of 1915-1916 served to expunge from the memory of the people the failures of parliamentary government during 1912-1914, or where they were remembered they were ascribed solely to the machinations of Yüan Shih-k'ai. It was thought that he, rather than the lack of readiness of the people and the deficiencies of the legislative leadership, had been the chief obstacle to the attainment of constitutional government of the parliamentary type. He it was who had dissolved the Assembly after gathering the reins of power into his own hands; he had been responsible for the introduction of one man government under the Constitutional Compact. Consequently his death was expected to inaugurate an orderly resumption of power by the Assembly. This was the avowed aim of those who had risen in arms against the reestablishment of the monarchy—an aim which had been accepted by Yüan himself before his death. It was natural that the members of the Assembly who, in June 1916, had begun to gather at Shanghai preparatory to resuming their positions at Peking, should have forgotten their own sins of omission and of commission. But bitter experience should have taught them that Yüan was merely the central representative of a system of provincial military control, and that his death had not ended the system but had only temporarily weakened it.

*Failures of
parliamentary
régime forgotten*

There were, in addition, several important questions which had to be answered before the new parliamentary era could begin. In the first place, which of the two constitutions (both provisional) should be considered as in force? If the Compact, then the old Assembly had no legal right of existence. If the Nanking Constitution, then the term of office of the members of the lower house had expired, since they had been elected in 1913 for three years, and one-third of the Senate had to stand for reelection before the upper house could sit with full membership. Because of this situation, coupled with the demand of the "independent" provinces that the old Assembly should resume power, it was decided to regard the first provisional constitution as operative, but to consider the years 1914-1916 as an interregnum, allowing the members of the Assembly to sit out their entire terms with the subtraction of the period of dissolution from the time served. By this expedient it was made possible for the Assembly to

*Nanking
provisional
Constitution
revived*

begin its work as part of the machinery of government without the delay attendant upon the holding of new elections.

*Li Yuan-hung
accepted as
President;
Tuan Chi-jui
the Premier*

The second question related to the constitution of the executive branch of the government. Yüan Shih-k'ai had transferred the executive powers to a Cabinet appointed by himself, without the confirmation of the parliamentary body, and had placed one of his henchmen, Tuan Chi-jui, as the Premier and Minister of War. Then, on his death-bed, he had requested Li Yuan-hung, as the Vice-President of the Republic, to assume the presidential office. Both President Li and Premier Tuan were military men, but with decidedly different attitudes toward the Republic and the exercise of power by Parliament. The former leaned toward the revolutionary point of view as it had been embodied in the Nanking constitution, as well he might since he had been an active figure in the revolution. The latter was of the school of Yüan Shih-k'ai, and he, rather than President Li, had the confidence of the conservative leaders and the military commanders in the north. Logically, whatever the choice for the presidency, a person more representative of the parliamentary point of view should have been made the Premier. But, because of his following, the Assembly confirmed Tuan Chi-jui in his position as Premier, making the same compromise which it had made in 1912 when it had elevated Yüan to the presidential office. It also accepted the accession of Li to the presidency to fill out the unexpired term of President Yüan. In the fall it proceeded to the election of a Vice-President, making selection of Fêng Kuo-chang, one of the strongly placed Viceroys on the Yangtse.

2. THE NEW ERA

*Comparative
harmony at
Peking*

The new era began harmoniously enough. The President was a convinced constitutionalist, and the Assembly for a time was on its best behavior. The Premier was confirmed in office without much opposition, and the Vice-President was elected in an orderly manner, the contest being carried on in the most approved parliamentary form. The only indication of trouble came with the constitution of the Cabinet, when some of the military governors, assembled in conclave under the leadership of an ex-imperialist, Chang Hsün, protested against the inclusion of T'ang Shao-yi, one of the leaders of the *Kuo Min* party, in the Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and when they announced their intention to keep an eye on the Assembly in its work of constitution-framing. T'ang Shao-yi was not included in the Cabinet, and it was charged that the Premier was not sufficiently opposed to interference from the military. This incident caused bad feeling between the radical party in the Assembly and the executive, but it was largely forgotten as time elapsed without further interference from the military.

Chief interest at Peking, during the fall and early winter months of 1916, was attached to the work of framing a permanent constitution

for the Republic. The Assembly had been working on the draft of a permanent constitution at the time of its dissolution by Yüan Shih-k'ai, and had completed the section dealing with the President's office. Yüan, in turn, after he had established himself as dictator under the (provisional) Constitutional Compact, and before undertaking to restore the monarchy, had indicated an interest in the establishment of a permanent instrument of government by appointing a committee to frame it. After the monarchy had been revived, interest in the constitutional question was lost.

*Status of
permanent
constitution*

With the revival of the Assembly the work was taken up at the point reached before the dissolution, with the draft as a basis for further deliberation. Constitution-making was undertaken by the two chambers sitting at the Temple of Heaven as a Conference on the Constitution. The draft permanent constitution had been entirely the work of the Assembly, which had deliberately disregarded the point of view of the executive branch of the government, as presented to the committee by the President. Consequently it provided for the full supremacy of Parliament, and for continuing parliamentary supervision of the executive, when Parliament was not in session, through a permanent parliamentary committee. It was this feature of the constitution which was particularly objectionable to Yüan Shih-k'ai, and which he had seized upon as a legitimate excuse for the dissolution of the Assembly. In the main the draft followed the French model, provision being made for interpellation, for vote of want of confidence, and for dissolution of the Parliament only with the consent of the Senate. This last feature weakened the control of the executive by virtually denying it the right of appeal to the country against an adverse vote in the House of Representatives. The permanent constitution, as it came from the Conference on the Constitution in the early summer of 1917, continued all these features with the exception of the provision for a parliamentary committee to supervise the government when Parliament was not sitting. That provision was omitted, the chief ground of objection being that it gave too much power to a small number of members of Parliament.

*Debatable
provisions of
draft permanent
constitution*

The chief difference of opinion which developed in the Conference on the Constitution was over the provincial system. The southern party wanted to establish a decentralized system, with the right to choose the Governor vested in the provincial Assembly. The conservatives, and the executive, on the other hand, advocated the continuance and the strengthening of the centralized administrative system inherited from the Manchus, with the ultimate aim of knitting the provinces together territorially, as well as from the administrative standpoint. Beyond this, the radicals wanted the provincial system provided for constitutionally, while the conservatives wanted it established by statute. On the whole question no agreement could be reached, and when the constitution was finally published, the chapter dealing with the provincial system was omitted.

*Difference of
opinion over
provincial
system*

*Assembly again
becomes
obstructive*

As time went on after the establishment of the new régime, the early harmony tended to disappear, and for much the same reason as during the presidency of Yüan Shih-k'ai. The Assembly began to grow obstructionist so far as the suggestions emanating from the Cabinet were concerned, and, again, it failed to develop a constructive program to substitute for the one presented to it by the Premier. Heckling of Cabinet representatives became common, merely because it embarrassed the government. There were continual threats of impeachment, and, although none of them were carried out, certainly they did not make for mutual understanding. The Assembly continually rejected nominations to Cabinet office; the interest of the members in their work declined, so that adjournments for lack of a quorum became common; and many of the sessions of the Assembly were marked by extreme disorder, several of them ending in free-for-all fights.

*Failure of
Premier to
coöperate*

The Premier, on his side, failed to indicate a willingness to coöperate in good faith with the Assembly. He went about the business of government, just as had Yüan, as though what he did were no business of the legislators. Instead of advising with the Assembly as he worked out the details of the financial problem, which involved the making of loans and the reorganization of the revenue system, he made his arrangements and then asked the consent of the Assembly to something which had already been carried to completion. Sometimes he made nominations to office which he knew would be unacceptable in order to get later confirmation for a nomination only partly acceptable. And he insisted on relegating the President to a position of comparative obscurity, relying, of course, on provisions of a constitution which had been framed with the intention of restraining a "strong man" accepted as President from necessity rather than choice. It was a comparative lack of strength rather than desire which caused him to keep reasonably well within the limits of the Nanking constitution, and this became clear when he had behind him in opposition to Parliament the military power of the provinces.

3. THE WAR QUESTION

*War question
provides
material for
internal conflict*

Serious trouble did not develop, however, until after the first months of 1917, when, again, a question from the outside provided the material for an internal crisis. The question was that of Chinese participation in the World War, a question which interests us here only because of its effect on internal politics, and which may therefore be stated only in its main outlines.

*Diplomatic
relations with
Germany
severed*

When Germany announced her intention of engaging in unrestrained submarine warfare, the United States invited China, among other neutral states, to join her in protesting to the German government against its declared policy. On February 9, 1917, China sent a note of protest to Germany. When no satisfactory reply had been

received a month later, diplomatic relations were severed. In taking these first steps the Premier had the support of Parliament. While, at the beginning, the President was not so favorable because of a fear lest China should become involved in difficulties with an ultimately victorious Germany, he finally agreed to the severance of relations, subordinating his own opinion to that of Tuan Chi-jui.

When the breaking off of diplomatic relations had no effect in bringing about a modification of German policy, the government was forced to contemplate the third step—an actual declaration of war. There was considerable opposition to this in many quarters on the ground that China had nothing to gain by war with Germany, and had much to lose by becoming her active enemy. It was necessary, in order to counteract this feeling that the government should be able to show substantial advantage to China from joining the Powers at war with the German Empire. To this end negotiations were commenced with the representatives of the Entente Powers at Peking. . . .

*Opposition to
declaration of
war*

Before he had received a favorable reply from the Powers, the Premier gave Parliament to understand that he was assured of substantial concessions along the lines indicated if China joined the Entente. The negotiations dragged on, however, without any decision being reached, and interest in the war issue declined throughout the country. As interest lessened the majority of the government in Parliament decreased. It soon became apparent that the unanimity of the different departments extended only to the question of war with Germany, and that opposition was steadily growing even to the war policy of the Cabinet.

*Decline of
interest in war
question*

In order to divert attention from the unsatisfactory condition of the negotiations, Premier Tuan resorted to the expedient of asking the advice of the country. If it could be shown that a unanimous public sentiment favored war, he would have that to urge as a reason for the favorable action of Parliament irrespective of possible concessions from the Powers. To aid in the manufacturing of this sentiment Tuan summoned to a Conference some of the Military Governors.

*Conference of
Military
Governors
summoned*

From the time this conference met the question of war became more a matter of internal politics than of foreign policy. The Military Governors assembled in Peking late in April, and the attention of the country was immediately centered upon their activities.¹

From this time, when representatives of the military assembled to consult upon a matter of national policy, dates the ascendancy of the northern military party in Peking politics. For this reason space must be given to a description of the exact status of the military governor in the provinces and his influence on the central government prior to 1917.

*Ascendancy of
military dates
from conference*

4. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR

Under Manchu rule, it will be remembered, the provincial establishment had consisted of a Viceroy or Governor, a treasurer, judge, the salt-comptroller, and the grain intendant, together with their deputies and assistants. The Viceroy (with jurisdiction over two or more provinces, with the exception of Chihli and Szechuan) and the Governor exercised substantially the same power within their juris-

*Manchu
provincial
system*

¹ VINACKE, *Modern Constitutional Development in China*, pp. 236-38.

dictions that the Emperor had in the Empire. In addition to their civil functions, they commanded the provincial constabulary and such parts of the national army as had not been transferred to the control of the Board of War. These troops were paid out of the provincial treasury, and, as a consequence, the allegiance of the soldier was to the Governor, who paid and kept him, rather than to the State.

*Provincial
assemblies a
permanent
feature of
system after
1909*

As a result of the constitutional movement under the Manchus, provincial assemblies were provided for as part of the governmental machinery, and they were actually opened in most of the provinces in 1909. These assemblies were retained as part of the provincial system after the revolution, with the exception of the period of personal rule by Yüan Shih-k'ai, when they were temporarily done away with, to be later restored with the reestablishment of parliamentary government.

*Control by
Assembly only
in southern
provinces*

When the revolution broke out in 1911, in some cases the regular provincial officials proclaimed their allegiance to the republican cause, and retained their control of the province. In other cases the provincial assembly took control of the situation, ousted the Imperial officials, and selected the head for the province from among the gentry, or from among the natives of the province who had been in the Imperial service. This reconstitution of the government took place, during the course of the revolution, only in the provinces south of the Yangtse.

*Revolution
effected transfer
of allegiance to
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

In the provinces loyal to the Dynasty the revolution merely effected a transfer to Yüan Shih-k'ai of the allegiance of the Governors. But in these provinces, as well as in those to the south, the sole basis of authority, during the revolution and after, came to be military power.

*Troops and
provincial
revenues
controlled by
Military
Governor*

As has been pointed out, the Governor had control of the troops even before 1911. In the course of the uprising the number of men under arms increased very materially in all parts of the country. The recruits for both the Imperial and the Revolutionary armies came mostly from those living on the economic margin of existence, and from those living as brigands, men who went into the military service because of the guarantee of pay and the certainty of food and clothing. The pay was not always forthcoming, but, so long as the commander retained control of territory, the subsistence was more certain. The more troops a man had, the larger the district he could control successfully, and the more important the figure he could cut politically. Many armed bands sprang up within the province, rendering nominal allegiance to the legal or self-constituted provincial authorities, but establishing themselves in control of prefectures or districts, supporting themselves by force, and maintaining themselves by collecting taxes over the smaller area or by requisitioning the people for supplies. Part of the taxes collected might be turned over to the provincial

leader, after the expenses of the local régime had been defrayed, but very little went beyond the province.

When Yüan Shih-k'ai became President he undertook to restore peace and order in the country. But he did not have the means to disband these practically independent troops in the face of the opposition of their leaders. Neither did he have the financial resources with which to buy them off and make up the arrears of pay due their soldiers, without which it would have been impossible to persuade them to return to civil life. Furthermore, it would have been a dangerous undertaking to disband them without making some temporary provision for their support, since to have done so would have meant that they would become brigands, and thus even more of a menace to the country than they were as soldiers. The consequence was that the President legalized the position in the province of their commanders by giving them official rank, trusting to carry out a gradual demobilization as conditions returned to the normal. Thus the only limitation on the power of the *Tutuh*, or Military Governor, lay in such public opinion as could make itself heard directly, or indirectly through the assembly where such a body was in existence; and in the requirement of the central government that a measure of peace and order should be maintained in the province. In addition to the Military Governorship, certain other offices were created to make provision for the support of such men as Chang Hsün, the Imperial commander at Nanking when that city was captured by the revolutionists. General Chang retired up the Tientsin-Pukow railroad from Nanking, and established his headquarters at Hsüchow in southern Shantung. Since he was too powerful to be antagonized, and, further, gave assistance to Yüan by serving as a perpetual threat to the parliamentarians, he was given an office to retain his allegiance. The President's desire to control strategic locations within provinces the military governors of which were not fully trusted, provided another motive for complicating the system. Thus Shanghai was separated from Kiangsu province under a Defense Commissioner who was controlled directly from Peking.

*Status of
Military
Governor
under
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

In the spring of 1913 Yüan Shih-k'ai undertook to replace the *Tutuh* with a Civil Administrator in a few of the provinces, with a view to the ultimate restoration of civil government. The paying off of troops was one of the declared purposes of the Reorganization Loan negotiated in 1913 with the Five Power Group. Some of the funds were used for this purpose, commanders being paid at the rate of fifty dollars per head. However, Yüan soon found other uses both for the money and for the men. After the President had made himself the dictator, he retained the Military Governor as head of the province, but changed the title from *Tutuh* to *Chiangchun*. On the whole he restored the old Manchu system of provincial administration, even abolishing the assemblies provided for just before the Republic was established. In order to strengthen his own position during this period

*Military régime
useful to Yüan
the dictator*

he attempted to entice to Peking men of whose allegiance he was doubtful. By getting them away from their provinces, and their troops, he was able effectively to deprive them of influence for the time. This was accomplished in the case of Li Yuan-hung, Tsai Ao, and others of prominence.

5. THE TUCHUNATE

*Peiyang
military party:*

*a) Chihli
group*

*b) Anhui
faction*

The military governors and commanders north of the Yangtse who were faithful to Yüan constituted what was known as the *Peiyang* military party. There were two main factions in the party even during the period of ascendancy of Yüan Shih-k'ai. One, which came to be known as the Chihli group, accepted the leadership of Fêng Kuo-chang, who took the place of Li Yuan-hung as the Hukuang Viceroy after he had been brought to Peking. The other, called the Anhui faction, looked to Tuan Chi-jui as its leader. Until 1916, however, both factions recognized the leadership of Yüan Shih-k'ai and strongly supported him in his struggle against Parliament.

*Chihli faction
attempts
mediation
between
President and
the south*

When his control began to weaken, after March of 1916, the Chihli faction, which was powerful in the central Yangtse region, attempted to strengthen its position by assuming a mediatory rôle as between the President and the south. General Fêng called a conference of provincial representatives which should attempt to find a basis of agreement. This move was largely unsuccessful because of southern distrust of his motives, and it was countered by the Anhui clique, which secured the transfer of the national executive power to Tuan Chi-jui as Premier and as Minister of War.

*Status of
military after
death of Yüan*

After the restoration of the Republic the situation was not materially changed. The military governors remained in control in their provinces, although their title was changed to *Tuchun*. While the provincial assemblies were revived, the actual power rested with the military. The leader of the Anhui clique continued as Premier, as has been noted, and the provinces were temporarily quiescent. Ultimately the groups united for the purpose of resisting the pretensions of the southern and parliamentary party.

*Hsüchow
conference*

In the autumn of 1916, with Parliament established again at Peking, with a President who believed in constitutional rather than military government, and with their ranks somewhat divided, it must have appeared to the *Tuchuns* that the day of their provincial supremacy was drawing to an end. In order to show that they would not give up power without a struggle, however, several of them gathered a second time at Hsüchow, this time at the call of Chang Hsün and without the active participation of Fêng Kuo-chang. From the time of this conference dates the gradual extension of the power of the *Tuchuns* to Peking. It was a threat from the conference which prevented T'ang Shao-yi from taking a seat in the Cabinet; and it was at that time that announcement was made to the Assembly that

nothing must be done which would be prejudicial to the interests of the executive and the military. One reason for the renewed ill-feeling between the Assembly and the Premier was the fact that he took no steps to assert the freedom of the government from control by the *Tuchuns*, but was rather suspected, and, indeed, openly accused, of fostering military interference in order to strengthen his own hand at Peking. Certainly, when the issue was definitely joined later, Tuan Chi-jui threw in his lot with the *Tuchuns*, and not with the constitutionalists.

After this Hsüchow conference, nothing further was heard directly from the *Tuchuns*, as a body, for some months, in spite of the fact that they formed a "Union of the Provinces" at that time, and expressed the intention of holding periodic meetings to consider national affairs. This "Union," of course, was nothing but a league of the northern and some of the central *Tuchuns*. *Tuchuns*
quiescent

The voice of the military party was next heard when, after the war issue had been raised, they were summoned into conference by the Premier. They decided in favor of war, and, since the Premier and Parliament were of substantially the same opinion, it would seem that nothing remained but the issuance of a formal declaration. However, the Premier decided to make assurance doubly sure and held off the introduction of the war bill while, by entertainment and otherwise, he attempted to enlarge his majority. After the bill had been introduced, and while Parliament was debating it, a mob demonstration in favor of it was staged before the Parliament building. The members of the Assembly took this as an attempt, as it probably was, on the part of the Premier to coerce them into doing something which they were prepared to do voluntarily. Consequently they refused to take action until a reconstruction of the government was undertaken. All of the Cabinet members resigned except the Premier, but he refused to go out by his own action. *Attempt at
coercion of
Parliament*

6. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY IN POWER AT PEKING

Out of the ensuing turmoil at Peking and in the northern provinces there came a definite alignment of the two elements that had been moving toward conflict since the first revolution—an alignment of the civil against the military power. Parliament, demanding the resignation or removal of the Premier, represented the civil and constitutional power, while the Premier, supported immediately by the northern *Tuchuns*, insisted on maintaining himself in control against the will of Parliament. The parties were struggling to control the action of the President, Li Yuan-hung, who hitherto had been rather a negative factor in the government, respected but not followed. Now he became the central figure, for he had it within his power to sustain the Premier by siding with him against Parliament, either by merely refusing to dismiss him, or by going so far as to dissolve Parliament, or he might take his stand firmly with the legislature *President
dismisses
Premier*

by removing the Premier. To the surprise of every one he did the latter. Had he stopped there, standing firm against the military opposition to his action which developed, he might well have gone down in history as the real "strong man" of the early Republic. But when the test came he did not have the courage of his convictions.

*Revolt of the
Tuchuns*

Upon the dismissal of Tuan Chih-jui from the premiership, the military governors broke into open revolt, not against the Republic, but against parliamentary dominance. Perhaps instinctively, they seemed to realize that their position in the provinces could not be secured without the elimination of the representative element in the Peking government. They organized a provisional government at Tientsin, gathered their forces together for a march on Peking, and openly defied the President and Parliament.

*Grounds of
revolt*

Strangely enough, the revolting *Tuchuns*, in demanding the dissolution of Parliament, rested their case on constitutional grounds. They took exception to the clause in the permanent constitution, then nearing completion, which restricted the exercise of the right of dissolution by the Premier by making it necessary for him to secure the consent of the Senate. They maintained also that the dismissal of the Premier was unconstitutional, since every mandate had to receive the counter-signature of the appropriate Cabinet Minister, in this case the dismissed Premier, to be valid. Therefore, they contended that Tuan alone could legalize his dismissal, since his temporary successor, Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, had no constitutional right to his position even by succession from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

*Parliament
divided*

The parliamentarians besought the President to stand firm, promising him support from the southern provinces. But their advice was weakened by the fact that it was not unanimous, the conservative element standing with the militarists and advocating a self-dissolution of the Assembly for lack of a quorum. Many of the parliamentarians, as a matter of fact, began to pack for a hurried departure from Peking, and it became difficult to find a quorum. However, the Assembly refused to help the President out of his difficulty by formally dissolving itself, even when he suggested this as the most satisfactory solution of the problem.

*"Mediation"
of Chang Hsün*

When the punitive expedition of the militarists started its march northward, President Li began to weaken in his position. Finally he took the absurd step of summoning Chang Hsün, one of the worst of the militarists, to Peking to mediate between the two elements. The latter showed what could be expected of him when he stopped at Tientsin on his way to the capital to consult with the military government sitting there. From Tientsin he telegraphed the President his "advice," which was that Parliament should be dissolved. Then he moved to Peking surrounded by his own men, the most feared soldiers in China. They made a picturesque crew, with their brightly

colored uniforms and their "pigtails," from which they had been given the name of the "pig-tailed army."

Mediation, to General Chang, meant dictation. And President Li accepted his order that Parliament be dissolved, showing himself to be "an idol with feet of clay," as the Far Eastern Review called him. General Chang, however, did not rest there. He was an avowed imperialist, faithful to the last to the Manchu cause. From the time of the founding of the Republic he had been accused of a desire to restore the Dynasty, and it was predicted that his presence in Peking would result in a restoration. He had denied, from Tientsin, that he had any such intention, but the ease with which he gained complete control caused him to change his mind.

*Attitude of
Chang Hsün*

As the result of a midnight resolution Chang Hsün proclaimed the restoration of the Manchu monarchy on July 1, 1917, with himself as the Premier. The old dragon flag appeared throughout the city as if by magic, the people indicating their acquiescence in the change in that way. The new régime, however, proved to be short-lived. General Chang had been told, when at Tientsin, that the *Tuchuns* would not stand behind a movement to restore the Manchus, but he thought that they would accept it if presented with the restored monarchy as an accomplished fact. In this belief he was wrong. However heartily they may have disliked parliamentarianism, it turned out that the *Tuchuns* had little less desire to see their privileges curtailed by the reëstablishment of the Manchu Dynasty. Instead of acquiescing in the change, the military government at Tientsin announced its intention of continuing the march of its forces on Peking, not to bring Parliament to terms, but to restore the Republic.

*Restoration of
Manchus
proclaimed*

Out of this change of status might easily have come a reunification of the country. After the dissolution of Parliament its members retired to Shanghai and Canton, and at Canton they set up a government declaring itself to be the constitutional government of China. This government recognized Li Yuan-hung as the President and took up arms in his behalf and that of the parliamentary party. When the *Tuchuns* took the field in defense of the Republic, an opportunity was afforded for a reconciliation on the basis of coöperation against the Manchus. Unfortunately the northern armies were so easily successful in overthrowing the monarchy that the south had no chance to share in the undertaking, even if its aid had been sought. Equally unfortunately, no overtures were made to it at the time, and, when the armies led by Tuan Chi-jui were in occupation of Peking after a brief campaign of about three weeks, the government was reconstructed without the inclusion of any members of the *Kuo Min* party. The militarists could not surrender so remarkable an opportunity to complete their dominance, already established in the provinces, by the complete assumption of power at Peking.

*Tuchuns restore
the Republic
without aid of
south*

President Li had been forced to take refuge in the legation quarter

*Fêng Kuo-chang
becomes
President*

of the city when the monarchy was proclaimed, and from his asylum he resigned his position in favor of the Vice-President, Fêng Kuo-chang. This put the leader of one faction of the *Peiyang* military party in that office, while the leader of the other faction assumed position as Premier. After some delay an assembly of a conservative nature, representative of the northern provinces, was constituted. The end of the summer of 1917 found the military leaders of the north in complete control at Peking, but confronted with the necessity of either subjugating or compromising with the southern provinces, if a united China was to exist.

7. FACTIONAL STRUGGLES IN NORTH

*President vs.
Premier*

During the year from August of 1917 to September of 1918, chief interest in the north lay in the struggle for power which developed between two cliques among the military, the one centering around the President and the other around the Premier. The chief issue in this struggle was their respective attitudes toward the provinces controlled from Canton by the constitutional party. President Fêng desired to pursue a policy of conciliation, while the party of the Premier favored an attempt at reunion by conquest and subjugation. Hostilities against the south were carried on intermittently, depending upon the degree of support given to one faction or the other by the *Tuchuns*, the real masters of the provinces north of the Yangtse. In carrying on this contest the President found, as had Li Yuan-hung before him, that his position at Peking, detached from the main body of his supporters, was considerably weaker than when he had been at Wuchang, looking both north and south, with his own men in power in neighboring provinces, and, most important of all, immediately under his supervision. At one stage he tried to leave the north for the Yangtse, but was firmly although politely turned back to Peking. After considerable jockeying for position the Premier's party carried the day, the seal being set to its victory when, the President's term having expired in October, 1918,² it was successful in elevating its candidate, Hsü Shih-chang, an old-time official, to the presidential office.

*Anfu Club
organized*

In order to insure its success in the election, the Tuan faction organized itself into a society or club, the *Anfu* Club, which had as its ostensible purpose the carrying on of propaganda among the members of the newly-elected Parliament in favor of Hsü Shih-chang for the presidency. After it had attained its object, the Anfu Club continued in existence for the purpose of promoting the individual interests of its members. These interests related to the monopolizing of public office, largely for the purpose of lining the pockets of the *Anfuites*. To line their pockets they had to have access to some source of supply outside of the country, and this source they found in Japan,

² Both Li and Fêng were considered to be merely filling out Yüan Shih-k'ai's term of five years, dating from his election in 1913 as permanent President of the Republic.

whose financiers made loan after loan to the Peking government, either secured on various public services, or in return for valuable concessions of various sorts, or without security. Consequently the people of China came to consider the *Anfu* government as pro-Japanese and engaged in the process of selling out the country to Japan.

The plans for conquering the south which were laid from time to time and half-heartedly put into effect did not succeed. The country was still divided between the two rival governments when Hsü Shih-chang was elevated to the Peking presidency. Shortly after his accession to that position the World War came to an end and the Peace Conference appeared on the horizon. China, as one of the belligerents, was entitled to a seat at that conference, and to a voice in the settlement of the questions to be brought before it relating to the Far East. But the Powers friendly to her saw that it would be difficult for her to present her views effectively so long as the country was in a state of disunion. Consequently it was suggested to the government at Peking that it would be advisable for it to seek a basis of agreement with that at Canton.

*China divided
in 1918*

The Canton government, after its year of independent existence, had lost its appearance of constitutionality. The old leaders of the constitutional party, such as Dr. Sun Yat-sen, were still active and had organized a government known as the Military Government of the Southwest. The *Kuo Min Tang* itself continued its existence with large numbers of adherents in the south. Back of the civilian element in this government, however, was the same type of military power as that in control of the north. Civilian control extended actually only to Canton and its environs. Consequently it is difficult to make a very clear distinction between the two governments as far as their actual character was concerned.

*The Canton
Government*

With this government, however, negotiations were opened by Peking in December of 1918, after an armistice had been declared by Hsü Shih-chang so far as the northern troops were concerned. T'ang Shao-yi, representing the Southwest in the internal peace conference, laid down a series of claims as the basis for negotiations, one of them being that the mandate issued by President Li dissolving Parliament should be cancelled. This was the rock on which the conference finally split, the north refusing to concede the illegality of its position. At one point before this, however, the conference was brought to a temporary end because of the discovery made by T'ang that the militarists in the south were seeking a basis of agreement with those in the north behind his back.

*Internal peace
conference at
Shanghai*

While the north and the south were unable to reach an agreement on the conditions of union, they did coöperate in sending representatives to Paris to represent China rather than one or the other of the two contending parts of the country. The Chinese delegation presented China's case to the Peace Conference very effectively, but it found that the Powers were bound by previous agreements with

*Paris decides
against China*

Japan which prevented them from settling the question of the disposition of the German rights and interests in the Far East in a manner satisfactory to China. Consequently, in the Treaty of Versailles, those interests were transferred from Germany to Japan, with the understanding that the German properties in Shantung province would be restored to China after negotiations between that country and Japan.

*Chinese reaction
to Versailles
treaty*

When the news of the award reached China it produced an immediate reaction against the *Anfu* government, controlled, as it was popularly supposed to be, from Tokyo. The students first rose in revolt, refusing to attend their classes, and carrying on an educative campaign among the masses by means of street meetings with a view to informing the people as to the exact state of affairs. Later they were joined by the merchants, who instituted a boycott against all Japanese goods. As a result of this agitation the most noticeably pro-Japanese of the Peking ministers were forced to resign their positions, and Japanese interests were affected most unfavorably by the boycott. The expression of a growing national feeling which was so marked at this time did not, however, serve to reunite the country or to drive the militarists from power at Peking or in the provinces.


8. OVERTHROW OF ANFU RÉGIME

*General Chang
Tso-lin of
Manchuria*

In spite of this agitation it was not until the summer of 1920 that the next internal crisis developed. After the assumption of control by the *Anfu* clique, the non-*Anfu Tsuchuns* manifested a growing dissatisfaction. Two among them had grown to considerable power. One of the two was General Chang Tso-lin, Inspector-General (*Super-Tsuchun*) of the three Manchurian provinces. He was an uneducated man, a leader of Hunghutze, or brigands, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. During that struggle he fought on the side of Japan, and upon its conclusion he was taken into the Chinese service, where he received rapid promotion on account of bravery. The year 1911 found him the Military Governor of Fengtien province, which position he held, serving Yüan Shih-k'ai faithfully until his death, up to 1918, when he was given control of all of Manchuria. During the years of his control he devoted his considerable talents as a military man and an administrator to the development of Manchuria and to the consolidation of his position therein. General Chang played no active part in politics south of the Wall until he intervened in support of the Tuan Chi-jui policy of forcible action to bring the south to terms, thus taking a position in opposition to the Chihli faction. After that time he came to feel that Tuan did not give him his fair share of the spoils of office, and consequently he began to evince a more positive interest in general Chinese politics.

*Super-Tsuchun
Ts'ao Kun*

Ts'ao Kun was the other powerful and dissatisfied *Tsuchun*. He also was popularly known as a *Super-Tsuchun*, since in 1920 he was *Tsuchun* of Chihli province and concurrently Inspector-General of Sze-



POLITICAL-MILITARY MAP OF CHINA

- Chinese Republic
- Russia
- Japan
- British possessions
- French possessions
- Portuguese "
- United States "
- Railways
- Kweilin = Provincial capitals

English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500







chuan, Kuangtung, Hunan, and Kiangsi provinces. General Ts'ao coöperated with Tuan Chi-jui and the other militarists in the movement against Peking to restore the Republic in 1917. Thereafter he remained acquiescent in the *Anfu* régime as long as he was well treated financially by the government.

Generals Chang and Ts'ao had as much real sympathy with Tuan Chi-jui as with each other, and consequently it was some time before they found common ground for coöperation against the Peking government. But as the *Anfu*ites tended more and more to monopolize office to the exclusion of the adherents of Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao Kun, and to divert into their own pockets the major part of the fruits of office, the two warlords began to consider the possibility of setting themselves up as the makers of ministers in Peking in place of the *Anfu* clique. But neither dared to move without assurance of the support of the other.

*Attitude of
Chang and
Ts'ao to Anfu
régime*

By the summer of 1920, however, they were prepared to coöperate, and were then forced to act, whether willingly or not. One of Ts'ao Kun's division commanders, General Wu P'ei-fu, was in Hunan province attempting to bring about its pacification. Because his actions violated orders issued from Peking, Premier Tuan Chi-jui asked the President to issue a mandate dismissing him, and also his chief, Ts'ao Kun, the latter because of his insistence that the Peking authorities furnish him with money to pay his troops. Under considerable pressure the President issued the mandate. General Wu, however, instead of accepting his dismissal quietly, led his troops on Peking, avowing his intention of driving the *Anfu* government out of the city. At the same time he proclaimed his ultimate objective to be the convocation of a national convention to determine all of the points at issue between the various factions. This declaration drew to his support the student class which had been so active at the time of the Shantung award, gave his activity a national character, and made him, for a time, the man of the hour.

*General
Wu P'ei-fu
moves on
Peking*

Unfortunately he was not free to carry out his good intentions, for he was only one of Ts'ao Kun's division commanders and thus under his control, while a movement southward executed by the Manchurian forces enabled Chang Tso-lin also to claim some credit for the success of the anti-*Anfu* campaign and to participate as a principal in setting-up the new régime. Consequently Wu P'ei-fu was relegated to the background after the occupation of Peking, and with him the idea of a national convention. The net result of the victory of 1920 proved to be merely a shifting of control from one faction among the militarists to another, from Tuan Chi-jui to Ts'ao Kun and Chang Tso-lin.

*Wu relegated
to background*

9. RECURRENT CIVIL WAR

The internal situation after 1920 was more muddled than it had been at any previous time. The Peking government existed only on

*Internal
situation after
1920*

sufferance of the two *Super-Tuchuns*, Ts'ao Kun and Chang Tso-lin, and they had power only by virtue of the large bodies of soldiers acting under their direction. The south was not united, a military group from Kwangsi province contending with the Canton forces under the control of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who depended for his support on the military governor of Kuangtung province. Each province had its own group of militarists who contended with each other and intrigued with those in control of other provinces to secure their support. And in the central part of the country a movement toward provincial autonomy developed. This movement for autonomy seemed, for a time, to offer considerable hope for the future. The theory was that each province should first of all establish its own government, free from control of the militarists, and that ultimately a federation of the autonomous provinces of China should be established.

*Development
retarded by
political strife*

This was the situation at the time of the opening of the Washington Conference, at which the problem of China figured so prominently. To the outside world, it appeared rather a hopeless situation. And it would have been immediately hopeless had it not been for the fact, already noted, that the Chinese have not been much accustomed to concern themselves with the problems of politics. In spite of the turmoil of the country, growing rather than decreasing as years passed by, the people continued to buy and to sell, to import and to export, as though nothing were wrong. In this they were held back, of course, by the condition of political chaos, but not to the extent that would have been true of any other country. While political disintegration had been going on, economic integration and development had been proceeding, so that the situation was not so hopeless as it appeared to be. Nevertheless, China could not be treated as anything but a problem, and a problem it will remain until the political situation has resolved itself in such a way as to make possible a common government capable of assuming and giving effect to obligations in the ordinary relations of international life.

*Hope centered
on General
Wu P'ei-fu*

The Peking government was a figurehead controlled by those among the provincial leaders who had the most effective means of exerting pressure on it. In 1920 they were the men already mentioned. But the popular hope centered around the real victor of the struggle of that year, Wu P'ei-fu. He had retired into comparative obscurity, so far as the outside world was concerned, after his victory over Tuan Chi-jui. In his obscurity he went about the business of developing his forces, making alliances with others of the militarists in the Yangtse region, and preparing for a struggle for control with the Manchurian warlord. For, out of the successes of General Wu, Chang Tso-lin had profited more than had Ts'ao Kun. It was General Chang who was the stronger of the two, both as an individual and from the standpoint of his support, and he became the dominating force at Peking whenever he chose to assert himself.

The struggle for mastery developed in the spring months of 1922. General Wu, supported by his chief ally, the Christian General Fêng, *Wu gains control of Peking* *Tuchun* of Shensi province, moved northward with his forces, while General Chang came south from Manchuria. When their armies met, Wu P'ei-fu again showed his superiority by ousting the Manchurian troops from Peking and driving them back into Manchuria. This left him free to carry out the plans announced two years earlier. Li Yuan-hung was persuaded to resume the presidency, the Nanking constitution with its provision for parliamentary supremacy was revived, a new Parliament was convened, and the reunification of the country was proclaimed and partially effected.

But several groups stood out against the new government. Sun Yat-sen, for example, stood in the way of a complete reunion of all factions south of the Wall. He had sided with Chang-Tso-lin in the struggle, promising him support by an attack on General Wu from the south. His failure to deliver this support was one important cause of Chang's failure to maintain himself in north China. But Dr. Sun lost control of Canton, his chief military supporter went over to the side of unity under Wu P'ei-fu, and he himself had to flee to Shanghai. Later he returned to Canton, resuming control of the city, whence he continued to fulminate against the Peking government. *Attitude of Sun Yat-sen*

Furthermore, though General Chang had been decisively defeated, he was able to retire to his Manchurian domain, which he continued to rule as an area independent of the authority of Peking. He immediately set about reorganizing and strengthening his army; he treated the Manchurian revenue system, including the Salt collections, as his own; and he separated the Shanhaikuan-Mukden section of the Peking-Mukden railroad from the southern section, thus seeking to emphasize the independence of Manchuria. Consequently Sun in the south and Chang in the north remained to be dealt with before the unification of the country could be considered complete. It was also incomplete by reason of the fact that Lu Yung-hsiang, an *Anfu Tuchun*, remained in control of his province, Chêkiang, with a henchman in control of Shanghai and the district of Sung-kiang, which is part of Kiangsu province. Outside of these regions the Chihli party of Ts'ao Kun and Wu P'ei-fu was dominant. *Unification incomplete*

It must be recorded, however, that this change in the composition of the Peking government did little to better the actual political condition. The real power remained in the hands of the men who controlled the provinces, the authority of the so-called central government extending but a little distance beyond the city walls. Cabinets continued to be made and unmade by the strongest of the military leaders. Li Yuan-hung was supported for a time, it is true, by Wu P'ei-fu, who, however, gradually withdrew from the center of the Peking stage in favor of his superior, General Ts'ao Kun. *Peking controlled from provinces*

Furthermore, the financial situation at Peking became more and

*Financial
weakness of
Peking*

more strained and uncertain. The central government was forced to ask for an extension on some of its loan payments and was hard-put to meet its current expenses.

*Activities of
bandits: the
Lincheng case*

To illustrate the actual condition of the country, it is but necessary to recall the series of bandit outrages which, during 1923, served to focus the attention of the outside world on China. Armed bands, not even under the nominal control of the officials, infested many parts of the country. Many Chinese, including women and children, were carried into captivity and held for ransom. In some cases foreigners were attacked and made prisoners. The most notorious of these outrages was committed at Lincheng, when a train was stopped and some of the passengers, including foreigners, were carried off. Three thousand men were in this band of brigands, and the troops of the province of Shantung proved insufficient or incompetent to bring them to book, making negotiations necessary in order to effect the release of the foreigners. From the terms demanded by the brigands it is reasonable to infer that politics was somewhat mixed up in the incident, as their leaders demanded that the brigands be enrolled in the army and that the force be recruited to the strength of from ten to fifteen thousand men. This body, they insisted, should not be placed under the direction of the governor of Shantung province, but should be under a separate command, and should be stationed in a position where it would be in a position to embarrass the Ts'ao Kun (Chihli) faction, should trouble develop either from the forces of Sun Yat-sen in the south or Chang Tso-lin in the north. The central government, supported by Ts'ao Kun, under the proposed arrangement, would have been especially impotent in the face of a simultaneous attack from both regions. These terms were not fully acceded to, but the bandits were finally persuaded to release the foreign prisoners.

*Ts'ao Kun
elected
President*

In the fall of 1923 another change occurred in the composition of the central government. Li Yuan-hung was again forced to vacate the presidential chair, partly because of the attitude of General Fêng Yü-hsiang, who exerted an influence on Peking from the northwest after 1922, and partly because of the desire of Ts'ao Kun to add the presidential title to his other dignities. He was elected to the office on September 5, after spending enormous sums in bribing the members of Parliament in order to secure a quorum and a favorable vote. This same Parliament celebrated the 1923 anniversary of the Revolution by promulgating the permanent Constitution of the Republic, thus completing the task begun in 1913. The permanent constitution remains unenforced, however, taking its place with the numerous other paper advances made since the founding of the Republic.

*1923
comparatively
peaceful*

In the spring the fancy of China's military rulers seems to turn inevitably to civil war, with never more than a two-year interval between struggles. The spring and fall of 1923 were comparatively uneventful, although an outbreak was threatened in the Chêkiang-

Kiangsu region because of the desire of the Kiangsu *Tuchun* to bring the Shanghai enclave under his control. Peace efforts of the gentry, together with Wu P'ei-fu's disapproval, resulted in the signature of a peace treaty by the *Tuchuns* of Kiangsu and Chêkiang. But while peace was preserved during 1923, Chang Tso-lin, Wu P'ei-fu, and the lesser lights of the military firmament, engaged in preparations for war. They enlisted and trained men, stored up military supplies of all sorts, and, most important of all, made alliances and counter-alliances with semi-independent militarists, in this way seeking to undermine the foundations of the opposition. The effects of these winter intrigues and bargainings were shown with the outbreak of hostilities.

The spring of 1924 found both sides waiting for the spark which would start the expected conflagration. Chang Tso-lin had cemented his alliance with the *Anfu Tuchun* of Chêkiang province, and with the out-of-power *Anfuites*, including Tuan Chi-jui, and had reached an understanding with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The Wu P'ei-fu ranks in central and north China were outwardly closed. The major antagonists were ready when war broke out between Chêkiang and Kiangsu provinces, after preliminaries of mutual recrimination which extended over the summer.

*Outbreak of
war in 1924*

Fighting had no sooner commenced than the Manchurian forces began to move southward, so that the attention of the country was immediately turned from Shanghai to Tientsin. It is hardly worth while to pause on the details of the struggle. The outcome was a reversal of the verdict of 1922, due partly to the strength of Chang Tso-lin's armies, but largely to the defection of General Wu's chief ally, the Christian General Fêng Yü-hsiang. Fêng occupied Peking while Wu P'ei-fu was at the front, imprisoned President Ts'ao Kun, caused mandates to be issued dismissing General Wu from his command and his posts, and with him his chief lieutenants, and established a new central government. This defection and change in control at Peking brought Wu P'ei-fu between two fires, and forced him to give up the contest since reinforcements failed to reach him from central China. After an unsuccessful attempt to reassert himself he temporarily retired from the stage.

*Defection of
Fêng causes
defeat of
Wu P'ei-fu*

Both Chang Tso-lin and Fêng Yü-hsiang then turned to Tuan Chi-jui, urging him to return to power as the head of a new régime, and each seeking to be the one to invest him with authority. Ultimately Fêng, Chang, and Tuan met in conference at Tientsin, and Tuan was persuaded to accept a joint appointment as Provisional Chief Executive. He took over the powers of the central administration from General Fêng's appointees on September 22, 1924.

*Tuan Chi-jui
becomes
Provisional
Chief Executive*

With the Chihli party eliminated at Peking and its power apparently broken in the provinces, attention naturally centered on the relations of the triumvirate—Chang, Fêng, and Tuan. It was clear that Tuan Chi-jui's position was a precarious one, although he was soon surrounded at Peking by his *Anfu* friends, for his chief task was

*Position of
Tuan precarious*

to please the two powerful militarists who had united to return him to power. In the endeavor to please both he was very likely to satisfy neither.

*Activities of
General Fêng
Yü-hsiang*

As for Fêng, even before the Tientsin meeting he had attempted to consolidate his position by organizing a new force called the *Kuominchun*, or National Army, raised by popular enlistment. Recruiting went on after the settlement until he had built up several of these "people's armies," with which he proceeded to dominate the western section of north China, continuing also to maintain himself in the northwest, and to overawe Peking. While taking these steps to consolidate his power, he tendered his resignation from his posts and announced his intention of going abroad. His retirement, however, was not taken very seriously, and Tuan Chi-jui naturally refused to accept his several resignations. It seemed evident that Fêng's retiring proclivities were due partly to a feeling that he had been outmanœuvred by Chang at Tientsin, but largely to a desire to take stock of the situation before committing himself further.

*Chang Tso-lin
extends his
position*

An advance of position was also undertaken by Chang Tso-lin, who occupied the eastern provinces as far south as Shanghai with his leaders and troops, the while he insisted on a voice in Peking affairs. Each man was suspicious of the other and it seemed only a question of time until a break would come, and with it a struggle for the ultimate mastery.

*Death of
Sun Yat-sen*

Another factor in the national equation must be noted. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been invited, as the leader of the *Kuo Min Tang* and a member of the anti-Wu coalition, to help arrange the settlement. He proceeded north via Japan, planning his journey so as to reach Tientsin after the conference of the "big three" had been concluded. This left him free from commitments when he finally reached Peking. It had been decided at Tientsin, following earlier precedents, to convoke a Reorganization Committee to regularize decisions reached as to the permanent form of government. Fêng, Chang, and Tuan had projected a conference of appointive representatives, and against this Dr. Sun protested as vehemently as his poor health permitted. After a protracted illness he died in Peking, on March 12, 1925, while still engaged, characteristically enough, in protesting against the decisions of the Peking government. The death of Dr. Sun removed one complication, but only to substitute another. For some time before his death the *Kuo Min* party had been in a state of division, the left wing inclining toward Soviet Russia. Dr. Sun himself was the leader of this wing. After his death the attempt was made to canonize him and thus to perpetuate his leadership in order to ensure the dominance of the party by the left. It would be impossible, in brief compass, to give an intelligible description of Canton politics, with its warfare against Kwangsi and Yunnan mercenaries, the organization of a "Red" army and its struggle against the Canton merchant volunteer force, and the contest of years between General

*Radical wing
of Kuo Min
Tang dominant
at Canton*

Ch'en Ch'ung-ming and Sun Yat-sen for control of Kuangtung after an initial coöperation. It may merely be noted that the years 1925-1926 found the so-called communist faction dominant at Canton and its environs and apparently giving the people an acceptable government. The movement northward from Canton came after certain events in the North had occurred which must be noticed before the present situation is described.

The rest of the tale can be briefly told. The situation in the North which has been described was obviously such as to render inevitable an early resumption of hostilities. This came in the autumn of 1925 and was continued into the spring months of 1926. The first phase of the contest was local, reproducing the initial outbreak in the war of 1924, only with different actors. The conflict commenced with an attempt to drive Chang Tso-lin's men from Shanghai. This forced him to move northward as a recognition of the fact that he had stretched his lines too thin. It was followed by a movement of Fêng Yü-hsiang's troops to Tientsin, the capture of which drove General Chang back into Manchuria, without, however, completely eliminating his influence from Chihli and Shantung provinces. General Fêng then brought about the defection of one of Chang Tso-lin's most trusted generals, who was guarding the gateway to Manchuria. When he turned against his chief it looked for a time as though the end had come for General Chang. He was able, however, to secure support from Japan, who sent additional troops to Manchuria, ostensibly to safeguard the interests of her nationals at Mukden and along the railways. While taking this step Japan continued to assert her neutrality in the struggle, but actually her action was directed toward enabling Chang to regain control. Regarding this as an incident in the larger struggle in north China, we may point out that Japan's action merely brought into the open an under-the-surface international struggle, for Soviet Russia had been supplying Fêng Yü-hsiang with munitions and support in order to advance her interests in the northwest and in north China, while also carrying on an active propaganda at Canton. Thus an old rivalry was merely renewed. It may also be here pointed out that Wu P'ei-fu was the only major contestant for power who had received no foreign support, the merchant class of central China financing him. The financial backing which the *Anfu* Club had received from Japan had been notorious, and, by reason of his position at Mukden, Chang Tso-lin had been forced to maintain friendly relations with Japan. The Canton party had received aid from the same source until it began to lean toward Russia. And Fêng's Russian connections have already been referred to. Consequently the Japanese action was not new or surprising.

The next move in the game came toward the end of 1925, when Wu P'ei-fu appeared on the scene again as a major contestant and began to press Fêng Yü-hsiang's troops northwards. By that time Fêng had again retired to travel abroad, with the announced intention

*Fêng Yü-hsiang
vs. Chang
Tso-lin*

*Temporary
elimination of
Fêng Yü-hsiang*

of studying and working at Moscow, and he refused to resume command even to save his hard-pressed legions. As the struggle developed it became clear that General Chang, once more firmly established in Manchuria, and Wu P'ei-fu had again joined forces to drive the supporters of the Christian General from Peking. This had been accomplished by the early spring of 1926, but the *Kuominchun* had merely been pushed beyond the Wall, not broken-up and dispersed. After that time operations against them were not pressed, although there was continual talk of carrying the struggle into Mongolia. The distribution of the spoils had to be arranged, however, by agreement between two allies, who were extremely mistrustful one of the other, and a government had to be set up at Peking which could receive the recognition of the Powers. While Chang Tso-lin's men guarded Nankow Pass to prevent the reëmergence in north China of Fêng and his hymn-singing troops, their commander was not willing to turn his back on Wu P'ei-fu long enough, nor to risk weakening his position by undertaking to break up the armies which had retired into Mongolia.

*Cantonese
capture Hankow*

Before conditions had stabilized themselves at Peking, Wu P'ei-fu found himself threatened from the south. After the death of Sun Yat-sen the Russian influence at Canton became even more marked than it had been during the last years of his life. Under Russian leadership at the Cadet school at Whampoa, army officers were trained who were able to discipline the southern troops until they became an effective fighting force. At the same time an efficient propaganda service was organized. After the new force had been properly equipped the move northward, which Sun Yat-sen had been forced continually to postpone, was begun under the leadership of a brilliant young Cantonese commander, General Chiang Kai-shek. In October, 1926, the southern force, calling itself Nationalist, and politically representative of the *Kuo Min Tang*, had forced Wu P'ei-fu out of Hankow and established the headquarters of its government there. Not only Hankow, but Wuchang and Hanyang as well, came under the control of the Nationalist party. This defeat eliminated Wu P'ei-fu again for the time being, leaving his ally Chang Tso-lin, who, it may be noted, had furnished him with no aid whatsoever, dominant in the north.

*Continued
Nationalist
successes*

The Nationalist armies then began to move toward Shanghai, moving principally from the immediate south, northward through Fukien province. At the same time pressure was exerted on its defender, Marshal Sun Chuan-fang, from the west. The Nationalist successes have been continuous. Sun's forces were unable to stem the tide and finally, early in 1927, aid came to him from the north. Shantung troops were sent to strengthen the defense of Shanghai and its environs. With the coming of this support Sun was eliminated as a political factor. Some of his commanders and soldiers went over to the enemy and the remainder retired in disorder. The new troops

sent by Chang Tsung-chang of Shantung at the direction of Chang Tso-lin, who headed the new northern coalition, have been no more successful in holding back the Nationalists than were their predecessors under Sun Chuan-fang, and at the present time (March, 1927) it appears to be only a matter of time until all of China south of the Yangtse River will be controlled by the Nationalist government, either directly or through those who have accepted allegiance to, or alliance with, Canton. Wu P'ei-fu has again gathered together a force which is enabling him to maintain himself in Honan province. Fêng Yü-hsiang returned from Moscow about the time that the Cantonese move north began. He has accepted the leadership of the *Kuo Min Tang* and has been attempting to effect a junction with the Nationalist forces. His armies have been moving from the northwest by way of Kansu province. Consequently he is again a factor to be reckoned with, although at the moment a somewhat uncertain one. Except for Wu in Honan and Fêng in the northwest, and leaving out of consideration the model province, Shansi, the governor of which has steadily kept himself and the province out of the recurrent civil strife, the north is dominated by Chang Tso-lin, either directly or through alliance.

Since the south is again under *Kuo Min Tang* control, a word should be said about its principles and methods of action before this account is closed. It should be noted, in the first place, that it is not, strictly speaking, a southern party. While its principal strength is south of the Yangtse River, it has adherents in all of the provinces, and most overseas Chinese are enrolled in its ranks. This has made its task of conquest easier than it would otherwise have been. In the second place, its reliance is put on propaganda as much as on arms. In advance of the Nationalist armies have gone those who have preached the *Kuo Min Tang* faith and organized its supporters. These propagandists have even invaded the military camps of the enemy. This activity, of course, merely represents a higher and better organized development of the pre-1911 tactics. In the third place, it has made effective use of the strike in the cities to weaken resistance to the Nationalist armies. This action has been directed against the foreigners at Hankow and Shanghai recently, and at Canton previously, with considerable effect. But it has also been an instrument of action in the internal warfare.

*Kuo Min Tang
policies and
methods*

From the standpoint of principle, the most widely advertised of the *Kuo Min Tang* objectives is the ending of foreign privilege. Thus its leaders have announced that the party will bring the "unequal treaties" to an end as rapidly as possible. The Nationalist government took over the foreign Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang immediately upon gaining control of those cities. It undoubtedly hopes to accomplish the same thing at Shanghai after it gains control of the native city. Its professions have been taken seriously enough by the Powers to cause them to send large detachments of troops to Shanghai

Its principles

to guard the International Settlement and the French Concession. The Nationalists are called anti-foreign. They themselves say that they seek nothing, not even recognition from the Powers, but are determined to end the nineteenth-century treaty system, immediately if possible, with or without negotiation. They profess to be willing to negotiate new treaties, on a basis of perfect equality, with any state. And they declare themselves ready to protect any or all foreigners who accept the status of equality and submit themselves to Chinese control.

So far as the internal situation is concerned, they have two declared major objectives. One is to overthrow militarism. The other is to educate and elevate the condition of the masses. The party declares itself to be a party of the working masses, interested primarily in their welfare. There is a communist left wing in the *Kuo Min Tang*, but the introduction of communism into China is not among the declared aims of the party.

If the Nationalists should establish their control throughout the country, or even maintain themselves south of the Yangtse River, it will be possible to compare their practices with their professions and to evaluate the *Kuo Min Tang* as an instrument of government. All that can be said now is that they have a program, no matter how vague and full of generalities, and that this distinguishes them from their northern adversaries, who have no program at all. Since the reconstruction of the party, and of the government at Canton, the Nationalist practices have not diverged more widely from their professions than the condition of conflict would appear to justify. They have forced their claims on the attention of China and of the world and must henceforth proceed to justify themselves by actions rather than by words.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA

AFTER an extensive consideration of the political history of modern China the conclusion would seem to be justified that there has been progressive political chaos under the Republic. The standards of public life have not been elevated, certainly, nor has the government notably interested itself in advancing the welfare of the people. Changes have been taking place, however, which deserve consideration before we turn to the non-political aspects of modern China. Their discussion may serve to draw together some of the threads of international relations, as well as to complete the picture of modern China from the standpoint of her public life.

*Progress made
in spite of
political chaos*

I. CHANGED CONCEPTION OF RÔLE OF GOVERNMENT

First we may note a growing perception of the enlarged rôle to be played by government in a modern society. This has been largely due, of course, to the economic and social changes which have been taking place gradually since the middle of the nineteenth century, to the enlarged outlook coming from comparison of China with the foreign world, and to the actual pressure of the Occident on the Orient. The economic, social, and cultural changes will be described separately, but their importance in bringing about an enlarged view of the functions of government must not be forgotten. The nineteenth century position was, essentially, that the government was responsible for the maintenance of peace and order, for the collection and expenditure of taxes and tribute, and for the preservation of the country from external aggression. But it was not expected to assume any of what may be described as developmental functions, nor did it need to maintain a department of foreign affairs.

*Enlarged view
of functions of
government*

The first modification of this restricted view came with the establishment of the foreign Powers in Peking in 1860. The *Tsungli Yamen* was thereupon established as the intermediary between the Court and the Legations. It was not, however, constituted as a real department of foreign affairs. After the Boxer uprising it became such an agency when it was changed to the *Wai Wu Pu*. Following the revolution, when it became the *Wai Chia Pu*, it attained completely the character of a modern foreign office, supervising the foreign relations of China, in both their internal and their external aspects. During this same period of years China gradually brought into being a diplomatic and consular service. The Chinese overseas representatives at first have been concerned primarily with the preservation of

*Foreign office
gradually
evolved*

*New point of
view in foreign
affairs*

the treaty *status quo*. They did not have any active rôle to play in protecting and developing Chinese interests, except by seeking to prevent an enlargement of the treaty position of foreigners in China. This was also the function of the *Tsungli Yamen*. It was only after 1900 that this negative and resistant point of view began to change. Until the Republic was established, the change in attitude was nominal rather than real. Since then China has taken an increasing initiative in developing her foreign affairs. This has been shown, for example, in the new interest taken in securing protection for those Chinese who have sought their fortunes overseas. It is further illustrated in the positive attitude taken toward treaty revision since the war. The expression of the new point of view has been retarded, naturally, by the weakness of China, and by the political chaos of the past ten years. But these conditions make even more significant the positive attitude which China now takes in her foreign affairs. Here is a new force which will have to be reckoned with in the future.

*Creation of
Department of
Commerce and
Agriculture*

The creation and development of an administrative department of Agriculture and Commerce and Industry also indicates a modernized and broadened point of view. This department was established in 1903, during the first era of conservative reform. Subsequently two departments took its place, the Department of Industry and Commerce and that of Agriculture and Forestry, but these were consolidated shortly after into a Department of Agriculture and Commerce. It has charge of all governmental activities relating to agriculture, forestry, fisheries, stock raising, industry, commerce, and mining. It must be recognized that these activities are yet relatively unimportant and will so continue during the period of military dominance. Yet it is not without significance that the government should have contemplated undertaking work of such a nature, and that, while lack of funds and political chaos have prevented much actual accomplishment, nevertheless something has been done. In 1916 a Chinese Forest Service was inaugurated and for a time it appeared that the government would actively interest itself in reforestation as well as in training men in the theory and practice of forestry. After the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai, however, the service was curtailed, and a policy adopted of merely encouraging reforestation by private enterprise or under provincial direction. Several of the provinces have instituted services and are attempting reforestation; some of the railways maintain nurseries; and there are innumerable small plantations in various parts of the country.

*Central
government
must participate
in reforestation
movement*

The revival of activity by the central government, when there is one of any stability and financial power, is necessary if the vitally necessary reforestation takes place. It is a tremendous task which demands the united efforts of the provinces and private enterprise under the unifying direction of a central government. The importance of the work to the agricultural population is clear, and it may be

expected that it eventually will again be pushed. Here we can only point to its partial inception as an indication of a more modern conception of governmental function.

Beyond this the Department of Agriculture and Commerce has made moves toward the establishment of agricultural experiment stations, and at least one agricultural train has been sent (1918) into the country. This train "carried samples of improved seeds, modern implements of cultivation, and other educational matter. It was accompanied by trained lecturers, who explained the principles of selective breeding of seeds and animals and the advantages of thorough cultivation."¹ Such propaganda, if enlarged and extended, would in time have a wonderfully beneficial effect on Chinese agriculture. But the Department of Agriculture and Commerce had a total budget in 1919-1920 of only slightly over three and a half million dollars silver, which may be compared with the hundred and fifty millions gold at the disposal of the United States Department of Agriculture. Thus it is not to be wondered at that its activities are mainly on paper. This also explains why only one hundred fifty thousand dollars silver is devoted to agricultural development work.²

*Limited nature
of agricultural
improvement
work*

On the industrial side not much more has been done than to issue regulations such as those governing the establishment and conduct of mining enterprises in China. Some of these were promulgated directly by the President, and some came from ministries other than that of Agriculture and Commerce. But their significance is not less great because of a variation in the place of origin. They, together with regulations governing the establishment of Chambers of Commerce, point to the development in the future of a more positive relationship of the government, both provincial and central, to industry.

*Significance of
regulations
issued*

2. CURRENCY REFORM

Another important indication of a new point of view is to be found in the successive governmental moves, not yet carried to completion, to reorganize the currency system of the country. It is really an understatement to say that China's currency system has been and is chaotic. In the first place, during the nineteenth century there was no one recognized and government-preserved standard of value which was also a national medium of exchange. The *tael* was the standard, it is true, but there were seventy-seven distinct varieties of it. Furthermore, the *tael* itself was not a coin, but represented a weight of silver, varying from place to place in fineness. In addition to the *tael* there existed several varieties of the silver dollar, of which the Mexican had come into most common use before the Republic. Then there

*The currency
system*

¹ TYAU, *China Awakened*, p. 173. This was apparently done by the Department of Communications rather than the Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

² See article by ARNOLD, *Agriculture in the Economic Life of the New China*, in *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 154-181.

were such subsidiary silver coins as the ten and twenty cent pieces. After 1900 copper coins were minted. Finally there was the brass "cash" which had for generations been the only minted coin. Paper money had long been known to China, but until recently there were no governmental banks of issue. None of these media of exchange bear a fixed and invariable relationship to the others, nor is their exchange value the same throughout the country. It is the value of the silver, according to fineness, which determines the value of the *taels*, and that fluctuates with the market value of silver. The same is true of the dollar and the subsidiary silver coins. This fluctuation, together with the fact of local variation in standard, leads to confusion and uncertainty in business transactions. This has benefited only the dealers in exchange, for whom China is literally a paradise.

*First move
toward reform*

The first move in the direction of reform came when, as one of the provisions of the British Mackay Treaty of 1902, the Imperial Government agreed to undertake the task of reorganizing the currency system. Mr. J. W. Jenks, an American expert, was invited to study the problem and make recommendations for its solution. His proposals for the introduction of the gold exchange system were rejected because of opposition from high placed officials. Part of the opposition was due to misunderstanding, but more was due to the proposal for foreign supervision during the first stages of reform.

*Regulations
promulgated*

Study of the question, however, continued, and in 1910-1911 a definite scheme of reform was embodied in law and a foreign loan was negotiated to enable the plan to be put into operation. The revolutionary developments of 1911 prevented action at that time. But in 1914 new regulations were promulgated. These constitute the farthest advance made in the solution of the problem. Under the 1914 regulations the silver dollar known as the Yüan was taken as the standard. The new dollar, and subsidiary silver coins, were minted in large quantities, but no effective machinery for introducing them and for retiring other coins was devised. Consequently we must regard as premature the statement of the Finance Minister in 1918 that the reforms contemplated in 1914 had been made effective and that China was ready to take the next step—of introducing the gold exchange system. The political chaos of the years 1916-1926 in fact has served to increase the currency chaos, since the provincial governors have been led to use the mints and also the printing press to finance themselves. But when political stability is restored it may be expected that officials will again undertake the task of reforming the currency, as one of the positive contributions which government alone can make to the establishment of a new China.

*Influence of
West in
promoting
currency reform*

It is interesting to note here one of the effects of the foreign impact on China. The Imperial Government was urged to deal with the early opium trade because the draining of specie out of the country involved derangement of the currency system. But the question of reform of the currency was not raised. The first silver

coins introduced were foreign—the Spanish and Mexican dollars—and it was only in 1887 that the first government mint was established in Kuangtung province, where the earliest contacts with the West had been established. It was foreign suggestion, due to the difficulties encountered by foreign trade, reënforced by the pressure felt in the payment of the foreign imposed Boxer indemnity, which led to the first open move toward reform. A foreign government, that of the United States, was asked to aid in finding a solution for the problem. An American, Dr. Jenks, first proposed a plan of reform. And it was largely because of the continued interest of the United States in the question that the Currency Loan was contracted when a plan of reform had been promulgated. The most notable suggestions as to methods of solution have come from such men as Dr. Vissering of Holland, who served as an adviser on currency matters to the first Republican government, and Mr. Passari, who subsequently held a similar advisory position.

3. PUBLIC FINANCE

Closely related to the problem of currency reform, and, in fact, to all questions of extension of governmental activity, is the question of public finance. It is well known today that China's public credit is no longer good, either among her own citizens or abroad, in spite of the fact that her debt is relatively small and her resources are potentially great. The reasons for this may be sketched briefly at this point, as the condition is largely an outgrowth of almost a century of foreign intercourse and of political disintegration.

*Decline of
public credit*

In 1842 the basis of the revenue system, as has been pointed out, was the land tax. As early as 1713 the levy was declared fixed for all time. Accretions in it took place, but they were mainly in the form of exchange transactions, and indeterminate additions to cover the "costs of collection," a meltage fee, etc. Since these accretions rarely reached the central government, the tax, as a revenue producer, was comparatively inelastic. Then there was the revenue derived from the Salt Gabelle or monopoly. Tribute, either paid in kind or commuted, was another source of income. And finally there were the collections made at Canton from levies on the foreign trade, only a part of which reached Peking. These sources of income sufficed to meet the needs of the government during the pre-modern period.

*Revenue
sources*

But the disorganization attendant upon the T'ai P'ing rebellion and the Mohammedan uprisings added to expenses while curtailing income. The revenue system never fully recovered from the effects of the former attempt to overthrow the Dynasty. To meet the new condition a system of internal transit charges was introduced in 1853 and extended throughout the country in 1861. This was the *likin*, originally a contribution of a thousandth, which rapidly became a large revenue producer, but one which was a serious handicap to

*Likin
introduced*

trade as the levies increased and as it came to be imposed within a province as well as at provincial boundaries.

Customs an
important
source of
revenue

The customs should have been a substantial revenue producer of a flexible kind, but the customs charges early became fixed by treaty at five per cent *ad valorem*. The customs, however, was a substantial source of revenue despite this limitation, and it became increasingly important as foreign trade developed. This was partly because the service was foreign administered and all the collections were available for public uses.

Increase of
expenditure

From these various sources the Imperial Government was able to supply its comparatively modest needs during the nineteenth century in spite of the devastation worked in central China by the T'ai P'ing rebels. It would also have been able to build up a modern army and navy, had it not been for the venality of officials in high places. But after 1895 the pressure of new financial demands began to be felt. Publicly maintained schools were established and had to be financed. Loans were made to pay off the Japanese indemnity, part of which was secured on the customs collections. The Boxer indemnity became a first charge on the customs and salt revenues. The administrative loan of 1913 was secured by the Salt Gabelle, which was reorganized under foreign supervision and the income derived from it consequently substantially increased. Similarly other loans, both foreign and domestic, the latter issued under the Republic, were made charges on the customs, the salt tax, the newly introduced wine and tobacco tax, the *likin* collections and various other revenue sources. By 1926 only surpluses were available for use by the central government from these sources, since interest charges and payments on capital account had to be met before anything became available for administrative or developmental purposes. In addition to these secured loans many were contracted after 1916 without definite security. Some of these were legitimate, but many, such as the Nishihara loans of 1917, cannot be so considered. The proceeds went to line the pockets of officials rather than to meet public expenses. They were made in the hope of securing concessions of various sorts from the government of the day. Upon these unsecured loans the Chinese government came into default after 1922.

Decline of
income

They were to have been met out of income from sources, such as the land tax, not ear-marked for other loans. But the income of Peking from the provinces steadily declined after the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Land tax and *likin* collections were largely retained by the provincial military governors for their own uses, sometimes for the development of the province, but more usually to pay their troops and line their own pockets. Thus in 1922 Peking came to have a monthly income of only about \$200,000 to meet monthly expenses of upwards of \$9,000,000. Consequently nothing could be done but default on loan payments. It was also necessary to go further into debt to meet

the ordinary administrative expenses, and to defer payment of some obligations.

It was in part this condition of insolvency which led the officials at Peking to interest themselves so actively in securing revision of the customs treaties after 1920, for this was the source of revenue least easily encroached upon by the military authorities in the provinces. Since the several moves toward revision are discussed elsewhere we need not dwell upon them except to note that the revision following the Washington Conference did result in the securing of additional income. Further augmentation will come with the restoration of complete autonomy to China. This was conceded in principle at the tariff conference of 1925. From the standpoint of meeting the needs of Peking, however, the advantages of tariff revision may prove partly illusory. The added income might be used as security for the payment of interest and principal of the outstanding loans, both domestic and foreign, which are at present unsecured and the payment of which is in arrears. In that case only such surplus as existed would be available for the use of the central government. Furthermore, there is a strong movement in some of the provinces toward the distribution of the customs surplus among the provincial authorities.³ It is only the insistence of the Powers on dealing with a central authority in this and other matters which preserves the fiction of unity in the form of the impotent Peking government. If the facts should force the Powers to recognize and deal with several governments in China, it will be interesting to see what will be done with the entire national debt, including that secured on the customs and the Salt Gabelle.

*Insolvency
increases
interest in
treaty revision*

If China continues as an international entity, or if two or more states finally establish themselves in succession to the Republic, the new government, or governments, will be in a position, when tariff autonomy is actually regained, to aid in the development of the economic life of the country as has not been possible in the past. The tariff can be used to protect the present incipient industry, or it can be used for bargaining purposes in relation to China's export trade. One reason given for demanding tariff autonomy, in addition to the desire to terminate the "unequal treaties," was the necessity of affording protection to the new industry. This desire in itself gives another illustration of the new point of view toward governmental functions developed since the middle of the nineteenth century. The Chinese leaders express no desire to cut off trade contacts with the outside world—the old point of view—or even seriously to limit them. But they accept the Western premise that the power of the government should be exerted positively in such a way as to promote the interests of those engaged in industry.

*Relation of
tariff autonomy
to future
development*

Closely connected with the question of the tariff is that of the *likin* tax. The Western governments have persistently linked tariff

*Abolition of
the likin levy*

³ This has been the policy of the Canton government which now (December, 1926) controls most of China south of the Yangtse River.

revision and abolition of the tax, at least so far as foreign imports and exports are concerned. An early formal evidence of this association is to be found in the Mackay treaty. Since that time abolition of the *likin* has been repeatedly advocated by one or another of the Powers. Finally the Chinese agreed to end it by the time when it was agreed that tariff autonomy should be restored. This agreement was of course partly the result of a trade. But undoubtedly it also constitutes a free recognition of the fact, long appreciated by the Chinese merchants, that these interior barriers furnish a serious handicap to internal trade which must be removed if a national industry is to develop, and if agricultural products are to find easy natural markets. Unfortunately the provincial rulers derive substantial revenue from this transit tax, retaining virtually all its proceeds for their own uses. Until they are displaced or enlightened it will be impossible to bring about its abolition. But when the present turmoil is brought to an end, it may be expected that the *likin* levy will go. That will constitute a substantial negative contribution to the development of modern China.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS

*Internal
significance of
modern
communications*

Another important development in which the government is involved is in the field of communications. This has already been discussed in detail from the financial and international point of view. But its internal significance needs to be strongly emphasized. The China of 1842 had neither railroads nor highways worthy of the name; telegraphic, telephonic, and wireless communications were undreamt of. This condition generally persisted until after the end of the nineteenth century. Consequently it is during a period of less than twenty-five years that new instrumentalities of communication have been introduced and developed in China; and it is during a much briefer period that the consequences of these changes have been revealed.

*Public
ownership and
operation of
railways*

It has already been said that by 1926 China had only about seven thousand miles of railroad constructed and in operation. The additional mileage either already contracted for or definitely projected will just about treble the total. Most of the lines built have been financed and constructed under the authority of the central government. Lines built with foreign capital but placed under Chinese operation after construction, lines redeemed from foreign control by the payment of the original loan, and lines financed and constructed by China, have all been maintained and operated under the direction of the Ministry of Communications at Peking. Consequently it may be safely asserted that the principle of government ownership and operation of railways has been accepted. The roads under the control of the Ministry of Communications have been fairly and efficiently run where the military rulers of the country have not interfered with them. Most of the deficiencies of operation

and the deterioration of equipment and rolling-stock of the past few years must be blamed on the militarists in the provinces rather than on the incapacity of the management.

The Chinese railway, given semi-normal conditions, has demonstrated its soundness as a financial investment. Thus in 1918 almost all of the roads were making a substantial return on the capital invested in them. They were being used ever more extensively for the movement of goods and passengers, all of which meant an increasing revenue. As operating expenses were not on the increase, and as the rolling-stock was being used to advantage, the proportion of the increased revenue which could be set down as profit was steadily increasing. When it is remembered that most of the lines are trunk lines, and that, inasmuch as feeder lines have not yet been constructed, goods still have to be brought to the railway by wheelbarrow or cart, the future possibilities of the roads as revenue producers can hardly be overstated.

*Chinese
railways a
sound
investment*

It is equally impossible to overstate the value of the railway for the economic life of the country. Industry producing for a national market would be impossible, or greatly handicapped, without it. The agricultural surplus of one part of the country could not be made available for other regions under the old conditions, or in areas not yet served by the railway. Consequently the farmers in one section might have to lose part of the fruits of their industry for lack of market for their produce, while the people elsewhere might be reduced to eating grass, roots or leaves of trees because of the failure of their crops due to flood or drought. Furthermore, new and undeveloped areas have been or may be opened to cultivation as a direct consequence of the building of railways.

*Economic value
of railway*

Hundreds of millions of dollars have been added to annual wealth production of China through the construction of railways in Manchuria. The resources of Manchuria have only been scratched. A few thousands of miles more of railways in that great agricultural empire will open tens of thousands of square miles of rich lands to settlement and development. The rise of the soya bean from a position of obscurity in China's trade twenty years ago to one of second in importance in her exports is due in the main to developments in Manchuria in economic transportation. Similarly, hundreds of thousands of square miles of arable lands in Mongolia await railways to open them to millions of settlers.⁴

The importance to the country of any agency which can serve to diffuse population from the congested areas and allow of additions to the food supply of a nation, is obvious.

The value of the railroad in enabling goods to be moved more rapidly and cheaply is equally apparent. The effect from this standpoint is revealed in the following quotation.

*Effect on
prices*

Wheat in the Wei Basin during ordinary years sells for 40 cents

⁴ ARNOLD, op. cit., pp. 162-3.

silver a bushel. The flour mills at Hankow, less than 800 miles away, two years ago, when there was a shortage of wheat crop in the Yangtze Valley, purchased wheat from Seattle at upwards of \$1.00 gold a bushel; transported it 6,000 miles across the ocean, then 600 miles up the Yangtze and delivered it at Hankow, cheaper than wheat could be delivered from the Wei Basin where it sold for less than 50 cents silver a bushel.⁵

*Inadequacy of
existing mileage*

China has a population, in round numbers, of four hundred million, while there are one hundred and ten million people in the United States. Its land area is a seventh larger than the United States. But where the United States with its smaller territory and its smaller population has nearly three hundred thousand miles of railway, China has seven thousand. This means two things: first, that the economic life of China is restricted largely to the locality; and second, that an undue proportion of the population must devote itself to the transportation of such goods as are moved from place to place.

*Effect on
livelihood of
men engaged
in carriage of
goods*

Here we touch upon one of the sore spots in modern China. The introduction of rail communications, and of the steam craft on the larger waterways, even to the small extent to which it has taken place, has deprived large numbers of men of their usual occupation as carriers. They have not yet been adequately provided for, as they cannot turn back to the already fully occupied land of their native provinces, nor has modern industry developed to the point where it can readily absorb all of them. Their detached condition is one stimulus to the establishment of factories where many of them will ultimately make their adjustment to the modern world. The railway itself is providing a field for many, and as time passes will provide for more by opening new lands to settlement and by breaking down the hesitancy to leave the village. But for the past several years there has been a group unable to fit into the new order of things, except as its members have become brigands or have gone to swell the army rosters.

Road building

In addition to the railway, the building of roads has improved, and from all indications will continue to improve, communications and transportation. There has been in full swing for several years (since 1921) a "good roads" movement. As a result of activity in this field, it is claimed, over seven thousand miles of road had been built by the end of 1924. These modern roads are to be found mainly in and around the treaty ports. But, as part of the famine relief work undertaken after 1920 under foreign direction, substantial work in road building was done in Chihli, Shantung, and Shansi provinces. Furthermore, General Fêng Yü-hsiang has turned his soldiers to road building, among other activities undertaken in the intervals between fighting. His contribution has been made in the northwest. Of the total mileage constructed probably only a portion is suitable for motor transport, which is what must be aimed at. But the greater

*Regions where
roads have
been built*

⁵ Ibid., p. 163.

mobility developed as a result of even this small beginning has undoubtedly made itself felt in the lives of the people.

We can only mention the improvement of waterways, both natural and artificial, which has taken place or is projected. The improvement of the harbor at Shanghai, the conservancy work undertaken at Tientsin, the project for the rehabilitation of the Grand Canal—all of these undertakings have an intimate bearing on the economic life of the country and its people. Foreign initiative, it may be noted, has been felt here as well as in other directions.

*Other
improvements*

Closely related to the improvement in the means of transportation is the advance resulting from the establishment of a postal and telegraph system under government auspices. Before 1860 the only means of communication were the official courier system and the native posting houses, except, of course, for travelers, who might carry letters from place to place. The courier system, used for the transmission of official dispatches, was inefficient and unduly expensive, but it was formally ended only in 1912-1913, when the Chinese Post Office undertook the transmission of all government dispatches. The native posting *hongs* carried letters, parcels, bank drafts, and *sycee*, and they also engaged in trade. One agency did not serve the entire country but confined its activity to one or two provinces, or only to districts within a province. After the Post Office was established the *hongs* continued to function, having strongly organized themselves and established intimate relations with the coast and river steamship companies. With the extension of official postal facilities they took advantage of them to secure the carriage and delivery of the less profitable material entrusted to them. On the other hand, they served the postal authorities in inland provinces and in remote districts as collecting and distributing agencies. This was particularly the case when the postal service was merely one of the activities of the Maritime Customs. At this time the *hongs* functioned independently of, but in increasingly close relationship to, the postal service. They have gradually been displaced throughout the Republic, even in the interior, where the Post Office has established day and night courier services. Today their activities are restricted to small districts within which they can offer services impossible for the Post Office to establish.

*Posting hongs
gradually
supplanted*

The idea of a national postal system gained acceptance gradually and as a result of experiments conducted by the Maritime Customs service under the direction of Sir Robert Hart. By 1875 the Chinese government had become convinced of the desirability of extending its activities along this line, and it agreed to insert in the Chefoo Convention a clause undertaking to establish a postal system. Unfortunately this was not done and it was not until 1896 that the Chinese Post Office was formally established by Imperial decree. A parcel post system was introduced in 1898 and the money remittance system in 1897. In 1914 China formally adhered to the Universal

*Inauguration
of modern
postal service*

Postal Convention, although she had observed the rules of the Union from the beginning. From 1896 the development of the system was rapid; one new office after another was opened until today the country is served as efficiently as the extension of the railway system permits. Thus the number of offices and agencies increased from 2,096 in 1906 to 6,201 in 1911 and to 11,306 in 1922. Similarly, articles posted increased in number from 31,994,143 in 1906 to 426,363,616 in 1922, and parcels posted from 400,126 in 1906 to 4,791,420 in 1922.⁶

*Administration
of service*

Until 1911 the postal service was administered as a division of the Customs and Posts Department. Then it was transferred to the Ministry of Posts and Communications (now the Ministry of Communications) and the Postal Secretary was given the title of Postmaster-General. Since 1898 this position, by agreement with France, has been held by a Frenchman, and recommendations of the French government have had to be considered in selecting the staff.

*The foreign
post office*

One of the difficulties which the National Post Office encountered from the first was the necessity of competing with foreign post offices maintained on Chinese soil. The objections to the foreign post office became so obvious and so serious that, as is noted elsewhere, it was agreed at the Washington Conference that they should be withdrawn from Chinese territory.

*Telegraphic
communication*

There has been a similar development of telegraphic communication facilities since 1881 when the first line was opened. Today there are over fifty-five thousand miles of land line, which transmitted in 1919 over one hundred seventy-one million words. There are also through cable companies operating in the Republic.

*Wireless
introduced*

Wireless communication is naturally of more recent introduction, but there are now stations in many of the provinces, with the greatest development in Manchuria. A powerful station has been erected near Peking by the Japanese Mitsui Company and several (British) Marconi stations are in operation. The (American) Federal Wireless Company has a contract for a high-power station to be erected at Shanghai and medium-power stations at Peking, Hankow, Canton, and Harbin. The terms of this contract, however, bring it into conflict with the Mitsui and Marconi agreements, and there has arisen a serious diplomatic controversy which so far has failed of amicable settlement.

*Effects of
improved
communications*

Without these improvements in the means of transportation and communication it would obviously have been difficult, if not impossible, for new systems of thought to have been widely spread in China, and consequently for the intellectual and social as well as the economic changes, which will be subsequently discussed, to have taken place. The full cultural effect of improved communications, however, will be felt in the future as facilities are more widely extended. The political effects have been more immediately important until the last five or six years. Railroads have facilitated the movement of troops and strengthened the control of the central govern-

⁶ These figures are from the *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 408.

ment so far as it had an effective hold on them. As they came under the actual control of provincial militarists, however, they promoted the tendency toward disintegration and civil war. The general tendency has been toward division and concentration along the lines of the railway systems. Telegraphic communication has had a similar effect in both promoting and retarding the cause of revolution. Its principal importance here has lain in the fact that it has enabled various groups throughout the country to keep in touch with one another. The simultaneous and instantaneous outbreak of activities in widely separated centers such as Peking, Shanghai, and Canton would have been impossible without the telegraph or wireless. Both the telegraph and the postal system have aided in the propagation of new political ideas and doctrines.

5. LAW REFORM AND EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY

Another important phase of development is to be found in the field of law. Pre-modern China had a highly developed if, from the modern standpoint, somewhat barbarous criminal law. But civil relations were almost wholly regulated through local custom and family and guild rule. Consequently there was no well-developed code of civil law enforced by public authority. This lack came to be particularly felt as trade developed on a national basis, and as the corporate form of organization was introduced and the new industry was gradually developed. Furthermore, from the modern and Western point of view, the administration of law was defective. There were no courts in the Western sense, the district magistrate administering law and justice subject to appeal to the provincial judge and the metropolitan authority. There was no clear distinction of the judicial from the executive and legislative authority. The individual accused of crime, moreover, was held under conditions extremely offensive to Western ideas.

*Pre-modern
legal system*

It was these conditions which were thought to justify the establishment and maintenance of the system of extra-territoriality. This system may be summarized as follows:

*Extra-
territorial
system
summarized*

(1) Cases in which no foreigners are involved are tried in Chinese courts by Chinese law. (2) Cases between two or more nationals of the same treaty power are tried in the courts of that power and the law applied is that of the power concerned. The Chinese police have the power of arresting foreigners but they must promptly turn them over to the national representatives for trial. (3) Cases between nationals of different treaty powers are determined, not by Chinese courts, but by the authorities and laws of the states concerned, according to agreements between the states. (4) Controversies between nationals of non-treaty powers and nationals of treaty powers in which the latter are defendants, are determined by the authorities of the treaty powers. In cases where the nationals of a non-treaty power are defendants, jurisdiction is in the Chinese courts. Cases between the nationals of non-treaty powers or cases in which they appear as plaintiffs or complainants against Chinese defendants, are

settled in Chinese tribunals under Chinese law. (5) Cases between Chinese and nationals of treaty powers are determined by the tribunals of the defendant and the law of his country is applied.⁷

Where the Chinese is defendant, the case is tried in what is improperly called a mixed court, a Chinese territorial court presided over by a Chinese magistrate, with the foreign consul sitting as an assessor to look after the interests of his nationals and to institute appeals, where necessary, from the decisions of the Chinese magistrate. The most important of these mixed courts is that at Shanghai. Until the first revolution this was strictly a Chinese court functioning in the International Settlement. In 1911 the court was taken over by the foreign consuls in Shanghai, and since that time the Chinese magistrates have been appointed by the foreign municipality, so that it has become a foreign-controlled court. This step was taken as an emergency measure, but foreign control continued. Consequently the Chinese continually demanded the restoration of the court to their control, which demand, in its most recent phase, resulted in an agreement, already put into effect, to return the court to virtually the same control as that of 1911.

*Objections to
system*

This system, in spite of its inherent defects, worked no great hardship when the number of foreigners was few and there were only a few treaty ports. Even then, however, one objection to it developed. The consuls were appointed as business agents and not because they had legal training, and their competency was open to question. As more places were opened to foreign trade, this objection became serious. It was taken cognizance of to a limited extent by England and the United States, who instituted national courts to assume jurisdiction in more important cases, and to hear appeals from the consular courts. But this did not remedy another defect—that coming from the difficulty of transporting witnesses long distances to establish the contentions of Chinese plaintiffs in the foreign tribunals.

*Agreements
looking to end
of system*

In 1902, in the Mackay Treaty, Great Britain agreed to give up her extra-territorial rights if and when the Chinese laws were so improved as to warrant such action. In 1903 the United States and Japan made similar promises, and the Washington Conference provided for a commission to investigate the Chinese laws and administration of justice to determine whether and under what conditions the system might be ended. This commission was constituted at the end of 1925 and carried on its investigations during the first half of 1926.

*Law reform
undertaken*

Reform in the legal system was begun during the period of general reform under the Manchus. Under the direction of the "Bureau for Law Reform" the draft of a new criminal code was completed in 1907. This was revised in 1910 and was promulgated as a provisional code in 1912. A draft code of criminal procedure was also promulgated in

⁷ *China Weekly Review* (Supplement), June 19, 1926, p. 63.

1912. A Law Codification Commission, working in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, has been engaged continuously since 1914 in the task of revising the Manchu promulgated codes, and in the attempt to work out a system of general principles from the diversified mass of local customs. The sincerity of the Chinese in attempting to bring their legal system into harmony with those of the Western states may be better estimated by the work of this commission than by the failure, under the conditions existing during the last ten years, to put new codes into operation throughout the Republic. The work done by the commission will bear fruit in the future when the political situation has been stabilized. It consists, among other things, of the promulgation of the Code of Penal Procedure and the Civil Procedure Code and of the revision, ready for promulgation, of the Criminal Code. In addition, much work has been done looking toward the preparation of a Civil Code. Laws concerning trade and commerce, mining, copyrights and patents, prison administration, and naturalization have also been enacted. Foreign experts, both Japanese and European, have assisted in the preparation of the codes and the laws. When these laws are put into effect uniformly throughout the country, China will have taken her place beside the more advanced nations so far as that can be accomplished by law.

On the side of administration, a Supreme Court has been created and has been functioning for over a decade. It has handled a large number of cases, many appealed from the provinces, and has given general satisfaction. In the provinces there are provided both low and high courts, which in some cases, as in Chêkiang province, have been functioning as efficiently as the condition of military rule has permitted.

*New Courts
created*

In the last statement is presented the most serious obstacle to the abolition of extra-territoriality. Even where established the national courts often find themselves impotent in the face of the existing system of arbitrary military government. So long as the present political chaos continues there is certain to be question as to the extent to which the new codes and the new system of administration actually operate and how far they are merely paper reforms. Certainly today in many places in the interior the administration of "justice" is just as arbitrary and corrupt as during the heyday of Manchu misrule.

*Effect of
political
condition on
legal and
judicial reform*

On the other side may be presented the fact that Germans and Russians, who are now denied the protection of extra-territoriality, do not seem to have suffered from its loss. And yet this may be partially due to the fact that they are indirectly protected by reason of the maintenance of the system for other foreigners, and to the fact that the Chinese are on their best behavior at present because of their desire to secure the total abolition of the system.

*System ended
for Germans
and Russians*

While it is too early to predict the immediate future of extra-territoriality, it is not hard to understand the recommendation of

*The future of
extra-
territoriality*

the commission against its immediate abolition as a system. It is, however, entirely safe to say that as a system it is doomed if and when civil government is restored over a united China. If the Powers move too slowly in the matter, the present indications are that they will be confronted with an ending of the system by a Chinese denunciation of the treaties whether internal conditions justify it or not. The first moves came with the abolition of the extra-territorial privileges of Germans and Russians. It must be recognized that their status had been changed in fact before negotiations looking toward a restoration of treaty relations had commenced. The Soviet action in "voluntarily" giving up the treaty privilege was in reality a graceful recognition of an existing fact. Had conditions been normal, however, so far as Germany and Russia were concerned, China might not have been so successful in concluding agreements with them without the inclusion of extra-territorial clauses. A more significant indication for the future is to be found in the denunciation in 1926 of the Belgian "unequal" treaty. If this precedent is permitted to stand, it is only a matter of time until, regardless of the status of legal reform, the Powers will find themselves confronted with the same action as that taken in the case of the Belgian treaty.

*New codes will
be put into
effect as
rapidly as
conditions
permit*

It may be expected, however, that the new codes will be made effective as rapidly as the condition of the country permits, for it is to the interest of the Chinese themselves, as they have come to recognize, to have in operation a more satisfactory system of law. The advantage of having access to the new courts, presided over by men trained in the law, has also been recognized. Reform in prison administration, except in the large commercial centers, will probably proceed more slowly. There are model prisons today in such places as Tientsin, but in most places the old type of prison is still to be found. It is only with the development of the new type of official that change will come.

*Abolition of
extra-
territoriality
means
completion of
opening of
China*

Regardless of the method by which it is done, the ending of extra-territoriality will result in the completion of the process, begun in 1842, of opening China. For only then will it be possible to expect that the entire country will be opened to foreign trade and residence. Under extra-territorial conditions the problem of control of foreigners is too great to allow them to spread throughout the Republic. This is a primary argument for the maintenance of the "treaty port" system. Consequently it would seem to be to the real interest of foreigners to have extra-territorial jurisdiction brought to an end as rapidly as possible. Probably, as has been intimated, Chinese nationalists, naturally opposed to the "unequal treaties," will insist on action before slow-moving vested interests have agreed that it is safe to entrust foreigners to Chinese law and the Chinese courts, even taking into account reforms which have been accomplished. The advantage today, however, seems to lie with the Chinese nationalist, supported as he is by Russia. If he chooses to act, it is

difficult to see what England, the United States, Japan, and France can do about it. It is questionable whether they would dare resort to nineteenth-century methods to preserve a nineteenth-century system.

6. THE FOREIGN SETTLEMENTS

Closely connected with the extra-territorial question in the Chinese mind is the question of jurisdiction over the foreign residential area, known as the foreign concession, in several of the treaty ports. The Chinese forgets what the foreigner remembers. He forgets, first, that these settlements originally consisted of what the Chinese considered to be undesirable lands. Second, he forgets that it was the Chinese official who was most hostile to the admission of the foreigner into the Chinese city for residence. And third, he forgets that it is foreign initiative, foreign capital, and foreign sanitary and police measures which have so changed the character of these areas that control of them has become desirable. He sees Chinese living in the foreign municipality and kept from the political control to which their number entitles them. He forgets that the conditions which have attracted the wealthy Chinese did not exist in the Chinese city whence he came.

*What the
Chinese forgets*

The foreigner, on his side, forgets the change in conditions since 1900. He fails to recognize the possibility that his own conditions of life have been accepted by many of the Chinese living in the foreign residential area. He overlooks the significance of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty which he imported into China and which Chinese, educated in his schools or in Chinese institutions which propagate his ideas, have accepted. He forgets that Chinese, as a result of their infiltration, have as much of a financial stake in the satisfactory upkeep of the area as foreigners.

*Change in
conditions*

The political significance of the concessions from the Chinese point of view should also be mentioned. They have afforded admirable centers from which revolutionary political propaganda could be, and has been, launched. At the same time they serve as places of refuge for the political "outs," pending the swing of the pendulum in their favor. Consequently it may be inferred that the existence of these areas has been a factor in preventing the solution of the political problem. Their desirability as places of refuge, on the other hand, may explain why there has not been greater insistence on their return to Chinese jurisdiction until the development of the contemporary nationalist agitation.

*Political
significance of
concessions*

Thus there is much to be said both for the foreign and for the Chinese point of view toward the concessions. But the strength of the position of the Chinese lies in their greater ability to act directly in the matter, once their own political house has been set in order. The handwriting on the wall has been translated by the more far-sighted foreigners, who are accepting the principle of Chinese representation on the municipal council, as at Hankow. Perhaps rapidly,

*End of
concessions
indicated*

but if slowly yet certainly, the end of the foreign-controlled residential area in China is approaching, together with the abolition of the extra-territorial system.

Dynamic phase
of life entered
upon

From this summary treatment it must seem clear that Chinese public life has entered on a dynamic phase. Other indications of the same trend, some of which are even more significant than the changes just outlined, will be pointed out later. All that we have attempted in this chapter is to describe changes, other than in the field of education, to which the government has been intimately related. In every case, however, the new activity is closely related to and will have an effect on the lives of the Chinese people. It is this which lends importance to the new point of view toward governmental functions which has been manifested increasingly in the past twenty-five years.

Change in
outlook

It is not maintained at all that China has completely or even largely modernized herself, from the Western standpoint. But it is clear, and will become clearer as time goes on, that the nineteenth-century outlook has been fundamentally changed and that a new China, from the point of view of the activities of government, is emerging.

Application of
new point of
view retarded

The great reason why more has not been accomplished lies in the financial weakness of the civil authorities and the usurpation of their functions by the military. The two, of course, are closely related. Consequently many vitally necessary tasks will have to be postponed until the contemporary struggle for power has ended.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER STUDY

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CHAPTER XIV

THE PROGRESS OF CHINA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

I. POLITICAL STABILITY NOT AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO PROGRESS

FOR the Westerner, political stability is the absolute prerequisite of material progress, so intimately is government related to the economic life of the state. Consequently he finds it difficult to understand that the condition of political turmoil in China which has marked the last decade has not produced a corresponding economic chaos. The explanation, which is extremely simple, has already been indicated. It is to be found in the fact that the economic life of the country has been lived apart from governmental interference or direction. The change in this particular has been of such recent development, and has been carried such a short distance even to the present time, that political retrogression has not prevented economic progress from taking place during the last twenty-five years. The relaxation of the hand of authority, with the resulting increase in brigandage and piracy, and the incessant turmoil due to civil war, have undoubtedly retarded the normal economic development of the country, particularly because the latter has made difficult the undertaking of vitally necessary developmental functions by government. But changes in the economic life of the country have taken place in spite of political disorganization to an extent impossible in an entity such as the economic state of the West. It is in the non-political fields that there have been taking place significant changes which must be appreciated if contemporary China is to be understood. As far as possible their consideration has been postponed so that they might be given more unified treatment at this point in the survey of the past century. These changes have come so gradually that it is only in the last decade that they have become vitally important. But in estimating their significance we must bear in mind that in many cases they really constitute beginnings or tendencies rather than completed movements. This both increases their interest and makes more difficult their authoritative treatment.

Progress in spite of political condition explained

2. FOREIGN TRADE

An important indication of the economic progress of China since 1900 is to be found in the expansion of the import and export trade and in the change in character of both imports and exports.

Growth of trade followed enlargement of points of contact

Although treaties of trade and commerce were consummated between China and Western nations during the years 1842 and 1843 and as a

result certain designated ports were formally opened to foreign trade, yet it was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the Chinese themselves exhibited an interest in intercourse with the outside world. China's geographical isolation, its huge continental proportions, its tendency to wall itself off from the outside world, the self-sufficient nature of its society, its racial homogeneity, the uniqueness of its civilization and its lack of adequate internal communications, all militated against an expeditious development of contact with the outside world.¹

Thus it took half a century for China to manifest a real trade interest, although there was gradual expansion of trade during the nineteenth century. This growth was almost inevitable as the points of contact were increased. In 1842 five ports were opened to trade. With each successive application of pressure by the Powers new ports, known as Treaty Ports, were opened to foreigners and foreign trade. After a time the Chinese government opened a few ports of its own free will. The number of treaty ports opened now numbers sixty-nine, and there are eleven places voluntarily opened to trade and foreign residence. The trade naturally increased with this enlargement of the points of contact under the stimulus of foreign interest.

*Expansion of
foreign trade
after 1900*

After 1900, as China committed herself more fully and freely to foreign intercourse, the foreign trade grew more rapidly. The value of imports increased between 1900 and 1910 from over 211 to almost 463,000,000 Haikwan *taels*. During the same period exports increased from almost 159,000,000 to just under 381,000,000 *taels*. The effect of the revolution, but more particularly of the European War, was to check the import trade and, after 1914, to expand the export trade. But in both cases the post-war years, which have also been those of greatest political unsettlement in China, have been marked by rapid expansion. The year 1922 saw a net importation valued at 945,000,000 Haikwan *taels* and an exportation valued at 655,000,000 *taels*. Thus in a period of twenty-two years the foreign trade values increased almost three hundred fifty per cent. While these values must be discounted because of a change in price levels and on account of fluctuations in exchange, still they represent an advance which becomes little short of remarkable when the abnormal internal and world conditions are taken into account.

*Change in
character of
foreign trade*

Of much more significance than their increase in value, however, is the change in the character of the imports and exports. Considering the former first, an analysis of the trade warrants acceptance of the statement that "the old order—China importing opium, cottons, and a few sundries—has been completely swept away, and, although the country is looked to as a large supplier of foodstuffs to the Western world, it is no less an importer on a large scale."²

It was opium which first turned the trade balance against China,

¹ ARNOLD, *China's Post-War Trade*, in *Annals of American Academy*, November, 1925, p. 82.

² *China Year Book* (1924), p. 671.

although its importation was not legalized until 1858. In 1882 it accounted for over thirty-four per cent of the imports. In 1902 importation of other goods had so much increased that only eleven per cent of the total imports was opium. Then in 1906, as part of the reform program, China reverted to her earlier attitude toward the drug, and an Imperial edict ordered that opium smoking should be brought to an end by 1917. At the same time an attempt was made to reach an agreement with England lessening importation from India. This resulted in an understanding with the Indian government by which the export from India to China was to be reduced ten per cent per annum for a period of three years (1908-1911).³ A new agreement reached on May 8, 1911, "provided for the complete extinction by the end of 1917 of the export of opium from India to China, and of the Chinese production of opium. It also provided that Indian opium, meanwhile, should be barred 'from any province in China which can establish by clear evidence that it has effectively suppressed the cultivation and import of native opium.' "⁴

The opium trade

With this agreement as a stimulus, progress was made toward curtailment of domestic production, although the revolution caused a temporary set-back—by reason of disturbed conditions, however, and not because of any change in policy. In spite of China's failure to live up to the 1911 agreement, the Indian government announced that after 1913 no further sales for the Chinese market would be permitted. It was also excluded officially by 1915, on the ground of the ending of cultivation, from fifteen provinces of China. All of this must be distinctly set down on the side of progress, particularly the strides made toward the lessening, province by province, of internal production.

Curtailment of domestic production

Unfortunately, after 1915 a different story must be told. As military government established itself in one province after another, and as the authority of Peking declined, cultivation was resumed and by 1923 the only provinces free from the poppy were those so located that it was more profitable to rely on imports from neighboring provinces than to furnish their own supplies. The military must be held responsible for this because in some cases the *Tuchun* forced cultivation, and in others encouraged it in order to augment his resources. A notable exception has been Shansi, where, under Governor Yen Hsi-shan, an active campaign to suppress both cultivation and smoking has been carried on successfully, except as conditions in neighboring provinces have prevented the attainment of complete suppression. Elsewhere smoking goes on openly, with the officials reaping a profit from it as well as from the cultivation. There was some decline in cultivation in 1924-1925, due rather to previous over-production than to any change of attitude on the part of officials. Thus China has become by far the largest producer of opium in the world. As against the two million pounds produced in India in 1924

Resumption of cultivation

³ On condition that native production should be reduced in the same ratio.

⁴ *China Year Book* (1924), p. 552.

China must be credited with over twenty-five millions. This means that it is on China herself, rather than on England, that pressure must be put to reduce production as a means of restricting consumption.

Increased use
of other
narcotics

In this same connection must be noted the increased use of other narcotics, such as morphia, by Chinese in recent years. Here the supply comes from abroad and, since it is smuggled, it is difficult to estimate its quantity and source. Such seizures as have been made by customs authorities, however, indicate that the smuggling is done mostly by Japanese and Germans. It is brought in mainly through the ports in leased territory and through Shanghai. Because of its cheapness and the ease of using it, the morphine pill bids fair to displace the opium pipe among the poorer classes.

Foreign trade
analyzed

Returning to the general question of foreign trade, we find that in 1902 cotton goods and sundries accounted for seventy-two per cent of the imports; and food products, kerosene, and metals for seventeen per cent. In 1910 cotton yarn and cotton goods represented twenty-six per cent of the total imports; rice seven per cent; metals and machinery eight per cent; kerosene five per cent; sugar four and a half per cent; railway materials three per cent; marine products two per cent; cigarettes and tobacco two per cent; coal two per cent; dyes one and a half per cent; matches one per cent; woollen goods one per cent; and other goods of various sorts thirty-seven per cent. By 1923 importation of raw cotton had increased from less than one per cent of the total in 1910 to six per cent, which meant an increase in value from 4,500,000 to 54,000,000 Haikwan *taels*. The cotton goods imported had more than doubled in value, but this represented only fourteen per cent of the total import trade as against thirteen per cent in 1910. And cotton yarn had substantially fallen both in value and in proportion.⁵

Character of
imports
indicates
important
changes in
economic system

Without making a more extensive analysis of the import trade, we may fairly say that it reveals a continual broadening of the demand for foreign goods, and that it shows a most interesting change in the character of the demand. The value of machinery imported has increased from nine to thirty-seven million *taels*—from two to four per cent of the import totals. This indicates a change in internal production from hand to machine work. To put it another way, it means that the industrial revolution has reached China. The increased importation of raw cotton and the decrease in importation, both in value and proportion, of cotton yarn reveals the same change. China is beginning to manufacture to supply her own needs in cotton goods. This conclusion is not invalidated by the increased value of cotton goods brought into the country because the Chinese are not yet able to supply their own expanding needs, nor has weaving by modern means been undertaken as extensively as spinning. Since we shall have to return to this question in another connection, we may temporarily postpone the drawing of final conclusions.

⁵ These figures are drawn from a table presented by JULEAN ARNOLD, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

Referring to another import commodity, kerosene, it may be pointed out that it represents an important change affecting the lives of the people by affording them better lighting at night in places where electric lighting has not been introduced. The development, during the World War, of new markets for China's vegetable oils was partly responsible for the increased demand for kerosene, as was also the increased wealth due to war trade, which made possible a wider replacement of vegetable oils by kerosene for illuminating purposes. But whatever the reason for the change, the improvement in lighting in the homes has significance in the development of the new China. A similar modernization of life is revealed in the importation of matches. The value of match importation had decreased by 1923, but this was due to the fact that China was supplying her own needs in the face of an enlarged demand, rather than to a lessening of the demand. Other changes in the life of the people are shown in the fourfold increase in importation of paper, largely due to the establishment and increase in the number of newspapers; in the introduction of motor cars; and in the importation of photographic, printing and lithographing materials, and telephone and telegraph supplies, and scientific instruments. These and other importations mean that the Chinese, from the material standpoint, are beginning gradually to change their manner of living.

*Also indicate
changes in life
of people*

In the same way, an analysis of the trade reveals a much wider range of commodities exported. The most notable change, perhaps, is the relative decline in exportation of tea, which represented almost forty-eight per cent of the export trade in 1882, ten per cent in 1902, and only two and a half per cent in 1922. This is to be explained by the inroads made on the Chinese overseas market by Japanese and Indian teas, by the failure of the Chinese to improve their output, and, recently, by the temporary decline in the Russian demand due to conditions in Russia. Silk, the other great staple of export, has also shown a relative decline in terms of the total trade, although one not at all comparable with the decline in tea exportation. Another interesting development is that of the export of soya beans, bean-cake, and bean-oil, which was negligible in 1900, was eight per cent of the total in 1910 and had increased to fifteen per cent of the 1923 total, taking a place in the list second only to silk. In value this means an increase of over a hundred million *taels*. The rise of the soya bean to its present position in the trade parallels the settlement and the development of Manchuria under the stimulation of the Japanese South Manchurian railway.

*Shift in
emphasis in
export
commodities*

Exports are almost entirely raw materials and foodstuffs, except for certain manufactures peculiar to China such as silk piece-goods, carpets, embroideries and laces, hair nets, and a few other items. And yet we find listed among the exports egg products, a new and growing industrial commodity, nankeens, and even cotton yarn. These are indications, small to be sure, that China will some day be found

*Wider range
of exports*

competing with the Western states and Japan in their own markets. The increased variety of China's exports is indicated in the fact that in 1910 only thirty-three products were sufficiently important to be listed among the exports, while in 1923 there were forty-seven separate types of export, each valued at more than a million *taels*.

It must of course be admitted that foreign trade, as such, plays a relatively small part in the Chinese economy. But it deserves consideration both for itself and because of the indications it gives of changes going on within China during the past quarter of a century.

*Small part
played by
foreign trade
in China's life*

3. CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL LIFE

These changes may be even better gaged by examining the internal productive processes and internal trade. As to the latter, it is impossible to present reliable and comprehensive figures showing its extent, either in the past or at the present time. But where goods had to be moved on waterways by junk and flat-bottomed boats pushed and pulled by man power, and on land had to be carried on the camel and the donkey-cart or by the wheelbarrow, it is clear that trade on more than a local basis would be greatly restricted. The use of steam vessels along the coast and on the great navigable rivers, together with the building of roads and the construction of railways, has assuredly greatly expanded internal trade, an expansion limited, of course, by the extent to which these innovations have been made. But even the small beginnings which have been made have tended to break down economic provincialism and localism, and to create national markets. Thus it is fair to infer that internal trade has grown even more largely than foreign trade since 1900.


*Increase in
internal trade*


The agricultural population constitutes today, just as it did in 1842, the largest occupational group in China. Outwardly the village peoples engaged in farming have been the least affected in their lives and economic activities by the contact with the West. This would naturally be the case, since they live in places where there is very little contact with the foreigner, and where they are largely shut off from the new currents. In the interior villages the ground is prepared in the same way that it was generations ago. The primitive plow, drawn perhaps by a donkey and a bullock jointly, is used, and primitive methods of harvesting and threshing are employed. The farming implements and machinery of the West either have been rejected or have never been heard of. There has been little introduction of mechanical devices for labor saving purposes.


*Agricultural
methods remain
primitive*


While this is and for a long time will be the case, there are certain explanations of it other than ignorance or unwillingness to change. In the first place, the farm machinery which has been so highly developed in the United States is not adapted to the needs of Chinese agriculture. It is all designed for extensive cultivation with the minimum use of human labor. Where individual land holdings are small and scattered, as they are in China, the farm machines such as a

*Explanation
of failure to
introduce
agricultural
machinery*









tractor or a gang plow cannot be readily used, and are uneconomical for the individual farmer. It could be introduced successfully only by an agreement to disregard boundary-lines in plowing. The Chinese farmer, who is an individualist, can be led only gradually to agree to this as he is shown a positive advantage which he would secure from it. In the second place, Western tools and machines are so expensive that the Chinese could not afford to buy them even though he could see that they would ultimately pay for themselves. The chief advantage urged for them is that they replace labor, enabling one man to do the work of several. But this is not an advantage in China, where labor is too abundant. So long as the man-power available for agriculture is not decreased, labor-saving agricultural devices will make little appeal. On the contrary, they arouse opposition because they mean starvation for the people displaced. If industry should draw off enough men from the farms, or if an extensive emigration overseas or to Manchuria and Mongolia should take place, or if both in combination should happen, so that there would exist an acute labor shortage in agricultural regions, then Western farm implements might make an appeal, if it could be shown how they could be used effectively under Chinese conditions and if the farmers could finance their purchase.

But while there has been little change in the use of implements, there have been significant changes in the agricultural economy. In the first place, the improvement of communications has had its effect on the peasant population. For the first time it is beginning to be possible to produce primarily for sale rather than for use or for purely local exchange. This change will be fully realized, and its consequences manifested, only with the completion of the railroad system. But even now it results in the beginnings of agricultural specialization. Instead of the farmer directly attempting to supply his major wants and those of his family, which is bound to be uneconomical, he can grow the products best adapted to the soil and climate of the locality, and sell in an ever-widening market, supplying his needs by purchase with the proceeds derived from the sale of his crops. Thus one may see, in the light of present developments and also on the basis of experience in other countries, the end of the uneconomical, relatively self-sufficient family or village in China. This is further indicated by the fact that the factory can supply clothing and shoes, for example, more cheaply than can home labor.

*Changes in
agricultural
economy*

This should not, however, be taken to mean that there was no exchange of goods in the nineteenth-century China, or that the family or village was completely self-sufficient. The farmer did not make all of his own tools, for example, nor did he produce everything necessary to his well-being. The existence of market towns, and the development of a town artisan class and of a measure of specialized production in the handicrafts, indicate that there was inter-change of goods. Much of this was local, but some exchange took place over

*Exchange not
new*

a comparatively wide area. The change indicated in the preceding paragraph is in the direction of enlarging this exchange and of increasing specialization to the point of making the farmer ultimately dependent on the town for the satisfaction of his wants. This has the consequence of forcing him to produce primarily, rather than secondarily, for the market, whereas formerly production was primarily for use.

*More extensive
cultivation of
staple crops*

The increasing cultivation of crops which must be sold in a comparatively wide market affords another indication of this change in agricultural China. The staple crop of Manchuria, for example, has come to be the soya bean. In Chihli and Kiangsu provinces, the two largest areas, and in Shansi and elsewhere on a smaller scale, cotton is being grown in such quantities that China has become the third largest producer in the world. Again, tobacco is being grown in marketable quantities in almost every province. Some of it is undoubtedly produced for home and local consumption, but more and more it is being grown for the general domestic market, since the making of cigars and cigarettes has become an important home industry. The increased cultivation of the poppy during the last ten years has already been referred to, and it must be recognized that opium is produced for the market rather than for the use of the cultivator. Other examples might be given, but enough has been said to indicate the tendency. It is clear that the farmer who devotes himself to the production of a staple such as tobacco or cotton comes to depend on others for his own foodstuffs, and that others consequently find a larger market for their products. Thus the movement toward specialization is carried a step further. The general movement may also lead to importation of agricultural products if the staple is widely enough cultivated to restrict food producing areas. Thus cotton, either raw or manufactured, begins to enter the list of exports, and rice and grains the list of increased imports. As will be pointed out later, the development of domestic industry is a substantial factor in producing this change in cultivation.

*Attempts to
improve raw
products*

The last few decades have also witnessed a conscious movement to improve the raw products. The government has been partly responsible for attempts at improvement, both directly, and indirectly through the government schools. Furthermore, private efforts, both individual and collective, have been made in the same direction.

It has been demonstrated that China can grow American cotton of good quality and long staple. It has also been demonstrated that the native cotton, which is of short fibre . . . can also by the process of selection be greatly improved. . . . Chinese interested in the cotton industry are taking steps to improve the quality and quantity of the raw material, and arrangements have been made for the retention by these interests of an American cotton expert to work in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture of the University of Nanking.⁶

⁶ ARNOLD, *Commercial Handbook of China* (1919), vol. II, p. 322.

Steps have also been taken in recent years to weed out diseased silk worms, take more scientific care of the cocoon, and prepare the raw silk in a way better suited to the requirements of foreign high-speed looms. These efforts must continue if China is to regain her former dominant position in the silk trade. The same thing is true of tea-growing. The Chinese are beginning to study the needs of the foreign market, and as a result are attempting to improve cultivation and to undertake more careful selection and grading.

It is in those fields of production which are related to industry or to foreign trade that the Chinese are making the most conscious efforts toward improvement. But in other fields there are indications of change which will be more marked as time goes on. The agricultural departments of some of the schools and colleges are experimenting with a view to finding products which might profitably be introduced. It has also been discovered that the Chinese farmer often saves the poorest part of his crop for seed purposes, and he is being introduced to the idea that instead he should reserve the best part of the crop for future sowing. From this it will be a short step to specialization in the production of seeds. This will undoubtedly increase the yield wherever it is done, and thus ultimately improve the condition of the farmer. Scientific rotation of crops is also being urged, which will help to reduce the cost and the labor of fertilization. It is not without significance that in 1910 the amount of artificial fertilizer imported was entirely negligible, while in 1923 it was valued at four million Haikwan *taels*, ranking twenty-fifth on the list of imports.

*Agricultural
education*

It cannot be seriously argued that the standard of living of the Chinese farmer has been notably elevated during recent times. In certain sections, due to drought and flood, and the consequent famine conditions, which reached their high-water mark in the great famine of 1921, living conditions became distinctly worse than usual. But with normal conditions restored, there are indications that the standard has been slightly elevated. This is indicated in the great growth in tobacco consumption and in increased importation of other luxuries, in the use of artificial fertilizers, in the amount of third-class travel on the railways, and in numerous other ways. It has been so slight, however, so far as the masses are concerned, as to deserve no more than mention. In many sections, particularly those affected recently by flood or drought, Chihli province for example, the majority of the farmers continue to be not only poor but even below the poverty-line.⁷

*Standard of
living only
slightly
improved*

Another aspect of rural life which deserves consideration is the rural industry. Spinning and weaving, particularly, have long been part of the rural economy. In order to live it was necessary for all members of the household to contribute something to its maintenance.

*Rural
household
industry*

⁷ See *Chinese Rural Economy*, by J. B. TAYLOR, in *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2. He fixes the poverty-line at an annual income of \$150 or under.

And because of the inadequate communications the villagers had to produce everything possible for themselves. Since almost all of the men in the village were farmers, each household was also an industrial establishment, just as it was in the American frontier community. The materials for clothing either were produced on the land as part of the farming operations or were procured by exchange. But in either case they were usually transformed by home labor, particularly that of the women and children. Furthermore, where possible the attempt was made to eke out the family income by production for exchange or sale. Thus industry, outside the trading centers, and except for a limited specialized production, was diffused throughout the numberless villages of the country.

This continues to be true in spite of the move toward the establishment of the machine economy with its factory system. But even here a change may be perceived. In the cotton growing areas of Chihli and Kiangsu provinces, for example, the home industry continues, but the jobber or small capitalist is making himself more and more a dominant factor. Sometimes he furnishes the tools such as the spindle and the loom, besides supplying the raw cotton or the yarn to the farmer. He then collects the yarn or cloth and sends it to the market. The rural household receives a return only for the work done. In other cases the spindle or the loom, almost invariably of the primitive and familiar kind, belongs to the family, the dealer supplying materials and marketing the product. New type machines, more complicated than the old and with a much greater output per labor unit, are being introduced in some cases, but only gradually where they are used in the home. The improved machines are more usually operated under the supervision of the dealer in a semi-factory system. Here in the textile industry is shown the transitional stage from the old to the new order. The same change is going on in silk spinning and weaving, in paper-making, and in other household industries.

*Changes in
rural industry*

*Paper industry
illustrates
change*

As illustrating what is happening to rural industry outside textiles, we may mention the paper industry of Ch'ien-an. Owing to the suitability of the water of a stream near the city and the existence of a supply of white earth, paper has long been made in the villages nearby. The paper shops of the old kind consisted of seven workers. Five of these prepare the raw materials (the paper is made from the mulberry) and dry the paper; one makes the paper and the head man finishes or smooths it. The owner of the plant usually has more than one such shop. He keeps the books and sees to the marketing beside supplying the capital. . . .

One of these small capitalists proved to be an enterprising man. In 1914 he went to Korea and Japan to study paper making in those countries and in 1916 started a "Korean paper mill." This was so successful that the next year he added another and in 1919 purchased some quite elaborate machinery. By this time others had become interested and a number of mills were started. These are of two types, a smaller with thirty workers each and a larger with over fifty work-

ers. The latter use water power and have an output ten times greater than the former. In 1920 there were four of these Korean mills. They are usually owned by a group of partners. 1920 was very successful and 200% profit was made by some. This led to over-expansion, thirty-one mills operating in 1921. The large output however seriously reduced prices (from \$32.00 to \$9.50) and the following year only twenty mills continued to operate.⁸

Here we have an example of the first steps in putting on a factory basis an industry which had been attached to the rural household. In the case of the household industry of whatever kind, it occupied the time of the farmer and his household particularly during the winter and early spring, and served as a side-line to farming operations. As machinery is introduced, and with it the factory system, industry cannot be treated as incidental to farming, but has to recruit its own independent labor supply. In China, as elsewhere, the worker tends to leave the farm, thus lightening the pressure on the soil, or women and children are used, and the new industry, in a different way to be sure, continued to afford a supplementary income to the rural household, just as did the old. In either case such changes as that described are almost imperceptibly working a revolution in the rural economy.

Industrial activity ceasing to be incidental

4. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Even in the towns and cities of the nineteenth-century China, industry was in the handicrafts or cottage stage. With few exceptions production was for a strictly local market. The shop and the factory were the same. The instruments of production were simple tools rather than elaborate and costly machines. All, or most, of the processes of an industry were carried on under one roof and by the same people, there being little subdivision of labor and industrial specialization. There was no problem of capital and labor, for instead of the employer and the wage worker we find the artisan, become the proprietor, assisted by the journeyman and the apprentice. All engaged in the same trade were united in the craft guild, which controlled prices, quality, wages, and the terms of apprenticeship, and fixed the number of apprentices in proportion to journeymen.

Industry in cottage stage of development in pre-modern China

The old conditions persist to such an extent that it is still true that most of China's industrial output is produced in the home or small shop and with the same organization. But at the same time it must be recognized that the general movement is in the direction of placing industry on a modern basis. Thus while the hand loom persists in both the cotton and silk industries, the modern machine loom has been introduced, together with the power spindle. In 1925 there were over four hundred fifty modern silk filatures and weaving mills, more than two hundred cotton mills, and sixteen woolen mills. The active cotton spindles numbered over three million. In addition to this, there were over forty albumen factories, more than forty

Extent of development of modern industry

⁸ Ibid., pp. 244-5.

canneries, thirty-four iron and steel works, fifty-three dockyard, ship-building, and engineering works, one hundred twenty-nine flour mills, upward of a hundred oil mills and bean-cake factories, two hundred seventy-four electric light and power works, twenty paper mills, and other modern undertakings too numerous to list. It must be re-emphasized that these establishments use modern machinery, and that in addition there is the transitional movement going on through the medium of the small capitalist, which has been mentioned. This will undoubtedly result eventually in large additions to the factory and machine economy.⁹

In comparison with the United States or even Japan, it must be admitted, the new economy is merely in embryo in China, or at the most is at a decidedly infantile stage. Nevertheless, when it is remembered that there had come virtually no change in methods of production before 1900, and when one recalls the difficulties of transportation and communications, together with the size of the country and the rigidity of its organized life, these beginnings assume a greater relative importance.

Two elements have contributed to the development of the new industry. The first that comes to mind is the influence of the West after China had come to accept more freely the new order of things. The second is to be found in the building of railroads and the establishment of steamship lines. It is unnecessary to dwell further on the improvement of communications except to point out that the large-scale production of the machine and factory system is based upon a national rather than a local market, and that the enlarged market is created as transportation facilities are improved. Thus industry has been stimulated, even more than has agriculture, by the building of railroads. For the sake of both branches of the national economy China should look forward to the early construction of an additional fifty thousand miles of railway as a minimum program.

Most of the Chinese enterprises of the modern sort which have been successful are individually financed, are family affairs, or are organized as partnerships, with two or several members. The joint-stock form of organization has only rarely been used with complete success. This is partly because legal regulation and control has not been effectively established. But even more it is due to the lack of a highly-developed sense of corporate honesty, the same deficiency which has long manifested itself in government. Funds collected by stock subscription have often been used for individual purposes, such as speculation unrelated to the business of the corporation, and have frequently been dissipated. The distrust consequently engendered among possible investors retards the development of larger enterprises than those coming within the means of, at the most, three or four individuals of wealth. It will undoubtedly take time for the

⁹ The number of establishments has doubled in some classes and quadrupled in others since 1922.

Importance of beginnings made

Contributing elements to new development

Corporate form of organization not widely used

proverbial honesty of the Chinese to be extended to the joint-stock undertaking. In the long run this may prove to be a good thing, however, if it leads to a multiplication of smaller industrial enterprises of a modern sort, since these can be better controlled and will permit a better adaptation of the old organization to new needs than would otherwise be possible.

While the joint-stock enterprise is only gradually making its way, what is perhaps its necessary forerunner, or at least is related to it and to factory production—a modern banking system—is coming rapidly into existence. Here also the old and new are found side by side. The Shansi bankers still do a limited business in central China and the old-style exchange shops remain. But since the revolution a large number of modern banks of the Western kind have come into being. Many of these are now organized in a National Banker's Association, including the Bank of China, which is the fiscal agency of the central government, and which has branches throughout the country; the Bank of Communications, which is similarly related to the Ministry of Communications; numerous provincial banks; and such institutions as the Chêkiang Industrial Bank, the Bank of the Salt Industry, the Ningpo Commercial Bank, and many others. The modern bank is playing and must continue to play an important rôle in promoting industrial development in China. Further than this, the government has shown a dependency on the modern banks in floating its internal loans and in tiding itself over financial crises at Peking. The government banks have shown unsound tendencies in financing, particularly in their currency issues; but this has been largely due to their governmental connection and to the exigencies of domestic politics, rather than to a failure of the bank managers to appreciate the principles of sound finance. The power of organized Chinese finance was illustrated on at least one occasion when the National Banker's Association was able to dictate the conditions of a loan to the government.

*Modern banks
established*

5. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ON GUILD SYSTEM

It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the description of the nineteenth-century industrial organization, in and through the guild, which was given in the first chapter. It is, however, necessary to examine briefly the effects of the introduction of machine methods and factory production on the guild system.

In the first place, it must be recognized that much of the strength of the craft guild as a price-fixing and quality-establishing agency was due to the fact that production was local and found an outlet in local or provincial markets which the guild members monopolized. The local organization, which comprehended all who were engaged in a particular type of production in a restricted area, could control its members in these two matters. This control was further strengthened because all the processes of the industry were carried on in the

*Localization
of industry
accounts for
strength of
guild*

*Business
organism
simple in
cottage system*

one establishment, specialization being the exception rather than the rule. In other words, the organism was simple and it was integrated in the shop. The proprietors, controlling all of the steps in the manufacture of a particular commodity, were able to meet and establish standards and prices by agreement. Inter-guild agreements were necessary only in exceptional cases.

*Modern
industry
weakens guild
control*

But with the broadening of the market as rail and steam communications have developed, the craft guild has lost the ability to control it. Where Shanghai and Tientsin goods compete in central China, for example, neither the Shanghai nor the Tientsin guild can control the competition. Furthermore, the division of industrial production into more and more separate processes, each carried on in an independent establishment, weakens the authority of the guild, which is able to exercise control over merely a part of the enterprise of production. The industrial organism becomes so complex under modern conditions of specialized production that the essentially simple guild organization loses its usefulness. Therefore the conclusion is inevitable that modern industry, as it establishes itself in China, weakens the guild organization and will ultimately bring it to an end unless it finds a basis of adaptation to the new order.

*Necessity for
apprenticeship
strengthened
guild*

In still another particular the new industry has weakened the position of the guild. Under the old conditions of production it was possible to regulate the number of workers in a given industry, since a long apprenticeship was required to produce the trained artisan. By fixing the number of apprentices in a shop, the guild could limit the number of journeymen, and it could also control the number of establishments and prevent undue expansion of production. Furthermore, as the labor supply was restricted, the individual who underpaid his workmen, according to the minimum standards set up by the guild, could not readily replace them.

*Necessity no
longer exists*

In the new industry the necessity for a long apprenticeship disappears, since the mastery of one process and of the operation of a machine can be readily gained. Thus the labor supply is immeasurably increased and dependence on the guild correspondingly lessened.

*No sharp
division
between
employer and
employee in
cottage system*

Again, under the old order, the master had been a workman himself before he became the proprietor, and he lived as master in intimate contact with his workmen, who were usually few in number. Consequently there was an intimacy of relationship which made it difficult to differentiate clearly the employer from the workman. This also made it possible for master and man to be united in the one organization, as they were in the guild. Since the affairs of the shop were known to the workers almost as well as to the proprietor, the problem of fixing wages was simplified. The whole relationship was normally not that of employer and employee, in the modern Occidental sense, but that of fellow-workers.

Here again the new order has produced, or is inaugurating, a change which will become increasingly important as the industrial

plant becomes larger. In China, just as elsewhere, the factory system impersonalizes industry. It produces an industrial wage-worker who is no longer in intimate contact with the artisan proprietor, and who is not himself an artisan. The result is that the proprietor, who is an industrial capitalist rather than a former workman, will not find himself at home in an organization which includes the wage-worker, nor will the latter find that the old organization serves his purpose.

*Separation of
classes in
modern system*

At present, in the places where modern industry is developing, the guild is taking on the character of an employers' association, and the workers are developing their organization in the labor union. The latter is in an embryonic stage as yet, except in such places as Shanghai, Canton, and Hongkong. The recent strikes in all three places demonstrate the power and effectiveness of action of organized Chinese labor. The organization for other than nationalist purposes, however, will have to be built on national rather than local lines if it is to be as effective in purely industrial disputes.

*Guild becoming
an employers'
association*

The guild as an employers' or trade association may serve a useful purpose or it may give way to some other organization. Recently there have come into being Chinese chambers of commerce, which are modeled on the foreign chambers of such cities as Shanghai and Tientsin, which, in turn, find their prototypes in those of English and American cities. The Chinese chamber of commerce is essentially an inter-guild organization, although it numbers individual enterprises as well as guilds in its membership. It serves a distinctly useful purpose in integrating the increasingly complex business community. Here it serves modern industry much as the guild itself served the craft in pre-modern times. It is by perpetuation of the guild as an employers' association, and by the establishment of chambers of commerce on the basis of the guild, that adaptation is already taking place.

*Chinese
chamber of
commerce*

An original development, rather than a purely imitative one, is to be found in one of the functions of the chambers of commerce as set forth in the law providing for their organization. They may legally serve as a court, acting through one of their committees, to settle industrial disputes where the parties in controversy are not members of the same guild, and to bring to an end conflicts between employers and employees over wages. This latter form of activity, however, will lead to trouble unless the workers are given active representation. If local unions should be given representation as workers' guilds, this defect would be remedied and the field of usefulness of the chamber of commerce court would be enlarged.

*Arbitral
functions of
chamber of
commerce*

It should be noted in this connection that the chamber of commerce court does not supplant, but rather supplements, the guild as an arbitral agency. Disputes between members of the guild are still subject to its adjudication, while disputes between those who are members of different guilds are arbitrated through the more inclusive organization. The craft guild in all probability will ultimately adjust

*Chamber of
commerce
supplements
guild*

itself to the new conditions by broadening into an organization of the related crafts. The beginnings of this development may already be perceived in the attempt to establish such an organization as the Lu-Pan Industrial Union in Peking, with the intention of drawing together into one unit all of those (masters) connected with the building trades. This would not interfere at all with the extension of the chamber of commerce idea, as the chamber would continue to find a reason for existence as an integrating agency for the business community.

*Adjustment the
keynote of
Chinese life*

The keynote of Chinese life has been adjustment, and the utility of coöperation, rather than competition, has been fully accepted. Through the adaptation of the guild system to the new conditions there may be successfully devised a new mechanism of adjustment which will enable modern China to escape some of the evils inherent in the industrial system which is being imported from the Western world. The greatest obstacle to be overcome, however, does not lie in the realm of competition for markets, but in the field of labor relations, since the problem of keeping employer and employee on good terms has not yet been solved.

6. LABOR ORGANIZATION AND PROBLEMS

*Labor unions
formed*

Organization of labor had not been unknown in the past, but it was temporary in character and was usually designed to effect some immediate end through collective action. Even so it proved on numerous occasions to be tremendously effective if the end aimed at could be quickly reached. Permanent organization was unnecessary under normal conditions, because the workers were entitled to, and did, participate in the guild meetings. Consequently it is only recently that permanent labor organizations of the Western variety have been formed. Such an organization was formed at Shanghai in 1919 and was called "The Union for the Improvement of Chinese Labor." The main purpose, however, was announced to be mutual benefit and protection, rather than defense against employers. This union was designed on a national basis, with the intention of establishing branches in other places. Many other similar organizations have been launched in Shanghai, Canton, Tientsin, and other industrial cities. It is difficult to distinguish those which have a political origin and objectives from those which have objectives such as are professed by labor unions in Western countries, but it is beyond question that the latter have begun to find a firm footing in the country. And although they may have been established primarily for mutual benefit and improvement purposes, they will undoubtedly be directed more and more toward the objective of increasing wages and lessening the hours of work. Even now strikes for such purposes are numerous, although again it is difficult clearly to distinguish the political from the non-political strike. A Peking vernacular paper lists strikes from September to December, 1922, to the total of forty-one. Seventy and

Strikes

nine-tenths per cent, it says, were for increased wages; twelve and two-tenths per cent were in opposition to the foreman; twelve and two-tenths per cent were sympathetic strikes; and four and seven-tenths per cent were for the right to organize a union.¹⁰ It may be noted that the formation of unions is not prohibited nor is it authorized by national law in China. Regulations for unions have been drawn up for enactment by Parliament, but have never been accepted and put into effect because of the disturbed political condition of recent years.

The remarkable thing is not the number of strikes in recent years, but rather the fact that there have not been more of them. The constantly increasing cost of living has created a serious situation both for the factory workers and for the much larger number engaged in the handicrafts and trades. A careful study of prices, wages, and standards of living in Peking¹¹ shows that prices in that city have been steadily mounting since 1900 in the various dietary staples and in clothing such as is worn by the workers. There have been variations and fluctuations, but the constant trend has been upwards. This rise has been especially marked since 1920. The problem of living has also been complicated by the copper exchange, which in its turn has been increasing. This is due to a continual enlargement of the supply of coins and to their debasement. Again, the worst conditions have developed since 1920, with the result that wages have begun to be paid in silver instead of copper. During the years since 1900 guild action has brought about several wage increases, but the real wage of the workman is lower today than it was in either 1900 or 1913, the years taken as the bases of comparison. "The guilds have a minimum standard of living which they attempt to maintain. If conditions give the workers a temporary increase in their standard of living the guild does not attempt to help them maintain the increase. It will not try to raise wages until prices are such that real wages have reached the customary minimum."¹²

Rise of prices

The rise of prices at Peking is probably fairly typical of the entire country. Prices at Canton, as a matter of fact, are reported to have reached an even higher level than at Peking. In the absence of similar detailed studies of other cities, it may be assumed that, so far as they have been operative, the factors which have produced price changes in one place have had similar results elsewhere. These factors have not been political so much as economic. "The various political events, revolution, civil war, attempted restoration of the Emperor, have had but little effect on prices unless they have been accompanied by disturbances sufficiently severe to affect the harvest by destroying crops in the field, or to make transportation difficult by commandeering-

Causes of price increases

¹⁰ *China Year Book* (1924), p. 658.

¹¹ MENG, T. P., and GAMBLE, SIDNEY, *Prices, Wages and the Standard of Living in Peking, 1900-1924*, in special supplement to *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, July, 1926.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

ing rolling stock and cutting communications."¹³ Among the economic factors may be mentioned drought and flood over wide areas which have affected production adversely, and population increases.

*Methods of
improvement
of labor
conditions*

To better labor conditions, three methods appear to be available. First, industrial stife may develop, as it has in many Western countries, concessions in the form of ameliorative laws or betterment of conditions being extorted through pressure from below either on the government or on the employer. This seems to be forecast from the organization of unions and a corresponding multiplication of strikes in recent years. Second, organizations such as the chamber of commerce court, with adequate labor representation, may prove a medium for the adjustment of difficulties. This would better harmonize with the traditions and procedure of the past. Third, voluntary amelioration from the top, perhaps as a means of forestalling the application of pressure from below, might prove successful. This would accord with the more enlightened practice in Western countries.

*Advanced
practices of
some enterprises*

Some employers are already developing the third procedure. Chang Ch'ien has created a "model city" around his factories. The *Commercial Press* of Shanghai provides school privileges for children, maintains a small hospital for its employees, gives its women employees a month off before and after confinement, furnishes an attractive resting place for its employees when off duty, and does numerous other things for them. Withal it was able to declare a fifty per cent dividend in 1922, and its shares have appreciated almost one hundred per cent. The Han Yeh P'ing Corporation similarly provides for its employees, as does Mr. Y. H. Moh, known familiarly as the "Cotton King" of China. All this is good as far as it goes, but it is weakened by reason of the fact that it is done from the top down. Furthermore, the "model employer" leaves wages low, expecting that compensation in the form of gardens and rest rooms will take the place of higher pay. In general the movement suffers from the fact that it is done "on the best foreign lines," which have not served to prevent industrial strife in the West. And finally, these individual achievements serve to obscure the fact that good working conditions are not the rule.

*Need for
regulation*

It must be recognized that most employers in China, as elsewhere at a similar or even more advanced stage of development, feel no interest in voluntarily improving the condition of workers by raising wages, lessening the hours of work, protecting women in industry, and refusing to make use of child labor. Wages are very low, and yet strikes have been necessary to raise wages in such places as Shanghai in order partially to keep pace with the increase in the cost of living. Even among the more enlightened employers there is no sentiment against the employment of women and children, and certainly there is little among the masses even of the industrialized workers, for the income from the labor of women and children appears to be necessary

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

to eke out the family income. Higher wages must be paid before there will come any pronounced demand from below for the safeguarding of women and children in industry. In this respect the enlightened employers are far in advance of the demands of labor. Government regulation has been attempted (the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce has promulgated regulations governing such labor), but political stability is a prerequisite to effective governmental action.

Just how far legal regulation and control of industry will develop in the future is problematical. The old tradition is to allow the economic life of the country to control itself, subject to the intervention of the magistrate when the public peace is threatened. This tradition is continued, as has been pointed out, in the development of the chamber of commerce court. But the new point of view toward governmental functions will probably continue to express itself, when political stability has been attained, through the development of some measure of legal regulation of industrial conditions.

*Some measure
of legal
regulation
may ultimately
come*

7. EFFECT OF FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE INDUSTRY

At present, even if there were political stability, the problem of regulation and control of the new industry would be more difficult of solution than in most countries because of the extent of foreign participation in it. For example, about forty per cent of the modern cotton spinning plants are Japanese owned or controlled, and an additional ten per cent are British owned or controlled, leaving only fifty per cent to Chinese control. While the same proportions do not hold true for other industries, foreign participation in some industries being considerably less, and in others even greater, there is generally a substantial foreign interest in Chinese factory production. Inflation in Japan following the war, together with the efforts of the Japanese government to encourage investment in industrial undertakings in China, helps to explain the striking movement of Japanese capital to China, and the cheapness of Chinese labor interests foreign capital in general in the establishment of factories in China. The problem of control arises from the fact that the foreigner is protected by the extra-territorial system. It is further complicated by the establishment of many enterprises, some of them Chinese-financed, in the foreign residential areas, which are removed from Chinese control.

*Extent of
foreign interest*

It is readily apparent that the old idea of industrial self-control and regulation cannot be maintained unless the entire industry is brought within the controlling organization, whether it be the craft guild or an industrial guild. Even government regulation can not be fairly introduced unless it can be extended over all engaged in the same type of production. For example, the native cotton industry cannot establish regulation as to price, quality, wage and labor conditions, and make them effective, so long as the foreign mills in

*Foreign
participation
makes difficult
organization
and control of
industry*

Shanghai are unregulated. Of course the reverse is also true. One difficulty encountered by the Shanghai Child Labor Commission of 1924 in framing recommendations for the consideration of the Municipal Council lay in the existence of competitive industry in the same industrial area which would not be affected by any regulation so enacted. "It is obvious," reported the commission, "that any action which might have the effect of raising the cost of production within the settlement would not only be unfair to industries competing with those outside, but would also be unwise from the more general point of view, since it would tend to the subsidization outside the settlement of the very evils which were being attacked within."¹⁴ So long as the settlements remain under foreign jurisdiction, this anomalous condition will continue. Chinese regulation, whether in law or through the organization of the native industry, will not extend over the foreign-controlled industry located in the concessions, and regulation in the concessions will be qualified in extent and operation.

From this it may be argued, as the Chinese are maintaining for this and other reasons, that the foreign concessions should be restored to the control of China. This is part of the demand of the new nationalism. So far as social legislation is concerned, however, this would probably not result in the immediate curtailment of the hours of labor for women and children or in other safeguards for them in industry, for Chinese opinion on this point is not yet highly developed.

Another problem presented through the foreign-managed enterprise, no matter where it is located, comes from the fact that in all labor disputes there is the possibility of race or national trouble developing. A strike in a Japanese, British, or American mill, growing out of treatment of the laborers by the foreman, or due to a controversy over wages, readily takes on the character of an anti-Japanese, anti-British, or anti-American movement, and leads to an international difficulty. The 1924 strike of the Hongkong seamen, and that in the Japanese mills in Shanghai in 1925, will serve to illustrate this ever-present possibility. The recent growth of nationalist sentiment makes the danger particularly acute now, and such a diversion or enlargement of issues is political and partly artificial in character. But it is a factor which has to be seriously reckoned with now and for the future.

These, then, are the significant economic changes which have been taking place in the past twenty-five years: 1) an expansion and change in the character of the import and export trade; 2) some progress in agriculture, and, through improvement of communications, an enlargement of the market for agricultural products; 3) the introduction of modern machine production, and the factory

¹⁴ From the report of the Shanghai Child Labor Commission, published in full in *China Year Book* (1924-25), pp. 545-561.

Restoration of the concessions would not improve condition of women and children in industry

Possibility of race troubles growing out of industrial disputes

Summary

system in industry; and, as a result of this, 4) changes in economic organization which are of great significance for the future.

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CHAPTER XV

THE PROGRESS OF CHINA: INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL

I. POLITICAL REVOLUTION AND INTELLECTUAL RENAISSANCE

*Revolution of
1911 not
produced by
reconstruction
of ideas*

NORMALLY a fundamental change of ideas, if not a modification of a cultural heritage, precedes and makes possible a political upheaval which can be called a true revolution. But in China the intellectual revolution has paralleled the political and to a degree may be considered a consequence of it rather than its cause. To a large extent the 1911 revolution was an anti-Manchu revolt, which assumed a republican character for lack of any alternative to Manchu misrule, rather than an expression of a change in the political philosophy of the peoples or even of those who became the new rulers of the country. There were notable exceptions to this among the leaders, but they were distinctly exceptions. So far as a new philosophy had developed between 1895 and 1911, it was imitative and exclusively political and was not founded on a thorough-going reconstruction of Chinese thought.

*Renaissance
subsequent to
Revolution*

Since 1911, however, there has developed, slowly but surely, a new intellectual and cultural atmosphere, which within the years since 1920 has taken the form of a renaissance outside the political field. This new appearance is more significant for the economic, social, and political future of China and her peoples and of the world than is any single recent development in the Far East. Consequently it is necessary to examine it as closely as possible from the standpoint of its causes and its consequences, both immediate and remote, as a most important phase of the history of the Far East in modern times. While it is of major significance at the present time, nevertheless it must be remembered that it has, as yet, affected largely only the educated class, and that its full effects will be felt only as it penetrates the masses.

2. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

*Effect of
classical system*

Education is a primary cause of the change in Chinese ideas. Prior to 1898, and indeed before 1908, there was no attempt at public education in the country. The Empire's relationship to education was restricted to the setting of the examinations which have already been described. The consequence of the examination system was the development of education in terms of preparation for the successive tests set by the government. As long as these were founded upon the classics and the classical essay, the educational incentive was directly

away from innovation and the propagation of new ideas. In other words, education was developed entirely in terms of the past, and not at all in relation to the present and the future. Furthermore, the result of education was a retentive memory rather than the abilities out of which develop creative thought. In addition to this, the intimate relationship between the "educated" class and officialdom created a vested interest in the maintenance of the old intellectual order. This served as a serious obstacle to educational change, since the acceptance of a new educational content would minimize the importance of the classically trained official. Consequently it was only slowly that even the more enlightened officials, those in closest contact with foreigners, came to appreciate the importance of "Western learning."

Thus it was left to foreigners to begin the opening of the Chinese mind as the second and more important part of the process of "opening" China. Of the several foreign groups in China it was the missionary element which had a natural interest in education. The traders dealt with the Chinese through the *compradore*, made no effort to learn the language, and on the whole kept aloof from the Chinese world in which they found themselves. The business of the missionary, on the other hand, necessarily brought him into contact with the Chinese community so far as it would receive him. And he shortly found that it would receive him more readily if he offered services which were not directly evangelistic as a preliminary to the bringing of his religious message. Consequently a primary incentive for the establishment of schools, and also hospitals, lay in his desire to come into readier contact with the Chinese people than was possible when he limited himself to evangelistic work.

*Foreign
missionary
interest in
education*

Another explanation, just as important, of the missionary interest in education is to be found in the desire to perform the same service for the Christian community that the church school performs in Western countries. The value of an educated constituency was certainly appreciated, particularly in view of the premium put on learning in China. Christian education on as wide a scale as possible was also necessary if the Christian ethical system was to displace or modify the Confucian. Furthermore, it was incumbent on the church to train a native leadership if its religious work was to be carried on successfully. This desire to train an adequate church leadership unquestionably explains much of the interest in education. The undertaking of medical education and the establishment of hospitals may be ascribed as much to a recognition of a great need as to the desire to establish contact with the people on a broader basis. The recognition of the social implications of the teachings of Christ would help to explain the willingness to serve the Chinese in these and many other ways. But the ultimate aim, naturally, was the evangelistic, and the attempted realization of this aim governed and

*Further
explanation
of interest in
education*

colored, to a variable extent, the non-evangelistic phases of missionary work.

*Educational
work other than
through estab-
lishment of
schools*

The missionary was also immediately and naturally forced into the work of dictionary making, language study, and translation as a preliminary to evangelization, for only as he was able to communicate directly with the Chinese, and as he could put his materials into a form which they could use, could he expect to accomplish his religious ends. At first his translation work took the form of the preparation of religious tracts. But again, in order to broaden the base of his approach, he was ultimately brought to translate secular literature. This work was distinctly educational in character, and led to the development of a more formal interest in education as a method of approach to the Chinese community.

*Educational
effects of
peculiar
missionary
interests*

Nevertheless, however much humanitarian and other interests may have prompted him, education was, for the missionary, a means to an end other than that of promoting an intellectual rebirth. The result of this was that those put in charge of schools were often selected primarily because of their interest in the spread of the gospel rather than because they had been trained as educators. They frequently emphasized the religious exercise in the school rather than the class room activity, and consequently made, and for some time were qualified to make, no significant study of the educational problem in China. The schools were of the primary division until toward the end of the nineteenth century, and were often mere adjuncts to the mission.

*Higher schools
established*

The first higher schools established were Roman Catholic Seminaries. After the founding of St. John's University at Shanghai in 1879, however, mission schools of nominal collegiate rank multiplied rapidly. For some time they corresponded, in grade of work done, to the American high school, although they were called colleges or universities. Until recently the same criticism could be made of these higher schools that has been made of missionary education in general—the teachers were missionaries first and educators second, so far as interest and training were concerned. Consequently the work done in the higher schools was open to serious criticism from the standpoint of the educationist. It would probably be fair to say that this continued to be true until after the end of the first decade of the present century. Schools—primary, middle and higher—multiplied, and from 1900 to 1910 the number of students increased, but methods and objectives remained approximately the same.

*Methods of
instruction*

The method of instruction employed in the college was usually the lecture, combined where possible with the use of a text book. There was little science teaching and less use of the laboratory method. Consequently the emphasis in the mission school on the whole differed but little from that in the Chinese private school. The student continued to do memory work and was little stimulated to thoughtful examination of the world in which he lived. Western

subjects were taught together with the Chinese classics, but they were unrelated to the experience of the student. He read and remembered and passed or failed in his examinations according to the retentiveness of his memory.

Public education in China dates from the end of the nineteenth century. Tungwen College had been established in 1865, it is true, but that did not mark the inauguration of a system of public schools. The first real Chinese university, Peiyang University, was founded by Li Hung-chang in Tientsin in 1895. Two other universities, the Chiao-tung-pu Nanyang and the Peking Universities, were established before 1900. Otherwise the sole public interest expressed was in the naval and military schools for the training of officers.

*Public
education a
later
development*

The beginning of a new day was heralded with the modification in the examination system and the establishment of a national school system proposed as part of the reform program of 1898. But the new era was only inaugurated with the abolition of the examination system in 1905, and the setting up of an elaborate educational program in 1908, as a basic part of the preparation for the introduction of constitutional government. Schools were built and many temples were transformed into schools for the teaching of Western learning. The multiplication of schools has gone on under the Republic, so that today there are about one hundred thirty thousand government schools of all grades, from the primary school to the university, enrolling approximately four and a quarter million students.

*Educational
programs of
1898 and 1908*

This expansion has been so rapid that it has been impossible to provide trained teachers for the modern schools. Consequently many who had only a smattering of Western knowledge were pressed into service. Many came from the mission schools, others were supplied from the stream of students who went to Japan to study after 1900, and some, particularly in the higher schools, had been trained in Europe and in the United States. As has already been pointed out, many of those who went to Japan to study were more interested in securing diplomas than in gaining knowledge. Those who studied in the Western countries lacked the background which alone could enable them to profit fully from their studies. And few of the students, trained either in or out of China during the first decade and a half of the nineteenth century, were primarily interested in the problem of education. Western learning was considered to be an open sesame to public office and was sought for that reason. Consequently it was usually the disappointed office-seeker who turned to teaching as a means of support, just as had been the case at an earlier time.

*Training of
teachers*

The ability of the foreign-trained Chinese to waken his country was conditioned by the degree of his own awakening. Increasing numbers who went abroad to study after about 1910 were prepared to study Western subjects in Western colleges and universities. They had some proficiency in the use of foreign languages, notably English, and they had been trained, partly by foreigners, in institutions of

*Defects in
educational
system and in
training
provided*

standing such as St. John's University and the American indemnity school, Tsinghua College. But, it must be repeated, they had studied history, philosophy, political science, and other subjects as though they were American or English boys rather than as Chinese, interested in them in relation to Chinese life and the Chinese environment. This process usually was continued in the Western college which they attended. They knew John Stuart Mill, but their teachers, who were in the main unfamiliar with China, did not, or were not able to, lead them to examine his ideas of government in relation to China. If they studied sociology, it was in relation to Western conditions and problems rather than to those of their own country. They tended to view China as if she were a Western country in direct ratio to the length of time they studied abroad. Upon their return they faced a serious problem of readjustment, which at first developed an extreme pessimism and only gradually led to a constructive criticism of Chinese society, based upon an attempt at gaining an intelligent understanding of its nature as contrasted with Western societies.

*Improvement of
instruction*

As time went on there came into being a more intelligent educational approach in the schools in China. The foreign teacher and the foreign-trained Chinese alike began to stress the understanding of some of the problems of life in China, and this called for a re-direction of the educational program. This was a result partly of the selection of teachers for mission schools because of some measure of training for the work rather than because of a "call" to save the heathen, and partly of a change in the class of studies pursued by Chinese abroad. Furthermore, normal schools were established as part of the governmental program, and teachers for the lower schools were given some training.

*Change in
point of view
and emphasis
after 1916*

It is also important to note that after 1916 advanced students tended to emphasize preparation for private pursuits rather than training to secure public office. It was politics which engrossed the attention of scholars from 1898 until the time when it became increasingly apparent that the political revolution of 1911 had failed to transform China into an Occidental state of an advanced sort. It seems to have been only within the last ten years that the truth has been appreciated that political change is dependent on social, economic, and intellectual change. Unfortunately this appreciation came only after the Western-trained Chinese found that the Republic, on the whole, left control in the hands of the old-style mandarin instead of effecting an overnight transfer of power to themselves. The point of view of the intellectuals after 1916 is fairly represented in the words of one of their number, who wrote:

In my humble opinion, politics is in such confusion that I am at a loss to know what to talk about. . . . As to fundamental salvation, I believe its beginning must be sought in the promotion of a new literature. In short, we must endeavor to bring Chinese thought into direct contact with the contemporary thought of the world, thereby

to accelerate its radical awakening. And we must see to it that the basic ideals of the world thought must be related to the life of the average man.¹

One result of the change in intellectual point of view has been the introduction of vocational education and its acceptance as part of the educational process. This in itself marks a distinct break with the age-old conception of education as a training of the mind (memory) and not a training of the hand. This same departure has been marked in the higher technical schools, where a willingness to work with the hands in the laboratory and the field has been gradually cultivated. In medical study the laboratory method has been introduced, so that students now learn partly by experimentation rather than wholly by listening to lectures, reading in books, and looking at pictures. Engineering students have begun to combine field work—application—with class room instruction. The recognition that one can work with his hands and still remain a scholar has had a distinctly emancipating effect on the Chinese mind. The development of the experimental attitude of the scientist has also encouraged a critical approach to literary and social studies

*Vocational
and technical
education*

3. THE PRESS AND THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING

Another influence, besides the school, in producing an intellectual awakening, has undoubtedly been the press. It has provided the vehicle for the expression of new ideas, and has served as a medium of information concerning movements and events in the foreign as well as the Chinese world. There have long been foreign-language papers, mainly English, which have served a useful purpose in carrying on discussions of happenings in China and elsewhere. There have been substantial journals, such as the *Chinese Repository*, devoted to "things Chinese." But, after all, these foreign undertakings existed primarily for the information of foreigners and the expression of the Western point of view, rather than for the purpose of stimulating thought among the Chinese and affording it an outlet. It is in the native publications that China is beginning both to evaluate and to express herself. The first Chinese newspaper was brought into existence in 1870. Two others were established before the war with Japan. After that war others appeared. The suppression of the Boxer movement, the inauguration of the Manchu reform program, and the growth of anti-Manchu sentiment were all instrumental in encouraging the founding of organs of opinion. But it was particularly after the revolution of 1911 that papers multiplied, until today every important town has its own newspaper. The improvement of communications has widened the area of circulation of the more important papers and has also made it possible for them to carry more than local news. Many, if not most, of the newspapers are mainly propaganda sheets, some of them foreign subsidized, and some of them

*Development
of the press*

¹ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 643.

personal organs of individuals or factions. But they all serve the purpose of stimulating discussion and provoking thought, principally about the position of China with respect to the Powers.

Magazines

In addition to the newspapers, and as a later development, there have come into existence periodicals ranging from the woman's magazines to the literary and the scientific journals. These latter, especially, are significant as affording an outlet for the new thought of the student-teacher class. A good example of the scholarly journal is the *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*. Other magazines devoted especially to the expression of new ideas are the *New Youth*, founded in 1915 by the Dean of the Peking National University, which suspended publication in 1917 but was revived under the editorship of six university professors in 1918; the *Weekly Review*, also a Peking University publication, devoted mainly to politics; and the *New Tide* (later called *The Renaissance*), a publication sponsored by the students of Peking University. Other schools have also established their publications, in which appear stories, plays, essays, and serious articles of social interest.

Effect of improved communications

Finally, we may mention, as an intellectual force, the increased movement of peoples. Railroads have helped to create a more dynamic intellectual life by broadening the horizon of the thousands who travel on them each year. The coolies who served behind the lines in France, and after the war returned to the villages of China with their tales of the outside world based on personal observation, helped to arouse the curiosity which the papers and magazines have still further stimulated in trying to satisfy it.

4. THE LITERARY REVOLUTION

Use of vernacular for literary purposes

One expression of the new tide has been the "literary revolution" which has been under way since 1917. This was formally inaugurated by Dr. Hu Suh (Shih), an American trained scholar and a member of the Faculty of Peking National University. At the beginning of 1917 he publicly announced his intention thereafter to write only in the spoken language, discarding altogether the old literary language as his medium of expression. The latter had for long occupied the same position among Chinese scholars as that enjoyed by Latin among the scholastics of Europe at the time the national languages were coming to literary birth. The *Wen Li*, or Chinese classical language, had been "dead," except for its use by scholars, for a long time, but it had maintained its literary supremacy in spite of the fact that the mandarin dialects were not only widely spoken but had "produced a vast amount of literature, a literature more extensive and varied than any modern European language ever possessed at the time of its establishment as a national language."² This literature was in the novel form mainly, a form which had not been recognized and incorporated in the classical tradition. The maintenance of the

² HU SHIH in *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, vol. VI, p. 97.

authority of this Chinese "Latin" was due to the distinction which its mastery gave to the scholar. Even more, however, its position came from the fact that it was enforced "by the power of a long-united empire, and supported by a fairly extensive system of education where the sole aim of its students has been to win office, honor and recognition on the strength of their ability to read and write in the classical language."³ Thus the abolition of the examination system and the collapse of the Empire were direct fore-runners of the departure from the use of the classical language by scholars. In addition, it was necessary to overcome the inertia developed from a long-continued tradition. This could be done only by a frank and open recognition of the divorce of the classical language from the life of the nation, and of the possibility of using the vernacular for literary and scholarly purposes. This conscious defense of the vulgar tongue was supplied by Dr. Hu. Others were attracted to the support of his cause, though for a time there was considerable opposition to the new movement.

In 1920, the Ministry of Education issued an order to the effect that, beginning with the fall opening of the year, the national language should be taught in the first two grades of the primary school. In the course of a few years, all the grades in the primary schools will be using the living tongue in the place of the classical. This change has of necessity affected the middle and normal schools where the primary teachers are trained, and these higher schools are anticipating the coming change by voluntarily adopting texts in the vulgate. Most of the recent publications have been in the vulgate. The newspapers and periodicals have in most cases ceased to publish poems in the classical language, and "new poems" in spoken Chinese are taking their places.⁴

The significance of this loosing of the fetters of old literary forms is obvious. It indeed prepares the way for a revival of creative literary activity in a new and flexible medium. The break with tradition in this fundamental respect also is helping to free the mind of educated Chinese and stimulate them to constructive rather than reproductive effort. The old classical tradition represents a literary refinement which had been carried to its ultimate conclusion generations ago. The departure opens the gate to a new literary life.

Of importance also has been the language simplification movement, and its concomitant of mass education to reduce illiteracy. Language simplification was undertaken in 1913 by a conference which met under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. This conference worked out a phonetic alphabet of thirty-nine symbols or letters, the mastery of which enables a person to read the newspapers and other simple literature.⁵ This system was tried out for five years in some of the higher normal schools. Phonetic systems, however, have found their widest use in Protestant Christian circles.

*Language
simplification*

³ Ibid., p. 97.

⁴ Ibid., p. 99.

⁵ T'YAU, M. T. Z., *China Awakened*, p. 11.

Mass education

Closely joined, in objective, to this movement toward simplification of the language is the mass education movement which is associated with the name of its principal leader, Mr. Y. C. James Yen, and which is organized through the National Popular Education Association. Mr. Yen and his associates worked out a course of study based on a thousand characters. These represent the words in most common use in the vernacular. Their mastery enables the individual to "write simple business letters, keep accounts, and read simple newspapers intelligently." This, by demonstration, can be accomplished in four and a half months with an application to study of an hour and a half a day. The teachers volunteer their services and come from the teacher and student groups. The movement has spread rapidly and has met with considerable interest and support among the illiterate masses. The work has been confined largely to the towns up to the present time.

5. INTELLECTUAL FERMENT

Critical attitude

The transfer of the interest of Chinese intellectuals from the realm of politics, since the establishment of military rule in the country, has resulted in an intellectual ferment of which the literary revolution is only one expression. The searchlight of criticism has been directed toward all institutions and practices, both Chinese and foreign, in an attempt to evaluate them in terms of contemporary Chinese life and problems, and in the light also of modern science and thought. The pragmatic test of social utility is being generally applied. This shows the influence of John Dewey on this generation of Young China, and is due to the number of Chinese who, while in the United States, came in contact with him and his school of thought. This influence was strengthened when he was invited to China to lecture at Peking University and throughout the country. Another strong influence has been that of Bertrand Russell, whose philosophy has also captivated a group among the intellectual leaders of the new China.

Effect of war on Chinese thought

It must also be recognized that the World War and its aftermath helped to stimulate a critical attitude of mind by lessening Chinese respect for the foreign system which permitted organized slaughter on such a stupendous scale, while theoretically accepting the Christian principle of peace. The anti-German propaganda which reached China also served to provoke thought about the Western world and its institutions. But above all the Shantung award at the Paris Conference led to an outburst of feeling, national and patriotic in character. From that moment dates the expression of Chinese nationalism, a nationalism which has become increasingly intensified since 1919.

6. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

Student protests against treaty of Versailles

It was the students in Peking who voiced the first protest against the Paris decision when news of it reached China. They paraded to the legation quarter to ask the intercession of the American and

other allied representatives. Denied admission to the legation quarter, they turned toward the homes of some of the *Anfu* Cabinet members, who were supposed to be tools in the hands of Japan. Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, was the most notorious of them. His house was partially wrecked, but he himself escaped and took refuge with the Japanese. The students then demanded the resignation of these ministers, and asked that the Chinese representatives at Paris be instructed to refuse to sign the peace treaty with Germany. Police measures were taken against the students, both in Peking and in other cities where student "unions" had been formed when the news from Peking arrived. The jails were filled, but the agitation did not cease. For every student imprisoned, several others appeared as agitators to stir up the people. The chambers of commerce and guilds joined the students, who went on strike, supplementing their propaganda work by proclaiming a boycott of Japanese goods. This boycott was maintained on a national scale for some months, and Japanese pressure on the Peking government for action against the merchants was unsuccessful in bringing it to an end. The power of the non-political classes was conclusively demonstrated, for the government was forced to give way. The treaty was not signed and the "traitors" were forced to resign.

However, the immediate accomplishments of the movement were not so important either as its ultimate implications or as the methods employed. Strikes among students for various reasons were a commonplace of school life. But for the students to go on the streets teaching and preaching to the masses concerning the wrongs done China in the present and the past, for them to organize demonstrations and to parade with banners proclaiming the national cause, and for them to suffer imprisonment willingly to carry conviction—these were new things which were soon to become common without losing their effectiveness. The boycott of foreign goods was not new. It had been used both during the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth. It had been used effectively at the time of the twenty-one demands. But its effectiveness as a national weapon was more conclusively demonstrated in 1919 than at any previous time. Beyond all this, the national character of the movement was in itself significant, for it indicated a perception of China as an entity, in striking contrast with, for example, the localism exhibited in 1895 and even in 1900.

The initial uprising, of course, subsided, although the voice of the student was heard from time to time between 1919 and 1925. But the educational aspects of the movement continued. Schools for the masses were conducted in an endeavor to reduce illiteracy, and to rouse the people to an appreciation of China's wrongs. These were supplemented by street-corner discussions led, or participated in, by students. Much criticism came to be voiced against mission schools as propagators of foreign ideas, and a distinct anti-Christian move-

The boycott

*Criticism of
West*

ment developed among the students. The West, generally, suffered as a result of the growing belief that Western countries would not voluntarily aid China to recover her ancient position in the world.

*Effect of
Washington
Conference*

This feeling was only temporarily lessened as a result of the Washington Conference. The half-way measures agreed upon at Washington were regarded as not going far enough in freeing China from her treaty restrictions, nor did the refusal of the conference to apply the principles of the "Nine Powers" Treaty" retro-actively meet with the approval of the articulate classes in China. And the long delay in putting the treaties into effect, and consequently in convening the Customs and Extra-territorial Conferences, even though conditions in China were partly responsible, intensified the feeling that China could not look to the West for justice, but would have to find her own remedies.

Soviet activities

This feeling was cultivated by Russian Soviet representatives even before treaty relations with Russia were resumed. The anti-imperialism of China's northern neighbor was contrasted with the attitude of the Western Powers to the manifest disadvantage of the latter. The Soviet agents were wise enough to establish intimate and sympathetic relations with the student and intellectual group represented by the national University at Peking. Their critical attitude of mind was applauded and stimulated while "treaty-port" Westerners were inveighing against the new thought as immature, radical, and the result of Bolshevik propaganda. The Russians also established contact with the Christian General Fêng Yü-hsiang, and with the nationalist *Kuo Min Tang* forces at Canton. They helped to train the forces which have at present occupied the country south of the Yangtse River, and they furnished General Fêng with arms and ammunition. But here the emphasis must be put on their encouragement of the intellectuals in their criticism of the institutions, ideas, and ideals of the "capitalistic and imperialistic" Western states.

*Anti-British
sentiment*

When the Japanese mill strike broke out at the beginning of 1925, the students flamed out again, parading and demonstrating in support of the strikers. One of these demonstrations culminated disastrously when the Shanghai settlement police, commanded by an Englishman, fired on the parading students, May 30, 1925, killing some and wounding others. A similar incident at Canton led to a revival of the boycott of Hongkong and of English trade in general. This boycott had first been proclaimed at the time of the Hongkong seamen's strike. It has been maintained steadily until recently. These two incidents, and notably that at Shanghai, led to a direction of sentiment against England instead of Japan. This shift was made much more easily than it would have been a few years earlier by reason of the marked conciliatoriness of Japanese policy toward China after the Washington Conference. Anti-British sentiment was subsequently intensified by the Wanhsien incident in 1926, when a British gunboat fired on that Yangtse village as punishment for the action of

Chinese forces in firing on British merchant vessels. The two happenings were incidental to the most recent events in Chinese civil strife—the movement of the southern forces and their allies against the northern militarists. Fuel has been added to the flame of anti-British sentiment by the recurrent demand from the treaty ports for a revival of a strong China policy. The unity maintained by the Powers at Peking until 1927 has helped to generalize this anti-British into an anti-foreign sentiment.

This latest expression of "anti-foreignism" is strikingly distinguished from that of the nineteenth century in that it is not due to a feeling of condescending superiority. It differs from the Boxerism of 1900 and the "Rights Recovery" movement which followed the Russo-Japanese War in that it is not an expression of the desire to preserve a static China, unaffected by the problems of foreign intercourse. Its immediate objectives are not unlike those of the "Rights Recovery" movement, but it represents, fundamentally, a desire to see China take her place in the world as an equal among equals. It represents a revulsion from the feeling that China can rely on the West for a solution of her international problems, and from the feeling that institutions, practices, and ideas are good because they are Western. Consequently it has served to strengthen the tide of critical discussion. In this respect it is a cause of the present intellectual ferment. In other respects it is a consequence of it, since the new thought has been national in character and thus has served to lead China away from a growing intellectual bondage to the West.

7. CHANGES IN FAMILY SYSTEM

The strongest evidence of conscious criticism of Chinese institutions is presented in the attack on, and the open repudiation of, the ancient clan-family system. Many factors had been at work to weaken the family system even before the young intellectuals began consciously to repudiate it. Among them may be noted, first, the enlarged movement of the people as the railway system has been extended. This made migration from the ancestral home easier and thus weakened the attachment to it. It also tended to break up the patriarchal family into smaller groups. The introduction of the Western industrial system has had a similar effect by attracting workers from the villages into the towns and cities, where they have been removed from the family authority, and have been forced to set up separate establishments. The century of Christian propaganda, with its attack on ancestor-worship, concubinage, and other practices connected with the family system, has been another factor. Yet another has been the enlarged knowledge of the West, and an appreciation of some of the advantages presented by its emphasis on the individual, and by its single household system. This knowledge at least afforded an opportunity to evaluate the Chinese system on a comparative basis.

*Forces
weakening
the family
system*

Another factor, which has been both a cause and a consequence

*Education of
women*

of the weakening of the family system, is the gradual emancipation of women. This commenced with the provision of girls' schools as part of the Republican educational program. Their education had been largely disregarded in Imperial days, as they could not take the examinations and in any case were considered to have no need of a classical education. Some of the mission schools, however, had made beginnings. Since 1911 facilities have been increasingly afforded for the higher, as well as the elementary, education of girls and women, both by the government and in mission and private schools. This has resulted in taking girls out of the home and bringing them in contact with one another and with the world, and it has postponed the marriage day among the educated classes. Furthermore, increasing numbers have been going abroad to study, which further postpones the day of marriage. The first girls to go abroad to study were sent to the United States in 1907. Now there are over two hundred Chinese girls studying in American institutions of higher learning. Naturally, as this education has proceeded, some women have prepared themselves for occupations other than running a home. The chief attraction has been into medicine and nursing, but some have taken a legal training, and others have become journalists. Thus there has been created, for the first time in the history of China, a class of economically independent unmarried women, a group which tends toward constant enlargement.

*Participation
of girls in
student
movement*

The girls in the schools took their place by the side of the boys in the 1919 student agitation, and in the subsequent student movement. This unprecedented performance produced no bad consequences, but it did suggest that women are likely to take a new initiative in China's life. Perhaps partly as a consequence of it, co-education has been introduced into some of the colleges and universities, and may ultimately be given a trial also in the lower schools.

*Revolt against
marriage
system*

The young men, particularly the American educated students, had been gradually moving toward revolt against the marriage system of the country, which deprived them of a voice in the selection of their brides, although the first generations of returned students generally acquiesced in that as in other features of the old order. But today the voice of the newly educated women has been joined to that of the men in opposition to such an exercise of parental power. The result is that family arrangements are being disregarded and the contracting parties are beginning to make their own choices. Parental authority is being further weakened by the refusal to take up abode in the family residence. In some cases, it must be admitted, the marriage ceremony is being dispensed with, as a sign of complete emancipation. The pendulum is swinging from one extreme to another, although extremism would seem to constitute the exception rather than the rule. On the whole, then, the effect of the education of women has been to weaken the family system, though it has not been consciously directed toward that end.

Finally we come to the part played by conscious criticism of the system in terms of its utility. The reaction against parental or family selection of mates has just been mentioned. But that is an obvious and surface criticism of the system in only one of its aspects. It has taken historical studies to show that the clan-family status represents one of arrested development, a stage through which other groups have evolved to the society founded on the individual. This realization has made it possible for a few intellectuals consciously to repudiate the whole system as one unsuited to the China of tomorrow. Some Chinese, though again a comparatively small number, have perceived the deadening effect of life lived in terms of ancestral ways of acting and thinking, and in a society whose members have as their chief function the production of off-spring to carry on the ancestral rites. It is interesting to note that birth control advocates have received a hearing in contemporary China. Extremists have gone so far even as to attack ancestor-worship, which is the center and core of the system. It is only fair to note that, in the face of this conscious criticism, the family system has found its strong defenders, some of them foreigners. The principal rational defense made of it is on the ground of its cohesive force. It is well pointed out that China has outlived her ancient neighbors, both far and near, largely because her life has been preserved through the clan-family. The lack of restraint of China's "younger generation" is pointed to as a symptom of disintegration and decay more serious than her political chaos. But without entering further into the argument it may merely be pointed out that both attack on, and defense of, a system long accepted without argument as sound is an indication that the old order is changing.

*Conscious
criticism of
family system*

Before leaving the question of the family system, we must emphasize the fact that only a small number of Chinese have repudiated or questioned the soundness of the family system. The changing point of view is expressed by the younger generation of foreign-educated Chinese, and by well-to-do Chinese living in the cities, more particularly the places of foreign residence and trade. The village point of view, on the whole, is still the pre-modern one. The changes, however, although restricted to a small group, are significant because of the fact that the attitude of that group will ultimately determine that of the nation. What has been said, by way of caution, concerning the family system, is also true of the rites connected with ancestor-worship. The masses still perform them, although the younger intellectuals have attacked them. Ancestor-worship is being slowly undermined, but is far from having been destroyed.

*Extent of
change in view
of family
system*

The intellectual attack on ancestor-worship is indicative, from another point of view, of the purely rational and skeptical attitude of mind of many of the student class and their teachers. It is founded on a lack of belief in a spirit world and, consequently, a loss of faith in the efficacy of ancestral rites.

*Indicative of
skeptical
attitude*

8. RELIGIOUS SKEPTICISM

*Attack on
religious beliefs*

This same skepticism has led to an attack on religious belief in general, and is a root cause of anti-Christian sentiment, together with its foreign origin and support, and the feeling that it is an advance agent of Western imperialism. But Buddhism and Taoism, and the religious growths on Confucianism, have come in for attack as well as Christianity.

*Confucian
worship*

The Confucian ethical system, apart from the elements of worship connected with it, is not so severely criticised, nor is a strong attempt being made to uproot it. It remains fundamentally supported by whatever of soundness inheres in a moral system which has found acceptance for long ages, and by the authority of tradition, and respect for the Sage whose name has for so long been almost synonymous with that of China.

The recent intellectual repudiation of Confucian worship has not yet seriously affected the masses of the people, although it may do so in time. The disappearance of the Empire carried with it the end of the worship of Heaven by the head of the state, except as it was temporarily revived by Yüan Shih-k'ai. The attempts to establish Confucianism as the national ethical system by constitutional enactment failed. Some of the official ceremonies in the provinces have been discontinued. But the rites in honor of Confucius have been largely maintained, conducted either by officials or by the Confucian societies which have come into existence. Honors are also paid the Sage in many of the government schools. Consequently the masses are likely to cling to the elements of worship in Confucianism for some time to come.

*Nature of
ethical system*

The Confucian politico-ethical system was essentially concerned with the ordering of affairs in this world—with the relations of father and son, husband and wife, brother and brother, friend with friend, and ruler with people. These relations were formalized to a high degree by the Great Teacher and his successors, notably Mencius and Chu Tzu. The five cardinal virtues emphasized in the system are kindness, rectitude, decorum, wisdom, and sincerity. Confucius proclaimed, "What you do not like yourself do not extend to others"—the golden rule negatively stated. Neither Confucius himself nor his commentators claimed to do more than to formulate and systematize the wisdom of the Ancients. Consequently they continually point to the past as expressive of the highest type of life, thus inculcating a backward rather than a forward view. The emphasis on filial piety as the highest of all virtues has led to the development of ancestor-worship, which has supplied a quasi-religious authority for the backward look. It is these two features of Confucianism that are being consciously combated by the skeptical intellectuals rather than the Confucian ethical system.

As a matter of fact, authority for their skeptical attitude is found

in the very teachings of Confucius and Mencius. They took the position of the agnostic, so far as the conception of God and of life after death is concerned. Why trouble about the unknowable as long as there are the problems of this life to be solved? They did not repudiate the conception of God, but they did not develop it.

*Confucian
authority for
skepticism*

It is true that the official worship of Heaven by the Emperor was closely associated with Confucianism, but it merely represented the maintenance and development of an old ceremony. It is also true that worship both of Confucius and of lesser lights in the firmament, together with ancestors, established itself as part of the system, and that the Sage himself was canonized by Imperial order in 1907. But these elements represent growths on a politico-ethical system which, it is felt, can be pruned off, as has been the worship of Heaven, without impairing the validity of the system.

*Confucian
worship*

The other great indigenous philosophy—Taoism—long ago lost its philosophical character. As a religio-philosophical system it was essentially mystical and quietistic. It derives its name from its emphasis on Tao.—

Taoism

. . . an impersonal Principle or Power, which, viewed in the absolute sense, is inscrutable, indefinable, and impossible to name. Viewed in the relative sense, it appears under many guises and in every part of the universe. It cannot be correctly translated as God. Indeed, in one obscure passage he says, "It appears to have been before God." Tao is, however, the source and support of all things. Calmly, without effort, and unceasingly, it works for good; and man by yielding himself to it, unresisting, unstriving may reach his highest well being. Suffering is the result of man's departure from the Tao state of pristine innocence and simplicity. It would be well to give up all study and the pursuit of knowledge, and return to the absolutely simple state of Tao. War, striving, suffering, would then all cease, and, floating along the placid river of time, the individual in due course would be absorbed in the ocean of Tao.⁶

This lofty mystical philosophy was too abstruse for the masses, and never gained the foothold among the educated that would enable it to displace Confucian philosophy. Consequently it early degenerated into a system of magic and superstition. The Taoist priests are "the prime leaders of magic and sorcery, which, as in other nations, is of prehistoric origin, and are the high priests of Animism. . . . They are open to any kind of engagement, whether exorcizing devils, releasing souls from hell, seeking the advice of the gods through divination or through a spiritualistic medium, organizing public processions to escort away with great *éclat* the demons of plague, arranging theatrical performances to celebrate the 'birthdays' of the gods—indeed there is not a stroke of superstitious business in which they are not prepared to take a hand and turn a doubtful penny."⁷

Its debasement

This system, and that of the *Féng Shui*, which is closely associated

⁶ SOOTHILL, *The Three Religions of China*, p. 49.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

*Effect of belief
in Fêng Shui*

with it, held the common people, and many of the educated, in its grip. The latter, particularly, has held back the introduction of the railway and other Western machines, since the superstitious feared their effects on the spirits of the air and water. Of course, many of the essentially hard-headed and reasonable Chinese professed disbelief in the whole régime of superstitious and magical practices even during the nineteenth century, but they seldom failed to avail themselves of the services of the priest in time of stress, on the off-chance that there might be something in it.

*Western
education
weakening hold
of superstitions*

The breath of Western scientific education, however, is beginning to clear away the mist of fear of the super-natural among the educated and partly educated. And skepticism as to the wonderfully developed spirit world of the Taoists is certain to spread as education is more widely diffused among the masses. As a matter of fact, the idols in many temples have been destroyed or relegated to obscure corners since 1911, and the temple itself dedicated to Western learning. It will, however, be a long time before superstitious belief in demons and spirits is wholly eradicated. The introduction of modern medical science, the erection of high buildings, the construction of railways, the operation of machines, and the development of criticism are, however, all moving toward that end.

*Status of
Buddhism*

Buddhism, the third great religion of China, is also feeling the sweep of the twentieth-century tide. In its original form "Buddhism is founded upon the permanent impermanency of all things, an exaggerated estimate of suffering, and the extinction of self as the only way of escape. Neo-Buddhism, or Mahayanism, recognizes a Being who transcends the impermanent, and its objective is salvation to a permanent heaven through faith in, and invocation of, saviors."⁸ It is the Mahayan form of Buddhism which has gained the strongest foothold in China. It was introduced into the country in the first century before Christ, but it made little progress for two and a half centuries, during which time no Chinese were permitted to become monks. After the interdiction was raised, it spread rapidly in spite of numerous persecutions due to the hostility of Confucian scholars to the new sect. Not making much headway among the scholars, it appealed particularly to the masses of the people. Even before its introduction into China, Buddhism had begun to lose its elevated character. This process was continued in China. The monks were usually ignorant and superstitious, incapable of appreciating the high moral teachings of the Buddha, even if they had known them. "As a so-called religion of the people it is hardly distinguishable from Taoism, whose deities it has had to borrow largely in order to popularize its own temples. Its hold on the people is restricted mainly to beliefs and ceremonies connected with death and burial."⁹ On the other hand, Taoism has borrowed fully as much imagery from Bud-

⁸ Ibid., p. 108.

⁹ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 614.

dhism as it has furnished it. And, in spite of its defects, Buddhism has had many good effects on China. "It has filled the land with beautiful pagodas. It has taught landscape gardening and encouraged sculpture and painting. Its symbols are common in all decorative art. The lion is seen at every palace gate; the umbrella is the emblem of imperial and magisterial authority; the rosary is, or was, a part of the ceremonial dress of every high official. The swastika, the net of metempsychosis, the wheel of the law—all these and many other symbols are woven into their fabrics, carved in their wood-work, and frescoed upon their ceilings."¹⁰ Not all priests have been debased and ignorant, and at different periods Buddhism found many adherents among the educated gentry. But during the nineteenth century the dark side of the picture was certainly uppermost.

Consequently it is meeting today the same criticism and rejection on rational grounds as is Taoism, although it still maintains itself among the masses. But unlike Taoism, it is now showing recuperative and reconstructive powers which may enable it to meet a large part of the criticism leveled against it and thus become again a vital power in Chinese life. Just as in Japan, Ceylon, and elsewhere, there is a strong reform movement in contemporary Chinese Buddhism. It has made little headway yet, but this does not argue that it will not result in revivification of the religion. Partly it is taking a philosophical turn, motivated by a desire to return to the understanding and application of the teachings of the Buddha. This means cutting through the superstitious growths and accumulations of the ages. Partly it is represented by a change of method and a revival of proselytizing. Here it is borrowing from the West. There has developed a Buddhist missionary activity which is an attempt to meet Christianity on its own ground. Young Men's Buddhist societies are springing up, and social welfare work is being inaugurated. But on the whole, so far as China is concerned, it must be recognized that the revival is merely in its beginnings, and it is too early to tell what its effect will be.

*Buddhist
revival*

Christianity is being criticized severely also, and on several grounds. Its foreignizing influence is being attacked as part of the nationalist agitation. The fact that mission work has been so long foreign financed and controlled has made organized Christianity appear as an essentially alien thing. The extent to which the converts to Christianity drew apart from the normal village life, and failed to participate in many common village activities, centering their interests in and around the church or mission, emphasized this point of view earlier in the present century. The relationship of this to the development of Boxerism has already been alluded to. But, more particularly of recent years, the educational work of the missions has been criticized on the ground that it is essentially foreign in content, and unadapted to the needs of Chinese life. It is held to have a

*Criticisms of
Christianity*

¹⁰ WILLIAMS, *China Yesterday and Today*, p. 310.

denationalizing effect at the time when China is dominated by the Western nationalist philosophy.

*Partial
validity of
criticisms
recognized*

That these criticisms are at least partially valid is recognized in mission circles and among Chinese Christians. This has led to two distinct but closely related movements. One is the development of an independent Chinese church, which is largely self-supporting and entirely self-controlling. Practically all Protestant missionaries look to the ultimate transfer to this native church of the evangelistic side of the missionary activities, although there is difference of opinion concerning the rapidity with which it can be effected. It is hoped that thus the church will in time cease to be a mere adjunct to the mission, which has thus far tended to dwarf it. As this happens the foreign Christians will appear in China principally as advisers to the Chinese. In the second place, there is a movement toward giving control of the mission itself to the Chinese. This has already been done by the Y.M.C.A., and it seems to be only a question of time until the several mission boards follow fully in the steps of the Christian Associations. As this is done, Christianity in China will be nationalized, as it has been in other countries. The Roman Catholics, whose ranks are substantially larger than those of the Protestants, seem to be moving toward the establishment of a native hierarchy, and consequently toward minimizing foreign control of the church. But naturally, because of fundamental differences in organization, their procedure in meeting this type of criticism has to be quite different from that of the Protestants.

*Study of
problem of
Christian
education*

In the field of education, the Christian institutions have been studying the problem presented by criticisms which have been made. The result has been an attempt to view the whole problem through Chinese as well as foreign eyes. An elaborate study of the question of Christian education in China was made in 1922 by a commission representing the mission boards and societies conducting work there. This commission had several Chinese members. The report made some severe criticisms of the educational work done in the past, and presented an elaborate program for the future. From this study, as well as from numerous other indications, it is clear that Christian educational work is undergoing revision to meet the criticisms which are being levelled against it.

*Cleavage in
church*

The intellectuals, however, are attacking Christianity at a much more important point than its foreignism. They are examining it in the way they have examined the more indigenous systems. And some of them have reached the conclusion that the missionary is seeking to get the Chinese to discard one set of superstitions in favor of another set. Some of them are declared atheists, and more are agnostics, and as such they are reproducing many of the arguments against Christianity which are heard in Western lands. The endeavor to meet their strictures, as well as the liberal theological training received by many of the missionaries, has led to a split in the ranks of the

workers in the field similar to that within the churches of the United States. Thus there are now modernists in China, emphasizing the social message, and giving a liberal interpretation to the Bible, and there are fundamentalists who insist that the primary function of the church is personal salvation. This cleavage disregards denominational lines and may ultimately serve to displace them, particularly if there comes a similar division within the Chinese church. In passing it may be noted that the Chinese have never understood denominationalism or appreciated the necessity of it, or of competitive Christianity. Consequently what bids fair to develop is an independent Chinese Christian church, with both a liberal and a conservative constituency, unless agnostic views become so widespread as virtually to eliminate Christianity. This latter seems improbable. The chief ultimate result of the present criticisms would appear to be that of forcing those interested in Christianity, whether foreign or Chinese, to find some rational basis for the defense of their views.

9. CHINESE ARTS AND ARCHITECTURE

Another field in which new ideas have penetrated and Western influence has been felt, although but slightly as yet, is that of art. There had been a high artistic development in pre-modern times, notably in painting. Many of the compositions deal with nature, or with man in relation to nature. Others are concerned with religious subjects, showing the strong influence both of Buddhism and Taoism. Most stress was laid on the loftiness of the sentiment and on the tone rather than on the technical accuracy of the reproduction. A strong current of symbolism runs through the whole stream of Chinese art. Pictures were considered to be "voiceless poems" and they conformed more closely to the canons of poetry than to those of Western art. In its chosen field, and within its limitations, Chinese art was certainly as highly developed as that of Europe. The principal weaknesses, from the Western standpoint, lay in its lack of perspective and in its technical inaccuracy. Scientific knowledge will tend to remove the latter, particularly in the realm of portraiture, while study in the West, and of Western art, will aid in introducing the idea of perspective. So far as the present is concerned, the contact with the West has not been beneficial. What has been gained in perspective and accuracy has been more than compensated for in a loss of the best qualities of the native art. Western qualities are essentially complementary to Chinese qualities, but the attempt to combine the two has so far resulted in a loss of the advantages of both.

*Influence of
West on art*

The same thing has been true in architecture. The old style buildings were monotonous in their similarity, but they were distinctively Chinese. The principal distinguishing feature was the roof, with its upward-curved edges and its elaborate decorations. The introduction of "foreign-style" houses was for a time purely imitative, and produced buildings entirely without distinction except that re-

Architecture

sulting from a complete lack of harmony with their surroundings. Recent attempts, partly by foreign architects, to work out a harmonious combination of Western and Chinese ideas have been partially successful, indicating that the ultimate effect of the introduction of Western ideas may not be unproductive of good results.

*Old art
maintained*

The vogue of things distinctively Chinese in Europe and America in the last ten years is preventing a blind imitation of the West, and is consequently aiding in the maintenance of Chinese art. For a time there was a serious danger that a complete swing from the old to the new would take place, instead of the development of a new art, distinctively Chinese because founded on the past, and yet new because modified in the light of contributions to knowledge from the West.

10. THE THEATRE

*The native
theatre*

The Chinese theatre is being more beneficially affected by the stream of ideas imported from the Occident, although as yet the improvement is noticeable only in what may be described as amateur circles. The art of the theater, so far as stage settings, or their lack, is concerned, is about at the point reached in Elizabethan England. No curtain is used, nor are stage sets prepared. The property man is placed on the stage in full view of the spectators, and he thus performs his functions publicly. Plays of a serious kind, usually historical dramas, are staged, and many broad farces are performed. In either case, the burden of creating an illusion rests solely on the actor and the audience, since the aids presented to a Western audience are lacking. But the acting in the professional theatre is excellent, for there is present much natural ability to build on, and the actors undergo a rigorous training before being admitted to the stage.

*Western
contributions
to dramatic art*

The contribution that is coming from the West is on the mechanical side of play production, and in the development of dramatic subjects new to the Chinese theatre. Furthermore, Western influence is stimulating the presentation of a coherent drama, divided into acts, in place of the customary long series of short episodical plays. It is among the foreign-educated students, who have been interested in the dramatic literature of the West, and in the Chinese middle schools and colleges, that an attempt is being made to write and produce plays in the Western manner. This in itself is interesting, for the Chinese scholar of the past has regarded the theatre as beneath his serious interest. Many of these plays produced in the schools are remarkably good when the difficulties of staging are remembered, and the acting is even better.

*The moving
picture*

The moving picture, entirely a Western innovation, has been introduced into the treaty ports, and to some extent outside them. This is a favorite form of entertainment offered, for example, by the Y.M.C.A. The pictures themselves are partly Occidental in content and on the whole tend to give the Chinese rather a distorted idea of Western life, especially as regards the relations of the sexes. There

are now, since 1919, Chinese producing companies, and native production promises to become important. The broadening effect of some of the news, scenic, and educational pictures must be recognized, however, for the moving picture offers a wonderful opportunity to bring the material features of Western civilization before the eyes, and vicariously into the experience, of the Chinese people.

The contact with the West has in other respects changed the life of the Chinese, particularly the educated group, on its recreational side. The Confucian scholar, devoted to his studies, took no physical exercise of any kind, whether as a youth or as a man. The most he did was to take slow-paced, meditative walks. The foreigner has brought with him his games and sports, which in recent years have been taken over by the Chinese in the schools. Tennis, basket ball, soccer football, and track and field sports attract much interest and attention. The Y.M.C.A. has played a major part in fostering athletic exercises in the schools and the returned students have also had their influence. Chinese field meets are now held both locally and regionally, and Chinese athletes compete successfully with representatives from Japan and the Philippine Islands in the Far Eastern Olympics.

*Western games
introduced*

The significance of this change may be realized when the new activity is contrasted with that of the scholars who wondered why the barbarian foreigner did not have a servant do all of these things for him. The students of today are being brought to an appreciation of the value of physical health which did not exist before the revolution. They are learning to appreciate the body as well as the mind, and are beginning to take care of it. By implication this means also that a knowledge of hygiene is being given them, and with it some knowledge of sanitation. Ultimately it may mean a transformation of Chinese living conditions.

*Significance of
this change*

The interest in hygiene and sanitation is, of course, not solely due to the development of interest in sports. It is due even more to the spread of modern medical knowledge, as medical education has been improved and modernized under Western influence. The two combined, however, are tending to produce a more vigorous student and scholar class, and to improve living conditions, though almost imperceptibly.

It is true that all of the movements and changes noted have affected only the upper classes, and those living at, or in the vicinity of, the treaty ports, and that most of the people are still largely untouched by them. This has led many foreigners to minimize their importance and significance. Not only that, but it has caused some of them to criticize severely the student class because it alone appears to be in ferment, and to be discarding the garments still worn by the nation. But it must be remembered that the students have always had a position of peculiar prestige and importance in China. As they go, the people will ultimately go. For a long time they were the strongest conservative and anti-foreign influence in the Chinese state. Now

*Extent of
change in China*

they have begun to move, and move rapidly. Many of their ideas are immature and crudely put, it may be conceded. They are ill-disciplined, as compared with their Confucian forebears, and are even a trifle over-assertive in the strength of their new knowledge. Perhaps it is a wine which has gone to their heads.

Chinese
applying
Western ideas

But the root of much of the criticism of them lies in the fact that they have begun to make logical application to their own lives and country of ideas brought to them from the West—such conceptions as nationalism and democracy. At the same time they have begun to view Western institutions, beliefs, and shibboleths critically. They have taken from the West the scientific method with its spirit of honest inquiry, and are beginning to make use of it.

China entering
on dynamic
phase

What it will lead to, it is impossible to tell with certainty. At present it has led to intellectual ferment, and almost to intellectual chaos. Criticism so far has been largely destructive. But destruction is a necessary preliminary to construction and reconstruction. Certainly China is no longer inert and static, but has entered upon a dynamic phase of life which may, and should, lead to a literary, social, and cultural renaissance.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN: INTELLECTUAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL

BEFORE resuming the consideration of the political and economic progress of Japan, it will be well to paint in the larger background formed by changing ideas and social institutions. Since culturally Japan is still in a transitional state, this cannot be done in definitive terms. Some broad lines of development are quite clear, however, and a beginning may fairly be made with them.

*Japan still in
transition*

I. RELIANCE ON LEADERSHIP

It is clear that modern Japan is what the group of able men who assumed power after the Restoration sought to make her. They were interested in establishing a strong state—one capable of maintaining its independence in the face of Western aggressive tendencies, and of playing a dominating rôle in eastern Asia. To accomplish their purpose, they borrowed freely from the West those things which they felt would secure the material foundations of the state. First, they imported Western military and naval armament and methods. This was in line with the national military traditions, it is true, but it was also the result of an acute understanding, developed by experience and observation, of the basis of real independence in the modern world. They sensed the weakness of the agricultural state and consciously and purposefully promoted the development of modern industry, going to the West for their models and their machines. This led to the establishment of a modern banking and currency system, to the building of railways, and to the fostering of a merchant marine, both for coastwise and foreign trade purposes. It was not necessary for Western governments and capitalists to force these measures on Japan. The leaders of the country, after foreign intercourse had been accepted and the Restoration accomplished, went or sent abroad for instruction and information. They freely imported foreigners to teach them what they wanted to know, and they retained them as long as they felt a need for their instruction. It must be emphasized, however, that their interest in the West was largely material and almost entirely utilitarian. Consequently they failed to grasp the social implications of the industrial system of the West. As a matter of fact, with certain exceptions which will be noted, it has been left to the West to bring to Japan such moral and philosophical conceptions as it had to offer to an Eastern peoples,

*Point of view
of leaders*

while Japan sought out for herself the mechanical and material benefits presented by the Occident.

*Materials at
disposal of
leaders*

In producing modern Japan the leaders of the state had certain materials to build with and certain foundations to build on. They had to deal with people accustomed to, and acquiescent in, leadership. The hierarchical series of loyalties developed with the feudal system was continued. The propaganda preceding the Restoration made it possible to concentrate the loyalty of the clan groups in the form of devotion to the Emperor, and through him to command support for the program of change and development which they inaugurated. The revival of *Shinto* as the national religion afforded an additional support for the new system which they sought to create. Furthermore, they did not have to build up a spirit of patriotism and of nationalism, as had to be done in China. The loyalty to the Emperor was almost automatically transferred or transformed into an abstract national patriotism.

2. CHANGES IN LIFE OF PEOPLE

*Material
changes*

This acceptance of leadership alone made it possible for Japan so rapidly to take on the appearance of a Westernized state. It was this which enabled the Japanese to change almost overnight from open hostility to foreigners to an outward acceptance of many of their ways. For the people followed the example set them and began to imitate the foreign world in many particulars. Here, again, they tended to interest themselves in the material things rather than in the ideas, and moral and cultural values, of the West. Western shoes have begun to replace the Japanese sandals and *gêta* in the cities. Western clothes are worn in place of the kimono to an increasing extent. With coat and trousers or skirt, has been introduced Western furniture. Meat and milk are finding their way into the national diet, partly by reason of the introduction of meat into the diet of the military conscript. With meat come the knife and fork in addition to, or in place of, the chopstick. Electric lighting is now almost as common as are Western clocks. But Western ideals of liberty, equality, and morality were not so freely drawn upon and diffused.

Change in dress

Part of this change may be due to the vogue of things foreign during the first years after the Restoration. This vogue was started by the makers of modern Japan to serve national ends. But it was partly due to other causes. Foreign clothing, for example, is less expensive than Japanese, particularly for the upper classes and for women and children. It is also better adapted to certain types of work. In other words, what is lost esthetically is compensated for in added utility. Even though foreign clothing is adopted for business purposes, the old costume is often worn at home, except where the house interior has been foreignized by the introduction of furniture. The adoption of a foreign-style uniform for the army and navy, which touch most of the young men, the requirement of a modified

foreign dress, in the nature of a uniform, for school boys and girls, and the wearing of foreign clothing by those who have studied or been engaged in business abroad, all have been factors in promoting a change in the national costume.

Foreign clothes are rather ill-adapted to the conventional method of sitting squatting on the floor. Consequently the change in dress has resulted in the introduction of benches into the school room and of chairs, tables, and other Western furniture into the homes and places of business of those who have made the change in costume. This change has resulted when the house itself is of Western style.

*Introduction
of Western
furniture*

Again, while foreign clothing has certain advantages over the Japanese dress for outdoor wear in cold weather, it is not adapted to padding, and multiplication of garments to take the place of heat in the home. It has been necessary, therefore, to introduce stoves in place of the charcoal brazier, which is useful only for warming the hands.

*Change in
method of
heating*

This is only one illustration of the way in which the habits and customs of the people are being modified. The greater freedom of movement which has come with the building of railways and tram-car lines, both importations from the West, is also having its effect in breaking down or modifying customary practices and established institutions. The importance of improved communications, however, except from the standpoint of facilitating trade, is not so great as it will ultimately be in China, because of the difference in size of the country, and because of the greater tendency to travel in old Japan than in nineteenth-century China. It has, however, tended to uproot the population and make it more mobile, and consequently to weaken local control of the individual.

*Effect of
improvement in
communications*

3. EDUCATION

Another importation from the West has been the idea of a national school system and of compulsory education. Reference has already been made to the establishment and extension of modern schools. At this point, however, the educational system should be reconsidered from the standpoint of its significance in the intellectual life of the nation. Since the war with China the number of schools of all grades has steadily increased. The period of compulsory school attendance was lengthened in 1908 from four to six years. The number of children actually in school, in proportion to those under an obligation to attend, has increased with the extension of primary school facilities, until in 1922 there was just short of one hundred per cent attendance. This constitutes, both absolutely and in comparison with the most advanced Western states, a remarkable quantitative record. It is the more remarkable when the actual period of time involved is considered. There are naturally defects in the system due to the rapidity of its development. It has not been possible adequately to train the number of teachers required for the many elementary schools.

*School
attendance*

The insufficiency of funds devoted to education, in view of the extensive program carried into effect, has made for decided underpayment of teachers, and has made it impossible to provide entirely satisfactory equipment, measured by the most advanced Western standards. The financing of the primary and secondary schools is entrusted largely to the local governments, the total expenditure for education out of the national treasury being only about twelve million *yen*. To help finance the system all pupils, except paupers, pay a small fee, in addition to which the pupil purchases his own books. These, however, are supplied by the government rather than through commercial enterprise.

The elementary school curriculum "embraces instruction in Japanese history, geography, mathematics, science, drawing, singing, gymnastics, and sewing for girls, with manual training for boys; and during the last three years of the primary course agriculture, commerce and the English language may be added."¹ The hours of work in the schools are long, vacations are few, and pupils as well as teachers take the business of education seriously.

Only about half of those applying for admission to the secondary schools can be accommodated, and the proportion narrows still further as higher institutions are reached. Thus it is only primary education which is put within the reach of every Japanese. This seriously restricts opportunity, as the desirable positions in the government service, in banks and commercial houses, and in teaching, are open only to those who have the coveted diplomas. The opportunity for middle and higher school education is offered, however, in privately maintained institutions which supplement the government's activities. Many of the private schools are Christian, although some are secular, supported out of native endowments. All are kept under governmental supervision and must conform to governmental requirements if their diplomas are to have practical value. They compare very favorably with the public institutions, and in some cases maintain even higher standards.

After this brief survey we may return to the original question of the effect of widespread education on the intellectual life of the peoples. Do we have in education a notable exception to the statement that modern Japan has been interested more largely, even exclusively, in the material side of modern life, rather than in the realm of ideas and of moral and cultural values?

First of all it should be noted that the view has been completely accepted that education is for the purposes of the state rather than for the liberation of the individual. This attitude permeates and gives its character to the entire system, from primary school to university. The state, according to the Japanese view, needs those who are steeped in loyalty to it, and its established institutions. Consequently primary school instruction is concentrated on the development of an

¹ BRYAN, *Japan from Within*, p. 197.

*Elementary
school
curriculum*

*Secondary
education*

*Effect of
compulsory
education on
intellectual life*

*Education for
purposes of the
state*

unquestioning loyalty. The instruction in Japanese ethics, for example, is in effect the cultivation of loyalty to the Emperor, of devotion to Japan, and of acceptance of the canons of authority. To this must be added, however, as an extension of the same idea, filial piety and obedience. The primary Japanese virtue is obedience, within the home and in the state. This emphasis develops unity of purpose on an authoritarian basis, but it prevents the growth of individuality of view, and the cultivation of a questioning attitude of mind.

All other subjects, within the limits of their content, are taught on the same basis. Since the text-books are prepared by the national Department of Education, there is little possibility of diversity of content in instruction throughout the country. The books are prepared with an emphasis on the Japanese nation which is clear and unmistakable.

*Text-books
emphasize
loyalty*

In the second place, with the exception of singing and possibly drawing, the subjects not of a nationalistic character are utilitarian, and are designed to strengthen the material foundations of the state. This is natural and inevitable in the primary grades. Reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography certainly constitute the essential tools which must be put in the hands of the citizen. And the mastering of the tools is more difficult in Japan than in Western countries because of the nature of the language development, and of the literary heritage, which requires knowledge of Chinese characters, since the Chinese classics are to be studied as part of the middle school curriculum. The effect of the type of study this demands is elsewhere mentioned, so that it need not be dwelt upon here.

*Utilitarian
emphasis in
primary
education
natural*

It is, however, in the higher schools, including the universities, that the utilitarian character of education is most marked. The technical and commercial schools naturally have that character. Tokyo University has faculties of law, medicine, literature, science, engineering, and agriculture. With variations in the number of faculties, this typifies the situation. An opportunity is afforded to secure the advanced preparation necessary to serve the state in the various professions and occupations, and thus, of course, to enable the individual to carve out a career for himself. Lawyers, doctors, engineers, trained agriculturalists, and administrators are necessary in the modern Japanese society, as are bankers, machinists, and men trained in commercial and vocational lines. But outside of literature and the fine arts, there is no encouragement of study in what may be called the humanities—no stimulus to philosophical study, outside the native horizon, including that furnished in the Confucian heritage, or to investigation and study in the social sciences. Anything that might result in the introduction or development of what have been called "dangerous thoughts," changing the political or social outlook of the students and of the people, has been excluded, as far as possible, from the entire school system. Instruction and investiga-

*Utilitarian
emphasis
marked in
higher schools*

tion in the natural and physical sciences have been satisfactorily built up, with the result that Japanese schools have produced able and well-trained men in those fields. But the scientific method of study of the state, and of social institutions, has not been developed. Quite truly it has been realized that this type of study and investigation would produce a less docile and more critical spirit, and perhaps might lead to the acceptance of the view that the state exists to serve the individual rather than to be served by him. Thus it may be said that education has not been an effective agency for promoting an active intellectual life in Japan, except within the comparatively narrow limits fixed by the utilitarian point of view and by the fear of "dangerous thoughts."

4. STATUS OF WOMEN

*Provision for
education of
women*

A marked feature of the development of the present century has been the attention paid to the education of girls and women and to the development of new spheres of activity for them. Formerly woman's place was felt to be exclusively in the home,² and education, in the sense of intellectual training, was largely denied her. However, the elementary school has long been opened to both boys and girls, without segregation in separate institutions. For some time after the Restoration no governmental provision was made for higher education for women, although as early as 1871 five girls of varying ages were sent to America for training. It was understood that upon their return they would devote themselves to promoting education for their sex. The Christian mission workers first took up the task of providing facilities for advanced training for women, and they still perform a very valuable service. The government, however, now provides high schools for girls, and maintains normal and higher normal schools for training women teachers for the elementary schools. In recent years women have been admitted as auditors at the lectures in the Imperial University at Tokyo. In addition to the Christian colleges for women, there is one privately maintained university, the Japanese Women's University, established in 1901.

*Activities of
women in and
outside the
home*

While women are extensively engaged in teaching, and to some extent in medical practice, journalism, and other professional activities, it still remains true that the women of modern as of ancient Japan look forward to marriage, and that at a comparatively early age. This complicates the problem for those interested in higher education, as frequently their students are compelled by their families to leave school before their work has been completed because a match satisfactory to the family has been arranged. There seems, however, to be a tendency in Japan toward later marriages among the upper classes. Whether or not this is due in part to the extension of educational opportunities, it does make it possible for learning to be pur-

² This statement, while generally true, needs to be qualified by recognition of the literary activity of women in various eras of pre-modern times.

sued a little farther before marriage than has heretofore been the case. Outside of the well-to-do classes it must be understood that women in Japan, both before and after marriage, are vital parts of the national economy. Since the larger part of the population is engaged in agriculture, it follows that Japanese girls and women in the rural districts help with the rice cultivation, are the chief tenders of the silk worms, pick the tea, and spin and weave in the home. In the industrial world, it should be noted that sixty per cent of all factory workers are women, while eighty per cent of the operatives in cotton mills are women. Child labor in Japan, furthermore, means primarily the labor of girls, for eighty per cent of the children employed are little girls.

Something is said elsewhere about factory legislation and the need for it. At this point reference may well be made to the conditions under which the girls and women live and work. There are of course notable exceptions, but on the whole the conditions of life are terrible. Here we have another illustration of the way in which the Japanese imported the material civilization of the West, its machines and devices of the most improved kind, without attempting an investigation of the methods which had begun to be developed of conserving human values.

The factory operatives are secured by systematic recruiting in the country districts. The advantages of life in the town are sufficiently vividly pictured to cause the girl willingly to leave the rural district. But the governing consideration is a money payment to her family, which often is barely able to eke out a living from the soil, and the prospect of what appears to be a substantial addition to the family income, which will continue until marriage. Incidentally, the movement of women to the factories tends to promote later marriage among the poor more effectively than does education among the wealthy.

*Recruiting
women for
industry*

When the girl reaches the factory she is often housed in a closed compound, where the girls are locked up to prevent them from running away. They have no privacy, only mat space for sleeping being allotted to each one. Sometimes, where there is a day and night shift, the bed is continually occupied. The hours are long, and fatigue interferes with normal recreation even when it is provided in suitable form. Due to the conditions under which they work and sleep, tuberculosis is rife among both men and women factory workers. Moral conditions are also bad. "A Japanese factory expert has affirmed that in some factories it is not uncommon for more than half the girls to lose their virtue in a year. The long hours leave the workers so weary that any sort of excitement is welcome, and consequently vicious pleasures and pastimes are encouraged and common. The most usual amusements are drinking, gambling and sensuality."³ The consequence is that by reason of disease, desertion, and also

*Conditions of
life among
factory workers*

³ BRYAN, op. cit., p. 139.

because of approaching marriage, there is a labor turnover of about eighty per cent among the women operatives, and recruiting must go on ceaselessly.

*Failure to
appreciate
social
implications of
industrialism*

From the standpoint of health, as well as of industrial efficiency, the nation loses tremendously by the maintenance of these conditions. Here is where the Japanese leaders have failed most seriously, even on a purely utilitarian basis, in making importations from the West. They did not appreciate the social ideals or even the efficiency ideas, which had begun to express themselves in the Occident. They saw the machine, but not the social implications of the machine economy. Consequently they have made no systematic attempt to conserve the health of the nation by insuring reasonably good living conditions for the future mothers who are engaged in industry. Christian employers often offer notable exceptions to the rule by attempting to look after their employees, and the Christian ideal of the sacredness of human life has spread somewhat beyond the Christian community. But so materialistic has become the outlook of the Japanese industrial leaders that a satisfactory social program may be expected to be developed by them only when it is demonstrated that it is good business, and to the practical advantage of the nation, to give attention to the welfare of the women workers. They will, of course, be helped to gain this appreciation as labor organizes to protect itself.

*Pre-marital
relations of
men and women*

The statement that this large proportion of the girls in the factories lose their virtue does not constitute the moral indictment of the factory system that it would in many other countries. Pre-marital relations between the sexes are quite common in many of the rural districts, although the proportions would not seem to be nearly so great. And this does not serve as a bar to marriage for the girl, as to a large extent it does elsewhere.

Prostitution

The difference in moral code is further illustrated in the openness with which the trade of the prostitute is plied. It is carried on under governmental supervision as a recognized occupation, although not an honored one. It is estimated that there are not less than fifty thousand licensed prostitutes in the country. These women are kept in a condition of bondage, as otherwise it is difficult to hold them.

Most of them soon loathe the business, but are helpless, hopeless prisoners,—for the keepers who paid their parents a few score or hundreds of yen and loaded them with beautiful clothes, charge all these items to their account, so that they are under a heavy debt which must be paid before they can leave. This debt the laws of the land theoretically ignore but practically recognize, for the "keeper" keeps the books as well as the brothel, and the police and officials are often on his side.⁴

Aside from the official attitude, the principal support of the system lies in the poverty of the lower classes. "The girl goes to the brothel

⁴ GULICK, *Working Women of Japan*, p. 105.

in obedience to her parents, who send her there to earn a living for herself and to help them out of special financial difficulties. Thus from first to last, so far as the girls, the parents, and the keepers are concerned, the question is economic."⁵ Many of the prostitutes, it should be said, come from the former *eta* or pariah class

To the number of licensed prostitutes, from the standpoint of morality, must be added the hotel and tea-house girls, for many of them are virtually in the same class. The *Geisha*, the class of entertainers, are also sometimes put in the same category. Their occupation, as that of the tea-house girls, may, and often does, lead to prostitution. But, occupationally, they are highly trained public entertainers.

Geisha

As the economic condition of the lower classes is improved, the willingness of parents to see their children engaged in these occupations is certain to lessen, and to the extent to which the parental control weakens as a result of the introduction of the individualistic ideas of the West, the system is bound to weaken. Furthermore, partly as a result of the sensitiveness of Japanese to foreign opinion, there is a growing condemnation of the open connection of the government with prostitution through the licensing system. This has the effect, not always of ending prostitution, but of pushing it more underground and out of the public view. Such a development should ultimately lead to the same reaction as is found in Western countries. Certainly prostitution is a less prominent feature of the Japan of today than of yesterday.

*Growing
condemnation
of licensed
prostitution*

5. THE FAMILY SYSTEM

Due to the emphasis on material development, there has been less change in the social than in the economic institutions of Japan. The family is still the basic unit of society, although the government deals with the individual as it does not, as yet, in modern China. Aside from ancestral worship, and from the Confucian emphasis on the family, and of the view of the nation as an enlarged family group, its principal support is to be found in the system of rural economy. "The family system, by which all is subordinated to family, is convenient to farmers for it means increased labor and economy of living . . . generally speaking, the family system at one and the same time keeps young men from striking out in the world and compels their early marriage so that the helping hands to the family may be more numerous."⁶ Industrial development has not broken down this point of view as yet, because of the extent to which the labor of girls is used. This is another method of adding to the family income. Marriage in industrial centers, however, often results in the establishment of individual homes. The ultimate effect, furthermore, of the expansion of the industrial system will be to weaken the family system, as it promotes a movement from the village into the town.

*Family
remains as
social unit*

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ ROBERTSON SCOTT, *Foundations of Japan*, p. 329.

Modifications
of family
system

But while the family system remains, certain modifications in it have been going on. In more advanced circles the marriage arrangements are not so exclusively in parental hands. The practice of "free" marriage is becoming more widespread each decade. By this is meant, sometimes, merely the right of an interview before the marriage arrangements are completed. In a more extreme form it carries with it a right of selection. Reference has already been made to the tendency to break up the household into its component parts with the drawing of the population into the cities. Under the influence of Western example, and also of teaching in the Christian schools and missions, the same thing is happening for other than economic reasons among the middle and upper classes. The tendency toward later marriages also has its effect on the family and indicates the weakening of family control.

6. ABOLITION OF CLASS DISTINCTIONS

Effect of
abolition of
feudalism

One social change made after the Restoration was a redivision of society. Two distinct classes were recognized—the nobility, which was graded into various ascending ranks, and the commoners. Class distinction, as between groups of commoners, was legally brought to an end. This brought the *samurai* down and elevated the pariah classes such as the *eta*. Of course this did not prevent the establishment and perpetuation of distinctions due to occupation and wealth, but it did take away special privileges and particular disabilities. Thus the *eta* are no longer legally restricted to the performance of the most menial and unpleasant tasks. They are not required to live in separate villages. And the ban on marriage outside their group no longer exists. However, while for the *samurai* the change had immediate and real consequences, for the *eta* it has been more nominal. They have so long regarded themselves, and been regarded, as pariahs that it will take several generations more before they are merged in the general population if, indeed, that ever completely comes to pass.

7. NEW CLASS ALIGNMENTS

Tenantry

As the feudal class divisions were modified or ended, new ones began to arise. In another place reference is made to the growth of a class of tenant farmers. This indicates that there is also a landlord class. Of course some farmers are part tenant and part owner, and many landlords are also farmers. But the general movement is in the direction of the two extremes—landlords who live on rents paid them, and tenants who own no land. This has already produced friction and class antagonism. The Japanese landlord is prone to consider only the economic return and not to concern himself with the condition of his tenant. His point of view is generally that of the absentee landlord in other countries, even when he lives in the rural district. He usually receives his rental in rice rather than money, which leads to ill-feeling, since, when the crop yield is small and prices high in consequence, the landlord gains more than the tenant,

and he also gains rather than loses when the yield is good. On the other side, this method of payment leads the tenant to try to pay his rent in the poorer part of his crop. Since he gives a large proportion of it to the landlord, he sometimes curtails expenditure on fertilizer and other means of enlarging his production. Consequently the landlord has his grievances against the tenant. In many parts of the country the tenants are being driven steadily into debt, since their yearly necessary expenditure is greater than their incomes. This is also true, although not so extensively, of the small owner. Since interest rates are very high, a hopeless condition results.

One answer to the tenant's problem is found in a drift to the industrial city. This has become so pronounced in recent years that the good tenant is at a premium, and both the landlords and the government are being forced to consider ameliorative measures. The government is helping by establishing land banks to make loans to the farmer at low interest rates. These are now to be found in almost every prefecture. The landlord is beginning to develop a sense of social responsibility. Some are more considerate in their demands; others help to provide better manures for the paddys and fields; others are seeking, in coöperation with the government, to train the farmer to the improvement of his methods.

*Ameliorative
measures*

Rural coöperation is developing somewhat, partly promoted by the landlord, but more largely independent of his direction. Paddy adjustment, among other things, showed the possibility of securing better results by coöperative action. There are all manner of rural or village societies for almost every conceivable purpose. Some are purely economic in character and end, but they range from societies to encourage the habit of early rising to agrarian coöperative institutions of a more usual sort. These societies are made up of all or part of the young men of the village. Many of them are valuable chiefly because they absorb their surplus energies.

*Rural
coöperative
societies*

But withal it must still be recognized that class division and class feeling are on the increase in the rural districts.

*Tenants'
Associations*

Influenced by the labor movement, which developed in the industrial centers during and after the war, this depressed class (i.e., the tenants) has of late shown spirit. It has begun to assert its claims against landowners. At the end of 1920 there were as many as ninety associations of tenant farmers, and sixty of these had been started for the specific purpose of representing tenants' interests against landowners. Strikes of tenants began and continue. The end of this movement of a proverbially conservative class is not at all certain.⁷

Since 1920 it has been estimated that the number of tenants' associations has increased to four hundred, one third of which are decidedly militant. It has been the general rise in the cost of living since 1914, and especially during the post-war period, which has produced this movement of protest.

⁷ Ibid., p. 88.

*Division in
industry*

In the industrial realm, also, class division has developed as a consequence of the establishment of the factory system. The reasons for this need not be discussed here, since they are the ones which have produced the same division in other countries. In Japan, as elsewhere, the economic separation of the employer and worker is ever growing more pronounced. Wages for the worker are low, hours are long, and living conditions are bad.

*Obstacles to
organization
of labor*

The movement toward organization of the workers is described in another connection. Here, however, certain obstacles in the road of effective organization may be indicated. In the first place, unionism has been associated in the public mind with socialism. Socialism embraces one set of the "dangerous ideas" which the government has bent its efforts to keep out of the country, as being inimical to the public peace and welfare. Consequently unionism has been branded as unpatriotic, a brand which serves to keep many out of the organizations formed. In the second place, the enforcement of the "peace preservation law" makes it difficult for union meetings to be held, or for other than benefit activities to be undertaken. In the third place, the proportion of women workers, as compared with men, handicaps effective organization and action. The woman is a temporary worker, pending marriage, and is in industry primarily to supplement the family income rather than as a self-supporting economic unit. Thus it is more difficult to interest her in organization. Her docility also has to be taken into account. Since so many workers are women, it is obviously difficult to organize the factory so as to bring effective pressure to bear on the employer. A fourth obstacle to the organization of labor may perhaps be found in the fact that modern industry tends to be diffused in many small factories rather than to be concentrated in a few large establishments.

*Association
of labor
movement with
socialism a
handicap*

In a country where it is assumed that the initiative will come from above, where the people are indoctrinated with the claims of authority, and where the rights of the state are elevated at every point above those of the individual, it is not strange that the impetus toward the assertion of the rights of the masses has come from the outside. The initial internal political liberalism lost its chief leader with the death of Itagaki. It was made futile, from the political standpoint, with the promulgation of the constitution, and with the establishment of the military bureaucracy in control of the state. Had it been allowed to develop, out of it might perhaps have come an economic and social liberalism. The early labor reform movement itself was handicapped because it was an Occidental importation, with the leaders dividing into an evolutionary or socialistic group, and a revolutionary or anarchistic group. The implication of a group of the radical leaders in a conspiracy against the Emperor in 1910, as a result of which some were executed and others imprisoned for life, was a fatal blow for the labor movement.

[It] became associated in the public mind with disloyalty and principles dangerous to the nation; which was just what its opponents desired for its overthrow. Suspicion of the labour movement has since continued, and, during the suspension of law and order during the recent earthquake in Japan, occasion was seized by rabid patriots to assassinate the leaders of socialism and labour.

... All the authorities have to do, in order to destroy any new movement, is to brand it with the feared and hated name of socialism. ... Labour unions are included in the regulations affecting socialism and anarchy, which is sufficient to give them the quietus. Nevertheless, there are many socialists still in Japan, some of them in labour circles, as well as among some young men of the middle class, but they can find no vent for expression.⁸

There are some counter-currents, however, which should be mentioned. There is, first, the fact that the working men and their children have had enough schooling to be able to read. Thus they are certain to realize, sooner or later, that their lot is different in many respects from that of their Occidental fellows, and to begin more strongly to insist on a recognition of their rights. Of course the laborer will have to overcome the emphasis his education has placed on the virtue of submissiveness to authority. In the second place, some employers and corporations, for example the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, are beginning to show an interest in the well-being of their employees. In other words, under the influence partly of Christian teaching, partly of Western example, and partly of a recognition of a sound business principle, a social responsibility is beginning to appear. A third important influence is foreign opinion. Japanese sensitiveness to the opinions of others has become almost proverbial. As the social backwardness of Japan is revealed to the Japanese representatives at labor conferences, and as there is increasing foreign criticism of conditions, the Japanese leaders tend to seek to remedy conditions, at least to the extent of lessening the volume of criticism. In the fourth place, the broadening of the franchise gives the workers a possibility of political action which has hitherto been denied them. It is possible that legislation in the future will gradually cease to represent exclusively the point of view, and conception of interest, of the industrial and commercial magnate. Thus, while to-day "the Japanese capitalists, as a class, are indifferent to labor interests and even labor questions, while the universities are more concerned with the economic than the human aspects of labor,"⁹ while the laborer has not yet awakened to his own condition and the possibilities of redress, it is still possible to perceive an upward trend and to believe that it will be confirmed with the passage of time.

An upward trend apparent

Two other forces have operated in recent years to produce an intellectual and social outlook different from the conventional one, and these should also be noted at this point. In the first place, the ending of the World War on the basis of Allied success, coupled with

⁸ BRYAN, op. cit., p. 143.

⁹ Ibid., p. 144.

the emphasis, at least in propaganda, during the last year and a half of the war, on democracy and its concomitants, weakened the authoritarian point of view in Japan, and stimulated to active expression an already existent liberal movement. Politically, as is noted elsewhere, this liberal movement resulted in a broadening of the franchise to the point of universal suffrage. It also resulted in a distinct liberalization of both foreign and colonial policy. And, of even greater ultimate importance, it had significant intellectual effect in that the interest of the intellectual and upper middle classes has been centered on the necessity for developing the individual as the basis of the state, rather than on strengthening the state by using the individual to serve it. In other words, a different type of intellectual interest has been shown in recent years, which, as it gathers momentum, may result in a transformation of the social thinking of the Japanese. It is being realized in many circles that, while Japan has been catching up with and keeping abreast of the West in her material development, she has been outstripped in the realm of ideas, or at least has been developing an antiquated set of ideas. It is not going too far to say that since the end of the war the social ideas of the Japanese have undergone more radical change—that there has been a greater liberalization of thought—than in the preceding twenty-five years.

Another great influence in Japan, as in other countries, has been the Russian revolution. The government and the ruling classes have been tremendously afraid of the new Russian ideas and of the effect of their introduction into Japan. Consequently every effort has been made to keep them out of the country. Furthermore, a counter-current has been maintained against them to neutralize their effect, in case they should, in spite of all precautions, find their way into Japan. But the counter-current has inevitably produced an interest in the current which it is designed to neutralize and minimize. And it has been impossible to prevent Japanese thought from feeling the Russian influence to some extent. Coming just at a time when labor unrest, in both town and country, was beginning to manifest itself, a movement which is frankly based on the conception of control of the state by the workers, and which has had world-wide repercussions, was certain to have some effect on the Japanese labor movement. That it has not had a greater effect, is due to the abhorrence of "socialist" ideas as unpatriotic, an attitude which had been cultivated prior to the war. Thus two streams of ideas, the one from the capitalistic states of the West and the other from communist Russia, have met in Japan to modify thinking about social relations within the last few years.

8. LITERATURE AND THE PRESS

In the realm of literature Japan has felt the force of the Western impact almost as much as in the field of economic and social development. This is readily understandable, since most of the old literary

forms have developed under foreign (i.e. Chinese) influence. The great exception is to be found in poetry, the canons of which have been, and remain to-day, distinctly and distinctively Japanese. Its peculiar quality is produced by the use of alternate lines of five and seven syllables. The usual length is five lines, the first and third of five syllables, the second, fourth, and fifth of seven, giving a total of thirty-one syllables. This length is not invariable, a shorter form of seventeen syllables often being used, but the alternation of lines of five and seven syllables is compulsory. The poems composed under these restrictions are suggestive rather than fully expressive. They convey impressions rather than unfold themes. Consequently Japanese poetry is essentially lyrical, the epic form being entirely foreign to its meter and spirit. The men and women of the Court and upper classes, both in ancient and modern times, have engaged in the production of verse as one of their principal avocations. Poetry writing competitions have been frequent, and often the winner comes from one of the lower classes, whose interest in poetry has also been noteworthy. While Japanese poetic forms have been virtually unaffected by the modern world, except for the work of Toson and a few others who broke through the restrictions as to length, the old forms have been widely used to express new ideas and impressions. In this way, certainly, modern Japanese poetry has felt the impact of the West without losing its distinctive Japanese flavor.

In fields of literature other than poetry, the production of pre-modern Japan was equally important. But it was so largely influenced from the continent that it was not so distinctively Japanese as the poetry. The earliest work extant is the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters), which is a saga of the beginnings of things and of the development of the Japanese nation. It was written in archaic Japanese. Almost immediately, however, it was displaced by the *Nihonji* (Chronicles of Japan), a work of similar content but written in the "classical" or quasi-Chinese language. This classical language, together with an imported Chinese literary canon, dominated Japan until a literary renaissance set in sometime after the firm establishment of order under the Tokugawa *Shoguns*. The Chinese influence continued, but there was a conscious attempt to break away from it. This was particularly marked in the field of historical writing and of religious investigation. There was also developed, under the Tokugawa, a wide variety of non-historical writings. Folk-tales and children's stories, moral discourses and novels, appeared in profusion.

With the Restoration, the interest in things Japanese ceased for a time, and attention was concentrated on Western literature, particularly the English. The years from 1868 to 1885 were not productive of literature. The Japanese gained a certain familiarity with the new world of letters through study, both at home and abroad, and through translation of Western books. But for obvious reasons the chief constructive interest of the nation was centered on political and economic

Chinese
influence

Western
influence

reconstruction. This, together with the cult of the West, made literary production difficult if not impossible. The chief interest in Western literature was in that of England at first and subsequently in that of the continent.

Romanticism

In general the next two decades were dominated by romantic schools, one headed by Shoyo, a Shakespearean student, a second by Koyo, whose principal contributions to Japanese letters lay in the objectivity of his descriptions, and in his brilliant style, and a third by the idealist Rohan. The intensification of national feeling resulting from the war with China, together with the optimism resulting from the triumph of Japan over her large neighbor, set the tone for much of the literary output of the years from 1895 to 1904-1905. From the standpoint of style the decade 1895-1905 was significant because of the high level reached. During these years the predominant Western influence gradually changed from English to Russian.

Realism

Rapidly, after 1900, romanticism gave way to naturalism and realism. The displacement of English by continental literature was partly responsible for this change. The attitudes developed by scientific study, however, and the pessimism engendered by the sacrifices and losses of the Russo-Japanese War, also contributed materially to the changed point of view. To some extent, also, it may be accounted for as a natural swing from the extreme development of romanticism. In its earlier stages this naturalism was distinctly beneficial to Japanese letters, resulting in many notable contributions to the literature of the nation, and securing recognition for writers whose work, although noteworthy, had seemed destined to obscurity. But the movement, with its emphasis on subject, caused a decline in style and, with the passage of time, naturalism, with its free treatment of sex relations, resulted in decadence and sensualism.

Idealism

About 1912 an independent stream, which had been running parallel, with the current of naturalism, became the main stream. Idealism in literature had been preserved through the writings of Soseki Natsume, a student of the classical as well as of the Western learning. After 1912 idealism became stronger as a result of a reaction against the extreme tendencies of the naturalistic writers. This reaction was confirmed and redirected as one of the consequences of the World War. Since the war, with the growth in importance of class struggles and alignments, Japanese literature has been strongly affected by the problem of class adjustment.

Western ideas

It is in literary circles that the non-economic ideas and ideals of the West have found their greatest hearing. And it is through literature, rather than the schools, that new ideas are coming into circulation in modern Japan.

The drama

While the drama has not been so greatly affected as the novel by the three-quarters of a century of foreign intercourse, it has not entirely escaped. Prior to the Restoration there were four forms of dramatic art. For the Court, the *Daimyo*, and the *samurai*, there was

the *Nō* performance, a stately dance to singing, the themes being religious or martial. The costuming of the performers was extremely elaborate. Because of the somberness of the *Nō* dance, it became customary to insert a farce into the interludes. This was called the *Kyōgen* (Mad Words). For the common people, since they were excluded from the *Nō* performance, two other forms developed. The first was a dramatic ballad, given to the accompaniment of a musical instrument called the *Samisen*. Puppets were used in connection with the singing of the ballad. The themes were not light or laughter provoking any more than was the *Nō* dance. Consequently, the *Kabuki*, or farce, came into existence, and with it arose the theatre in the Western sense. By the end of the pre-Restoration period it had come to be a fixed custom, at first decreed by law, that women's parts should be played by men. The actors were invariably professionals, highly trained for their work. A revolving stage had come into use, together with other mechanical arrangements. The dramas themselves were either historical or domestic in theme.

Since the Restoration the nobility have begun to patronize the plebeian theater, although they still interest themselves in the *Nō* representations. Women have in recent years appeared on the stage. New theatre devices have been introduced. But so far as the professional stage is concerned, the dramatic art remains essentially Japanese. Some of Shakespeare's plays have been translated and produced, as have those of a few continental European dramatists, but without marked success. There are some playwrights of reputation who find their models in the West, but their plays are produced more often by amateurs than by professional actors. They find a greater acceptance for their work in the periodicals than on the stage.

*Modern
tendencies*

One of the most noteworthy developments in Japan has been that of the press and of periodical literature. The newspaper is something entirely modern and its real development is a matter of the last twenty-five years. Some papers made their appearance shortly after the first treaties were signed, but the life of most was short. Only two existed in 1868. Others were established in 1871-1872, and as the agitation for a constitution commenced the papers multiplied. They were mostly organs of individuals who were opposed to the government. This led to the establishment of official journals. They were all interested in attack and counter-attack rather than in gathering and presenting the news of the day. Consequently they lost the support of their readers, who in time became disgusted with polemics. The result was that they were seldom sound enterprises from the financial standpoint. One of the notable exceptions was the *Jiji Shimpō* which was founded in 1882. It, however, was conducted as a politico-literary enterprise rather than as a purely commercial one, as were the other Tokyo papers. The newspaper considered purely as a business venture was first developed in Osaka. The Osaka *Asahi Shimbun* and the Osaka *Mainichi Shimbun* were brought into being, not to

The press

spread the ideas of the owners and editors, but to earn for them by gathering and selling the news. They were so successful that others were established for the same purpose. From that time, in spite of many handicaps, including government supervision, the number has multiplied, until now every town of any importance has its own paper, while there are more than fifty daily papers in Tokyo. To the nine hundred Japanese newspapers must be added several foreign language papers, some of which are excellent journals.

Periodicals

Periodicals of all kinds, including religious publications, scientific journals, commercial, engineering, and financial weeklies and monthlies, women's and children's magazines, and comic papers are published in Japan.

Censorship

All of these publications are kept under a more or less strict censorship, although the newspapers and political journals are the only ones seriously affected.

"Warnings are issued by the censor as to what must not be mentioned, as occasion demands, and violation of the order is punished by fine. Every journal on its establishment must deposit (with the authorities) a sum varying from 2,000 yen downwards according to place and frequency of issue, and a fine is deducted from the deposit for every offense. When the deposit is thus exhausted it must be renewed. . . . The average number of summonses for violation of ban on news each year is about 250, and the number of issues forbidden sale or suspended is about 175. The same censorship is exercised over publication of books, the number thus prohibited annually being about five hundred out of a total publication of over 20,000 volumes, 37 of these prohibitions being in reference to books imported from abroad." ¹⁰

The purpose of the censorship is to prevent the spread of "dangerous thought," or of information which it seems undesirable, for various reasons, to have reach the people.

Power of the press

In spite of this control, it must be recognized that the press has become increasingly powerful. If its case is reasonably good, a virtually unanimous press opposition can bring about the downfall of a government, or the modification of a policy, in Japan as in some other countries. The censorship is not maintained to prevent criticism of the Cabinet or of administrators, but to prevent the spread of ideas subversive of existing institutions.

9. JAPANESE ARTS AND CRAFTS

Painting

Japanese art, and the native crafts of an artistic character, have not shown much positive advance in the modern period, and in some respects have suffered an actual decline. Painting and decorative work had been very highly developed prior to the Restoration. While they show a strong Chinese influence, as does much of the culture of ancient Japan, in many respects the Japanese pupils surpassed their continental teachers. They excelled in line work, as did

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 247.

the Chinese, the reason being the development of fine brush work as part of the technique of good writing. The subjects treated were found in nature, and landscape work was especially good, although the draped figure was excellently portrayed. Nature was followed quite closely in landscape painting, except so far as perspective is concerned, and so far as the treatment was not purely imaginative. Old Japanese paintings and prints are designed to suggest the subject rather than to represent it in detail. This makes it impossible to compare the treatment fairly with that of European masters.

After the Restoration the attempt was made to introduce the methods and canons of Western art, a teacher being imported from Italy for that purpose in 1875. But European art encountered a long and honorable native tradition, and there was soon a swing back to the Japanese school. This was encouraged by the foreigners themselves, for the very good reason that the world would lose more than it could conceivably gain by an Europeanization of Japanese art. The Japanese public, furthermore, has not shown itself interested in Western-style paintings to the extent of encouraging the few who have completely made the break from the native tradition. Some of the younger painters have attempted to draw upon the West, not by way of imitation, but by way of combination of the best elements in the two schools. So far nothing especially noteworthy has come from this movement. Thus it may be said by way of summary: there is a strong conservative influence which strengthens the tendency toward maintenance of the ancient canons; there is a small group of painters who are attempting to paint in the Western manner; and there is a middle group which seeks to preserve the Japanese tradition, but which has studied in the West and seeks to develop the ancient art by combining with it contributions to technique drawn from abroad.

*Modern
tendencies*

Ancient Japan also excelled in metal work of all kinds. The bronze work ranged in size from such great statues of Buddha as those at Kamakura and Nara to small temple and house ornaments. The casting achievements of the large-scale work are only excelled by the exquisiteness of the small. The latter work was not all in bronze. The remarkable sword forging and sword ornamentation, as well as the *netsuké*, tiny carved ornaments for pipe-case and tobacco pouch, come to mind as examples of work done in other materials. Ivory and wood sculpture and carving were also highly developed. Buddhism and the military society both stimulated achievements in all of these lines.

*Metal work
and carving*

Some of the modern work compares very favorably with that of the past. But the increasing demand for cheap ornamentation, both in Japan and in the West, and the time factor which now enters into production, have tended to commercialize the work, and have resulted in a lessening of achievement. Much of the work done is decorative rather than artistic in the highest sense of the term.

Development
of artistic
crafts

The demand for quantities of Japanese porcelains and pottery in the West has had a bad effect on the ceramic industry. The best pieces are produced for the domestic market and are fully equal to the standards of the past. The same is true of Japanese *cloisonné*. Much of the modern work is inferior. However, the work of some of the artists is not only equal but actually superior to the best of the past. "The use of silver, instead of copper, as a base, and the setting of designs on the surface in greater relief by the *ishime* process, indicates still more the recent progress of the art. Ando has successfully imitated the French process of translucent designs, and Ota is producing the red monochrome that is the ambition of all workers in this beautiful craft."¹¹ Lacquer and damascene work, embroidery, and weaving have also been developed at least as highly in modern times as in the past. The reception accorded to native Japanese work in the West, together with the patronage of the Imperial Court and the nobility, have all served to promote the preservation and development of these and other native crafts. One modern influence, the commercial, has tended to change the artist into a mere artisan, it is true, but the other influences have aided in preserving the artist. Many of the examples which reach the European and American market are inferior, cheap goods. They represent the commercial output. That which is absorbed in Japan, or only occasionally reaches the West, represents the artistic achievement of the modern Japanese master.

Pre-modern
architecture

The characteristic feature of private architecture in Japan has been its extreme simplicity, together with its flimsiness of construction. In the towns the roof is of tile while in the rural districts it is thatched, except in the case of the wealthier farmers who also use tile. The interior walls are sliding panels, which can be entirely removed if it is desired to combine two or more rooms into one. Public buildings such as Buddhist temples are, however, of marked elaborateness, not so much architecturally, perhaps, as in their decorative features. The style is Chinese and it has been essentially unmodified in the Japanese environment. *Shinto* shrines represent the native architectural genius and the primitive simplicity of the people. They are enlargements of the primitive wooden huts of the early inhabitants. The distinctive feature is the *torii* under which the worshiper passes in approaching the shrine. It consists of two upright trunks, the upper ends of which are mortised into two horizontal logs which project beyond them on either side.

Western
influence on
architecture

The temples and shrines have been left architecturally unaffected by the contact with the West. Government buildings, on the other hand, are being built in a Western or pseudo-Western style, which almost completely fails to harmonize with the surroundings. In the cities, foreign-style dwellings, stores, and manufacturing establishments are increasingly common. As yet no style of building has been

¹¹ Ibid., p. 215.

evolved which offers the advantages of the foreign building and at the same time fits altogether harmoniously into the Japanese scene.

IO. RELIGIONS

One of the most prominent features of the Japanese landscape is the temple or shrine, from which it might be inferred that the people are very devout and intensely religious in their interests and outlook. Consequently this description cannot be concluded without a consideration of the status of religion in modern Japan.

The three organized religions are *Shinto*, the official cult, Buddhism, and Christianity. Confucianism does not exist as a distinct cult, although probably most non-Christian upper-class Japanese would describe themselves as Confucianists. The family system, and ancestor-worship, are of course indigenous, but the Confucian code of morals, emphasizing the filial virtues, reënforces and preserves the native system.

Three religions

Shinto, "the way of the Gods," the original faith of the Japanese, was revived as part of the movement which culminated in the Restoration of Meiji. It is the officially favored religion, although the government professes not to regard it as a religion. In essence it is a system of ancestor-worship. *Shinto* deities and shrines alike are classified according to their official status. The national shrines, of which the Great Shrine at Ise must be placed first, are devoted to the worship of deities of the mythological age. Each village has its shrine, dedicated to a local hero or personage of meritorious deeds. Between the two are those dedicated to the memory of distinguished patriots. In addition, each household has its own shrine, before which it worships the family ancestors, for the spirits of all of the dead are kami, or "god-like" beings. The total number of shrines is 114,086, of twelve grades. These are served by 14,590 priests. This represents a constant decrease in the number of shrines officially maintained and in active use, since the total number in 1908 was over 162,000. The number of priests remains about the same, the decrease being slight. There are thirteen officially recognized *Shinto* sects, and the total number of professed believers in 1922 was upwards of sixteen million people.¹²

Shinto

The principal importance of *Shintoism* in modern times has been nationalistic rather than religious. It has been used to develop devotion to the Imperial House and to the state by cultivating an intense patriotism based upon the supposedly divine origin of the nation and of its rulers. With the spread of education its hold on the masses has begun to weaken, although it is principally among the more highly educated classes that an appreciation of its incongruities in the modern scientific world has been felt. The rulers, however, feel that in this cult of patriotism they have an excellent means of preserving the political, economic, and social *status quo*. As a conse-

Importance of Shinto

¹² *Japan Year Book*, 1926, p. 187.

quence the people are encouraged in their beliefs by those who have themselves rejected them.

*Buddhism
introduced*

Buddhism was introduced into Japan from the continent in the sixth century. It established itself, after a struggle, by its customary compromise of admitting to its pantheon *Shinto* deities as Buddhist incarnations, and also by making concessions to the martial spirit of the Japanese. Its principal contribution to Japan has been in its influence on the art, literature, and general culture of the country, rather than in the realm of moral development and individual conduct.

Buddhist sects

At present there are twelve major Buddhist sects, with numerous sub-sects. Of these, three show the most vitality, and the most power of adaptation to modern conditions. These are the *Zen*, *Nichirin* and *Shin* sects. This tendency toward division has been one of the characteristic features of Japanese Buddhism. Including those of all sects, there were, in 1921, more than seventy-one thousand Buddhist temples, tended by almost forty-four thousand priests. There are about forty-eight and one half million adherents to Buddhism. Since, however, many Buddhists are also *Shintoists*, and vice versa, these figures are not of much absolute value in indicating the comparative strength of the two cults.

*Buddhist
revival*

What seems as clear in the case of Buddhism as in that of *Shintoism* is that its hold on the people is more nominal than real. At the middle of the last century Buddhism was inert and stagnant. Its power came from the momentum acquired during previous ages and from the lack of alternative except that presented in Confucianism, which never found a footing among the masses. As in China, the Buddhist priest was related to death rather than to life. The disestablishment of Buddhism after the Restoration, and the competition of Christianity, served initially to weaken it, but later to restore to it a measure of its old vitality. The result has been that Buddhist Young Men's Associations have been organized, Sunday schools for children have been established, and propaganda has been undertaken in Formosa and elsewhere. Some of the priests have begun to interest themselves in the problems of their parishioners, and have attempted to re-center the village life around the temple. But, on the whole, Japanese Buddhism has not developed an adequate moral code or any social program suited to the needs of modern society.

*Early
Christianity*

Christianity, as has been pointed out, was first introduced into Japan in the middle of the sixteenth century, but it was banned at the end of the century after it had begun to find a firm footing among the people. This early work was Roman Catholic. The Protestants were the first Christians to re-enter the field after the re-opening of Japan to foreign intercourse. Both the Roman and the Orthodox churches soon were at work, the former representing mainly French Catholic, and the latter Russian, Christianity.

The evangelistic work made slow progress for a long time, and

even now there are only about three hundred thousand converts, more than half of whom have been taken into the churches in the last two decades. This seems slight progress to have been made in a period of over sixty years. On the other hand, the influence and importance of Christianity cannot be measured by the number of enrolled church members. Through the mission schools, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., the Salvation Army, and many other philanthropic enterprises, the Christian ideal has been diffused among the people much more widely than statistics can reveal.

*Progress of
Christianity*

The greatest obstacle to successful evangelistic work has been the intense and narrow nationalism which has regarded Christianity as alien and cosmopolitan, and consequently as something which would have a weakening effect on the state and on individual loyalty to it. Next to this the materialism of modern Japan has been a handicap to the work of conversion. "Sectarianism in Christianity does not puzzle the Japanese much, as he is accustomed to it in *Shinto* and Buddhism," but he "considers the moral ideals of Christianity too elevated for the average man, especially in business and domestic life."¹³

*Obstacles to
evangelization*

The comparatively rapid increase in the number of converts in recent years may be explained in three ways. It may be due to the fact that much spade work had to be done over an extended period of time before results could reasonably be expected. Thus from now on will be the period of harvest. It may represent a growing recognition of the necessity for elevating moral standards and developing a social program. Since the other cults offer little in the way of a moral or social code suited to the needs of the times, there may be a movement toward Christianity. Or it may be the result of the partial Japanization of the Christian churches, so that there is no longer a fear of them as alien. Possibly all of these factors help to explain the acceleration of conversion.

*Explanation of
acceleration of
conversion*

The Japanese churches and other Christian institutions have been slowly moving toward self-control. Even in matters of finance dependence on foreigners has steadily lessened, some of the churches having moved to the point of financing themselves entirely from contributions of their Japanese members. In fact the Christian community has not increased proportionally as greatly as have the contributions to its support. This tendency toward independence has been accelerated in the last few years, since "a movement has recently appeared among Japanese Christian churches with the object of severing financial and other connections with the foreign mission boards, mostly British and American, and to take a free hand in their evangelistic work. This independence movement, it is significant to say, was voiced first immediately after the enforcement in 1924 of the new anti-Japanese immigration legislation in America, and has fast gained ground, meetings of influential Japanese Christians, exclusive of those of the

*Independence
movement in
Japanese
churches*

¹³ BRYAN, op. cit., p. 262.

Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches, having been held in Tokyo to discuss the ways and means for carrying the movement to realization."¹⁴

Social influence
of Christianity

This movement, it should be noted, is not directed against the missions, but is designed to render the church entirely independent of the foreign-supported mission. It should be added that this movement, generally speaking, has the support of the missionaries in Japan, just as does the similar movement in China. It is felt by many that Christianity can be much more effectively spread in Japan by Japanese through a purely Japanese institution. Through the spread of Christian ideals by means of the church a sounder social system may be developed than that which has resulted from the modernization of the economic life of Japan. Thus the remedy may be introduced from the West for the evils developed partly as a result of Japanese material borrowings from the West.

In spite of the numerous cults and sects, however, and of many picturesquely placed and beautiful shrines and temples, it cannot be said that today the Japanese are an intensely religious people. On the whole, the effect of the emphasis on the material, the spread of modern scientific knowledge, and the bringing of people in large numbers into the cities to engage in factory work, has been distinctly to weaken traditional beliefs. The lack of faith is reported to be most noticeable among the industrial workers. Certainly the hold of the national cult of *Shinto* has been weakened in recent years among them. This lessening of faith has been causing the political and industrial leaders a great deal of concern, for it has presented them with the necessity of replacing it, as a bond uniting the individual and the state, with something as useful and more in harmony with contemporary ideas. As has been intimated, Christianity may ultimately be turned to for a solution, or there may conceivably come a Buddhist revival. At any rate, here is presented one of the problems of the future unless the character of the Japanese, and of the state, is to be radically changed. Religion in Japan has been distinctly a conservative force, and if its hold on the industrial masses continues to be weakened, "dangerous ideas" of a secular nature, so long feared and guarded against, may find a wider hearing with disastrous results to the established order.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF JAPAN—1895-1926

*Consideration
of Japanese
development
interrupted
at 1895*

THE consideration of the internal political history of Japan was interrupted at 1895 in order that the wars with China and Russia and their consequences might be fitted into the picture. It now becomes necessary to return to the point then reached, and outline internal developments after 1895, so that the international position and policies of Japan after 1905 may be adequately treated.

*Essential
features of
constitutional
system
recapitulated*

It will be remembered that the constitution was promulgated in 1889 and the new governmental system inaugurated in 1890. The new machinery was not designed to give control to the electorate, since the House of Representatives was denied the powers necessary to enable it to control the executive. Consequently the years from 1889 to 1894 were marked by a constant struggle between the clan leaders, entrenched in the Cabinet, and the parties, controlling the House of Representatives. The powers of the Diet proved extensive enough to enable the lower house to embarrass, but not to control, the government.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES

*Nature of first
parties*

The parties, led by Itagaki and Okuma, had been organized partly as a means of carrying on the struggle against the control of the government by the Choshu and Satsuma clans and, partly because of a desire to make the political system at least semi-popular in character. For a long time the parties were really personal followings of such men as Okuma and Itagaki, held together by the personality of the leader rather than by any common set of beliefs as to public policies. Both the *Jiyu-to* (Liberal party), led by Count Itagaki, and the *Kaishin-to* (Progressive party), organized by Count Okuma, professed to stand for the same things—the establishment of a constitution and of a representative system of government, with the abolition of clan control—and yet the two groups were unable to amalgamate until 1898, and then only temporarily, because they were factions organized around the personalities of two dominating individuals.

*Party
opposition to
the Government*

The establishment of the Diet afforded the party leaders a convenient center from which they could work toward the restriction of clan domination by the introduction of the principle of party control exerted through the representative branch of the government. From the first they indicated their intention to oppose a government which they could not control, in the hope that by such opposition they could force the acceptance of the principle that the Cabinet must

be so constructed as to be able to secure a working majority in the House. By means of this systematic opposition, the House was able to bring about the downfall of successive ministries, but it was not able to determine their successors. The government, for its part, in its endeavor to break down the resistance of the forces opposed to it, resorted to successive dissolution of the House, and tried to control elections through manipulation of the election machinery. But no basis for compromise between the principles of party responsibility and non-responsible government could be found, since neither side was willing to give up its pretensions. Even Ito himself was unable to break down the opposition of the House, except by resort to the Imperial rescript. As a result of this situation, he seized upon the Korean trouble in 1894 as a means of rallying the nation to support of the government.

In this he was temporarily successful, but out of the war grew another conflict, this time within the oligarchy itself. From the time of the Restoration there had been two elements in the oligarchy with divergent views as to national policy. This divergence showed itself first in a definite way at the time of the Formosan difficulty, when the oligarchs split over the question of war or peace. The peace party, as has been related, gained the upper hand, which it retained until the time of the Sino-Japanese War. With that war the other party, led by Prince Yamagata, came into control, and from that time on, step by step, it pushed the Ito group into the background, so that while Ito brought party strife to an end by a resort to a foreign war, he raised a more formidable opposition to his dominance than that represented by the parties.

*Conflict within
the oligarchy*

This militarist control was a logical outgrowth of the clan system of government. When the army was reorganized after the Restoration, and the navy brought into being, the two strongest of the clans monopolized the highest positions in those services, Satsuma going into the navy and Choshu into the army, which branch of the service was organized on a national basis by Yamagata, a Choshu man. All of those in high rank, whether of his own clan or not, owed their positions to him and recognized him as their leader. Naturally both the army and navy men were interested in the development of their respective services. At first the army was considered to be more essential to the national protection and aggrandizement, and it consequently played the more important part in the struggles within the oligarchy.

*Militarist
control a
logical
outgrowth of
clan system of
government*

Normally, the two protective services would be considered to exist for the purpose of giving effect to national policies as determined by the civil branches of the government, but Prince Yamagata was a political as well as a military figure, and he was politically interested in the development of the army, and in its utilization for the carrying out of the dreams of the great pre-Restoration imperialist, Yoshida, whose pupil he had been. Adequate provision for this

*Establishment
of control by
Army and Navy*

could not be made so long as the peace and internal progress faction in the oligarchy was in control of the policy-determining branches of the government. But in the midst of the war with China the Privy Council was persuaded to issue an ordinance providing that the Ministers of War and Marine must always be selected from high officers on the active list of the army and navy.¹ The consequence of this was that no Cabinet could be completed unless the Satsuma and Choshu military men, and this meant primarily Yamagata, were willing to support the Cabinet. Their support was usually conditioned on the willingness of the Cabinet to make adequate provision in its budget proposals for the expansion of the two forces, and thus on its acquiescence in a policy of expansion on the continent.

*Ito able to
maintain
himself—
1894-98*

Ito was Premier in 1894, and the enthusiasm generated by the successful struggle against China, together with a virtual alliance with the *Jiyu-to*, which was cemented by conferring the post of Minister of the Interior on Itagaki, enabled him to maintain himself for four years. He was succeeded by Count Matsukata, in whose short-lived ministry Count Okuma was included "not as a leader of the Progressive Party, of course, but in order to separate him from his party."² Since this government was unable to control the Diet, Ito was again called upon to form a ministry.

*Party leaders
invited to form
government*

By 1898 it had become clear that a severe struggle was going on within the oligarchy, as well as between the clan leaders and the parties. These two contests were merged when Ito suggested to the other clan leaders the formation of a government party, a proposal which was vetoed by Prince Yamagata, who, however, concurred in Ito's next proposal, which was that the party leaders should be invited to form a government since none of the clan leaders could command a majority in the House of Representatives. In retrospect, it appears that Yamagata's concurrence was dictated by his belief that a party government would be unsuccessful, and that in any case it could ultimately be controlled through the Ministries of War and Marine.

*Experiment
of party
government
premature*

Consequently, in 1898, Okuma and Itagaki, who had amalgamated their followings into a new party, the *Kensei-to*, or Constitutional Party, were invited to form a government. This first so-called party government lasted only four months. From the first there was dissension between the two wings of the new party, principally over the distribution of the offices. The coalition had not been in existence long enough for the two elements to fuse, or to reach a completely satisfactory agreement as to program. The leaders were taken by surprise when invited to form a government, as it was probably intended that they should be, and the agreements reached were hastily

¹ This ordinance was modified in 1908 so that officers on the retired list might serve, but that did not deprive the army and navy of control.

² HORNBECK, p. 152.

concluded. The experiment proved premature, and left the clan leaders more securely entrenched in power than before.

After this demonstration of the futility of entrusting governing power to the parties, Prince (then Marquis) Yamagata consented to form a government which, while non-party from the standpoint of personnel, had a working arrangement with the *Jiyu-to*. Thus the clan leaders were moving toward a recognition of the party while remaining unwilling to entrust it with power. This Yamagata ministry also represents the triumph of the military faction in the oligarchy.

*Yamagata
ministry*

It was clear that Ito was the only one strong enough to hope to oppose the entrenchment of the Yamagata faction in permanent control, and that he could do so only provided he could find sources of strength outside of the oligarchy. He frankly recognized this when, in 1900, he reëntered the arena as the organizer and recognized leader of a new party, which took the name of *Rikken Seiyu-kai* (Constitutional Government Friend's Association), and which from the time of its organization became the strongest single force in the Diet. At the same time the Progressive Party was reorganized, with Okuma still the leader, as the *Kensei-honto*. These developments left Yamagata without support in the Diet and forced him to retire from office. Ito, as his successor, found himself with adequate support in the House of Representatives, but confronted with the opposition of the House of Peers which, representative of the clan idea, resented the fact that Ito had gone over to the parties, and, under the direction of Yamagata, made war on him. Furthermore, Ito proved unsuccessful as a party leader, alienating some of his supporters by his dictatorial methods, and others by his refusal to take care of his followers at the expense of the public services by allowing them to monopolize the offices. From this time it became apparent that the parties were more interested in the spoils of office than in controlling the government in the public interest.

*Ito organizes
Seiyu-kai*

*Unsuccessful
as party leader*

In 1903 the leadership of the *Seiyu-kai* was turned over by Prince Ito to Prince Saionji, one of the Court nobility, who continued to serve as its leader until the end of the Meiji era. When the Ito ministry was overturned in 1901, a protégé of Prince Yamagata became Premier, the Elder Statesmen retiring into the background, although continuing to dominate as the makers of ministries, since their advice was invariably sought, and followed, by the Emperor when it became necessary to select a new Premier, or to decide upon important departures in policy.

*Elder statesmen
control from
behind the
Throne*

During the first decade of Japan's constitutional life the various parties had learned their lesson. They had found that opposition to the government deprived them of any share in the spoils of office, and they had learned that political activity was expensive, with its campaigns and canvassing, and its competitive buying of votes. Its expensiveness was decidedly enhanced by reason of the successive

*Party interest
in spoils*

dissolutions, with the expenses of the election recurring not every four years, but sometimes every few months. Therefore, not being able to control the government and, consequently, to determine its constitution and the distribution of the spoils, the parties began to compete with one another for the privilege of an alliance with the government of the day in order that they might reap some of the rewards of political life and activity. This meant stagnation, as far as political progress was concerned, but it brought with it a comparative harmony in internal politics, which had been sadly lacking during the first decade after the promulgation of the constitution.

2. THE PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENT 1901-1912

*Period of
alternating
premiership,
1901-12*

*Seiyu-kai the
government
party*

*Reasons for
alternation*

*Financial
difficulties*

Count Katsura became Premier as the struggle against Russia reached its last peaceful stages. When the war broke out party strife again came to an end. This time, however, this merely meant that the opposition party ceased to oppose, for the Katsura government had enjoyed the support of the *Seiyu-kai* from the time of its organization. This condition continued to the death of the Emperor and the end of the Meiji era. Two men, Katsura and Saionji, alternated in the premiership from 1901 until 1912. Saionji, as the leader of the *Seiyu-kai*, was logically entitled to its support, while it might have been expected to oppose his rival, who was a bureaucrat opposed in principle to the parties. Not logic, but expediency, prevailed, however, for Katsura enjoyed *Seiyu-kai* support equally with its leader. Nor was it always a loss of support in the Diet which caused one to retire in favor of the other. When one had enjoyed power for a considerable time the Diet was apt to become bored with his government. Furthermore, as the time for elections to the House of Representatives would approach, the interest of party members in support of the government would decline, its demands on it would become excessive, and then the Premier would retire. Still another and a more important factor in causing the resignation of the Premier was the difficulty of finding a solution for the financial problem. The end of the war with Russia left the nation saddled with a heavy debt, and with a mounting expenditure made necessary by the attempt to consolidate and extend the gains of the war and to promote internal development. Katsura retired in favor of Saionji in 1905, when peace approached, and left him to grapple with the financial problem. When Saionji failed to work it out, and as the people became increasingly restless under the heavy burden of taxation, Katsura resumed the helm in 1908, with a program of reform which failed to meet the situation. Saionji again tackled the problem in 1911, only to give way to Katsura in 1912. It may be noted here that the principal obstacle to a solution of the problem of balancing revenue and expenditure, and the thing which contributed most strongly to the overthrow of these several ministries, was the demand of the army, and particularly of the navy, for increased appropriations. An elaborate program of naval expansion,

to be spread over a period of years, was proposed immediately after the war. Financial difficulties forced extension of the period, but the program remained, together with Prince Yamagata's insistence on its ultimate realization, to complicate the problem of finance.

*Financial
program of
army and navy*

3. RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In 1912 there began a new development which augured a renewal of the process of political evolution which had been checked by the long continued *Seiyu-kai* support of the government of the day. When Prince Katsura resigned in 1911 he announced the intention of retiring from the political arena. One explanation given at the time for his retirement was that he had grown restive under the dominance of Prince Yamagata, who remained as the power behind these alternating ministries. Furthermore, Yamagata had secured a post in the Imperial Household for him, and this automatically forced his withdrawal from politics. In 1912 the resignation of his successor precipitated a conflict among the Imperial advisers, as a result of which Katsura was enabled to emerge from his temporary obscurity and resume an active political life. His emergence carried with it a break with his former patron, Prince Yamagata, however, and led him to seek a new support, as had Ito before him, by the organization of a political party. Katsura's party, called the *Doshikai*, or Unionist Party, was recruited largely from the *Kokumin-to* (Constitutional Nationalists), which name had been taken by the Progressives in 1910. The seceders were animated by the desire to participate in the spoils of office, long denied them as members of the party of opposition. The *Kokumin-to*, with reduced strength, continued as an opposition party under the able leadership of Mr. Inagai. This raid on the *Kokumin-to* netted for the new *Doshikai* only about seventy parliamentarians, and Katsura's attempt to add to this number from the ranks of the *Seiyu-kai* proved unsuccessful. Consequently, with no majority in the legislature, confronted with the opposition of the *Seiyu-kai*, unsupported by public opinion, and without substantial backing among the Elder Statesmen, the Katsura government fell. It carried with it Prince Saionji, however, for Katsura persuaded the Emperor to order Saionji to bring to an end his party's opposition to the Cabinet. This Saionji could not accomplish, and he therefore felt obliged to retire from politics, since he had been unable to carry the Emperor's will into effect.

Katsura retires

*Reenters
politics and
organizes new
party*

*Not able to
secure
parliamentary
majority*

The resignation of Katsura paved the way for another clan government, supported as in the past by the *Seiyu-kai*. Admiral Yamamoto, a Satsuma clansman, became Premier in 1913. The support of his Cabinet by the *Seiyu-kai* led to a revolt in the party which resulted in the formation of the *Seiyu* (Constitutionalists) Club, an organization consisting of the more idealistic members of the party. A naval scandal brought about the downfall of the Yamamoto government

*Return to clan
government*

and, since none of the bureaucrats were able to form a Cabinet, seemed to prepare the way for the introduction of party government.

The Okuma
Ministry

Count Okuma, eighty years old, and "the man of all men in Japan who had consistently and indefatigably upheld and advanced the course of self-government,"³ accepted the premiership early in 1914. His program "emphasized economic reform, the eradication of corrupt practices, and the establishment of responsible government. Education should be fostered, peace maintained, productive enterprises advanced, and taxes reduced."⁴ The *Seiyu-kai* refused to support Count Okuma's Cabinet and he immediately dissolved the Diet and appealed to the country for support. For the first time since its formation, the *Seiyu-kai* found itself unable to command a majority in the House of Representatives, for a new party formed by union of the *Seiyu-Club*, the *Doshi-kai*, and a personal following of Count Okuma's, and taking the name of *Kensei-kai*, became the majority party.

Summary of
party views
and differences

Since, with one exception to be noted later, the organization of the *Kensei-kai* produced the last change in the party system, at this point it will be well to describe briefly the major parties.⁵ After 1905, when the struggle to overthrow the clan system and to establish responsible government was given up for the time, a change in party objective became apparent. The tendency to struggle merely for participation in the spoils has already been referred to. But a more significant change was due to the development of modern industry, and the rise of a capitalist class whose interests needed to be protected. The *Kokumin-to* early came to have a close relationship to the industrialists, a relationship which was taken over by the new *Kensei-kai* after 1914. Consequently it stands for the reduction of the income and business tax, and in general for policies which will advance the interests of its constituents. In the field of foreign affairs, its policy is that of economic rather than territorial imperialism, as was well evidenced in the twenty-one demands served on China by Count Okuma's government. The *Seiyu-kai* has had much closer relations with the bureaucrats, and it participated in the benefits of their policy of expansion by force rather than by economic penetration, although after 1918 it also came to stand primarily for economic expansion. While not antagonistic to the industrial capitalists, its constituents are the large land-owners and the commercial interests. Consequently, in the matter of taxation, it stands for the reduction of the land rather than the business tax. The *Kokumin-to*, the weakest of the three, has a following in the industrial centers. But as a party which has no hope of gaining the spoils of office, or of materially affecting public policy, "it can permit its principles to become

a) *Kensei-kai*

b) *Seiyu-kai*

c) *Kokumin-to*

³ Ibid., pp. 167-8.

⁴ Ibid., p. 167.

⁵ The changes in party organization, as far as the major groups are concerned, are indicated, for convenience, in the diagram opposite.

slightly idealistic, and it talks about reducing the indirect taxes on consumption, which are paid by the non-voting masses."⁶

4. EFFECT OF THE WAR ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Count Okuma's pledges were never carried into effect. Before economic changes could be inaugurated or tax reduction considered, the European War broke out, and with Japanese participation, and subsequent developments, interest was shifted from internal conditions to foreign policy. This aspect of Okuma's ministry will be considered in another connection. Here it is sufficient to notice the fact that the most serious opposition which developed to his government was based on the claim that its foreign policy was not strong enough. It was overthrown in 1916, partly as a result of Prince Yamagata's opposition to its party character as well as on account of its alleged failure to pursue a more vigorous continental policy.

*Shift in
interest from
internal to
external
questions*

Upon the recommendation of the Elder Statesmen, Count Terauchi, Yamagata's protégé, who had made his principal reputation as an iron-handed Governor-General of Korea, formed a non-party Cabinet supported in the Diet by the *Seiyu-kai*. He immediately dissolved the House and used the influence of officialdom against the *Kensei-kai* candidates, with the result that it lost its control without, however, the *Seiyu-kai* securing an absolute majority. Terauchi continued in control until 1918, when, due to the artificial raising of the cost of rice, there developed widespread dissatisfaction, which found an outlet through riots in the industrial centers. Advantage was taken of this condition to procure the resignation of Count Terauchi.

*Non-party
Cabinet
formed by
Terauchi*

He was succeeded by Mr. Hara, leader of the *Seiyu-kai* after the retirement of Prince Saionji, and the first commoner to assume the premiership. This elevation of a commoner was dictated by several considerations. In the first place, he was the recognized leader of a powerful party. In the second place, during 1917 and 1918 such great emphasis had been laid on the idea of democracy, as part of the war propaganda throughout the world, that it seemed fitting to show that Japan had accepted the new ideas. This was especially desirable because of the criticism which had been leveled against the militarism and clan government of Japan after 1914 in the Western world, and notably in the United States. And in the third place, there was no bureaucrat capable of forming a government.

*A commoner
becomes premier*

The Diet was again dissolved in 1920 "on the avowed ground that the (Mr. Hara) considered it a public danger that the *Kokumin-to* and the *Kensei-kai* had introduced an universal suffrage bill into the Diet,"⁷ but in reality to enable the *Seiyu-kai* to secure a stable majority. In this it was eminently successful, and consequently its power seemed secure for some time to come. Unfortunately Premier Hara was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic in 1921 while the Washington Conference was in session. His place was taken by Viscount

*Seiyu-kai
majority
secured*

*Effect of
assassination
of Hara*

⁶ IWASAKI, *Working Forces in Japanese Politics*, p. 105.

⁷ *Japan Year Book*, 1921-22, p. 62.

Return to
non-party
government

Takahashi, who also succeeded to the leadership of the party. In 1922, however, there came a split in the *Seiyu-kai* over the Premier's policy of cabinet reconstruction. This resulted in the formation of a new party, the *Seiyu-honto*, and the overthrow of the government. The Elder Statesmen still living in 1922, Prince Saionji and Marquis Matsukata, dictated the choice of the new Premier. Admiral Kato, who had made a very favorable impression on the non-Japanese world as a member of the Japanese delegation at the Washington Conference, took office on a platform of complete fulfilment of the Washington agreements. While engaged in carrying out his pledges, Admiral Kato died on August 24, 1923. The great earthquake which came in September, 1923, and which resulted in such great losses, found Japan under a hastily formed transitional government headed by Admiral Yamamoto, which soon gave way to a more permanent non-party cabinet headed by Viscount Kiyouri. Thus for two years Japan was ruled by non-party governments, supported by the old government party but not founded on it.

Party
government
again formed

It was not until after the elections of May, 1924, that a party government was again formed. In the elections the *Kensei-kai* returned 151 members to the House, the *Seiyu-honto* 116, the *Seiyu-kai* 100, and the remainder were independents or members of unimportant factions. The leader of the *Kensei-kai*, Viscount Kato, who had been the Foreign Minister in Count Okuma's 1914-1916 government, was invited to organize a Cabinet and assume the reins of power. His government has endured to the present time by virtue of his party strength, and the support accorded it by members of the *Seiyu-honto*, which has been considering amalgamating with the *Kensei-kai*, although so far the two groups have been unable to agree on the conditions of union.

5. ASPECTS OF POLITICAL PROGRESS SINCE 1895

Political
progress shown
a) in weakening
of clan control

This brief outline perhaps does not indicate that there has been much political progress in Japan since 1895. The people have certainly been largely uninterested in politics. The parties have not developed programs which could be expected to arouse much interest, couched, as they have been, in vague and general terms. Corruption in elections has been a marked feature of Japanese politics since before 1900, and the alliance of the government with one or another of the parties has been founded on the principle of division of the spoils. But with all this, and more, on one side, on the other must be set the fact that the control of the government by the two clans has steadily weakened since 1912, and that responsibility has been placed, if only intermittently, on the parties. It may be hoped that, in the not too distant future, the doctrine that the Cabinet shall be made up from the majority party in the popular branch of the legislature, and shall be responsible to the people's representatives, will be established as a constitutional doctrine of fundamental importance.

Furthermore, it must be set down on the side of progress that the electorate has been materially enlarged. The first change in that direction came in 1900 when the law was revised to permit Japanese male subjects over twenty-five years old who paid a direct tax of over ten *yen* to vote. This increased the number of possible voters from about five hundred thousand to one million seven hundred thousand. At the same time, the property qualification for membership in the House was abolished. The 1918-1919 Diet further substantially enlarged the electorate by reducing the property qualification to three *yen*. Since then a manhood suffrage act has been passed, thus putting the Japanese electorate on as broad a basis as any in the West where the principle of woman suffrage has not been accepted. This, together with the development of party government, should result in renewing the interest of the people in political questions, now that their interest may conceivably react on the policies adopted by the government. It is not to be wondered at that political life has been marked by corruption and by lack of popular interest, for governmental action has been almost entirely divorced from popular or even semi-popular control.

*b) enlargement
of electorate*

6. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It has been in her economic life, however, that Japan has undergone the greatest changes since 1895. Here there has been much progress, if the development of a modern industrial system, the building-up of a great merchant marine, and a great expansion of foreign trade, may be considered indications of progress. Before the war with China, as has been pointed out in another connection, there had been laid the foundations for the development of industry and commerce. Railways had been built; modern banks had been organized, and experimentation which finally led to the establishment of a satisfactory banking system was begun; the currency system had been reorganized and, shortly after the war, put on a gold basis; a modern postal system had been instituted; telegraphic and telephonic communication had been introduced; and a merchant marine, with the accompaniment of a ship-building industry, was in existence. Thus the basis for industrial development had been created. There had also taken place, largely under government auspices, some changes in the direction of establishing a new industrial technique. But, on the whole, it may be said that it was only after 1895, and particularly after 1903, that Japan began to be transformed into an industrial nation, and that Osaka and other cities began to take on the appearance of, say, Birmingham or Fall River.

*Economic
foundations
laid before
1895*

The three foreign wars in which modern Japan has been engaged have had pronounced effects on her industrial progress. Each has resulted in an expansion of industry; each has been followed by boom times, marked by much speculation, the temporary appearance of many new undertakings, and general over-expansion in industry; and

*Effect of three
foreign wars on
economic life*

each era of unlimited prosperity has been followed by a period of marked depression, carrying with it the collapse and disappearance of many of the unsubstantial prosperity-created undertakings. But the deflation of industry has invariably left Japan more distinctly industrialized than she had been before the war, and ready to begin a gradual progress on a more substantial basis.

*Imports and
exports*

A few figures will help us to visualize the economic development of Japan after 1895. Exports in 1885 were valued at slightly over thirty-seven million *yen*, and imports at more than twenty-nine million *yen*, making a total of sixty-six and one-half million *yen*. The war year (1894) saw this total increased to well over two hundred thirty million *yen*. The next war year (1904) found the total again increased to six hundred-ninety and a half million *yen*. The import trade of 1914 was valued at almost five hundred ninety-six million *yen*, while exports had increased to nine hundred ninety-one millions. In 1919 the export total had risen to two billion *yen*, and the import total to slightly over two billion. The depression of 1920 and thereafter, together with similar conditions in Europe, immediately reduced the totals, which, however, by 1926 had almost reached those of 1919. Even when we make all necessary allowances for changes in price levels, and for fluctuations in exchange, these figures serve to indicate a tremendous expansion in trade.

*Analysis of
foreign trade*

*Excess of
imports,
1895-1914*

An analysis of this trade reveals several significant facts. From 1882 to about 1894 there was an almost invariable excess of exports over imports, due largely to the fact that the Japanese people, agricultural in their interests, were still living the life of the past, and that need for Western commodities had not yet become strongly felt. After 1895, with but few variations, the excess lay on the side of imports—the so-called balance of trade remaining unfavorable to Japan until the outbreak of the European War, when the tables were again turned until after the end of that struggle. The depression following the war, coupled with the return of her normal competitors to the trade arena, and the necessity for large imports to repair the damages of the great earthquake of 1923, again turned the balance against Japan.

*Change in
character of
exports and
imports*

A more significant conclusion from an analysis of the foreign trade is that its character gradually changed after 1895. Thus the imports came to be raw materials and partly finished commodities rather than finished manufactures, while the exports became finished or semi-finished industrial products. The culmination of the change in character of the import and export trade is fairly represented by its distribution in 1919. Crude articles for food accounted for only 3.1 per cent of the exports but for 12 per cent of the imports; 4 per cent of the exports and 4.2 per cent of the imports were manufactured articles for food; raw materials other than food stuffs amounted to 5.2 per cent of the exports and 50.3 per cent of the imports; material for manufactures accounted for 43.2 per cent of the exports and 20

per cent of the total imports; and 43 per cent of the exports and only 12 per cent of the imports were finished goods. During the period of beginnings, from 1895 to the end of the Meiji era, when the balance of trade was consistently unfavorable, not only were many of the raw materials for industry imported, but machinery and industrial tools had to be purchased abroad, and the national industry was unable to meet the demand for manufactured goods. In the decade after 1914 all of that was changed, and Japan not only supplied most of her own industrial needs but also began to find a surplus for export.

Another way of illustrating this transformation of Japan into an industrial and capitalistic society is from the growth of the joint-stock form of enterprise. As late as 1905 there were only 83 joint-stock companies with a paid-up capital of a little over two million *yen*, as against 148 ordinary and limited partnerships with a paid-up capital of over a million three hundred thousand *yen*; whereas in 1914 there were 198 joint-stock companies with a paid-up capital of almost twenty-one million *yen*, while the 293 partnerships had a capital of only six million *yen*.

Growth of joint-stock enterprises illustrates change in economic life

Again, the number of machine looms in 1905 was only 19,040, as compared with almost 716,000 hand looms. By 1914 the number of machine looms had increased to almost 123,000, while there were less than 400,000 hand looms, indicating a substantial encroachment of the new on the old industry. This expansion was accelerated after 1914, and the expansion in that one industry may be taken as fairly typical of all others. The old, essentially esthetic, industries have continued to exist by the side of the new large scale production, but with a decreasing importance in the national economy. The tastes and habits of the Japanese, which disincline them to the standardized product, will undoubtedly perpetuate the market for the goods of the hand-worker, but factory production is rapidly developing an industrialized Japan.

Increased use of modern machinery

But handicrafts continue

It must be emphasized that the government has taken the initiative in the establishment of industries using modern machinery. Its interest has been in releasing Japan from dependence on the West for the materials essential to every-day life, and in building up a substantial export trade. This has led to an emphasis on utilitarian and large-scale production rather than the development of the esthetic and artistic native handicrafts. The new industry, consequently, parallels that of the West. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration, it may be pointed out that cotton and silk spinning and weaving, ship-building, match making, paper making, brewing and distilling, the manufacture of artificial fertilizers, and iron and steel works are among the more important modern industries. During and since the World War there has developed a chemical industry. In the modern industries the aim is standardization and large scale production.

Industrial development parallels that of the West

Electrical enterprise has also become important in modern Japan.

*Electrical
enterprise*

Electricity is used for lighting in all parts of the country, in addition to which it is being used extensively in industry for motive power. The rapid flowing streams are beginning to be utilized to generate electricity, so that the current is cheap and power plentiful. No country has greater hydro-electrical possibilities than Japan. As it is fully developed, it may partially compensate for the comparative inadequacy of her coal supply.

*Reëmphasis on
native crafts*

Prior to, and for a time after, the Russo-Japanese War the vogue of the West was so great in Japan that the native industries suffered an eclipse. At first they tried to adapt themselves by imitation and by acceptance of unfamiliar standards of artistry. The result was the creation of a hybrid which had no merit from the standpoint either of the West or of Japan. It was the foreigner who began to emphasize the esthetic values of the old Japanese handicrafts by his interest in them rather than in the Westernized product. Subsequently the Japanese themselves awakened to the possibilities of their native crafts, and Western influence came to be deprecated. This has led to a revival of interest in essentially Japanese goods. The ceramic industry was one which had most strongly felt the Western influence and which is now beginning to revert to Japanese standards and patterns. The making of lacquer goods, cloisonné, and damascene ware has also been rehabilitated in Japanese eyes. Silk production in the home, for the making of Japanese *obi* and other garments, without standardization of pattern, is another native enterprise which has considerable importance. It must not be understood that these native industries ever disappeared or lost their economic importance, but only that they lost temporarily in popular esteem because they were non-Western, that they tried to lose their distinctive characteristics for a time, and that now they are resuming their natural position.

7. EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

*Conditions
developed with
factory system*

The introduction of the factory system into Japan has strengthened the material foundations of the state, but it has brought with it all of the evil conditions found in the industrial societies of the West. The industrial city, with its smoke-laden air and its crowded slums; the hordes of women and children driven from the home to work in the factory and the mine, instead of eking out the family income by working at home in a leisurely fashion at one of the handicrafts; the divorce of the workman from ownership of the tools of the trade; the submergence of the artisan in the wage-earner who performs one routine operation hour after hour; growing inequalities of wealth, without the maintenance, in the industrial centers, of the feudal-family tradition of mutual aid; the development of group and class antagonisms—all of these features of industrialism are rapidly becoming characteristic of modern Japan.

These changes came so rapidly that no attempt was made, for

a time, to grapple with the problems they created. As a matter of fact, the leaders, as well as the great majority of the enfranchised people, at first remained indifferent to them, and as a capitalist class developed it attained sufficient power, in union with the parties, to prevent consideration of proposals for the amelioration of the condition of the workers. At the same time, the old nobility and the landed gentry felt no responsibility for conditions and consequently overlooked them. The first proposals for factory legislation were made in 1909, but it was not until 1916 that a measure was finally enacted and put into force.

*Failure to
enact
satisfactory
factory
legislation*

The regulations of 1916 provide for the gradual reduction of hours for young persons and women, commencing at fourteen hours per day, then to thirteen and finally to twelve, the process of reduction covering a period of fifteen years. When it is taken into account that only two holidays a month are granted and that the intervening periods of rest during working days are usually not over thirty minutes, it still leaves conditions deplorable. In fact the new law is almost a farce, since it promises so little relief to the workers.⁸

Act of 1916

Exemption from its operation of all state factories, and special provisions, such as the one allowing an extension of working hours in factories engaged in raw silk and silk textiles, further combine to render it an unsatisfactory measure. Its major importance comes from the mere fact of its enactment, which in itself indicates a growing recognition of the social problems rising out of the establishment of the factory system. Japan, of course, took part in the International Labor Conference held at Washington in 1920, where, however, she secured exemption from the eight-hour-day provision, together with other restrictions there agreed upon. Consequently the law of 1916 represents the farthest advance actually made up to the present time.

A plentiful labor supply due to her expanding population, to the attraction of city life for the rural laborer, and to the constant recruiting of young women for industrial service, meant that wages were low in Japan until after 1914, and notably until 1918, when the tremendous overnight expansion of industry, with its boom times and its apparently unlimited demand for workers, brought about rapid wage increases. These, however, were virtually absorbed by the mounting cost of living, and by an increased consumption consequent on the new prosperity. And it was a question whether the new wage levels could be maintained after the war. The demand for raw and finished silk in the United States was one large factor in producing this post-war boom; another factor was the artificial maintenance of high prices in the cotton industry through agreements among the brokers. The boom collapsed in 1920, however, just as similar periods of prosperity, marked by speculation, over-expansion, and over-capitalization, following the wars with China and Russia, came to an end.

Post-war boom

⁸ HERSHEY, *Modern Japan*, pp. 174-5.

*Industrial
depression
after 1920*

The immediate cause of the slump was the refusal of the Bank of Japan to continue to loan to private banks, and its further action in calling in all loans due and payable. But by 1920 the American demand for raw silk had been curtailed, shipping had suffered severe setbacks as a consequence of the end of the war monopoly of the Pacific carrying trade, and the China demand for Japanese cotton goods was lessened as a consequence of the boycott instituted when the decisions of the Paris Conference as to Shantung were made known in China. And, in any case, over-expansion ultimately brings its own penalties. This depression continued through the period of the Washington Conference, and one difficulty faced by the government was that of preventing further dislocation of industry as a result of the fulfilment of the pledges which made it impossible to carry out the already accepted program of capital ship construction. Partly to avoid throwing men in the shipyards out of work, a new program involving construction of cruisers was proposed. The repairing of the damage done by the great earthquake also quickened the stagnant industrial life.

*Taxation heavy
due to
constantly
increasing
expenditure*

It should be pointed out here that the problem of living had been greatly complicated for the people by reason of the heavy burden of taxation which they have had to bear during the twentieth century. Public expenditure increased, from 1902 to 1914, from almost three hundred million to about five hundred fifty million *yen*. After the entrance of Japan into the war, her expenditure mounted rapidly until the budget totals ran well over a billion *yen*. This was due in large part to her continental adventures, and to the expenditures made necessary by the military and naval program accepted in 1916 and revised in 1920, although general administrative expenditures also increased. During the same period, 1902-1914, the national debt increased from five hundred million to two billion five hundred million *yen*. The war with Russia was largely instrumental in bringing about this increase, but borrowings for railway development, after the railways were nationalized in 1906, and for the promotion of Japanese interests in Manchuria, materially helped to swell the total. This was further increased after 1914. As an offset to the latter, must be put the loans made by Japan to China from 1914-1918, many of which were political, and upon which payments both of interest and principal are in arrears.

*Methods of
securing
revenue*

Every possible expedient has been resorted to in order that these heavy charges may be carried. For example, the government instituted a tobacco, a camphor, and a salt monopoly for fiscal reasons, the first two following the war with China, the camphor monopoly also being designed to foster that industry in Formosa, and the third during the war with Russia. But nothing could avail to keep taxes from constant increase, so that, taking into account various luxury taxes, registration fees, and land, income, business, and inheritance taxes, the burden on the individual is very great. To these, of course,

must be added the levies for local purposes. Thus, in the last analysis, it is not alone industrialization which has made the poor grow poorer, even though that is responsible for the widening of the gap between the poor and the rich.

8. LABOR PROBLEMS

Before turning from this general question of economic conditions in modern Japan, we should say a word about the development of labor organizations. What amounted to a ban on the creation, or at least the effective utilization, of labor organizations was a clause in the "Peace Regulations" promulgated in 1900 which reads: "Those who, with the object of causing a strike, seduce or incite others shall be sentenced to major imprisonment of one to six months with additional penalty of y 3 to 30." This virtually condemned labor organizations to service merely as benevolent and social agencies. In spite of this, however, organization began shortly thereafter, although the various organizations changed so much from time to time that it was impossible to estimate their strength. In 1912 the Japanese Federation of Labor was established. Since its reorganization in 1920 by Mr. Bunji Suzuki, it claims an enrolment of about fifty thousand members, who, however, have as yet not reached the point where they have sufficiently defined views to enable them to act unitedly. The position of this and other similar organizations was improved when the ban on them was partially lifted in 1919.

During the era of war and post-war prosperity, strikes multiplied in Japan, in spite of the lack of well-developed labor organizations. The principal reason for most of the strikes, several of which attained considerable dimensions, was an unsatisfactory wage scale. While the depression after 1920 lessened the amount of labor agitation, increasing friction between capital and labor may be expected in the future, unless more liberal and enlightened action is taken to ameliorate the condition of the industrial population.

9. THE POPULATION PROBLEM

Industrial development has made many Japanese wealthy, and has undoubtedly added to the ability of the state to carry heavy financial burdens, since it has added to the taxable wealth. That it has not more successfully raised the standard of living for the masses has been due partly to the usual absorption of the largest share of the benefits by a comparatively small number of people; but fundamentally it has been due to the great increase in population since the Restoration. For a long time before 1867 the population had remained fairly stationary at about twenty-five million. In 1913 the official estimate placed it at a little over fifty-three millions, and by 1920, when the first official census was taken, it had increased to almost fifty-six millions. Better sanitary arrangements and modern medical methods conspired to reduce the death rate, while the birth

*Labor
organization*

*Multiplication
of strikes*

*Industrial
development
has not raised
standard of
living*

*Due largely
to increase in
population*

rate underwent no decline. Twenty-five millions could be supported by the agriculture of pre-modern Japan only at a comparatively low standard of living. If the population had continued stationary, however, improvements in transportation and in agricultural methods, together with the cultivation of new lands and the more scientific utilization of the wealth in timber, would have materially aided in improving the living conditions of the people even though there had been no great development of industry. But the agricultural resources of Japan are not sufficient to take care of the great increase in population which has come since 1867, even when those resources are more fully and economically utilized than they are even today, particularly if the island of Hokkaido is taken into account. Consequently, since 1905, when the industrial transformation really began on a large scale, the interest of Japan has been increasingly manifested in securing the industrial foundations of the state. These interests, from one point of view, lie in gaining control of adequate supplies of coal, iron, and petroleum, among the sub-soil products; in creating a source of supply of her own of raw cotton; and in enlarging her controlled supply of food products to take care of the needs of her industrial and commercial population which obviously cannot supply its own wants. Japan's continental Asiatic policy after 1905, and especially after 1914, indicates this changing interest, as will be subsequently revealed.

This has led to emphasis on expansion to secure a) raw materials

b) markets

From another point of view, the industrial state is actively interested in securing markets for its goods and, so far as possible, in establishing itself in those markets on a monopolistic or at least a preferential basis. While Japan holds a satisfactory position in the West for her silks and teas, her textile industry is primarily interested, of necessity, in the China market to which it sends its yarns as well as cotton piecegoods. Even before the war Japan had made remarkable gains in the China trade, and since then she has reached the point where her competition has seriously threatened British trade supremacy. In view of her favorable location and the growth of her production, it would seem to be only a question of time until Japan becomes the dominant factor in continental markets, except as industrial development enables China and India to supply their own needs. As one writer put it as early as 1912: "The Western countries having given to Japan their industries will see the fruits of these industries passed on to China."⁹

Without industrial development standards would have had to be lowered

Industry, then, has enabled the Japanese to take care of their population expansion since 1905 without a lowering of the standard of living, but this expansion has been so rapid that industrialization has not elevated the standard materially. And it has also decidedly influenced the development of Japan's foreign policy.

Another method of taking care of an expansive population is by means of colonization. While Korea and Formosa and a foothold in

⁹ LAWTON, *Empires of the Far East*, vol. 2, p. 926.

Manchuria were not acquired with a view to utilizing them as areas for colonization, an interest in Manchuria for such purposes might well be alleged, as it has repeatedly been in the past decade. But the Japanese have not been successful as colonizers. In Korea they have been successful organizers and exploiters, but they have not settled there in any large numbers in spite of organized efforts in the direction of colonization; and, as a matter of fact, the comparatively large Korean population, in any case, had first claims on the land. Formosa might have taken care of Japanese settlers, but the pioneer nature of the work to be done there has not proven attractive to Japanese. There, as in Korea, they have come as officials, as exploiters and as shopkeepers, but not as colonizers. The same thing has been true of Manchuria, where the Chinese, rather than the Japanese, have taken possession of, and maintained themselves successfully on, the soil.

Colonization to take care of population surplus

a) On Asian continent and in Formosa

More Japanese agricultural laborers have been attracted to Hawaii and continental America than to eastern regions, perhaps partly because the pioneer work has already been done. According to Japanese figures, by 1920 there were about 350,000 Japanese in China, including Manchuria and Hongkong; only about 18,000 in Singapore, the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sumatra, the Philippines, and other South Sea territories; 100,000 in Hawaii, constituting approximately half of the total population; about 90,000 in the United States, an underestimate according to some American figures; 14,000 in Canada; 43,000 in Latin-America; and about 12,000 in Australasia. These emigrants have contributed materially to the development of the regions to which they have gone in large numbers, but in North America and Australasia, as the number has increased, the hostility which the Chinese settler had encountered earlier manifested itself and led to the enactment of exclusion measures, notably by the United States and Australia. These measures, together with others discriminating against Japanese already in this country, have served to embitter the Japanese, as well as to close an outlet for Japan's surplus population. Since, however, this has entered into her foreign policy rather than her internal arrangements, its more detailed consideration must be postponed to a later chapter.

b) Overseas emigration

10. AGRICULTURAL LIFE

Thus far our discussion of the economic life of Japan has been concerned with industry. But that must not lead us to the conclusion that agriculture is of relatively little importance. The reverse is true, and because of its importance we can best conclude this chapter with a consideration of Japanese agriculture from the economic standpoint.

Importance of agriculture

Agriculture in Japan has always been, and still is largely, synonymous with the cultivation of rice. Barley, wheat, and some legumes are grown, but rice is the staple both of cultivation and of diet. In 1919 there were 3,104,611 *chō* of land devoted to rice, and only 1,729,148 to barley and wheat. The production of rice, 60,818,000

Staples of cultivation

koku, was much greater than the combined total production of wheat and barley. The rice grown is virtually all consumed at home, and is considered by the people to be much superior to that grown elsewhere and imported into the country.¹⁰

Land owning
and tenantry

The holdings of land have always been small, and farming has been very intensive. The average holding is only about two and one-half acres per family. Prior to the Restoration, the farmer held his land as a tenant of the *samurai* or *Daimyo*. Subsequently, with the abolition of feudalism, he was confirmed in the ownership of the land which he worked. From this basis of a land-owning peasantry the general movement, particularly in the last twenty-five years, has been toward an increase in tenantry. This has been partly due to the attempts of the more prosperous and far-sighted farmers to increase the size of their holdings.

Some 34 per cent of the farmers are land-owners; about 40 per cent are owners and tenants; and about 28 per cent are tenants only. . . . But an unwholesome feature of recent years is that the number of landlords is decreasing, while the number of tenants is fast increasing. In 1919, for example, there were 30,500 fewer landlords and 25,163 more tenants than in 1914. . . . So that while many have lost their land, others have added field to field and become independent landlords, a class prone to be more parasitic in Japan than in Western countries. If the process continues it will very adversely affect the situation, for extension of tenancy always deprives the Japanese farmer of independence and incentive.¹¹

In addition to this, the increase in tenantry maximizes the consequences of friction between landlords and tenants. With a rise in the cost of living such as came after 1914, the tenant's problem of livelihood becomes more acute, and antagonism to the landlord develops. In the future this will present an increasingly important series of problems. On the other hand, the landless man is more readily attracted into the factory town. This may be an advantage to industry, but it is not necessarily a good thing for the nation, and the competition with industry makes it much more difficult for the landlord to secure and hold his tenants. While the tendency toward increased tenancy must be deplored, the increase in the size of the holdings, together with consolidation and redistribution of individual properties, is of advantage in that it helps to increase productivity with the same application of energy. It also makes possible, to a limited extent, the introduction of new methods and tools. The problem, then, is to eliminate the evils of the situation while making the most of its possibilities for good.

Increase of
cultivable
area

Every year additional land is brought under cultivation. From 1905 to 1919, the total cultivated land was increased from 5,382,378 to 6,071,888 *chō*. The percentage of cultivated to uncultivated land

¹⁰ The largest export, that of 1917, was only 769,129 *koku*. Imports in the last fifteen years have varied from the 309,158 *koku* of 1916 to the 4,647,168 *koku* of 1918. J. W. ROBERTSON SCOTT, *Foundations of Japan*, p. 388.

¹¹ BRYAN, *Japan from Within*, pp. 118-119.

in 1909 was 14.6 per cent, while in 1918 it was 15.6 per cent. This must not be taken to mean that there are large areas which in the future can be brought under cultivation. It must be remembered that the islands are of volcanic origin, and are extensively broken up by mountain ranges and formations. The nature of the country, from the agricultural standpoint, is further indicated in the fact that there are fifty intermittently active volcanoes and about a thousand hot springs. Consequently the inhabitable and cultivable area will remain small in relation to the total area. As it is, the mountain-sides are being farmed to an almost incredible extent. It is thus partly the character of the country which makes certain the maintenance of comparatively small holdings of land.

While there has been a slight increase in the area cultivated, there has been a much greater increase in the yield, particularly of rice. The rice production in 1882 of 10,692,000 *koku* may be compared with that of 1913, 50,222,000, and of 1918, 53,893,000 *koku*. This represents a seventy-five per cent increase of yield. During this same period the population increased only fifty-five per cent. The additional rice production, together with normal rice importations, indicates an increased per capita consumption and, consequently, a somewhat higher standard of living, notably among the upper classes. If, however, the population continues to increase as rapidly as in the past, it will not be many years before the increase in agricultural production will be outstripped by the growth of population. This will make Japan dependent on the outside world for her food supply, as she now is for part of the raw materials for her industry.

*Increase in
crop yield*

This increased yield is partly due, as has been noted, to an increase in the area under cultivation. More largely, however, it is the result of paddy adjustment, which makes possible better irrigation; of more scientific manuring; of the use of improved implements; and of animal and mechanical power, where that has been possible; of more careful seed selection and a wider use of better seeds; of afforestation to prevent floods; and of the development of better rural loan facilities.

*Explanation
of increase*

As has been the case in other fields of development, the government has played an important part in promoting agricultural progress. It has established schools for the training of agriculturalists, and has introduced agricultural studies in the curricula of the lower schools. It has maintained experiment stations, which have studied some of the technical problems of the farmer and made the results available to him, encouraging him, in turn, to experiment. It has aided and fostered secondary rural production, such as sericulture and horticulture, though it has done this, apparently, not so much because of an interest in rural development as because of a desire to promote industry and to create an export surplus. It has sent lecturers on agricultural questions throughout the country. And it has been instrumental in improving communications.

*The rôle of the
government*

That more has not been done is due to the lack of funds for these

*Lack of money
retards
developmental
work*

purposes. "I have been assured again and again by prefectural governors and agricultural experts—and in talking to a foreigner they would hardly be likely to exaggerate—that considered plans for the prevention of disastrous floods, for the breaking-up of new lands, for the provision of loans and for the development of public intelligence and well-being were hindered in their case by lack of money alone."¹² This lack of funds for development purposes, it may be noted, is due primarily to the excessive proportions of the national income which are devoted to the army and navy, and to the payments on the debt incurred as a result of successive wars. This, however, is true of other countries as well as Japan.

*Secondary rural
occupations*

The principal secondary types of rural production are tea cultivation, sericulture, horticulture, tree and plant dwarfing and shaping, and animal husbandry. In some prefectures, tea cultivation and sericulture should perhaps be classed as primary rather than secondary pursuits, but for the country as a whole the former classification is sounder. Tea is grown throughout all but the northernmost prefectures, but the individual areas are small, and in most places the cultivation is carried on as a side line. Furthermore, the preparation of the tea for market in many instances is accomplished by hand rather than by machinery.

Tea cultivation

The importance of tea cultivation is indicated by the fact that 48,843 *chō* are devoted to it, and that there are 1,122,164 tea factories, including those attached to households. The total production in 1919 was valued at about thirty-four million *yen*, and tea to the value of about eighteen and one half million *yen* is exported every year. Most of the exported tea goes to the United States and some to Canada. The exportation to the former country is decreasing—from 50,000 tons in 1918 to 23,000 in 1920. This may be partly due to increased consumption at home, but it is to be more fully explained by an increased use of black teas by Americans.

*Rural silk
industry*

The silkworm and cocoon production of Japan has an annual value of over one hundred seventy million *yen*. "One acre in every dozen in Japan produces mulberry leaves for feeding the silk-worms which two million farming families—more than a third of the farming families of the country—painstakingly rear."¹³ These statements indicate the importance to the farmer of the production of raw silk. It lends itself admirably to service as a supplementary activity to crop farming, since the worm may be attended by girls and women, and since the rearing season is a restricted time in the spring and autumn.

*Expansion of
silk trade*

Japanese silk exportation is now twice that of China, her closest competitor, whom she passed in 1910. The production is three times that of Italy, and much greater than that of France. This has been made possible by the abundance of mulberry leaves in Japan, which serves to compensate for the atmospheric and climatic handicaps

¹² ROBERTSON SCOTT, *Foundations of Japan*, p. 370.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

from which, in comparison with her competitors, she suffers. For a long time the bulk of the raw silk—seventy-five per cent—was exported, but as the number of factories increases Japan is steadily increasing the proportion of the raw product transformed at home. This particular rural activity serves as the foundation of a most important national industry.

As the domestic demand for raw silk has increased, greater attention has been paid to its production, with the consequence that in some regions the tendency is to make it a primary rather than a secondary activity. As supplementary to cultivation it has been most important in adding to the income of the farmer, and thus in making him more prosperous. If he devotes himself to it exclusively, it may have directly contrary consequences, especially as he will become dependent on the condition of a world market, and on an industry in the control of which he will only indirectly share.

Silk production becoming primary rather than secondary as rural occupation

The income of many rural communities is further augmented from the fisheries. About a million and a half persons are engaged in the fishing industry, and the per capita catch, in terms of the total population, averages in annual value about seventy *yen*. This activity has been among those encouraged by the government, which has made scientific investigations, and has stimulated the manufacture of marine products. It has also interested itself in securing, or attempting to secure, fishing rights for Japanese along the coast and in the inland waters of Siberia.

Value of fisheries

The attempts to interest the farmer in stock-raising have been comparatively unsuccessful outside of Hokkaido. There the government maintains a stock farm, which is used to produce animals mainly for military uses. There is also some private stock-raising. But with an increase in the demand for dairy products and for meat, due to changes in the diet of the people, increased activity would seem to be imminent. Lack of adequate and suitable pasturage, however, will probably check the growth of animal husbandry before it assumes a great importance to the rural communities.

Stock-raising

The contrary has been the case with horticulture, and the growing of vegetables. The two combined now yield an annual production valued at two hundred million *yen*. Not only have the number and variety of fruit-bearing trees increased, but the fruit itself in some cases has been much improved by experimentation.

Growth of horticulture

By these and other activities supplementary to his fundamental rice and grain cultivation, the Japanese farmer adds to his income and finds it possible to live on his small allotment of land. Only to the extent to which these supplemental types of production are developed, does he have more than a bare subsistence. The number of days of labor on the land averages between one hundred-fifty and two hundred, the latter a maximum estimate, for the year. Thus it is apparent that the farmer and the members of his household have surplus time which can be devoted to productive subsidiary pursuits

Surplus time of farmer

without neglect of the main occupation or undue prolongation of the working day. What is necessary is to find the most profitable between-seasons occupations, and to encourage him to develop them even beyond the point reached up to the present time.

*Development
of Hokkaido*

Before leaving the subject of agriculture a few words should be added concerning the development of Hokkaido. The rigorous climate of that island has retarded its natural settlement and development by the Japanese, both because of natural antipathy to the cold climate, and by reason of the fact that the manner of living in Japan has not taught the people how to meet the cold. The poor people who constituted the group naturally drawn out of the main islands, even though they had by knowledge, or adaptive ability, been equipped to deal with the changed conditions of life, did not have the capital to build houses with well-fitted and glassed windows and to equip them with suitable stoves. The nature of the country also required a break with traditional methods of cultivation. This militated against its rapid settlement. Again, "an undoubted hindrance to the colonization of Hokkaido has been scandals and land grabbing." Some of the scandals have resulted in the overturning of governments. "Many of what the late Lord Salisbury called the 'best bits' are in the hands of big proprietors or proprietaries. Some large landowners no doubt show public spirit, but their class has contrived to keep farmers from getting access to a good deal of land which, because of its quality and nearness to practicable roads and the railway, might have been worked to the best advantage."¹⁴ The result is that tenants, rather than freeholders, have been sought and that many emigrants have returned to their homes dissatisfied with their venture.

*Emigration
to Hokkaido*

Much more might have been done to stimulate emigration to Hokkaido than has actually been undertaken. The beginnings made during the last quarter of the nineteenth century have not been progressively built upon, largely because of the increasingly heavy expenditure for other purposes since Japan became a World Power. More highways and railroads are needed. Money should be made available on easy terms to prospective settlers, and the land policy should be so revised as to discourage landlordism.

*Extent of
development*

It should not, however, be inferred that no progress has taken place in Hokkaido. A railway has been built. Flour mills, breweries, beet-sugar factories, canning plants, and other enterprises have sprung up. A university, begun as an agricultural college, plays an important part in the life of the country. All of these represent developments begun at a comparatively early time. One might also mention stock-raising for milk purposes and the establishment of enterprises for milk condensation.

*Hokkaido and
Japan's surplus
population*

There is room for much further development, as has been pointed out. In Hokkaido there is an area capable of absorbing a part of

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 359.

Japan's surplus population. So long, however, as the Japanese refuse to emigrate to Hokkaido on any large scale, the non-Japanese world is certain to question the existence of an acute population problem. That the problem exists may be granted readily enough, but it may be a matter for question as to whether the right methods are being used for its solution.

For five years in succession Tokyo had cut down the Hokkaido budget. Necessary public work and schemes for development have been repeatedly stopped. At a time when the interests of Hokkaido demand more farmers and there is a general complaint of lack of labor, at a time when there are persistent pleas for oversea expansion, there are in Japan twice or thrice as many people applying for land in the island as are granted entry.¹⁵

Thus consideration of the agricultural aspects of the population problem, as well as its industrial aspects, brings us back to the question of foreign policy, which must be considered as a primary interest of modern Japan.

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¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 359-60.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ASSERTION OF JAPANESE HEGEMONY IN THE FAR EAST

*Japan prepared
to assert
hegemony*

THE high-water mark of Japanese power in eastern Asia was reached in 1917-1918. The World War had enabled Japan to change from a borrowing to a lending nation, from a state with a constantly adverse trade balance to one with a favorable balance; from a nation with inadequate gold reserves to one with a large gold surplus. It had also enabled her to give free play to any continental aspirations which she had, without fear of foreign interference. But it was because the necessary preliminary steps had been taken that Japan was able to utilize the opportunity presented to her by the war. It was because she had already introduced modern methods of production that she was able to enlarge her markets, and it was as a result of the earlier efforts to build up a merchant marine that Japanese shipping was able to monopolize the Pacific carrying trade. It was also because the spade-work had already been done that Japan was enabled to attain at least a temporary hegemony in the Far East.

I. JAPANESE DEPENDENCIES: FORMOSA AND KOREA

*Formosa,
Korea and
China to be
considered*

In order to complete the picture of twentieth-century Japan, consequently, it is necessary to broaden the view from the Japanese State to the Japanese Empire. This involves, first, a consideration of the dependencies, Formosa and Korea; second, an estimation of Japanese activities and interests in Manchuria from 1905 to 1914; and third, an analysis of the China policy of the Japanese government from 1914 to 1918.

*Formosan
development*

Space precludes an extensive consideration of Formosa, the southern outpost of the Empire. It has the advantage of commanding access to the waters and the coast of China north of Fukien province, and its possession has enabled Japan to assert a special interest in that province. It is of interest to Japanese because it was acquired as a result of the country's first successful war in modern times, and also because it has been a financial burden, for large sums have had to be devoted to the subjugation of the aborigines in the uplands, a task which has not even yet been completed. The numerous public works undertaken, such as highway and railroad building, harbor improvement, etc., together with the establishment of schools, have added to the burden until recently, when the administration has become more nearly self-supporting. From the economic standpoint the island furnishes opium, salt, camphor and a little tobacco, all

controlled by government monopoly; tea, the largest item of export; fish and other marine products to the value of six and a half million *yen*; some coal and gold, and a little petroleum. The commerce of the island is mostly with Japan, China and the United States ranking a bad second and third in the trade. As has already been pointed out, Formosa has not attracted Japanese settlers in large numbers, in spite of some efforts at colonization, for as late as 1919 there were only slightly over 150,000 Japanese in the island.

Korea, renamed Chosen after its annexation, deserves, as the major dependency of Japan, more extensive consideration. The changes in its status up to 1905 have previously been indicated. The Chinese connection was finally broken off in 1895, from which time Russia and Japan struggled for supremacy. As one of the preliminaries to the final contest the first Anglo-Japanese agreement was negotiated in 1902. This was founded, among other things, on a recognition of the independence of Korea, with, however, a recognition as well of Japan's peculiar political as well as her commercial and industrial interests in the peninsula. The revised agreement of 1905 provided that "Japan, possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance these interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."¹ Following the war a protectorate was established, Prince Ito becoming the first Resident-General. This status was maintained until 1910, when a treaty of annexation was concluded between the Korean ruler and the Japanese Emperor represented by General Viscount Terauchi, the Japanese Resident. Thus one of the objectives of Hideyoshi, the sixteenth century leader, was finally reached in the twentieth century; thus the work begun, in its modern phase, in 1876 was completed. This consummation, by ending the international life of Korea, had as one of its consequences the termination of foreign governmental intrigue in the country, although, from time to time, accusations were brought against American missionaries that they were preaching seditious doctrines in their schools, and as late as 1920 a British subject, resident at Antung, was arrested when in Korea "because he had long been a suspect as abettor and friend of the Korean independence agitators."² Internal turmoil, moreover, except for the independence movement, has ceased.

In a brief estimation of the condition of Korea under Japanese rule, such as alone is possible here, it is difficult to do justice to the question. Certain things seem to be clear, however, and they may be stated in a summary way, leaving out of consideration more controverted matters. It is clear that the material condition of the

*Changes in
status of Korea*

*Internal
improvements
made by Japan*

¹ Art. 3 from text as given in *Japan Year Book*, 1915, p. 570.

² *Japan Year Book*, 1921-22, pp. 590-1.

country has been greatly improved. As in Formosa, roads have been improved and railroads built; harbors have been improved; electric lighting, introduced into Seoul, has been extended to other cities; lands have been reclaimed and the agricultural system has been improved; better sanitary methods have been introduced; a modern banking system has been instituted; industry has been promoted; and the export and import trade has expanded.

*Japanese trade
predominance*

From the expansion of trade, Japan has naturally gained the greatest advantage. Of the exports in 1917 over sixty-four million *yen* went to Japan, almost twelve millions to China, three and a half millions to Asiatic Russia, and only three hundred thirty-six thousand *yen* to the United States. Seventy-two and a half million *yen* of the imports came from Japan, twelve and a half million from China, and eleven and a half million from the United States.³ In the internal development of the country the predominance of Japanese interest is even more marked. It is only in the gold mining industry that non-Japanese interests have been able to retain a foothold. This also is natural, although foreign capital would undoubtedly have participated more largely in the development of an independent Korea. But in the field of trade the Japanese predominance is due primarily to her need for Korean products and her ability to supply Korean needs, coupled with the natural advantage of geographical proximity; and only secondarily to a deliberate attempt to monopolize Korean trade.

*Improvements
in political
system*

It may also be pointed out that Japan has given Korea a far better government than the Koreans had shown any ability or desire to give themselves, even though that government was long military in character, controlled from Tokyo. As a result of the agitation of 1919 the administration was reorganized in 1920, becoming much more liberal in its national character. The reorganization provided for the abolition of certain notorious abuses, such as flogging and discrimination in salary between Japanese and Koreans holding the same rank, and moved a step toward the introduction of local self-government.

*Policy directed
toward
suppression of
Korean
nationality*

But it must also be noted that Japanese actions have been motivated by the desire to make the area of greater value to Japan rather than by an interest in improving the condition of the Korean people. This is not to deny that the Koreans have materially benefited by many of the improvements made. But, on the other side, it must be recognized that the forcible introduction of the Japanese language at the expense of the Korean; the suppression of the Korean literature and of Korean institutions; the expropriation and sale, mostly to Japanese settlers, of a large part of the public lands which had been of common use to the people; the forced sale of much of the best privately owned property, with the consequent migration into Manchuria of the peoples whose lands had been taken; the repression

³ The same relative position is maintained in subsequent years. See *Japan Year Book*, 1921-22, p. 579.

of speech and suppression of Korean papers; and the exhibition of much actual brutality in dealing with the people—have not promoted the free and full acceptance of Japanese overlordship. To this it may be added that the Koreans have not been satisfied with the educational efforts of Japan. While there are 380 elementary schools solely for Japanese children, there are only some four hundred for the Koreans, although the Japanese constitute less than two per cent of the total population. This seems rather out of proportion. Furthermore, the schools for Koreans are designed primarily to make them good subjects of Japan, to which emphasis exception is taken. Even the mission and other private schools, to a number exceeding eight hundred, have been recently brought under the regular administrative control, and have been forbidden to engage in religious instruction.

The objections to Japanese rule, together with the recent worldwide enthusiasm for democracy and the principle of the self-determination of peoples, produced a serious revolt against the Japanese in Korea in 1919. This took the internal form of passive resistance and the external form of an appeal to the Paris Conference, which, however, refused to take cognizance of the claims of the "Provisional Government of Korea" which was organized at Shanghai. The latter was dispersed by the authorities administering the French settlement, the internal Korean movement was ruthlessly suppressed, and Japanese prestige maintained. Many malcontents, however, were left on the Manchurian side of the border, in Siberia and elsewhere. The Japanese authorities dispersed the fugitives in Manchuria, after several raids on Chinese territory, and the independence movement may be considered to have collapsed. It had, however, the good result, already noted, of liberalizing Japan's Korean policy.

Revolt of 1919

2. JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

Turning our attention to the second great area of Japanese interest, Manchuria, we find the Japanese position not quite so clearly defined, and the policy of the Empire not so easy to treat fairly. There are several conflicting views as to Japan's activities in Manchuria from 1905 to 1914, and as many conclusions as to their justification. This divergence may be largely explained by the initial acceptance of basically different premises, which, without any attempt to elaborate them, may be briefly stated. The Japanese position, in essence, has been that they made tremendous sacrifices in men and treasure to drive the Russians out of South Manchuria, and that by treaty they succeeded to a position there which justifies them in regarding it as a "sphere of interest." They say that in the development of their interests in this sphere they have made use only of such methods as the European states have employed in China and elsewhere, and they argue that until those methods are generally and universally repudiated they should not be condemned for utilizing them. They insist that they were under only two limitations in their succession to the

*The premises
underlying
Japan's
Manchurian
policy*

Russian position—that they would observe the Open Door principle, by which they understood the three propositions of Secretary Hay's Open Door circular of 1899, and that they would respect the independence and integrity of China. Those pledges they have observed, and consequently they maintain that the volume of criticism levelled against their Manchurian activities is totally unjustified.⁴

*Another and
contradictory
premise*

The other position is founded on the major premise that Manchuria is an integral part of China, and that, consequently, Japanese activities must be estimated from the standpoint of their effect on the maintenance of Chinese control in its integrity, or at least on its preservation except so far as it had been explicitly weakened by the loss of the Kuantung promontory by lease, and by the granting of railway and appurtenant rights up to 1905. Any enlargement or strengthening of the Japanese position beyond that point has been considered objectionable as militating against the Chinese interest. The critics of Japanese policy have also taken their stand on the Open Door principle, and on the obligation to respect the independence and integrity of China, and have found both of those undertakings violated by Japan from 1905 to 1914.⁵

*Different
interpretations
placed on
"open door"
pledge by Japan
and the
United States*

In order to understand why the same facts have led to charge and denial that Japan has violated the Open Door principle and that of the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China, it will be well to analyze them briefly at this point. It must be recognized that the Japanese, together with the European governments, had formally accepted as embodying the Open Door doctrine only the original Hay propositions: (1) that there would be no interference with any treaty port or any vested interest within any leased territory or "sphere of interest;" (2) that the Chinese treaty tariff should be applied within a "sphere," and that the duties should be collected by the Chinese government; and (3) that railway and harbor charges should be non-discriminatory. Thus the doctrine subscribed to is founded on the sphere conception, and it is not concerned with the securing of equality of investment opportunities within a "sphere." The limited character of the doctrine came to be forgotten in the United States after 1900, when the principle became generalized as that of "equality of opportunity." The consequence was that Japanese policy was criticized on the basis of a broader conception than that accepted by the government of Japan. Even though recognizing the American conception as ultimately the sounder, we should admit the unfairness of criticizing Japanese policy as though Japan had agreed to be governed by it when she had not. This difference of construction must be constantly borne in mind in evaluating Japan's

⁴ For an exposition of this point of view see the writings of KAWAKAMI, ADACHI, and others. It also underlies the analysis of the problem undertaken by CLYDE, in his study, *International Rivalries in Manchuria*.

⁵ This point of view is notably revealed in the writings of such American publicists as Mr. T. F. F. Millard.

Manchurian activities from 1905 to 1914 in terms of the Open Door doctrine.

The question of the integrity of China needs a similar analysis. Japan's acceptance of this principle is to be found in the 1905 revision of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, in the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911, in the Franco-Japanese agreement of 1907, in the Convention with Russia of 1907, and in the Root-Takahira notes of 1908. But the Japanese understood, apparently, that they were pledged to respect the territorial integrity of China only, which is, as a matter of fact, explicitly stated in the Russian convention. Thus they assumed that so long as they did not formally detach Manchuria from China they were living up to their agreement. The United States, however, as early as 1900 had come to realize that the administrative integrity of China must be maintained if her territorial integrity was to be preserved. In other words, the American position was that independence and integrity might be lost, even though both were formally and officially maintained, by continued encroachments on the administrative services, and that, furthermore, a curtailment of the right to decide the course of development within a portion of the state represented an impairment of its integrity and independence. Unfortunately, again, this broader and, from the Chinese standpoint, sounder conception of the principle was not officially elaborated and its acceptance secured by the Powers, including Japan. Instead, the old words and phrases reappear, with no new definition, in the Root-Takahira notes, thus leaving ample room for legitimate difference of opinion, and also for subsequent misunderstanding. Also, in the same exchange of notes the American government agreed to help maintain the *status quo*, by which the Japanese understood, properly, the Manchurian status as it had been established by 1908.

Difference of interpretation of other pledges

With this introduction, we may now turn our attention more explicitly to a survey of the Manchurian interests of Japan as they were established from 1905 to 1914. A convenient starting point will be found in the economic realm. Economic development may be partially measured in terms of the total foreign trade which, in 1898, was valued at about forty million *taels*. By 1908 it had increased in value to almost one hundred million *taels*, in 1911 to almost one hundred eighty millions; and in 1920 this last figure had more than trebled. Even allowing for changes in price levels, this represents a tremendous expansion. In terms of internal production the soya bean cultivation, the production of *Kaoliang*, millet, maize, wheat, barley, rice and all other staples has been greatly expanded. All of this may be explained in part by the influx of Chinese settlers, but it is also due to the activities of the Japanese railway administration, and to the enlargement of the market consequent on the improvement of communications.

Economic development of Manchuria

The South Manchurian Railway Company, it must be noted, engages in manifold activities besides the usual one undertaken by a

*Importance
of South
Manchurian
Railway
Company*

railway company. In addition to operation of the rail system in southern Manchuria, it exercises administrative functions in the railway zone, builds and operates hospitals and schools in the zone, maintains research laboratories and experimental stations, controls mining properties such as the Fushun and Yentai mines, operates steamship lines, is concerned with harbor improvement work at Dairen, maintains hotels, and operates electric plants at Dairen, Mukden, Changchun, and Antung. All of these activities, many of them governmental or semi-governmental in character, have been designed to add to the prosperity of Manchuria, and consequently to increase its value to Japan.

*Relation of
Imperial
government to
railway
company*

Thus it may be inferred that the South Manchurian Railway Company has been the principal agency through which Japan has acted to develop her sphere of interest. The activities of the company, nevertheless, have been those of the Japanese government, for it assumed, and has retained, the position of the largest shareholder, fifty per cent of the original capital of two hundred million *yen* having been subscribed by the Imperial Government. When the share capital was increased to four hundred forty million *yen*, the government continued to retain fifty per cent interest. Of this, one hundred million *yen* represents the value of the original property turned over to the company by the government, and the balance represents the amount of London sterling debentures which it assumed. The development of the original properties has been accomplished largely with British funds, the loans having been floated as government issues at a lower interest rate than could have been secured by a private concern. Thus British capital has indirectly participated in the development of Manchuria, without, however, reaping the usual fruits of such development. As a matter of fact, the proceeds of loans made in Europe have been expended for railway equipment in the United States rather than in the lending country. Since there is this close relationship between the company and the Imperial Government, it must be recognized that in the last analysis the company's policies have been the policies of the Japanese government and may be so considered.

Before leaving the question of Manchuria it is necessary to return to a consideration of the steps taken by Japan to consolidate her position there. It is clear that the country has been materially developed since 1905. Has Japan alone benefited by this improvement? What have been the effects of her activities on non-Japanese interests, including those of China?

*Japanese policy
toward railway
construction in
Manchuria*

The policy of Japan with respect to the development of rail communications has been discussed in a previous chapter. Suffice it to say here that, after she had determined to operate the South Manchurian Railway herself, Japan secured, as "secret" annexes to the Komura treaties with China, an agreement that no railway would be built by China, without Japan's consent, which would parallel or

compete with the South Manchurian. Supported by this agreement she vetoed the Hsinmintun-Fakumen project, and with and through Russia prevented the Chinchow-Aigun concession from being utilized, as well as vetoing the larger neutralization project of Secretary Knox. As has been indicated, this did not constitute, from the Japanese standpoint, a violation of her Open Door pledge, since that did not cover equality of financial opportunity. It did, however, amount to the imposition of a restraint on China's freedom in determining the course of development in a part of the Empire, and consequently might well be considered as an impairment of her independence and administrative integrity. From the Japanese standpoint it did not serve to detach Manchuria from China and so was not considered a violation of her other pledge. Furthermore, the Manchu government had agreed, in the form of a treaty, not to do the things which it was attempting to do through these concessions, and so was accused of bad faith and double dealing. The only safe generalizations which can be made about railway politics in Manchuria from 1905 to 1914 are: (1) that Japan showed herself determined to maintain an exclusive position within her sphere, as did Russia to the north, and that she was consistently bent on consolidating that position by means of new agreements with China; (2) that China was not prepared to acquiesce freely in Japan's railway monopoly, but that she was helpless without adequate foreign backing, both financial and political; and (3) that the United States alone among the Powers was interested in destroying or disturbing the Japanese monopoly, but that she also needed support if she was to succeed, and that she could not find that support. Consequently the year 1914 found Japan securely in control of the railway field, but at the expense of arousing the distrust and hostility of interested Americans.

Commercially the Japanese have also entrenched themselves in Manchuria. During the period immediately following the war with Russia, and while the evacuation of troops was taking place, non-Japanese traders were denied access to the territory on the reasonable ground that military rule had not yet come to an end. But during this same time Japanese goods were brought in on the railroad supposed to be used solely for military purposes, and the Japanese trader, as the first on the field, had an opportunity to establish himself before competition was possible. The Open Door principle, consequently, could not be considered to have come into operation until after the summer of 1906. The pre-war Manchurian place of entry was the Chinese port of Newchwang. It has been almost entirely displaced by the Japanese port of Dairen, partly because of the superior facilities for trade afforded at Dairen, but partly by reason of tariff discriminations against Newchwang on the part of the Japanese railway. This was not a violation of the Open Door principle, which has nothing to do with distinctions between places; but it did have the effect of militating against the American and British traders who had estab-

*Commercial
policy of Japan
in Manchuria*

lished themselves at the Chinese port of entry. The tariff schedules on the South Manchurian Railway have not discriminated in favor of the Japanese traders, but a system of rebates, which had the same result, was instituted, to be later given up, however, because of foreign criticism and complaint. The rebate system was replaced by one of subsidy, to which exception could not well be taken since it was frequently resorted to by other governments. Goods imported through Korea have been given advantages in the Manchurian trade,⁶ but since this advantage is open to all who choose to import in that way, it is claimed to be non-violative of the Open Door pledge. The Japanese who trade through Korea, however, are trading within their own tariff system, whereas foreigners are not; and this gives the former a decided advantage. In general, therefore, non-Japanese have not been induced to import through Korea. Particularly in the early days, in case of freight congestion, foreign (non-Japanese) consignments were frequently delayed, while Japanese goods were transported expeditiously, and sometimes non-Japanese goods were even tampered with.⁷ Foreign trademarks have also been used by Japanese, but this is an indication of a low commercial morality rather than a violation of the Open Door principle, and has taken place in Japan and in China proper as well as in the region north of the Wall. Finally, the Japanese have tried to out-distance their foreign competitors by evasion of the payment of the Chinese production and consumption taxes, or by their commutation, which they have been able to accomplish by reason of their political dominance. It must be recognized that Japan has retreated to within the letter of her Open Door pledge when decidedly questionable practices have been called to her attention, but that in many ways there have been grounds for complaint on the score of unfairness of competitive methods, even though it be denied that these have constituted violations of the original Open Door doctrine. Herein is to be found one reason for the Japanese-American friction over Manchuria.

From the administrative standpoint, it must be recognized that Japan has stretched its powers very widely.

*Extension of
Japanese
authority*

Japanese officialdom, from its base in the Leased Territory and through the consulates and the Railway Company, went on effectively consolidating and extending its influence. The result is that the Japanese authority has become practically absolute, not alone in the Leased Territory and along the Railway Zone, but, indirectly, throughout all of Southeastern Manchuria; for, while the Chinese administration still functions, the Chinese officials submit to the exercise of a veto power by the Japanese which renders Japan for practical purposes the final authority in determining issues of importance.⁸

Furthermore, Japanese subjects penetrated the interior of the

⁶ By agreement of May 29, 1913, they pay only two-thirds of the regular Chinese customs levies.

⁷ Control of postal facilities was also used to embarrass the foreigner and aid the Japanese.

⁸ HORNBECK, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, p. 262.

province illegally, since under the treaties they, together with other foreigners, were confined for residence to the treaty ports. This complicated the problem of administration for China, since the extra-territorial system extended to Manchuria. To control her nationals Japan instituted the "police box" system, thus asserting jurisdictional rights outside of the railway zone, and her position in the zone, whether deliberately or not, became distinctly embarrassing to the Chinese authorities.

*Penetration of
the interior by
the Japanese*

By way of a summary statement, then, it may be said that by 1914 Manchuria had been developed greatly from the economic standpoint—a development from which primarily Japan profited, although certain indirect advantages, such as came from the purchase of railway materials and other commodities which Japan could not supply for herself, came to the United States. Japan's exclusive position within her sphere, so far as railway undertakings were concerned, had been established, with the acquiescence of England and the support of Russia. And her political position had been consolidated, without, however, violation of the territorial integrity of China. It had been revealed, furthermore, that England was prepared to support her ally in her attempts to consolidate her position in Manchuria in return for the benefits which accrued to her from the alliance, while the relations of the United States and Japan had become increasingly strained.

*Summary of
position in
1914*

3. THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION

The growing friction between the United States and Japan had another cause, however, than that presented by the latter's Manchurian policy. The same years, between the war with Russia and the outbreak of the World War, were marked by the growth of sentiment on the Pacific Coast against the Japanese immigrant. This was, in a sense, merely a re-direction of the earlier hostility to the Chinese, when their numbers had materially increased, but it was now more serious because of the greater position of Japan in the world.

*Japanese
immigration
into United
States causes
friction*

The Japanese began to come to the United States in large numbers only after 1900, when there were upwards of 24,000 in the country. By 1910 their number had increased to slightly over 72,000, and by 1920 to more than 110,000. In proportion to the total population this was certainly not a threatening influx. But the concentration of the Japanese settlers in California and in other Pacific Coast states led to an exaggeration of the danger, an apprehension which was enhanced because the Japanese had settled on the land.

*Number of
Japanese on
Pacific coast of
United States*

Without attempting to enter upon a detailed analysis of the question, it may be said that the same sort of action was taken which had marked the earlier anti-Chinese agitation. The primary demand of the Californians was for the enactment by the national Congress of an exclusion measure. In 1906 the San Francisco School Board, by resolution, barred Japanese children from attendance at public schools

*The
"Gentlemen's
Agreement"*

other than the one maintained for Orientals. Japan strongly protested and the President acted, securing the rescinding of the resolution on the understanding that he would take steps to end Japanese immigration. This led to the making of the Gentlemen's Agreement in 1907, an executive understanding with Japan by which her government agreed not to issue passports to Japanese laborers whose destination was the continental United States. It also voluntarily followed a similar policy with respect to emigrants to Hawaii and Mexico. This led to a gradual decline in the male Japanese population of the United States, as, during the fifteen years in which it was in force, less than 98,000 men entered, while over 120,000 departed. There was, however, an actual increase by immigration due to the fact that women married to Japanese were permitted to enter under the Gentlemen's Agreement.

*Agreement did
not satisfy
Californians*

While it must be admitted as a fact that Japan was scrupulous in the fulfilment of her obligations, the Gentlemen's Agreement did not satisfy the Californians, who continually pressed for exclusion by law. They pointed to the increase in the number of Japanese in the country and charged Japan with bad faith, alleging as an instance the granting of passports to the so-called "picture brides," women married at long distance. This was not an unusual custom for Japanese, but Californians claimed that it was encouraged to permit the entrance of child-bearers into the United States. As is usual in such cases, there was a great deal of misrepresentation of Japan by Californians to make a case for Congressional action.

*California
land laws*

Not satisfied with agitation for an exclusion measure, in 1913 the California legislature enacted a law under which the Japanese, as aliens ineligible to citizenship,⁹ were granted the right to lease land only for three years, and to own land only for purposes specified by treaty, a clear discrimination against the Japanese. This action was extended and made even more drastic in 1920.

*Japanese
antagonism to
United States
stimulated*

None of these acts could help but arouse antagonism to the United States in Japan. Protests were lodged officially against all of them, and they provoked widespread popular hostility. This feeling was further embittered when exclusion was finally provided for by law in the Immigration Act of 1924, which was aided in its passage by a statement of the Japanese ambassador, Mr. Hanahira, that "grave consequences" would follow from its enactment.

*Japanese object
not to exclusion
but to
discrimination*

There are two aspects of the Japanese reaction to these successive acts which should be emphasized. The first is that they have objected primarily to being singled out for discrimination, as though they were of a lower order than Europeans. Their protests have not been directed against the policy of restriction, as was indicated when they willingly entered into the Gentlemen's Agreement. This is indicated by their acceptance, without particular bitterness, of the Australasian policy of exclusion by means of a dictation test, applied to all applicants

⁹ Finally decided by the Supreme Court in 1922. *Takao Ozawa v. U. S.*

for admission, even though it has been administered so as to exclude Asiatics; and is further indicated by their self-limitation of emigration to Canada under an agreement similar to that made with President Roosevelt. This ground of objection, of course, applies not only to exclusion as finally accomplished by the United States, but to discriminatory legislation such as the California Land Laws and to the denial of the right of naturalization.

In the second place, the Japanese attitude toward exclusion from under-populated regions is like the attitude they take toward their expansion in Asia. They have, as has been already emphasized, a serious population problem. The surplus might, they argue, be taken care of by emigration, or by industrialization based upon control of continental resources and territories. The United States has been most active in closing the door to the Japanese emigrant, and it has also been strongest, recently, in its objections to Japanese imperialism, whether economic or territorial. Thus it has been the primary obstacle since 1905 to the solution of Japan's pressing problem in either of the two satisfactory ways. Friction over Manchuria, in other words, has been reinforced by emigration difficulties, and vice versa. This leads us back to a consideration of the policies of Japan in Eastern Asia, a consideration which had included only the years 1905-1914.

*Fusion of
Japanese Asian
and
immigration
attitudes*

4. JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD WAR

With the outbreak of the World War in 1914 came what many Japanese described as the great opportunity for the Empire to establish itself more securely on the continent, and outside of Manchuria. The Far Eastern situation was necessarily very complicated and delicate because of the interwoven interests of the Powers in China. The Peking government, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, declared its neutrality. But the question of the status of such parts of China's territory as had been leased to foreign states was immediately raised. This question naturally centered around the German occupancy of Tsingtao. First of all, negotiations were undertaken between Germany and China with a view to the restoration of the German Leased Territory to the Republic. Under the terms of her agreement Germany had the right to give up her leasehold at Kiaochow at any time in return for a more suitable port elsewhere in China. Consequently the German government seems to have evinced its willingness to evacuate its position for the time, with a view to reestablishing itself in the Orient after the war. At least it is alleged that this was one of the reasons why England opposed the reaching of an agreement between China and Germany concerning the leased territory.¹⁰ Failing that, the Powers might have agreed not to utilize their bases in China for war purposes, thus extending China's declared neutrality over her entire territory. From the standpoint of the Far East, this would seem to have been the best solution. But before any

*Status of
foreign-
controlled areas
in China*

¹⁰ See WEALE, *Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific*.

agreement could be reached Japan so acted as to render further negotiations looking toward such an agreement impossible.

*Provisions of
Anglo-Japanese
Alliance*

For the declared purpose of maintaining the general peace in the regions of eastern Asia and of India, Japan and Great Britain were united in a general treaty of alliance. By the first article of that treaty it was agreed that "whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests." The second article continued that "if by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

*Japan's
obligations
and interests*

The outbreak of war in Europe in no way effected the territorial rights or the special interests of Japan, nor, so far as the initial appearance of the struggle was concerned, were the Far Eastern interests of England or her position in India so immediately threatened as to cause the alliance to become automatically operative to bring Japan to England's side. And in any case, since England was the member of the alliance which was involved in war, it would seem that the initiative in bringing Japan into the struggle should have come from her. The original official British attitude toward Japanese participation has never been made quite clear. The Japanese at first based their participation on their obligations under the alliance, but they seem not to have felt their obligations so strongly after they had driven the Germans from their holdings in Shantung province, and from the islands in the Pacific north of the equator. At least one informed observer felt that Japan came into the war in spite of, rather than because of, the desires of the British government. The American minister at Peking, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, has the following to say of Japan's entrance into the war:

On August 8, 1914, Japanese war vessels appeared near Tsingtao. Japan suggested on August 10 that the British Government might call for the co-operation of Japan under the terms of the Alliance. In view of possible consequences the British Government hesitated to make the call; the British in China considered it important that independent action by Japan in that country should be precluded.

Acting on its own account on August 15, the Japanese Government sent the Shantung ultimatum to Germany. The British Government was then informed of the action taken.¹¹

¹¹*American Diplomat in China*, p. 123. This position is borne out by the somewhat ambiguous statements of Sir E. GREY in his *Twenty-five Years*.

From this it appears that either Japan was moved by an unusually high sense of obligation, or else she had certain ulterior motives in participating in the European War before it had become a world-wide struggle. From her later actions we may infer that the latter is the correct explanation of her move. In the ultimatum sent to Germany on August 15, 1914, she demanded that Germany turn over to Japan her leasehold interest in Shantung province, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China," at a date not later than September 15, giving the German government a week in which to reply to the demand. When Germany made no reply to the note of "advice," the Japanese government declared war (August 23) and made preparations to drive the Germans from Tsingtao by armed force. In order to inform the rest of the world of Japan's intentions, the Premier, Count Okuma, cabled a message for publication in the United States in which he said: "Japan has no territorial ambition, and hopes to stand as the protector of peace in the Orient."

*Japanese
ultimatum to
Germany*

In moving on Tsingtao the Japanese landed their forces at a point about one hundred miles north of the port, moving toward their objective over Chinese territory, although that country had declared its neutrality in the struggle. After protesting, China accepted the inevitable and tried to make as few breaches in her neutrality as possible. Since this was not the first time that their territory had been fought over by other nations when they were not party to the struggle, the Chinese had precedent to guide them. They therefore resorted to the expedient adopted in 1904 at the suggestion of the United States, and delimited a "war zone," outside of which belligerent operations were not to be carried. This zone made ample provision for the Japanese plan of operations, but the latter immediately proceeded to disregard it by occupying the railway running into the interior of the province. This railway was, under the agreement of 1898 between China and Germany, a joint Chinese-German commercial enterprise of a private character, although it was operated under the supervision of the Tsingtao government. And, in the nature of the case, its occupation was not necessary to the success of the operations against the leased area, which was easily reduced by the Anglo-Japanese forces investing it.

*Occupation of
Tsingtao*

After the fall of Tsingtao, on November 7, the Japanese proceeded in a systematic manner to establish themselves in Shantung province. They took over the German interests outside of the leased area as a matter of course, including the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao railway, the line southward from Kaomi, the mines developed by Germany in the fifteen years of her occupation, and the various public and private property rights of Germany throughout the province. Not stopping, however, with a mere succession to the German rights, title, and privileges, Japan added, or attempted to add, considerably to them. For example, although Chinese troops had always policed the railway zone, outside of the leased area, the Germans enjoying no such

*Japan
consolidates
her position in
Shantung
province*

policing privileges as Japan and Russia had in Manchuria, the Japanese government took over the administration and policing of the railway area. These excessive rights were insisted upon even after the plea of military necessity could have no possible validity. The Japanese attitude was advertised in another particular. Under the German administration the Tsingtao customs service had been brought under the direct control of the Chinese Maritime Customs, with the limitation that the commissioner was a German, as were the members of the staff. But they were chosen from the regular service and worked under the general direction of its head, who, by the agreement of 1898, is a British subject. Also twenty per cent of the collections was turned over to the Tsingtao government for local purposes. After their occupation of the territory, the Japanese claimed the right to appoint a Japanese (not necessarily from the Chinese service) as Commissioner, with a full Japanese staff, similarly chosen. This, of course, would have removed the service at Tsingtao from the control of China, and, perhaps, would have resulted in the subtraction of the revenues from the general collection, although those revenues are hypothecated to meet the Boxer indemnity and other international charges. After protracted negotiations, however, Japan agreed to allow the German arrangements to continue, with the exception that Japanese were to replace Germans in the service at Tsingtao.

*Japan under
no obligation
to restore leased
territory to
China*

So far as the evacuation of the territory—"its restoration to China"—was concerned, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in reply to questions in the Diet, said that Japan was under no obligation to restore the leased area, as her pledge was made subject to Germany's handing it over to her without trouble. The sacrifice of Japanese men and the expenditure of Japanese money in the reduction of the port had created a new situation, which might have to resolve itself along different lines. What these new lines were to be was shortly indicated.

*Chinese "war
zone" ended*

At the end of 1914, when German resistance in Shantung had been brought completely to an end and with it the need for the military zone, President Yüan Shih-k'ai informed the Japanese (January 7, 1915) that China's neutrality would again extend over all of the province of Shantung outside of the leased territory. The Japanese immediately protested against the ending of the military zone as an unfriendly act, seizing upon it as the excuse for the presentation to the Chinese government of far-reaching demands.

5. THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

*Institution of
negotiations*

These demands, in five groups and twenty-one articles, were served on China on January 18, 1915, and were the subject of negotiation until well toward the end of May. They were presented directly to the President, in disregard of the Chinese Foreign Office, and he was enjoined to preserve a complete secrecy in regard to them prior to the conclusion of negotiations. News of the negotiations gradually filtered out to the foreign correspondents at Peking and through them

to the outside world. As the veil of secrecy began to be lifted, the Japanese government was forced step by step toward an acknowledgment of the validity of the reports from Peking. At first it was denied absolutely "on high authority" at Tokyo that any "demands" had been served on China. When the fact of the demands was conclusively established, it was given out that they were comprised in eleven articles, the most innocuous being published. Finally it was admitted that there were twenty-one articles, but that Group Five had been submitted merely for the consideration of the Chinese government, and that it was not being pressed on it by Japan. These successive admissions came as the result of the publicity given to the Japanese action, which forced Japan either to acknowledge her plans or to give them up. There was indicated every desire to keep the foreign world in ignorance of what was going on at Peking until the Powers could be presented with a far-reaching change in the *status quo* in the Far East as an accomplished fact which, under the circumstances, they would have to accept.

In presenting and pressing its demands, the Japanese government attempted to bring a double pressure to bear on President Yüan. In the first place, there was continually emphasized the possibility of military action by Japan in case she was not conceded the position she coveted toward China. Secondly, it was intimated that there were alive, and concentrated in Japan, Chinese elements opposed to the personal rule established by Yüan in 1914, and it was hinted that these revolutionist elements might become very formidable if given active Japanese support in men and money, which support would be forthcoming if President Yüan were not complaisant. On the other hand, it was suggested that Japan would have no objection to the reestablishment of monarchy in China, but on the contrary would be agreeable to it, if she could be assured of the friendly attitude of the monarch. This friendliness, it was hinted, might be exhibited by an acceptance of the demands. Thus the Japanese government threatened both the continued existence of China as a state and of Yüan Shih-k'ai as the ruler, while at the same time offering a bribe to the President in the form of support for his personal and family aggrandizement. There must have been, however, little hope in Japan that Yüan-Shih-k'ai would accept her tutelage, as he had been a pronounced opponent of Japanese expansion since his days in Seoul as Chinese Resident.

As the negotiations proceeded, the Chinese insisted on separate discussions of the several items of the demands in the hope that, by making concession of the less objectionable, they might save themselves from acceptance of the more objectionable. It was also hoped that, if they protracted the negotiations by means of a detailed examination of the Japanese proposals, foreign opinion might be aroused and pressure be brought to bear on Japan so as to bring about a modification of her position. Finally the Japanese minister at Peking presented an ultimatum requiring acceptance of the demands,

*Double pressure
on Chinese
President*

*China
presented with
ultimatum*

as they had been modified in the course of the negotiations, and excluding the notorious Group Five except as a possible subject for future negotiation. The conditions of this ultimatum, with a time limit for answer, and with the threat of force in case of non-compliance, were accepted by China, and the agreement thus reached was embodied in several treaties and a series of exchanges of notes.

*The demands
analyzed*

"Japan," Yüan Shih-k'ai remarked to the American minister in 1914, "is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China."¹² When the demands are examined in detail, the conclusion is made inevitable that Japanese policy was clearly pointed in the direction that President Yüan feared it would take. As indicated by the demands—

there would be three centers from which Japanese influence would be exercised—Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien. Manchuria was to be made more completely a reserved area for Japanese capital and colonization, but with administrative control wielded through advisers and through priority in the matter of loans. In Shantung, the interest formerly belonging to Germany was to be taken over and expanded. A priority of right in Fukien was demanded, both in investment and in development; this would effectively bar other nations and would assimilate this province to Manchuria. The northern sphere of Japan was to be expanded by including Inner Mongolia. From the Shantung sphere influence could be made to radiate to the interior by means of railway extensions to Honan and Shansi. Similarly, from the Fukien sphere, railway concessions would carry Japanese influence into the provinces of Kiangsi, Hupei, and Kwangtung. The Japanese interest already existing in the Hany'ehp'ing iron and coal enterprise, which was a mortgage with right to purchase pig iron at certain rates, was to be consolidated into a Japanese controlled company. Added to these was the significant demand that outsiders be denied the right to work any mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hany'ehp'ing Company without its consent; nor were they to be permitted, lacking such consent, to carry out any undertaking that might directly or indirectly affect the interests of that company. This astonishing proposal sought to make the Japanese concern the arbiter of industrial enterprise in the middle Yangtze Valley.¹³

None of these proposals, if accepted by China, affected her formal independence, sovereignty, or integrity. But actually she would be brought under the sway of Japan in the manner most approved by modern imperialism.

On the other hand—

Group V

Group Five consisted of the sweeping demands which would have virtually deprived the Chinese Government of the substance of control over its own affairs. The employment of effective Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military affairs; the joint Chino-Japanese organization of the police forces in important places; the purchase from Japan of a fixed amount of munitions of war—50 per cent or more; and the establishment of Chino-Japanese jointly worked arse-

¹² *American Diplomat in China*, p. 129.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

nals, were embraced in these demands. The latter involved effective control over the armament and military organization of China.¹⁴

Group Five was eliminated from the demands, but in the final agreements was set aside for future consideration and not given up. Consequently it continued to hang over the heads of the Chinese as a potential threat.

Before turning from this important question it will be worthwhile to summarize the agreements actually reached between China and Japan under date of May 25, 1915. This can be most conveniently and simply done by geographical areas, beginning north of the Great Wall and working southwards.

6. THE 1915 TREATIES

The treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia provided: (1) that the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, and of the terms of the South Manchurian and the Antung-Mukden railway agreements be extended to 99 years; (2) that Japanese subjects might reside and travel in South Manchuria, engage in business and manufacturing, and lease land outside of the treaty ports for trade or agricultural purposes; (3) that the Chinese government would give its permission to any joint Chinese-Japanese enterprises; (4) that Japanese subjects should be amenable to Chinese local law, but that the extra-territorial system, so far as the trial of offenders was concerned, should obtain; (5) that China should open to foreign trade and residence suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia; (6) that the Kirin-Changchun railway loan agreement should be revised in favor of Japan. By separate notes China conceded: (1) that Japanese subjects should have the right to open mines in certain areas specified by the Japanese; (2) that if she sought foreign capital for railway construction in Manchuria in the future, application would be made first of all to Japan; and (3) that if she found it necessary to employ foreign financial, military, or police advisers in South Manchuria, they should be Japanese.

*The
Manchurian
treaty*

The Shantung treaty provided: (1) that China should give "full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese government may hereafter agree with the German government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung" (art. 1); (2) that Japanese capitalists should have the right to build the Chefoo-Weihsien railway, in case Germany abandoned the privilege of financing it; and (3) that additional places for foreign residence and trade should be opened by China herself in the province. In exchanges of notes, China agreed not to alienate any territory within the province or islands along the coast to any foreign Power on any pretext whatsoever. On her side, in a separate note, Japan indicated her intention of restoring the leased territory of Kiaochow

*The Shantung
treaty*

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 134.

Bay to China when she had received it from Germany, on condition that China open the whole of the bay as a commercial port, that she set aside an area to be designated by the Japanese government as a residential concession to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan, and that an international settlement be provided for the residence of other foreigners if they desired it.

The demand of Japan with respect to the Hany'ehp'ing Company was treated in an exchange of notes. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote:

*Agreement
respecting the
Hany'ehp'ing
Corporation*

I have the honor to state that if in the future the Hany'ehp'ing Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon coöperation, the Chinese government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

Fukien province As to Fukien province, the Chinese government stated formally that it had given no permission to foreign nations to construct on its coast dockyards, coaling stations for military use, or naval bases, and that it had no intention of borrowing foreign capital for those purposes.

*Japan's
objectives
economic*

It is apparent at a glance that Japan's objectives on the continent had changed from the purely territorial to the economic. She had first urged, as justification of her policy, her need for room for expansion on the continent, so that by colonization she might take care of her excess population. From 1914 on, however, she did not demand control of territory for colonization purposes because all of her experiments in that direction had failed. It was not Japanese farmers who were to be found in Korea, Formosa, and South Manchuria, but shopkeepers, concession-hunters, and developers. This partly explains the change in her objective. To this fact must be added a change at home which tremendously affected the national development. The outbreak of the war gave a great stimulus to Japanese industry. Just as in the United States those industries relating to war supply were expanded in every direction, so in Japan the established undertakings, both in the field of munitions supply and in allied fields of production, and non-military production for the purpose of supplying markets temporarily vacated by Europe, were enormously expanded, and new enterprises sprang up over night. This industrial expansion strikingly called attention to Japan's reliance on foreign nations for certain of the essentials for an industrial life, such as coal and iron, and it caused Japanese statesmen to think of the war as giving them an opportunity to secure these essentials. Furthermore, a capitalist class had been developing in Japan with her industrial development after the war with Russia, and this class became all important during the World War. In order to secure support

and to ensure their activities against interference on the part of the Diet, the industrial and commercial magnates had entered into a close alliance with some of the party leaders. And it happened that in 1914, after the failure of Katsura to organize and lead a party, an attempt which he made in 1913, and the fall of a navalist ministry headed by Yamamoto, Count Okuma was called upon to form a government, on the basis of party support in the Diet. It was this Okuma ministry, hailed as the first truly party government in the history of Japan, which, in the interests of its clients, the industrial capitalists, served the twenty-one demands on China. This may help to explain their basically economic character.

In China the effect of the serving of the demands was to rally all factions to support of the President. Large groups were in favor of resistance to the point of war, although China lacked the means of making any effective resistance. A fund, called the National Salvation Fund, was started and subscribed to by all classes, from the highest to the lowest, for the purpose of preparedness. The President undoubtedly withstood the Japanese pressure as far as he dared, and saved as much as possible out of the situation. But he did not dare resist to the point of provoking a declaration of war. Yet he was greatly encouraged by the spontaneous expression of opinion in support of his government, and, as has been pointed out, was probably influenced by it to some considerable extent in undertaking the movement toward restoration of the monarchy. Indirectly, therefore, the demands had a considerable effect on the internal situation in China.

*Effects of
demands in
China*

The Yüan Shih-k'ai government, having accepted the demands, was in no position to repudiate them. But after the overthrow of the President and the restoration to Peking of the Assembly, the central government, so far as it did not come under the control of Japan, as during the period of *Anfu* ascendancy, maintained that the agreements were invalid, first because they had been forced, and second, because they had not been assented to by Parliament. More will necessarily have to be said of the Chinese attitude in the next chapter, when we consider the effect of China's entrance into the war, and the succeeding Japanese advances in position may be considered at the same time. Here, however, it is necessary to point out that Japan did not stop because she had gained her new position, but continued to press on China, whenever occasion offered, some of the items that had not been conceded in 1915. Trouble was continually arising in Manchuria between Japanese and Chinese, and each incident was utilized by Japan to forward her interests. In many of these cases the Japanese were at fault, either wholly or in part, but that did not prevent them from pressing their claims on China. The most notorious of these incidents was that at Chengchiatün, when trouble arose because a Japanese policeman took some of the products displayed by a Chinese vendor of merchandise and refused to pay for them.

*Chinese
governments
maintain that
1915 treaties
are invalid*

Troops of both sides were drawn by the trouble into a general affray, out of which the Japanese derived material for a claim on China, and again China had to make concessions.

*Japan and the
revolt against
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

Reference has been made to Japan's intimation to Yüan Shih-k'ai that trouble would arise for his government if he did not accede to the Japanese demands. In spite of the concessions made, this trouble actually came, although it was deferred until he attempted to make himself Emperor. Before the opposition to monarchy in China became active, Japan took the lead among the Powers in inquiring as to the ability of the Chinese government to repress the opponents of the movement. When Yüan replied that the nation was in favor of the restoration and that no trouble was to be apprehended, the Japanese minister said that his information led him to believe that Yüan was misinformed. As it proved, he was right and the President was wrong, and Japan herself had something to do with the correctness of the information of her minister for, at the right moment, Chinese revolutionaries proceeded from Japan, where they had been harbored since 1913, to southwestern China and raised the standard of revolt. These men were supplied with funds from Japanese sources, and with military equipment which came from Japan. And from this time on, even if she had not done it previously, as is sometimes intimated, Japan consistently supported elements opposed to the government of the day in China, hoping, by fishing in China's troubled waters, to add to her already large catch.

7. THE 1917 SECRET TREATIES

*United States
protests against
1915 agreements*

But it was not enough for Japan to force China to concede her greater and greater rights while the Powers were engrossed in the European conflict. It was necessary for her to safeguard and consolidate her new position by agreement with those states with interests in the Far East. The United States was the only country in a position to protest effectively against the 1915 agreements, so far as they affected its treaty rights in China. It did make a formal diplomatic statement of its attitude, but went no further in the way of protest. In this statement, made to the government of China, the United States said that "it can not recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy."

*Japanese
agreements
with Allies*

As the war in Europe proceeded it was marked by German successes, and it became more and more necessary for the Entente ranks to hold firm. During 1916, Japan apparently began to waver in her allegiance to her ally's cause. An aggressive press campaign against the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was carried on, the press advancing the view that the alliance was one-sided and consequently unfair. Furthermore, the apparent invincibility of Germany

was pointed out, and the desirability of a German-Japanese alliance to replace that with England was more than hinted. After the seed of discontent had been properly sown, the Japanese government demanded a *quid pro quo* for its continued adherence to the Allied side. This was given by England when she agreed to support the Japanese claims, at the peace table, to a reversion of the German rights in Shantung, and to the possession of the islands in the Pacific north of the equator taken from Germany. Japan, on her side, agreed to support the British claim to the islands to the south of the equator. France, at the same time, agreed to support the Japanese claims on condition that Japan would encourage the movement in China toward participation in the war on the Allied side. Italy entered into a similar agreement. All of these agreements, made in 1917 before the entrance of the United States into the war, were kept officially secret until the opening of the peace conference.

They were made the more necessary because of the outbreak of revolution in Russia in March, 1917, for Japan had attempted first of all to safeguard her position by agreement with the Czar's government. This agreement had been reached in the summer of 1916 when the two states entered into a firm alliance for the outward and published purpose of preserving the peace of the Far East, but, by secret protocols, with a view to delimiting their respective interests in Eastern Asia and coöperating in their maintenance against any attack whatsoever. In this delimitation of their interests, Russia recognized the changes made in the *status quo* by the Japanese 1915 Agreements with China, and accepted them as necessary of protection under the alliance, while Japan recognized as an accomplished fact the Russian advance into Outer Mongolia during the years 1912-1915. It is interesting to note that, whether intentionally or not, the alliance with Russia was to outlive the Anglo-Japanese alliance by one day.

*The treaty
with Russia
of 1916*

8. THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT

This left only the United States which had not recognized as an accomplished fact the establishment of Japanese hegemony on the continent. This recognition was delayed only until the war pressure began to be felt in this country. In November of 1917, in order to put at rest the rumors of antagonism between the United States and Japan by exhibiting their complete identity of policy and interest—rumors which the Secretary of State somewhat falsely ascribed to German propaganda—an exchange of notes took place between the United States and Japan, which constituted the so-called Lansing-Ishii Agreement. By this, the government of the United States recognized that Japan, because of geographical propinquity, had special interests in China. No attempt was made to itemize in detail these special interests, and consequently the Japanese considered, as did the Chinese, that it meant a recognition of the status of 1917, including

*The reasons for
and nature of
the agreement
of 1917 between
Japan and the
United States*

the successive advances made since 1914. The note, it is true, went on to reaffirm the adherence of the two Powers to the classic formulas of the Open Door and the integrity of China. It later developed that the United States understood one thing and Japan another by this recognition of her special interests. This difference of interpretation was not unrecognized by the Japanese government, but, as was explained to the Russian ambassador at Tokyo, this fact was not considered prejudicial to Japanese interests, because it was felt that Japan would be in a position to enforce her own interpretation when the proper time came.

*Japan supreme
in Eastern Asia*

Thus, by means of demands served on China, supplemented by the threat of interference in the internal political struggle in China, and by actual interference, Japan established her hegemony on the continent. Then, by successive agreements with Russia, England, France, Italy, and the United States, entered into largely because of war necessity, she safeguarded her supremacy against attacks from the outside world.

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CHAPTER XIX

CHINA AND THE WORLD WAR

I. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEUTRALITY

CHINA declared war on the Central Powers in August, 1917, thereby ranging herself with the Allied Powers as a co-belligerent. From 1914 to 1917 she had maintained, to the best of her ability, her position of declared neutrality, which meant that the government had pursued a negative policy designed to keep the country free from entanglements. As a result of this negative policy had come the establishment of Japan in Shantung province, and the enlargement of her interests in other parts of the Chinese Republic.

*Neutrality
maintained
to 1917*

Unquestionably, neutrality in a struggle which in no way affected her was the logical and proper policy for China to pursue. And yet, at an early period, she might have been brought into the war on the side of the Entente—not, however, because of any hostility to Germany, but from fear of Japan. Yüan Shih-k'ai intimated his readiness to undertake the reduction of Tsingtao in 1914, in order to prevent what actually took place, its occupation by Japan. Not only was he refused encouragement in the matter, but Japan actually vetoed Chinese action. The other Powers took their lead then, as later, from the Japanese because of their preoccupation in Europe. At a subsequent time President Yüan signified his willingness to depart from neutrality in favor of the Entente, without receiving a favorable reply to his suggestion.

*Willingness
to enter war
before 1917*

It may be thought that China should have declared war on her own responsibility if it was believed that anything could be gained by so doing. But it must be remembered that the Powers had taught her to believe that she should show no initiative in foreign affairs, for, whenever she had gone ahead on her own responsibility, she had become involved in trouble. Another consideration must be kept in mind in regard to China's policy during the early years of the war. She had an empty treasury which was being supplied out of a foreign purse, and, after the American withdrawal from the International Banking Group, and subsequent indications of American unreliability as a source of supply for pressing governmental purposes, Japan furnished the funds for a large part of China's reorganization. The only advances on the part of the group after 1914 came necessarily through the Yokohama Specie Bank, representing the Japanese participants. Because of this dependence on foreign funds for reorganization purposes, the hesitancy of Peking in adopting any policy not endorsed by the foreign Powers is easily understood.

*Reasons for
hesitancy in
adopting
positive policy*

2. THE MOVEMENT TO END NEUTRALITY

By 1917, however, a very different situation had arisen. With the opening of that year there came the development of a positive American leadership in China which was productive of results while it lasted. A sketch has already been given of the movement of 1917 to bring China into the war under American guidance. February brought the request of the United States that other neutral states should join with her in a protest against the extended German submarine warfare on the ground that it violated accepted principles of International Law and was an offense against humanity. The American minister at Peking urged that China should make use of this opportunity to develop a positive policy under the protection of the United States. Only in this way, it was maintained, could China gain admittance to the Peace Conference, and secure a voice in the settlement of the Far Eastern questions in which she had so vital an interest. Perhaps not realizing fully that such a protest could only be the first step in a series which would lead to a declaration of war, China despatched a dignified note to the German government, protesting in the name of International Law and humanity against the carrying on of an unrestricted submarine warfare. When a satisfactory answer was not received, as the next logical step China was brought face to face with the necessity of severing diplomatic relations with the Central Powers. If nothing else, the government stood to lose considerable "face" with the foreign and Chinese world alike if it failed to follow up its note of protest.

It was more clearly perceived that war might follow when the government came to contemplate breaking off relations with Germany than when the first step was taken. Consequently, some who had not opposed the first step hesitated over taking the second. The Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, who stood to lose more "face" than anyone else if nothing was done, favored going on. The President, however, was doubtful of the expediency of the new move. And it was still a question which, under the constitution, had the decisive voice in the matter, the President or the Cabinet. Before this question could be decided Tuan found it necessary to resign, retiring to his residence at Tientsin. This alarmed President Li, who felt that it would be impossible to reconstruct the Cabinet under any other leadership. Finally he was forced to give in on the war question in order to bring the Premier back to Peking. When the question of severing relations with Germany was presented to Parliament, the Premier was sustained by considerable majorities in both Houses.

Germany did not modify her policy as a result of the severance of relations with her by the United States, China, and the other states which followed the original American lead. Thus China was forced to consider the third step in the process, an actual declaration of war. As a preliminary to this, the Premier began negotiations in order to define the extent of China's participation, and secure tangible evidence

*American
leadership*

*Severance of
diplomatic
relations*

*Negotiations
over conditions
of entrance
into war*

of benefits to be derived from it. In return for a declaration of war, which the Entente Powers and the United States had come actively to desire, Tuan asked that they agree to the cancellation of the German and Austrian portions of the Boxer indemnity, and to the suspension of payments on the interest and principal of the Boxer indemnity due to the Allies; that foreign troops, maintained in China under the Boxer Protocol, should be withdrawn; and that the conventional tariff should be revised upwards. In return for this he was willing to promise to supply food stuffs, raw materials, and labor. The Allied ministers refused to give him any promises as to the action of their respective governments, and suggested that China declare war first and then negotiate for the concessions she wanted, intimating, however, that she would be well treated in the event of her adherence to their side in the struggle.

This was the attitude taken by many Chinese—that China should determine her policy independent of the attitude of the ministers, thus standing on her own feet in foreign affairs for the first time in many years. By so doing the government would make a decided break from the traditions of the past, from which only harm had come. In addition to this, a declaration of war could not but serve to make friends for China in the Entente camp; and the United States would be strengthened in her friendship for the Republic by the taking of a step in accordance with American advice. Thus the noted scholar, Liang Chi'-ch'ao, after explaining his views in some detail, concluded: . . . "that whenever a policy is adopted we should carry out the complete scheme. If we should hesitate in the middle and become afraid to go ahead we will soon find ourselves in an embarrassing position. The Government and Parliament should therefore stir up courage and boldly make the decision and take the step."¹

*Advantages of
participation
in war*

But the making of friends in such a manner involves also the making of enemies. This fact was brought home to the Chinese in many ways. It was pointed out to the government that Germany thus far had proven herself to be invincible in the war, and that it would be a great mistake for China to antagonize her. It would be better to play safe for the future, as in the past, by keeping on semi-friendly terms with the entire world.

*Fear of German
power*

This fear of German power is well illustrated in the exhortation of K'ang Yu-wei, another well-known scholar, and the leader in the early reform movement. He wrote as follows:

Which side will win the war? I shall not attempt to predict here. But it is undoubted that all the arms of Europe and the industrial and financial strength of the United States and Japan—have proved unavailing against Germany. On the other hand France has lost her Northern provinces, and Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania are blotted off the map. Should Germany be victorious, the whole of Europe—not to speak of a weak country like China—would be in great peril of extinction. Should she be defeated, Germany still can—after the conclusion of

¹ Quoted by WEALE, *Fight for the Republic*, p. 332.

peace—send a fleet to war against us. And as the Powers will be afraid of a second world war, who will come to our aid? Have we not seen the example of Korea? There is no such thing as an army of righteousness which will come to the assistance of weak nations. I cannot bear to think of hearing the angry voice of German guns along our coasts!²

*No cause of
hostility to
Germany*

Considering the matter from the standpoint of actions and policies of the belligerents, the opponents of a declaration of war could point out that China had no reason for hostility to Germany, except the ancient one of the seizure of Tsingtao in 1898. On the other hand, since 1914 she had been involved in a series of controversies with Japan, and had had a less important but still significant conflict with France, who had tried to extend the limits of her settlement in Tientsin against China's will (the Laohsikai affair), to say nothing of her difficulties with England and Russia over Tibet and Mongolia. Certainly the Entente Powers had not demonstrated to the Chinese a higher ideal of international action than had Germany.

*Belief in
sincerity of
American
professions*

On the other hand, there was a belief in the sincerity of the professions of the United States which led to a feeling of assurance that it would look after the interests of China if she became a belligerent, protecting her against her friends as well as her enemies. And, it must be recognized, the American declarations concerning the rights of small nations, and the necessity for waging war to end war by creating a more ideal international order, were peculiarly adapted to impress the Chinese scholar. But of even more importance in offsetting the argument against a declaration of war, so far as it was put in terms of external relations, was the fact that the United States and the Entente Powers were in a position enabling them immediately to aid the Chinese government, financially and otherwise, while Germany was not.

*Internal
argument
against war
participation*

But there was also an internal argument against participation in the war. Many Chinese felt that it would be wrong for China to undertake a foreign war when she had not yet begun to solve her own pressing internal problems. Not a strong foreign policy, but internal consolidation and reorganization, would prove the best means of preserving the Republic. When one thinks of war he thinks in terms of armies, and when many Chinese thought of armies they thought of the possibility that a declaration of war would tend to strengthen the military party in China, and thus hold back indefinitely the realization of truly representative government.

*Conference of
Tuchuns*

This is what actually happened, although not directly as a result of participation in the war. Reference has already been made to the calling of a conference of the *Tuchuns* by the Premier, and to the subsequent happenings, such as the attempt to restore the Manchus, and the establishment of the militarists in control at Peking. These developments grew out of the failure of the Premier to gain concessions from the Powers in advance of the declaration of war, for

² WEALE, p. 334.

he had let Parliament know that he was carrying on negotiations, and that he confidently expected to be able to show concrete advantages to be gained by ending China's neutrality. When the negotiations were protracted, the people began to lose interest in the war question. In order to turn attention from their unsatisfactory state, while still keeping control of the situation in Parliament and outside, the conference of the *Tuchuns* was called. From that time the war question fell into the background, and its place was taken by the much more interesting problem, to the Chinese, of the political effect of the consultation with the militarists.

After things had begun to settle down in the fall, with Tuan Chi-jui again in office as Premier, but with a new President, Fêng Kuo-chang, the war issue was revived. The declaration of a state of war with the Central Powers was actually issued on August 14, a step which was necessary to demonstrate the sincerity of Tuan, to gain the support of the Powers for the new régime, and to put it in a favorable position to finance itself.

*Declaration of
war, August 4,
1917*

3. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR

This action had certain very desirable effects for China, and for the Entente as well. On the Chinese side, after some negotiations, there was gained a substantial revision of the tariff—the charges being brought from an actual two and one-half per cent to an effective five per cent, which meant an increase of seven per cent over the valuations put on imports and exports in 1901. It should be noted that this was not a very great concession for the Powers to make to China, but rather was an act of elementary justice. She was entitled to this five per cent charge under the Boxer Protocol, but had been unable to get any revision of the treaties after 1901, as values changed, to give her the Customs revenues in percentages to which the Powers had then assented. In the second place, as a result first of her severance of diplomatic relations with the Central Powers in March, and then as a consequence of the declaration of war, China was enabled to resume control of the German and Austrian residential areas in the various treaty ports, such as Tientsin, where they had been granted exclusive concessions. Other German and Austrian public and private properties were assumed, or sequestered, pending adjustments following the war. In the third place, the Entente Powers agreed to a cancellation of the German and Austrian shares of the Boxer indemnity, and to a suspension of payments to the Allies for a five year period. This, together with the increase in revenue from the Customs, helped to relieve the financial situation. Finally, the Chinese thought that they had assured themselves of the right to a seat at the Peace Conference, whenever it should meet, on terms of complete equality with Japan.

*Concessions to
China by Allied
Powers*

The Allies, in turn, gained materially from Chinese participation. They had already been taking advantage of the Chinese labor supply,

*Advantages to
Allies of
Chinese
participation*
a) Labor

and the change of status materially facilitated the recruiting of laborers, their training, and their transportation to France. While China sent no armies to the West and did not take any great part in the Siberian operations of the Allies, yet she made a decided contribution to the war through her laborers used behind the lines in France. Their presence enabled many men to be released for military duty who would otherwise have been used in necessary but subsidiary services. Many favorable comments have been made on the value of the Chinese laborer to the Entente.

b) Primary
materials

Again, China agreed to furnish the Allied and Associated Powers with primary materials. The available Chinese surplus, either in foodstuffs or raw materials, was small, but it might easily have been made much larger. This was particularly true of the industrial productivity of the Republic. China might have made a great contribution to the war by the supply of pig-iron and similar materials, if she had been able to finance an increased activity. Unfortunately she had no capital available for this purpose herself, and her allies in the war failed to furnish her with funds or the necessary credits for machinery and supplies. Here the fault lay particularly with the United States, which alone was in a position to take care of China's comparatively small needs. Financial support had been promised her by the American minister so far as he was able, without instructions, to commit his government. These promises were never made good, and, consequently, one effect of China's participation in the war was to throw her directly into the arms of Japan. The Japanese saw the advantage in financing China up to a certain point, and under advantageous conditions, while the Americans lacked their foresight. If Washington had read the future more clearly, there might easily have been a different aftermath to the war in China.

c) German
tonnage released
for use

A third gain to the Allies from China's participation in the war, more important than those just mentioned, was the use of the German tonnage then interned in the ports of China. In 1917 the great cry was for ships, and more ships. The desire to get the use of these German vessels was, to a large extent, back of the eagerness of the Entente Powers to bring China into the war. And then German activities in the Far East were definitely brought to an end when China closed her doors to the Germans, driving out many, and interned the remainder for the period of the war. This was of more than immediate importance, particularly to England and Japan, for they had long felt German commercial competition in the Far East. It was well known that Germany was maintaining as many of her commercial contacts in China as possible, in order to resume her trading and financial operations there as soon as the war came to an end. This resumption was made much more difficult by the sequestration of German properties by China and by the internment of German and Austrian subjects.

d) German
activities in
Far East ended

4. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF CHINA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR

The effects of the war on the Far East up to 1917 have been described in the preceding chapter. The political effects of China's participation during the remaining period before the Peace Conference can now be pointed out.

The initial step leading China into the war had been taken at the suggestion of the United States. At that time, and for some months thereafter, the Chinese attempted to model their conduct on that of their neighbor across the Pacific. This American leadership, if it had been continued and made effective, would have done much to break down the conception of Japanese hegemony on the continent which had been so carefully and systematically built up during the first three years of the war. To avoid this, after she had taken the steps necessary to safeguard her newly-won position through her alliance with Russia, and by means of the secret treaties of 1917 with England, France, and Italy, the Island Empire attempted to wrest the leadership in the move to bring China into the war from the United States. Thus the Japanese minister at Peking rather ostentatiously "advised" China to take the step which was already under contemplation. At the same time the Japanese newspapers in China continually emphasized the negligibility of the United States in the Far East, pointing out that in spite of repeated protestations of American sympathy for and interest in China, the government of the United States had consistently failed to do anything to protect her from the rapacity of the foreign Powers. A case in point was the American withdrawal from the first Consortium, on the ground that its terms for making the reorganization loan threatened the independence and the administrative integrity of China. Then the United States failed to finance the Republic on more favorable terms than those offered by the International Group, whose terms China was consequently forced to accept. On the other hand, it was pointed out that if China would only become more friendly to Japan, a nation of "doers" rather than of "sayers," she might expect to be helped out of her manifold difficulties. The Japanese also took advantage of every American slip in policy, such as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, to bring home to the Chinese the apparent emptiness of American professions, and to emphasize the seeming fact that all of the Western nations recognized the primacy of Japan in the Far East. This policy was still further forwarded by the concentration of the authorities at Washington on the western phases of the struggle after the United States became an active participant. All other considerations were subordinated to that of winning the war in the West.

*Japanese
hegemony
continued*

Thus, when China became disrupted in the spring and summer of 1917, prior to her declaration of war on Germany, the American government, in a note presented to the Chinese Foreign Office, declared that it was much more important that China should set her own house in order than that she should declare war on the Central

*Japan protests
against
American
advice to China*

Powers. The advice was not only well meant but it was sound. Yet it came strangely from the very government which, a few months earlier, had been urging China to get into the war. Japan took advantage of this note to protest vehemently, in the press of the country, against this foreign "interference" in the internal affairs of her neighbor. When nothing further was said about the matter by the United States, she was able to say to the Chinese that the Americans had recognized the right of Japan to determine the nature of the communications passed between Washington and Peking. It was considered by the Chinese to be but another indication of the recognition in the West of Japanese hegemony in eastern Asia.

*Japan active
at Peking
after 1917*

When China, through the military government set up at Peking, had definitely committed herself to participation in the war, the Japanese set about reaping further advantages for themselves out of the new development. The failure of the United States to finance the Chinese government played directly into the hands of Japan, for she gladly undertook that task herself. Loan after loan was made to Tuan Chi-jui's government during 1918 and even after the end of the war in Europe. Sometimes security in the form of the pledging of provincial taxes was demanded; more often concessions of every sort, from the right to build railroads and open mines, to industrial undertakings, were made the *quid pro quo* for loans. Many of them were made under the terms of an agreement reached in 1918 for coöperative participation in the war. A War Participation Board was set up in Peking, for the ostensible purpose of working out plans for the rendering of military aid to the Allies, but for the real purpose of borrowing money from the Japanese for internal purposes, money which went to line the pockets of the officials. This period marks the height of Japanese power at Peking. Under the direction of the War Participation Board, a military agreement was reached between the two countries in 1918, by the terms of which, briefly, they agreed to concert plans in common for war undertakings—the Japanese to furnish advisers for the Chinese army and navy, and to finance any activities undertaken; the Chinese, in turn, to furnish Japan with information as to their military resources, and to purchase war materials from her. The signature of the armistice agreement should have brought to an end the activities of the War Participation Board, but it was continued on the pretext of the necessity for protecting the two countries against the introduction of Bolshevism from the north. It was ended only with the overthrow of the *Anfu* clique, which was finally driven from Peking in the summer of 1920 by the armies of General Wu P'ei-fu.

*Support given to
various factions*

But Japan's activities were not confined to Peking. She managed to put some of her eggs in other baskets, in order that they might be brought home the more safely. While Japanese money was flowing into the pockets of the *Anfu*ites, some of it found its way into the coffers of the Canton government headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and

some of it was used to build up the power of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria. Japan conceived her interest to demand the maintenance of the existing chaotic conditions in China, and she found that the easiest way to attain that end was to make it possible for all of the factions to be supplied, more or less well, with money and arms. To understand from this that every government in China was manipulated from Tokyo, of course, would be far from the truth. It was not necessary for Japan to direct their several activities to attain the end of the continuation of internal strife. All that was necessary was for her to provide, directly or indirectly, the sinews of war, and the real or fancied differences of interest between the various factions did the rest. Each faction thought, or professed to think, that only under its direction could China be reëstablished in her former honorable position in the world. Dr. Sun Yat-sen inveighed against the *Anfu* Club while it was in control at Peking, but that did not make him ready to coöperate with the government controlled by Ts'ao Kun and Chang Tso-lin, which succeeded it. On the contrary, he soon began to negotiate with the exiled *Anfu*ites with a view to overthrowing the new régime with their help. And, when Chang Tso-lin was on the point of being driven out of Peking by Wu P'ei-fu, Dr. Sun was found to be in alliance with his former enemy, General Chang. All of this was made possible by a continued supply of Japanese money to the various factions, and by the furnishing of credits in Japan for the purchase of war materials.

5. THE LEGAL SITUATION AT TIME OF PARIS CONFERENCE

Before moving on to a consideration of the Peace Conference and the significance of its decisions in relation to the Far East, it may be well to summarize, from the legal standpoint, the situation as it had developed after 1914. The German holdings in Shantung province, as far as they were comprehended in the contract or lease of 1898, gave Germany no title to territory as owner, nor did Germany acquire sovereign rights in all or part of Shantung province. Sovereignty over the entire leased area was expressly reserved by China, the exercise of sovereignty being waived in favor of Germany for ninety-nine years. Legally Germany was merely an occupier, holding under the limitations of the lease contract. Consequently, all that could be acquired from Germany by any other Power was succession to her rights and privileges. But one of the limitations or conditions under which the leasehold was to continue was that it should not be transferred to any other Power by Germany. In other words, the maintenance of the lease was made dependent on its continuation in the hands of the original lessee. Thus, without any other factors being considered, a transfer of the leasehold by Germany to any other state, through the treaty of peace, should have brought with it the abrogation of the agreement.

*The German
position in
Shantung
province*

Consequently the Japanese right of succession to Germany at

*Japanese
succession
imperfect*

Kiaochow Bay, because of her reduction of the territory by military means, was, at least, imperfect. When it is considered, further, that the original agreement was forced from China by Germany, it may be held that Japan was in the position of the receiver of stolen property. He does not have title to that property because he has taken it from the thief, but merely holds it until it can be restored to the original and rightful owner. So Japan may be considered, after her operations in 1914, to have acquired Chinese property, which she held temporarily, pending its restoration to the original owner, or agreement as to its ultimate disposition. In other words, her title still remained to be established by agreement with China and not with Germany, who had no legal right to transfer the leasehold to any other Power, and consequently could not give a clear title to it.

*Effect of 1915
agreements*

The 1915 agreement with respect to Shantung, however, effected a fundamental change in the situation. By the Shantung treaty, agreement was reached between China and Japan as to the ultimate disposition of this Chinese property. The government of the Republic recognized in advance any settlement which might be reached directly by negotiation between Japan and Germany, with the supplementary understanding that if Germany transferred her leasehold to Japan the latter would restore it to China on certain conditions. Furthermore, in 1918 the Chinese government supplemented its undertaking of 1915 by agreeing, in an exchange of notes, to an arrangement of the various questions in relation to Shantung. This agreement provided for joint working of the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway after its status had been finally established; to the ending of Japanese civil administration outside of Tsingtao; to a retirement of Japanese troops to Tsingtao, leaving the policing of the railway to Chinese troops; and to the engagement of Japanese "for the headquarters of this police force, at the principal railway stations and at the police training school." The Japanese position was further strengthened by its recognition by Russia (the Czarist government) in 1916, and by England, France, and Italy in the 1917 secret treaties. It should be noted, however, that this recognition was not given because of the legality, under International Law, of Japan's claims to the reversion of the German rights in Shantung, but from considerations of expediency.

*Changes
resulting from
China's
entrance into
war*

China's participation in the war, in its turn, brought about certain legal conditions, and established certain legal relationships. In the first place, it brought to an end all treaty engagements between China and Germany which were in the nature of servitudes, or were inconsistent with the carrying on of war, or the making of peace. Thus, if China had declared war on Germany in 1914, it would be clear that the 1898 agreements would have been brought to an end by that act, and that German extra-territorial rights in China would have ceased. These rights, resting on treaty provisions, could be restored only if directly revived, by mutual consent, in the peace

settlement. In the second place, upon her declaration of war on Germany, all property of the German government in China reverted to that country for administration temporarily, or for confiscation immediately, depending upon the positive action of the Chinese government. Thus China would have reacquired her position as the exerciser of sovereignty in the leased territory. But China did not declare war until 1917, and at that time she had already agreed to abide by any decision reached by direct negotiation between Japan and Germany as to the disposition of the German interests. This agreement was not abrogated by China's entrance into the war, although the Chinese delegation at Paris maintained that their country's "entry into the War so vitally changed the situation contemplated in the treaty (of 1915) that, on the principle of *rebus sic stantibus*, it ceased to be applicable."³

6. THE PARIS CONFERENCE AND THE FAR EAST

When the Peace Conference met at Paris, in the summer of 1919, the Chinese factions united in sending a delegation to represent the interests of the country. The Chinese delegates presented to the conference a request for the direct restoration to China of the German leasehold and rights in Shantung province, and for the cancellation of the agreements relating to Shantung province made between Japan and China in 1915 and 1918. Their case was based upon several contentions. First of all, it was maintained that China's entrance into the war worked direct restitution to her of the German leased territory, in spite of the 1915 agreement to accept the result of direct negotiations between Japan and Germany. For, secondly, the Chinese delegates insisted that these agreements should be considered invalid in their totality, including the Shantung treaty. And, consequently, the 1918 agreements must be treated in the same way, since they rested for their validity on the agreements of 1915. The 1915 treaty, they maintained, should be considered invalid for two principal reasons: first, because it had been signed by the Chinese negotiators under threat of war, and, second, because it had never been ratified in the manner provided for by the Chinese constitution.

The Chinese case

Before the Peace Conference convened, Japan had begun to lay her plans for the retention of the rights promised her by the Allies. Not much was said in the press discussions about the Japanese claims in Shantung. But another issue was prepared to be presented to the delegates assembled at Paris. This was in the form of a demand for the recognition of the principle of racial equality. Apparently the Japanese people, if the press truly reflected their views, were much more interested in the establishment of that principle, one to which, on the surface, exception could hardly be justly taken by the nations

The Japanese program

³ TYAU, *China Awakened*, append. B, p. 397. See also statement of Dr. John C. Ferguson before Foreign Relations Committee of Senate. Quoted by WILLOUGHBY, note, p. 392.

fighting a war for democracy, than they were in the securing of material advantages out of the war. The principle, it need hardly be pointed out, had application particularly against the United States and the British Dominions, which had erected barriers against the free access of Asiatic peoples to their shores. It could have no other significance, since in every other way the Japanese were on a footing of complete equality in their intercourse with the other members of the society of nations. To be sure, China and other Asiatic countries were not, but Japan had insisted upon the same special privileges in her intercourse with them that other states enjoyed, and had shown no indication of a willingness to give them up.

This part of her case was undoubtedly prepared by Japan to neutralize American opposition to her contentions with regard to Shantung province. It was well known that China was looking to the United States for support at Paris, and, in spite of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the government of Japan was fearful lest she should secure it.

The Japanese contentions may be summarized briefly. First, she demanded that her right of succession to the German holdings and rights in Shantung province, and in the north Pacific, should be recognized in the treaty of peace. She based her claims on her sacrifices of men and of treasure in the war, on the inter-Allied agreements, which she then produced for the first time officially, and on her willingness to restore Kiaochow to China by negotiation, after she had received it from Germany, and conditionally. Secondly, she asked for "acceptance of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals."

Because of the rejection of the latter demand, largely as a result of the veto of President Wilson, put upon the ground that it referred to immigration and its restriction, and was consequently unacceptable to the United States, the Japanese were in a strong position to press for the acceptance of their first contention, actually the more important to them. They had lived up to their obligations as an ally, not only clearing the Germans out of the Far East, but policing the Pacific and part of the route to Europe. This had meant a serious drain on the national treasury, in addition to involving the loss of life of Japanese subjects. Were they alone among the Allies to be cast aside and denied any share in the material fruits of victory? If so, then they would play a lone hand in the future and have nothing to do with the proposed League of Nations.

When the Japanese delegates began to intimate an intention of leaving the conference, as the Italians had done over the Fiume question, the opposition of President Wilson weakened. And, with the loss of his support, the Chinese lost their case at Paris, for the other Powers were definitely committed to Japan by their agreements made during the war. So, while Japan failed to gain a recognition

*Summary of
Japan's
contentions*

*Japanese
position
strengthened
by rejection of
demand for
"racial
equality"*

*China's case
lost*

of racial equality, she did secure the reversion of the German rights in the Far East which she had hoped for as the chief result of her participation in the war for the purpose of "preserving the peace of the Far East."

7. FAR EASTERN PROVISIONS OF TREATY OF VERSAILLES

By the terms of the peace, China was relieved of all responsibility for the fulfilment of her obligations to Germany under the terms of the Boxer Protocol; she regained control of the German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow; she was confirmed in her possession of the public properties of the German government in China, except those of a diplomatic and consular character; she was relieved of all liability arising from the internment of German nationals during the war, and from the seizure of the German vessels interned in Chinese waters; and she secured the restitution of the astronomical instruments taken from Peking at the time of the Boxer rebellion. Japan succeeded to the German position in Shantung acquired under the agreements of 1898 and subsequent agreements, including the leasehold of Kiaochow Bay and the economic rights enjoyed in the province. This succession was conditioned by a verbal promise given to the "Council of Three" that Japan would restore to China, by direct negotiation, all political rights in the province, retaining for herself only the economic rights and privileges.

*Summary of
terms of
settlement
affecting China*

It was this promise, coupled with the feeling that if only the League of Nations could be established China would be able to secure ultimate justice, which President Wilson used to justify his own participation in the award. However, he failed completely to see that a restoration to China of her political rights in Shantung province, without the economic rights, would leave China with the shadow and Japan with the substance.

*President
Wilson's
justification of
action*

This was the view of the Chinese people when the news of the award reached them. It was also the view of their delegates at Paris. The latter tried first of all to register their opposition to the award by signing the treaty with a reservation as to the Shantung clauses, and, when they were denied the right to sign with reservations, they refused to append their signatures to the document. In this they were expressing the views of an aroused public opinion at home. The first reaction to the Shantung decision came in the form of the student movement, directed both against officials in the government who were suspected of being tools in the hands of Japan, and against the Japanese in China. In the latter case their activities were largely confined to propaganda designed to show to the people the true state of affairs. But that it seriously affected the Japanese was shown by the pressure which the Imperial Government brought to bear on Peking to compel the Chinese to put down the students by force. After the student protest had begun, it was sustained by the action of the merchants, who instituted a nation-wide boycott against the

*Chinese reaction
to peace terms*

Japanese.⁴ As a result of the pressure exerted by these two elements, Japan indicated a willingness to enter upon negotiations with China to carry out her promise with respect to Shantung, but the Peking government refused to consider such negotiations except on the basis of complete and unconditional restoration. This impasse continued until the meeting of the Conference at Washington.

8. REVIVAL OF THE CONSORTIUM

*Reasons for
revival and
reorganization*

One other event of the year 1919 is of sufficient importance to deserve notice. It was President Wilson who had refused the support of the American government when it was asked for by the American participants in the first International Banking Group. By 1919, however, he had reached the conclusion that there must be international coöperation in the financing of China, in order to prevent any one state from gaining financial control of the Republic. Consequently he took the lead at Paris in the reorganization of the International Group, with the elimination of Germany and Russia, but the inclusion of the United States, making it again a Consortium of Four Powers. The idea back of the reorganization was the pooling of all agreements, past, present, and future, for the financing of the Chinese government, and for the development of communications and industry in China. After negotiations between the financial agents representative of the several countries concerned, agreement was reached as to the conditions of their activities, with one exception. The Japanese desired to exclude Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia from the field of Consortium interest, in spite of the fact that those territories were an integral part of China, and that China was to be the field of interest of the Consortium. Under pressure, however, they receded from their position after they had been promised that nothing should be undertaken in those regions which would prejudice their interests therein.

*Consortium
inactive*

The Consortium came into being in 1919, but it found no scope for its activities, for the Chinese were hostile, fearing lest, under the guise of aiding China and developing her resources, the aim should be to establish an international financial control of the country. This fear has been gradually allayed as the Chinese have become convinced that the declared aims are also the true aims of the Consortium. But still it remains inactive, largely, perhaps, because of the internal turmoil in the Republic, but partly because of the lack of real interest on the part of some of its members in international as distinguished from national undertakings.

9. CONSEQUENCES OF CHINA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT TREATY

The refusal of the Chinese government and people to accept the Shantung provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and, consequently,

⁴ The effectiveness of the boycott is revealed by the fact that imports from Japan of cotton yarn declined, from May to September, from more than twelve to less than four thousand *piculs*. Other imports showed the same relative decline.

the non-signature of the treaty, meant that certain questions growing out of Japanese and Chinese participation in the war were left unsettled. The most difficult of these was that relating to the ultimate disposition of the German rights, titles, and interests in Shantung province. Since this delicate question was only settled in connection with the Washington Conference, its consideration may well be postponed to the chapter on the Conference.

*Chinese question
left unsettled*

Another series of questions related to the reestablishment of normal treaty relations with Germany. The war between China and Germany was declared ended by presidential mandate of September 15, 1919, and German consular and diplomatic representation was renewed. Negotiations were then undertaken which resulted in the conclusion of an agreement on May 20, 1921, which was ratified by the Chinese President on June 28. The most important provisions of this agreement were those embodied in articles three and four, by which Germany permanently waived jurisdiction over her nationals in China, placing them entirely under the authority of China's law and her courts, and by which tariff autonomy, so far as German imports and exports were concerned, was conceded.

*Re-
establishment
of relations
with Germany
by separate
treaty*

Since unusual interest attaches to the abrogation of extra-territorial rights, the text of the third article of the treaty may be quoted.

The citizens of either Republic, residing in the territory of the other, shall in conformity with the laws and regulations of the country have the right to travel, to settle down, and to carry on commerce or industry in all places where the citizens of another nation are allowed to do so.

*Special
provisions for
control of
German
Nationals in
China*

They are placed, both their persons and property, under the jurisdiction of the local courts; they shall respect the laws of the country wherein they reside. They shall not pay higher imposts, taxes or contributions than the nationals of the country.

In answer to certain questions raised by the German representative, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. W. W. Yen, made the following statements in an appended note:

1) The Chinese government promises to give full protection to the peaceful undertakings of Germans in China, and agrees not to further sequester their properties except in accordance with the generally recognized principles of international law and the provisions of the laws of China; provided that the German Government will treat the Chinese residents in Germany in like manner. 2) . . . Law suits of Germans in China shall be tried in the modern courts, according to the modern codes, with the right of appeal, and in accordance with the regular legal procedure. During the period of litigation the assistance of German lawyers and interpreters who have been duly recognized by the court is permitted. 3) In regard to law suits in the Mixed Court, in which Germans are involved either as one or both of the parties, the Chinese Government will in the future try to find a solution so as to insure justice and fairness to all the parties concerned.⁵

A simultaneous German "Declaration" accepted the validity

⁵ From text as given, *China Year Book*, 1925, pp. 783-85.

German
Declaration

of Articles 128-134 of the Versailles treaty, bringing to an end the special privileges enjoyed by Germany in China prior to the war. Beyond this, the declarations provided the basis for the adjustment of war claims and those growing out of the sequestration by China of the property of Germans. By these provisions for the repeal of all the laws and regulations issued by China governing trading with Germany in war time, the way was opened for her re-entry as an active competitor in the China trade.

Questions at
issue between
Japan and
China left
unsettled

This preliminary commercial agreement, supplemented by another exchange of notes providing for the settlement of outstanding questions, terminated the war in its Far Eastern phase, except for the settlement of the questions at issue between the two "allies," China and Japan. The war, however, had temporarily complicated the politics of the Far East by reason of Allied intervention in the region north of China. This complication was the result of the collapse of Russia, and the establishment of the Bolsheviks in control of the machinery of government. It remains, therefore, for the Siberian question to be considered, before we are in position fully to appraise the necessity for, and the results of, the Washington Conference.

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CHAPTER XX

THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC OF SIBERIA

I. AREA AND RESOURCES OF SIBERIA

ONE of the great number of new states born during the confusion of the years following the outbreak of the World War was the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. The circumstances of its birth, and the nature of its development up to the time of the Conference at Washington, entitle it to a place in any narrative of recent events in the extreme East. In order to understand its history it is necessary to appreciate the position of Siberia in the Russian Empire prior to the revolution of 1917; to consider the character of its population; to estimate briefly its resources; and to understand its position, as a region of the Russian Empire, in the world movements of 1914-1917.

Reasons for including Siberia

"Siberia," as Kropotkin points out,¹ "is not the frozen land buried in snow and peopled with exiles only, that it is imagined to be, even by many Russians. In its southern parts it is as rich in natural productions as are the southern parts of Canada, which it resembles so much in its physical aspects." It is in large part because of the circumstances of its acquisition and settlement that it has come to mean, to many people, a land of total desolation.

Nature of the country

At the time of the outbreak of the World War, Siberia, as an area in the Russian Empire, comprised over 4,800,000 square miles of territory, with a total population of somewhat over ten millions of people. This territory stretched from the Ural Mountains in the west to the Sea of Okhotsk in the east, and from Manchuria and Mongolia northwards to the Arctic Ocean. Large stretches of this area, it is true, were not inhabited, nor were they habitable for Europeans. Parts of it were suitable only for the raising of reindeer, and for fishing and hunting, many valuable fur-bearing animals being found. Another large section furnished vast timber tracts. Further to the south, Siberia contains fertile lands suitable for cultivation. In this area the climate is such that wheat and other cereals may be easily and profitably grown.

Extent of territory

The entire region known as Siberia was divided, for governmental purposes, into ten governments and provinces. The most populous of these was the government of Tomsk with, in 1915, an estimated population of four million.

Governmental subdivision

2. ACQUISITION OF SIBERIA

This enormous territory was acquired by Russia in a piece-meal

¹ *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, p. 169.

*Early Russian
advance*

fashion, much as England, and later the United States, occupied the continental area of what is now the United States. As early as 1555 it is said that Russia received an annual tribute of one thousand sables from some of the tribes to the east of the Urals. But the actual conquest and occupation of the land dates from 1580, when Yermak, a Cossack brigand, having failed to keep out of trouble in European Russia, crossed the Urals with a small band of followers and took possession of the territory having as its seat of government a town called Sibir. From this place the name of the whole region was derived. The territory he occupied was offered to the Czar in return for a pardon for his past offenses. From this time on, for a century, the advance of Russia was slow but steady. In 1587 the town of Tobolsk was founded; in 1632 followed the establishment of Yakutsk; Lake Baikal was reached in 1651, and the town of Irkutsk was founded; and the years 1655-1658 witnessed the conquest of the Buriat tribes living in the region around Lake Baikal, in spite of a strong resistance on their part. Prior to this time a rapid march was made across the frozen north, and the Sea of Okhotsk was reached in 1639, the whole northern region being added to the Russian Empire. Following this, an attempt was made to penetrate the regions east of Lake Baikal from farther to the south. Moving across northern Manchuria, Habarov sought the Amur, the great waterway of Eastern Siberia. Following along the Amur he came to the Ussuri River and attempted to occupy the region drained by it.

*Manchus halt
Russian
advance*

Up to this time the Russian advance had been opposed only by loosely-organized and weak tribes of semi-barbarians. But when the Amur and Ussuri regions were reached, the Russian advance was checked by the opposition of the Manchus, who had just established themselves in control of China. The attempt of the Manchus to drive the Russians out of northern Manchuria was eminently successful, the seal to their success being set in the treaty of Nerchinsk, the first treaty negotiated by China with a European state in the period of modern history. By it, the Russians agreed to withdraw from the region of the Amur. From 1689 until after the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Russian advance was halted.

*Revival of
Russian
interest: work
of Muraviev
Amurski*

But at the same time that the maritime nations of Europe were insisting on the opening of China to foreign intercourse on less restrictive conditions, the Russians again manifested an interest in the Amur territory. In 1846 an expedition was sent out to explore the river to its mouth. The report of this expedition was purposely made unfavorable, and Russian interest might not have been aroused in the East if it had not been for the work of one man, who bears to the second period of advance the relation that Yermak bears to the first. In 1847 Muraviev was appointed by the Czar to the position of Governor-General of Siberia. Under his direction a second expedition was sent to the mouth of the Amur. The report of this expedition was so favorable that Muraviev determined not to rest until Siberia

had been extended until it had the river as its boundary to the south. In 1850, under his direction, the town of Nicolaievsk was founded at its mouth. But he realized that it would be difficult to substantiate Russia's claim to the territory on the basis of exploration and the establishment of one settlement, and he determined to colonize the entire region. In order to accomplish this, he was forced to rely on his own resources, as he could not get men and supplies from Russia. Consequently he asked for and received permission to raise an army from among the inhabitants of Siberia for the defense of the territory and for its settlement. He then proceeded to release convicts and enlist them in his force, and he added to their number from among the Cossacks. With them he began the settlement of the Amur and provided for its defense. De Castries Bay was occupied, Alexandrovsk was founded, and a claim was advanced to the island of Saghalin on the basis of exploration and occupation. All of this occupied the years from the time of Muraviev's appointment as Governor-General of Siberia until the outbreak of the Crimean War. At that time the problem was complicated by the appearance, off the mouth of the Amur, of an Anglo-French fleet. The initial attacks were repulsed, however, and, because of their preoccupation elsewhere, the English and the French made no further attempts to dispossess the Russians.

In 1858, while the Western Powers were attempting to secure a revision of the treaties with China, Muraviev sought to consolidate the Russian gains in the north by agreement with China. The result was the treaty of Aigun (1858), by which the Russo-Chinese boundary was fixed at the Amur River as far as the Ussuri River, from whence it was left undetermined. Count Putiatin, the Russian envoy to Peking in 1860, was able then to secure an additional agreement with China by which the territory east of the Ussuri was brought within the Russian Empire, and sanction was given to the Russian occupation of Peter the Great and Possiet Bays. This brought Russia to the Pacific and extended her territories south to the Korean border, giving her an excellent natural port at Vladivostok, although not satisfying her desire for an ice-free port on the Pacific.

*Russia reaches
the Pacific*

It should be noted that this advance was largely the result of the foresight and labor of one man, Muraviev, and that it did not then represent the expression of a national policy of expansion to the east. As a matter of fact, Muraviev, from the beginning, had to combat the opposition of influential officials at St. Petersburg. This opposition was due, at first, to the desire to see Russia face ever westward, and then, in 1858-1860, to fear lest the advance should embroil Russia with China. It was not until the Court was presented with the accomplished fact in the form of the treaties with China that Muraviev secured complete recognition for his services. Then he was made a Count, with the full title Count Muraviev Amursky.

*Expansion
eastward did
not represent
settled national
policy*

3. SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORY

*Groups
contributing to
settlement
a) Cossacks*

*b)
Revolutionists*

The vast territory thus acquired over a period of three centuries was settled at first very slowly and then, particularly after 1890, with increasing rapidity. Leaving out of consideration the native peoples such as the Buriats, three distinct elements contributed to its settlement. The initial occupation was largely the work of Cossacks. They spread out thinly over the regions first acquired, thus holding them for Russia. The second element, brought into the country in comparatively large numbers after the first quarter of the nineteenth century, was entirely different. From 1823 to 1887, no less than seven hundred thousand exiles were sent into Siberia from European Russia. Some of these were of the criminal classes, but many of them were political prisoners, and men of a rather high type. They were followed by their families and many of them settled permanently in the country. Among the political exiles may be mentioned the Decembrists, following the failure of the revolutionary movement of 1825; Polish dissenters in and after 1863; and those who lent themselves to the successive revolutionary movements up to the outbreak of the war in 1914. This exile system, even for political offenders, was brought to an end in 1914, but not before it had contributed materially to the upbuilding of Siberia from the standpoint of population.

*c) Peasant
emigrants*

The third, and by far the most important, element consisted of peasant emigrant settlers. This emigrant movement began after 1860, and was given an impetus by the abolition of serfdom in European Russia. Thus about two million emigrant settlers came into Siberia from 1860 to 1863. About five hundred thousand more came in during the twenty-year period following 1870. After that time, as rail communications were developed the tide of emigrants flowed much more strongly. The greatest single contributing factor to the development of the country was undoubtedly the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

*The Siberian
railway*

The first suggestion of a railway to the Pacific was made in 1858. In 1884 the Perm-Ekaterinburg-Tiumen Railroad, projected in 1875, was carried to completion. In 1890 the Trans-Ural line was extended to Cheliabinsk, and, in 1891, the Trans-Siberian road was authorized by Imperial Rescript. This railway development changed the entire character of the Russian relationship to her Far Eastern provinces. As these successive developments were carried to completion the country began to be more fully settled, the emigrant following closely in the wake of the railway pioneer. And this settlement, and the greater ease of communication, naturally attracted the attention of the Imperial Government to the region east of Lake Baikal.

*Reasons for
building
railway*

The railroad had been projected originally for economic reasons, but at the same time it was a sound move toward integrating the Empire. When the government came to undertake its construction, it was apparent that it would be a great saving if it could be built across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok; and the defeat of China

in her war with Japan made it possible to secure the railway rights in Manchuria which have already been described. The Manchurian section of the Trans-Siberian road was known as the Chinese Eastern Railway.

After 1896 the Russian government committed itself to a policy of open expansion in the Far East. This led it into the undertakings in Manchuria and Korea which brought it into conflict with Japan. But the policy was also expressed in the government's encouragement of the eastward movement of the Russian peasant. This encouragement was made even more emphatic after the defeat of 1904-1905 in order to make sure that the territories actually incorporated in the Empire should be strongly Russian in their character and population. The Russian population of Siberia in 1904 was about 6,500,000. In 1906 over \$1,300,000 was devoted to assisting emigration. This was increased in 1908 to ten million dollars, and in that year about half a million people settled in Siberia.

*Stimulation of
emigration*

Siberia was not invaded by the Japanese armies in the course of the Russo-Japanese War, but many Russian troops passed through the territory on their way to the Manchurian battlefields. This revealed the nature of the country to many people who had gained no adequate conception of its possibilities prior to the war, and in that way the conflict promoted the emigration movement, for many of the soldiers, upon their demobilization, returned for purposes of settlement on the land.

*Emigration
stimulated by
war with
Japan*

The treaty of Portsmouth had a more direct effect on Siberia, for it contained two clauses of extreme importance to its people. In the first place, Russia lost title to the southern half of the island of Saghalin, which she had gained in 1875 by exchange with Japan for her shadowy title to the Kurile Islands. In the second place, she was forced to grant to Japanese fishermen the right to fish in Siberian territorial waters. Another effect of the war was, through the loss to Russia of her port facilities in the Liaotung peninsula, the enhancement of the importance of Vladivostok, which she proceeded to make into a strongly fortified naval base.

*Siberia and
the Peace of
Portsmouth*

By 1914, Siberia, in every sense, had become an integral part of the Russian Empire, ruled from St. Petersburg, and without any notable desire to break off from that rule. In many respects the status of the people of the country was higher than that of the peasants in European Russia, and their conditions of life better. The smallness of the population and the abundance of land had made possible the development of larger holdings than was usual in Europe. The late development of the country, and the pioneer nature of the life there, had developed a pronounced spirit of individualism. This was enhanced by the fact that land was held in individual rather than in community ownership. Thus the ideas of the people, and their manner of life, were not dissimilar to those of the population of western Canada or the United States in the early days.

*Conditions in
Siberia in 1914*

*Desire for local
autonomy*

But while the people were Russian and the territory was an integral part of the Empire, they did desire a greater local autonomy in that Empire, although not expressing any great desire for independence. Many of them believed, quite correctly, that the development of the country would be retarded so long as purely local questions had to be decided after reference to an authority as distant as St. Petersburg. The desire for autonomy was expressed in 1905, at the time of the movement which resulted in the establishment of the first Duma. Then Siberians demanded local self-government, with Russian control restricted to matters of imperial interest. While they did not get what they wanted, the year 1905 did see a step in advance when the Zemstvo system was introduced.

*Siberian
relationship to
World War*

During the early part of the World War, up to the time of the Russian Revolution, there was no indication of any great dissatisfaction in Siberia. The people responded to the demands made on them just as did the inhabitants of the other parts of the Empire. Their only peculiar relations to the war came through the use of their territories as areas for the confinement of German and Austrian prisoners of war, and the facilities they were able to afford, through Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railway, as a port of entry and means of transportation for war material purchased in the United States and Japan.

*Russian
withdrawal
from North
Manchuria*

Russia purchased large quantities of war materials in Japan, but finally she reached the end of her ability to pay for them. As a result she was forced to withdraw farther from Northern Manchuria. In part-payment for the munitions which she needed, and in order to persuade the Japanese to continue to supply her with materials of war, she transferred to Japan her railway properties from Changchun almost to Harbin, just falling short of giving Japan a long-coveted direct connection with the Trans-Siberian.

4. EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTION ON SIBERIA

*Approval of
March
revolution*

The revolution which broke out in Russia in March, 1917, received the same sort of response in Siberia as in European Russia, but it developed different consequences. It was received with approval, and was hailed as the inauguration of a new era. Consequently there was no immediate attempt made to take advantage of it for the purpose of establishing a separate state. The first revolutionary governments were either heartily approved or passively accepted. But of course the upheaval brought with it a measure of uncertainty and of consequent instability. Immediately, the local government bodies, such as the Zemstvo, took over the direction of affairs. In addition, in many of the towns there were organized local committees (soviets) to supervise the officials, who were largely men put in office under the former régime, and to see to it that the interests of the people, and of the revolution, were safeguarded.

Naturally, a country settled as Siberia had been contained many

radical and revolutionary individuals and groups. This number was increased immediately after the revolution by an influx of exiles who attempted to enter Russia by way of Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian. Many of these people remained in Siberia.

*Revolutionists
in Siberia*

In addition to establishing their own governments, thus realizing the decade-old demand for autonomy, the people sent representatives to the constituent assembly which was convened for the purpose of determining the form of government and framing an organic law for Russia.

*Siberia
represented in
constituent
assembly*

With the overthrow of the constituent assembly, and the establishment of the Bolshevik group in control of European Russia, trouble in, and for, Siberia began. Among the workers in the towns there were many who sympathized with the Bolshevik communist program. But on the whole the peasants were, at first, non-communistic, although they were socialistic in their views. What the result would have been if they had been left to work out their problem unhindered, it is impossible to say, for they were worked upon from the outside and were, in some places, influenced by outsiders who came in following the first revolution. These outsiders were of two sorts: radicals who had been exiled under the Czarist régime; and conservatives who had fled from Russia at the time of the first outbreak of revolution or were driven into exile when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government. The first element, in coöperation with the Siberian radicals, were interested in establishing a communist state in the Far East. The second element sought the entire or partial restoration of the old régime.

*Division
following
Bolshevik
revolution*

5. FOREIGN INTERVENTION PROPOSED

Foreign intervention in Siberia did not come until 1918, and it was not seriously contemplated until the Russians, under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, withdrew from participation in the war. Immediately following the revolution, however, warships were sent to Vladivostok to follow developments. During this early period Rear-Admiral Knight, of the American Navy, tried to keep in touch with the various factions in the city, and, when dissension began to develop, suggested a plan by which they might be united with the aid and support of the Allied Powers. This plan was not acted upon by his government, and the situation in Siberia was permitted to develop until it began to appear possible that communism would find a firm hold there.

*No immediate
move toward
intervention*

Early in 1918 official suggestions were made in favor of an allied intervention in Siberia. On March 14 Mr. Balfour, in the British House of Commons, urged that Japan be invited to intervene in order to prevent German domination of that country. It was alleged that large numbers of German and Austrian prisoners had been released and were working their way eastwards, and that Siberia would fall into their hands if steps were not taken to prevent it.

*Japanese
intervention
proposed by
British*

This proposal, it may be noted, was for an exclusive intervention by the Japanese, rather than for an inter-allied move.

*Japanese
attitude toward
proposal*

The early Japanese attitude toward intervention was expressed officially by Baron Goto, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on May 1, 1918, when he said that "Japan must give encouragement, assistance and support to the work of reorganization" in Russia, and that she must continue to assume the burden of "preserving the peace in the Far East." His government then, with the concurrence of Great Britain and France, proposed to the United States that Japanese troops should be sent to Vladivostok to protect the interests of the Allied states. When President Wilson expressed dissent as to the wisdom of this policy, the Japanese government assumed the attitude that it did not care to make any further overtures, but would wait until the Allies could agree among themselves as to the best course of action. However, because of an expressed fear as to the security of the supplies which had been concentrated at Vladivostok for transportation over the railway to the Russian front before the outbreak of the revolution, Japanese and British marines were landed at that city in April. Japan further prepared for eventualities when, on May 16, she signed an agreement with China, providing for co-operation in the defense of their interests to the north, and for the movement of troops over the Chinese Eastern railway.

*The question of
the Czecho-
Slovaks*

It was not until the summer that the United States not only concurred in, but indeed proposed, active inter-allied intervention in Siberia. The reason for the change in the American attitude was stated to be the necessity for helping the Czecho-Slovaks to extricate themselves from a dangerous position which had been created by a change in the attitude of the Russian government toward them. This Czecho-Slovak force was made up of former subjects of the Austrian Empire who had either been captured by the Russians or had, at the earliest possible opportunity, deserted from the Austrian ranks and had been given asylum in Russia. When the Russian military collapse came, following the revolution, they indicated a desire to leave Russian soil and to secure transportation to France in order, on the western front, to fight for the Allied cause. This desire was due to the hope and expectation that, out of the success of the Allies, would result the establishment of a Czech national state.

Soon after the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks, the Czecho-Slovaks asked for permission to leave Russia. This permission was given them in February, and their withdrawal eastwards commenced. But in March the treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia was signed. Germany then proceeded to put pressure on the Russian government in order to secure a revocation of the permission given to the Czechs to withdraw. The Soviet government succumbed to this pressure, and in May the attempt was made to disarm them. Their response was immediate, taking the form of the occupation of territory from Cheliabinsk to Krasnoyarsk. They thus found

themselves in occupation of what had become enemy territory, with no way of extricating themselves unless they could retain control of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Their main difficulties were supposed to come from Austrian and German prisoners of war, who, it was said, had been released and armed, but in fact it was their presence as an armed force in Russia which put them in danger.² It was this situation which caused the government of the United States to change its attitude toward intervention.

Preliminary to acting, the United States and Japan, the two principal parties, issued official declarations of their intentions. The American declaration first laid down the proposition that any general military intervention was unwise as having the effect, not of serving, but rather of using Russia, thus working an unjustifiable division of the Allied forces. It would also constitute an unwise diversion of attention from the western front. This was by way of reiteration of the original American attitude. The declaration then went on to state:

*Declarations
of intention
made by Japan
and the
United States*

As the government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence.³

The American declaration carried with it an assurance that there would be no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs, and no impairment of her territorial integrity.

The Japanese government gave similar assurances as to the purpose of the intervention, and pledged itself not to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and to respect her territorial integrity. Both parties stated that they would withdraw their forces immediately upon the attainment of the limited objectives of the intervention.⁴

Small contingents were furnished by the European states to aid in making up the expeditionary force which was despatched to

² From the first, many people in the West looked to this force as a possible antidote to Bolshevism and urged that, instead of withdrawing, they be aided to assume control of Siberia. They refused to acquiesce in this plan for a time, but when attacked they defended themselves, and, as a result of this, found themselves involved in Siberian affairs. Their occupation of the country, coupled with the demand that they hold it for capitalism, led to their being viewed with suspicion by the Russians, and this it was, in reality, which made their situation dangerous, rather than the presence of armed Germans and Austrians in any numbers.

³ *New York Times, Current History*, vol. 8, pp. 466-7.

⁴ *Ibid.*

*Size of
contingents
sent to Siberia
by Allies*

Vladivostok in pursuance of this agreement, and the United States and Japan agreed each to send seventy-five hundred soldiers. The American contingent actually consisted of about this number, but Japan sent troops out of all proportion to the importance of the intervention or its declared purposes, thus immediately justifying the fears of those who had felt that Japanese intervention in Siberia would be for some ulterior purpose. Estimates of the number of soldiers brought to Siberia by Japan range from a lower limit of about thirty thousand to a maximum of about ninety thousand.

*Fear of
Bolshevism
cause of
intervention*

This Siberian intervention was said to be necessary because of the danger to the Czecho-Slovaks from the German and Austrian prisoners who had been armed following the peace of Brest-Litovsk. As a matter of fact, however, it was fear of Bolshevism which, as much as anything else, brought about the intervention. To "steady Russian efforts at self-government" meant, so far at least as the Western Powers were concerned, giving aid and support to any faction in Siberia which would oppose the establishment of the Soviet rule. This was the Japanese attitude as well, although the Japanese policy seemed, subsequently, to have been dictated equally by a desire to fish in Siberian waters.

*Japanese forces
penetrate the
interior*

With a few exceptions the non-Japanese foreign troops remained at Vladivostok, although some small expeditions were sent into the interior along the railroad to facilitate the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops. The Japanese, on the other hand, penetrated into the interior in force. Troops were landed at Nicolaievsk, at the mouth of the Amur; Habarovsk was occupied; Blagovensk and Alexievsk were captured, and were occupied in conjunction with American troops. Furthermore, a systematic advance along the Trans-Siberian Railway was begun. In all places, and on all occasions, the Japanese comported themselves as masters in the Siberian household, stirring up for themselves a legacy of distrust and ill-will.

6. INTERNAL STRUGGLES

*Support given
non-Bolshevist
governments*

The Siberians, meanwhile, had begun the work of organization for themselves. In many places local soviets sprang up and took control of affairs. But, on the other hand, several attempts were made to establish non-Bolshevist governments. In spite of their pledges not to intervene in the internal politics of the region, these anti-Bolshevist governments were, one after the other, accorded support by one or another of the Allied Powers, with the Japanese systematically encouraging any of them which showed a willingness to deal with Japan on her own terms. It is not necessary to discuss these governments in any detail. General Horvath established an anti-Bolshevist government at Harbin, on Chinese soil, and he received Japanese support for a time. In spite of this support, or perhaps in part because of it, Horvath failed to gain a following in Siberia. His failure was also due to the fact that the Siberians were

fearful of any cause which savored of reaction. After his collapse as a "savior" the Japanese turned elsewhere. In June, 1918, prior to the inter-Allied expedition, an attempt was made to establish an all-Siberian government at Omsk. This government was non-Bolshevistic. With it was later merged a government set up at Ufa. The consolidated government was brought under the control of a directory of five members, three of whom were socialistic in their affiliations. This directory appointed Admiral Kolchak as Minister of War. On November 17, 1918, by a *coup d'état*, he made himself the dictator of the Omsk government and declared his intention of driving the Bolsheviks out of Siberia.

Because of his apparent strength, the Japanese then came to the support of Kolchak, although at the same time they were furnishing money and supplies to the Cossack Ataman Semenov, who had established himself at Chita. Since the aims of both Kolchak and Semenov were the same, the attempt was made to consolidate their strength, Semenov being brought under the nominal direction of the Kolchak government. However, he did not support it in good faith, and by his denial of support he contributed to its ultimate overthrow. The Kolchak government, however, passed from the scene, in its turn, because it over-reached itself in its attempt to clear the region east of the Urals of the Bolsheviks. Its troops won some initial successes, principally during the period of the reorganization of the Red Army, but after that had been completed the Kolchak troops began to suffer reverses, and ultimately that move against Bolshevism went the way of the others.

*Kolchak régime
overthrown*

After the defeat of Admiral Kolchak, the entire region between Lake Baikal and the Urals—western Siberia—declared itself in favor of sovietism and of incorporation into Soviet Russia. From this time it ceased to be seriously affected by the struggles in the eastern part of Siberia. The eastern region, however, had to go through an extended period of turmoil before it attained a measure of political stability. Semenov remained in Chita and profited by the defeat of his nominal superior through the addition of the remnants of Kolchak's troops to his own force. Outside of the region around Chita, which was ruled by Semenov by terrorist methods, extreme instability continued. Some territory was occupied by Japanese troops, or was controlled by Russian figureheads who were subsidized by Japan. Outside of these places there was little government.

*Western Siberia
unites with
Soviet Russia*

*Conditions in
eastern Siberia*

Out of this condition of disintegration there were born bands of Partisans, a combination of Siberian patriots and freebooters, sometimes intermingled, and sometimes organized into separate bands. These Partisans gradually extended their control over eastern Siberia during 1919, and through them, ultimately, a semblance of order began to emerge. In the end even Semenov succumbed to them, and was driven out of Chita, which then became the center of a new government.

*"Partisan"
bands formed*

*Far Eastern
Republic of
Siberia born*

These Partisan bands were largely communist in complexion and were intent on establishing a communist régime in eastern Asia affiliated with the Moscow government. As they cleared the country westwards, however, they came into contact with a movement, largely initiated by one man, Krasnoschekoff, working eastwards under the direction of Moscow. Originally a communist, Krasnoschekoff had come to realize that Siberia could not be properly developed, at that stage of its progress, save through a capitalistic medium, and, further, he had come to see that the Allied Powers would not readily sanction a communist state in the Far East. Consequently he undertook to persuade the Russian government of the advisability of erecting in eastern Siberia a democratic state as a buffer between it and Japan. He was successful in this, as in his subsequent attempt to convince the Partisans of the futility of their endeavor to establish communism in the region east of Lake Baikal. Out of his labors, with the sanction of Soviet Russia, there finally came into being the democratic state which took the name of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. But this new state did not include all of the Russian territory hitherto known as Siberia. In the first place, the region west of Lake Baikal elected to remain a part of Russia. Then, the former province of Kamchatka was reserved as Russian territory by the terms of an agreement with Moscow.⁵ In the third place, the Japanese continued for some time in control of the Maritime Province, acting largely through Russian figurehead governments. And, in the fourth place, Saghalin which, north of the fiftieth parallel, had been part of the Russian Far East, was occupied and held by the Japanese pending an adjustment of the Nicolaievsk difficulty.⁶ Consequently the territory of the Far Eastern Republic extended only from the eastern side of Lake Baikal in a narrow strip eastwards to the Maritime Province.

7. INTERVENTION PARTIALLY ENDED

*Reasons for
withdrawal*

Before considering the fortunes of the new state, we must say a few words more to bring the account of the intervention to an end. After the armistice agreement with Germany had been concluded there seemed to be little reason for the continued maintenance of the Allied troops in Siberia, since it had not been stated that a struggle against Bolshevism was one of the reasons for the intervention. Furthermore, the Allies, with the exception of Japan, were anxious, by the end of 1919, to get out of the country. The reasons for the maintenance of a military force in Siberia became increasingly

⁵ This seems to have been done with a view to using it as a bait for American capital, the purpose of the Russian government being to grant concessions for its exploitation. It was said at the time that the Russian government hoped in this way further to embroil the United States and Japan.

⁶ Several hundred Japanese, together with a large number of Russians, were killed at Nicolaievsk as a result of a conflict between the Japanese and Partisans. Part of the responsibility for the outbreak of trouble must be borne by the Japanese, who attempted to determine the type of government established there.

difficult to explain to the people of the United States, Canada, and other Western countries after the war was ended. Furthermore, the relations of the Americans, particularly, with the Japanese became increasingly difficult as time passed. Because of obstruction of the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway, an agreement was reached in January, 1919, by which it, together with other sections of the Trans-Siberian, was taken from the control of Japan and her satellites, and brought under the administration of an inter-Allied board made up of representatives of the United States, England, France, Italy, Japan, and China, under the presidency of a Russian. Friction developed immediately, however, and charges of Japanese obstruction and bad faith continued to be made. This was not only true with respect to the railway, but was generally the case. Japan was accused of attempting to make use of her military position in Siberia to establish, by rather under-handed methods, a commercial and general economic dominance of the country. It was alleged, and on good authority, that she was bringing in goods of a commercial character, contrary to agreement, in the guise of military supplies, and that she obstructed in every possible way the activities of non-Japanese in Siberia. Further than this, American and Japanese troops came into antagonistic relations with one another, due in part to the high-handed actions of Japanese soldiers—their deliberate disregard of the rights of the inhabitants of the territory.

The Japanese, on their side, objected to American criticisms of their actions and policy. The government of the United States, for example, protested against the excessive number of soldiers the Japanese government sent into Siberia, and also objected to the Japanese occupation of Saghalin. Furthermore, individual Americans were not at all hesitant about expressing publicly their distrust of Japan's policy of entrenchment in the Far East, and this did not tend to develop good feeling between the two peoples, or their troops.

*American-
Japanese
friction*

Consequently it was in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and dislike that the American withdrawal was begun after January, 1920. It was announced that this withdrawal was undertaken in fulfilment of the pledge, given at the time of the sending of troops, that they would be evacuated as soon as the limited objects of the intervention had been gained. This was in the nature of a direct reminder to Japan that she had assumed a similar obligation. However, it did not cause her to retire, in spite of the fact that substantial elements of the Japanese public were tired of the costly Siberian adventure. The military party still had the upper hand!

*Japan remains
in Siberia*

Since the agreement regarding inter-Allied supervision of the Siberian railway system provided that it should "cease to be operative upon withdrawal of the foreign military forces from Siberia,"⁷ China took the opportunity afforded by the American withdrawal

*The Chinese-
Eastern
Railway*

⁷ Art. 5. For text see *Manchuria—Treaties and Agreements*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1921), pp. 32-33.

to reassert her interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway. On October 2, 1920, the Ministry of Communications reached an agreement⁸ with the Russo-Asiatic Bank by which, pending a final arrangement with a recognized Russian government, China assumed the supreme control and direction of the road. New arrangements for its administration as a purely commercial undertaking were made, and all governmental functions, including policing of the railway area, were assumed by the Chinese government. This provisional status was maintained until, and for a time after, the Washington Conference.

8. THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

*Japanese
attitude toward
new state*

*Constituent
Assembly meets*

*The
governmental
system*

*Economic
provisions of
constitution*


The establishment of the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer state between Japan and Russia met, perforce, with Japanese approval, although the Republic was not given recognition. In May the Japanese commander not only expressed his gratification over its establishment, but said that Japan would evacuate Siberia as soon as it was clear that a stable government had been formed. The Japanese then proceeded to withdraw from Trans-Baikalia, but continued to maintain their troops in the Maritime Province. In spite of that, however, the Vladivostok government, in the winter of 1920, recognized the government established at Chita as the government of Siberia. As a result of negotiations with the other governments, and of the driving of Semenov out of the territory which had been under his control, it became possible to proceed with the organization of a unified government by the end of 1920. Consequently provision was made, under the Kerensky election laws, for the choice of representatives to a constituent assembly. This body met for the first time on February 12, 1921, with a non-party peasant majority, and proceeded to frame a constitution for the newly-established Republic. This constitution was adopted on April 17.

The government provided for under the constitution consisted of an assembly elected by universal suffrage, and an executive of seven members elected by the assembly. From the standpoint both of its selection and its powers, the executive was made an agency through which the assembly would act to realize its will. Very broad powers were granted to the assembly in addition to the general legislative power. These included the approval of treaties, the organization of the army, and supreme control over administration. The executive, however, was given the power to appoint and remove from office.

More interest, however, attaches to the economic than to the political system of the Republic. Here we find that the constitution says: "private ownership of lands, forests, waterways and other national resources within the territory of the Far Eastern Republic is forever annulled. All land in whosoever use or possession it may be is declared to be the property of the toiling people and forms the national fund."⁹ But "the institution of private property is preserved.

⁸ For text of agreement and annexes, see *ibid.*, pp. 210-220.

⁹ Art. 5, sec. 1, clauses 126-127.



All citizens and private companies are guaranteed the inviolability of their movable and immovable property subject to the restrictions provided by this constitution."¹⁰ Here we have, apparently, a decided inconsistency of provision. One writer, however, explains it rather reasonably in this way:

The whole plan is directed towards the elimination of absentee landlordism and land speculation. The man who uses the land has a right to what it produces, subject to the eminent domain of the State.

The apparent conflict comes from the fact that the words which are translated "immovable properties and estates" do not in Russian, as they do in English, include land. They correspond rather to the term "fixtures" as used in connection with English law of real property. . . . The title to the land itself remains in the State, but the actual benefit from its use accrues to the holder as long as he devotes it to a reasonable use.¹¹

Meanwhile, in spite of the "gratification" expressed by the Japanese General Oi at the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic, Japan proceeded to embarrass the new government in the regions under her control. On January 31, 1920, the government which had existed at Vladivostok was overthrown by the Russians and a new régime less friendly to Japan was substituted for it. It was this new government which entered into relations with the Chita authorities. Since it was able to maintain order in Vladivostok, and that without Japanese support, it would appear that the sole reason for the continued maintenance of the soldiers of Japan at that port had been removed. This, at least, was the view of the foreign world, as well as that held by large sections of the population of Japan. In order to demonstrate the necessity for remaining, the Japanese armed the troops led by General Kappel, formerly part of Kolchak's army, who overthrew the government in Vladivostok, setting up one of their own under the leadership of Spiridon Merkuloff. This, the military party in Japan said, indicated that it would be unsafe for Japanese troops to be withdrawn. Consequently they extended their control further through the Maritime Province, and refused to allow the writ of the Chita government to run in the regions under their control.

*Relations of
Republic with
Japan*

When an invitation to a conference to discuss Far Eastern questions was received by Japan, the government decided that it was expedient to present at least the appearance of trying to close the books on the Siberian venture, just as it showed a desire to wipe the Shantung question off the slate, and as it settled the Yap controversy with the United States apart from the Washington Conference. Consequently a conference was opened at Dairen between the Japanese and Chita governments with a view to settling all outstanding questions. The conferees, however, failed to reach any agreement. In fact, the Japanese attitude was such that the only basis for agree-

*The Dairen
Conference*

¹⁰ Art. 5, sec. 3, clauses 146-7.

¹¹ NORTON, *Far Eastern Republic of Siberia*, p. 167.

ment was a complete surrender by the Far Eastern Republic to far-reaching demands. These were comprised under seventeen heads, and were so extensive that they can only be summarized in general terms. From the military standpoint the Chita government was asked to pledge itself to convert Vladivostok into a purely commercial port; to destroy all fortifications there and along the Korean border; and to agree never to maintain a naval force in the Pacific. But the bulk of the demands were concerned with economic rights to be enjoyed by Japanese in Siberia. These included an extension of the Japanese right of participation in the Siberian fisheries; the right of navigation of the Amur River and other inland waterways; a pledge that Japanese subjects should always be permitted to enjoy equal trading rights and privileges with the citizens of the Far Eastern Republic, together with a guaranteed right to own land, open mines, etc. The Republic was to agree to lease to Japan, for a period of eighty years, in compensation for the so-called massacre at Nicolaievsk, the northern half of the island of Saghalin. And all of the rights, titles, and privileges in property which Japanese subjects had secured from the successive Siberian governments, many of them under the control of Japan, were to be recognized as valid. Furthermore, a pledge was required that at no time in the future would the communistic principle be introduced into the Republic. These are but a few of the demands served on the Siberian representatives at the Dairen conference. It needs but their partial statement to explain the failure of the conference to reach a settlement of the questions at issue between the two countries.

*Failure of
Republic to
secure
admission to
Washington
Conference*

With this situation in Siberia, the Far Eastern Republic tried to secure recognition from the United States, at least for the purpose and to the extent of allowing it to present its case and its claims at Washington. This was denied to it,¹² and, as is pointed out elsewhere, the Conference adjourned without finding a solution of the Siberian question.

*Russian interest
in the Republic*

The total effect of the policy of Japan, and of the refusal of the Western states to recognize the Far Eastern Republic, was to drive it into closer relations with Russia. It is a fair assumption that it was largely with the hope of establishing the relations with the outside world denied to communist Russia that the Republic had been first contemplated by Mr. Krasnoschekoff. At least the Republic was established with the approval of the Soviet authorities, who also approved of its democratic character. After giving this approval,

¹² The United States had set up the idea of a "moral trusteeship" for Russia, to be exercised pending the reestablishment of a "sane" and unified Russian state. It was felt, apparently, that recognition of the Far Eastern Republic would constitute a recognition of the legal disintegration of Russia, and thus could not be considered. The Siberians were asked to believe that their rights would be looked after and safeguarded by the Western "trustees." At the Washington Conference a resolution was adopted applying this idea of trusteeship to the Chinese Eastern Railway. The later direct Sino-Russian agreement concerning it was protested as a departure from the principle.

and formally recognizing the Republic, they kept their hands off, giving advice only when it was asked. Because of the views of the persons at the helm in Chita, this was probably rather often, particularly so far as foreign affairs was concerned.

Under the pressure of Japanese policy, the young Republic looked more and more to Moscow for support. This led naturally and inevitably to a resumption of the old relationship between Siberia and Russia, the former assuming to an ever greater extent the character of a fully autonomous province of the Russian state, so far as its internal affairs were concerned, but putting the direction of its external affairs in the hands of Russia. From its point of view, furthermore, the failure of the Republic to secure representation at Washington ended its independent usefulness to the Russian government, and so, after the conference, we find little mention of the Far Eastern Republic, but are confronted again with Russia in the Far East. The consequences of the resumption of Russian activities will be made apparent in the course of the discussion of international relations in the Far East after the Washington Conference.

*Resumption of
old relationship
with Russia*

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CHAPTER XXI

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND AFTER

I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFERENCE

*Reasons for
consideration of
Far Eastern
questions*

THE Washington Conference originated out of a desire, in the interest of economy, to reduce naval armament. But since a navy is, or should be, a means of realizing the ends of national policy, it is clear that there is a close relationship between the existence of policies and interests which will lead to conflict, on the one hand, and the willingness to give up or reduce the means of putting policies into effect, or of protecting interests, on the other. So far as the United States was concerned, in 1921 the area of future conflict seemed to be the Far East, Japan seemed to be the potential opponent whose policies apparently conflicted with those of the United States, and China, it appeared, might be the principal field of conflict, due to the weakness and disorganization of the Republic. Consequently it seemed necessary to seek a solution of the Far Eastern question if naval armament reduction were to be seriously considered. This explains the invitation issued to the Powers to confer on Pacific and Far Eastern questions, while simultaneously discussing questions of armament.

The modern history of the Far East serves as the background of the Washington Conference. This background, however, may be made clearer by a brief summary of the policies of Japan, the United States, and England.

*The Japanese
position in 1921
summarized*

The development of the Japanese position with respect to the continent of Asia has been discussed in some detail in the preceding pages. By 1921 Japan was in a position, strategically, to dominate the East. All of the sea approaches from the north to the south were controlled by her. In the north, the possession of the island of Saghalin and of the Kurile Islands, together with Hokkaido, gave her control of entry into the sea of Okhotsk; the Japan Sea was closed to the outside world by the Japanese control of Saghalin, Hokkaido, Japan proper, and Korea, reënforced by their ownership of the island of Tsushima; possession of the Loochoo Islands and the Pescadores, running from the Japanese main islands south to Formosa, and of Formosa, enabled her to shut off the Yellow Sea. Thus she controlled all access to China from Fukien province north, and all access to Siberia. Further than this, her position in northern Saghalin gave her effective control of the mouth of the Amur River and thus of the great waterways of Siberia. From Korea and the Kuantung leased

territory she controlled access to Manchuria. Her position north of the Great Wall and in Shantung province gave her the power to dominate Peking if she chose to exert it. The German railway rights in Shantung, coupled with the extension of them secured after 1914, gave the means of cutting off north China from the central part of the country. And working north from Fukien province, another Japanese sphere of interest, and south from Shantung, she could maintain an effective control of central China. Thus, from the military standpoint, Japan had gained a dominating position toward China, and had a great advantage over competitors for position who had to approach the continent from the eastern side and by sea.

In establishing this territorial position Japan had fought three successful wars at ten year intervals, thus displacing China in Formosa and Korea, Russia in Saghalin and Manchuria, and Germany in Shantung. These territorial gains, it may be noted further, had been duplicated by economic advances. Korea became an exclusive field for Japanese exploitation; the Manchurian market was dominated by Japan, which asserted a virtual monopoly of investment rights there. Also, particularly in the field of railway financing, substantial interests had been built up in Shantung; the economic wedge was inserted in eastern Inner Mongolia in 1915; the attempt was being made in 1921 to secure a strong economic position in Siberia; and an important interest had been established in some of China's resources outside of Manchuria and Shantung.

*Means of
establishing
dominancy*

After 1905 the principal opposition to Japan in her Asian ventures came from the United States. England, as an ally of Japan, and with a particular interest in her European relationships, was in no position to oppose the Japanese. Russian interest in the Far East lessened after the defeat by Japan and the agreement with England in 1907, the Czar's government resting satisfied with the preservation of its position in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia by agreement with Japan in 1907, 1910, and 1916. Consequently the United States, which, under Roosevelt, had looked upon Japan as the defender of the faith against Russia, and upon the Anglo-Japanese agreement as a beneficent instrument to preserve the peace in eastern Asia, became engaged in the thankless task of attempting to restrain Japan. America's opposition to her efforts to consolidate her position in Manchuria embittered Japan against the United States, and the failure of the policy of the United States enhanced its distrust of Japan. This estrangement was further emphasized by the immigration controversies.

*United States
Japan's
principal
opponent*

The American interest in China, as has been revealed, antedates 1905 or even 1895. But the United States had no sustained interest in Far Eastern politics for three decades after the Civil War. From the beginning of treaty relations with China, Washington had demanded "most-favored-nation" commercial treatment, and had not asserted or attempted to gain for itself special rights except those accruing

*The American
interest
summarized*

to it, together with all treaty Powers, by reason of the system of extra-territoriality, and through the treaty tariff system. Otherwise individuals had made American policy—when Seward was Secretary of State, for example, and during the Burlingame régime at Peking—with the consequence that interest and activity was intermittent. The same was true in the larger Pacific area, except for the sustained interest in the fortunes of Hawaii after the settlement of California and the Pacific Coast. And American policy even toward Hawaii veered from one extreme to another. Secretary Webster held that the independence of the islands should be respected by all, including the United States. Secretary Marcy stated that the United States would acquire the islands rather than see them controlled by any other country. Seward advocated a "strong" Pacific policy, preferring annexation to reciprocity. The policy then reverted to reciprocity, as embodied in the convention of 1875, and changed from that to the Blaine policy of 1881 of "drawing the ties of intimate relationship between us and the Hawaiian Islands so as to make them practically a part of the American system without derogation of their absolute independence."¹ The note sustained after 1850, however, was the assertion of American interest as against that of third parties.

*Renewal of
American
interest in
Far East
a) Hawaii
acquired*

But after 1895 American interest in the Pacific became intensified and the interest in China revived. The reasons for this are various, but all have a bearing on the subsequent Far Eastern activities of the United States. First may be noted the war with Spain and the simultaneous annexation of Hawaii, which advanced the frontier of the United States a considerable distance into the Pacific. Annexation had been actively agitated as early as 1893, following the establishment by revolution of the government headed by the American, Sanford B. Dole. A change of administration deferred ratification of the annexation treaty until after Cleveland passed from office, but a second treaty signed by President McKinley on June 16, 1897, was followed by annexation by joint resolution on July 7, 1898. It may be noted that Japan, whose peoples had begun to settle in Hawaii in considerable numbers, protested against this extension of the American position, but accepted the new status after the project had been carried to completion.

*b) Retention of
Philippines*

A more direct consequence of the war with Spain was the occupation of the Philippine Islands and the intermediate base at Guam. The former were eventually ceded to the United States by the treaty of peace, and the campaign of 1900, so far as the Philippines constituted an issue, established the intention to retain them at least until the peoples were ready to govern themselves. Here is not the place, even if space permitted, to embark on a discussion of the American Philippine policy. The history of the islands after their acquisition is part of the history of the United States. But the reten-

¹ See I, MOORE's *Digest*, pp. 483-88, for American policy toward Hawaii. It may be here pointed out that it offers an interesting parallel to Japan's Manchurian policy.

tion of the Philippines has an important bearing on the Far Eastern policy of the United States which must be considered at this point. One reason urged for their acquisition and retention was that they would give the United States a tangible territorial footing in the Far East, thus entitling it to a voice in Far Eastern affairs. Another was that Manila would serve as a convenient base of approach to the China trade, enabling the United States to participate in it more largely and more effectively.

Just as the original American interest in China was due to her trade at Canton, so the revival of American interest was due to a feeling of need for overseas markets. Many were convinced by 1898 that the future prosperity of the United States was dependent on an enlarged participation in foreign trade, and on entering the competition for investment privileges in such regions as China. Both as a market and as a field for investment, China was conceded to be potentially the most promising uncontrolled backward state. This feeling, whether or not warranted by the facts, is enough to explain the interest in the Philippines as a stepping-stone to China, and in events in the Celestial Empire.

At the time when the United States was beginning again to look outward, economically and politically, the scramble for concessions was at its height in China, whose continued existence as a state, and consequently as a potential market, seemed to be threatened. The restatement, in the Hay notes, of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity was the American reaction to the situation. But the years from 1900 to 1904 revealed clearly that the United States had not a sufficiently vital interest herself to restrain Russia in Manchuria, and consequently to preserve the policy. This the American government left to Japan, sympathizing with and encouraging her, just as England was doing, and to almost the same extent. To the United States, Japan was fighting to preserve the Open Door and the integrity of China. Roosevelt was sufficiently a realist, however, to see that Japan herself, if unrestrained, might become a danger to American interests as a result of the elimination of Russia as a factor in Chinese politics. Consequently he hoped to see Russia and Japan serve as checks on each other's actions after 1905.

When Japan succeeded to Russian policy as well as to Russian interests in South Manchuria, and Russia failed to seek to restrain her, but rather agreed with her on their respective spheres, and to mutual support therein, it was necessary to devise some other plan of action to sustain American policy. This plan was the neutralization of the Manchurian railways, or at least the introduction of American and British capital into Manchuria. The proposals and actions of the years 1907-1910 indicate a Japanese-American conflict of interests and of policies. In this diplomatic conflict Japan was as victorious as she had been in her wars against China and Russia. But the fact of conflict of interest, together with the fact of Japanese victory, led to mutual

c) Interest in markets

Reaction to move toward partition of China

Conflict of interest with Japan, 1905 to 1914

antagonism and recrimination, which in turn had to be reckoned with in the policies of both countries. As has already been indicated, this hostility was confirmed and strengthened as a result of the unfair treatment of Japanese in the United States, and as a result of the movement toward exclusion. As early as 1911 there was talk of a possible war between the two countries.

*Reaction to
Japan's
post-1914
activities*

This friction was not abated by reason of the actions of Japan following her entrance into the World War. Whereas before, the Imperial Japanese government had been able to square its professions and its practices to the satisfaction of its supporters, justifying its Manchurian activities to a reasonable extent, its activities after 1914 could only be considered as frankly aggressive, and indicative of a desire to dominate China. Consequently, both in Japan, on account of American criticisms, official as well as unofficial, and in the United States, the situation was regarded as critical and highly explosive.

*Scope of
proposed
conference
broadened*

Thus when the Borah resolution, inviting the President to convoke a conference of the Powers to consider the reduction of naval expenditure by mutual agreement, passed the Senate (May 26, 1921) and the House (June 29), and the administration was moved to action, the scope of the conference was broadened to include a consideration of Far Eastern and Pacific questions. The impulse behind the Borah resolution was primarily the desire to reduce expenditure. But, as a practical proposition, it was apparent to the administration that armament reduction could not be undertaken successfully without a removal of some of the causes of international friction. At that time, so far as the United States was concerned, it has been seen that a primary source of discord was to be found in the condition of China, and in Japanese policy toward China and Siberia.

*China's interest
in the Conference*

This proposal to make an adjustment in the Pacific meant that the interests of other states than the United States and Japan would have to be taken into account, and the interested parties consulted. One of the parties in interest was unquestionably China, and an invitation was necessarily extended to her government to send delegates, since the American government did not project a feast of the vultures with China furnishing the meal. We have already set forth China's position in detail, and we need only say that her aim was to recover ground lost during the years of her modern history.

*Original
British interest
and policy
vis-à-vis China*

Another state with an active interest in any attempted solution of the Far Eastern problem was Great Britain, including not only Imperial England but Canada and Australia as well. No adequate introduction to the Washington Conference could be made without a consideration of the part Great Britain has played in Eastern Asia. The conclusion of the war, resulting in the Nanking treaty and the opening of China, left England with Hongkong, which rapidly became the most important commercial center in the Far East. No further territorial gains at China's expense were made by England until 1898, except that represented by the occupation of Upper Burma.

Her interests were primarily commercial, although she played a leading political rôle at Peking after the right of legation had been established as a result of the war of 1858-1860. As the premier trading state, her policy ran parallel with that of the United States, as it was intermittently expressed from 1860 to 1895. This policy was to secure the progressive opening of China to trade on a "most-favored-nation" basis. Due to her interest in the protection of India, which has always been in the background of English Asiatic policy, she was opposed to any great weakening of China, particularly to the benefit of Russia.

An indication of a change in British policy, from support of China to support of Japan, was given when she not only did not lead in the movement to keep Japan off the mainland in 1895, but also refused to participate in the intervention which caused the retrocession of the Liaotung promontory. And when the movement on China began, after 1895, she participated in it to the extent of securing Wei Hai Wei and territory at Kowloon for herself, and demanding and receiving railroad concessions in the Yangtse valley, together with a non-alienation pledge as to that region, thus staking out a sphere of interest for herself. She reverted to her earlier China policy in accepting the Hay proposals of 1899, and in taking a stand in opposition to partition in 1900. As Russia threatened to assume a dominating position in Manchuria and north China, England, perceiving a threat to her trade, and to India as well, sought for support in attempting to check the Russian advance. Anglo-German agreement was tried and failed on account of the refusal of Germany to apply the principles of the Open Door and integrity of China to Manchuria. The United States insisted on playing a lone diplomatic hand. Thus England turned to Japan in the agreement of 1902. From that time England supported Japan faithfully, not only against Russia, but subsequently against the United States when American capital attempted, with government support, to invade Manchuria.

*Change of
British policy
after 1895*

But the growth of American-Japanese antagonism caused much disquietude in England for several reasons. In the first place, there had been a growing friendliness between England and the United States, both expressed and promoted by the withdrawal of the former from the Caribbean in favor of the latter in and after 1902, and this embryo friendship was threatened because of English support of Japan in Manchuria. In the second place, Englishmen were not wholly sympathetic to the idea of aiding Japan in case of war with the United States, as the revised agreement of 1905 would have obliged them to do, especially as English China traders and financiers of repute were as critical of Japan's Asiatic policy as were many Americans. And in the third place, so far as the immigration question entered into such a possible struggle, the Canadian and Australian policy and interests were identical with the American. The result was that the alliance of 1911 excluded from its operation any state with which either party had a general treaty of arbitration, such as had just been negotiated

*Revision of
Anglo-Japanese
Alliance in 1911*

between England and the United States. The failure of the Senate to ratify the treaty, however, left matters as they had been before, until the so-called "Bryan Peace Commission" treaty was negotiated. This England construed as a general arbitration treaty in the sense of the alliance, without open Japanese objection. But whether Tokyo would have concurred in this construction in case of war, remains an open question.

War necessity forced England to acquiesce in the extension of Japanese power and influence after 1914, and to enter into the secret agreement of 1917. Loyalty to Japan, and respect for her word, caused her not to oppose Japan's claims at Paris. But it is not an over-statement to say that many Englishmen desired to see the alliance terminated because it constituted a handicap to the extension of British trade and financial interests in China, because it lent British passive support to the undue extension of Japanese influence in the Far East, and because it seriously prejudiced Anglo-American relations.

For these reasons, and because of Dominion pressure, the question of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was made a principal item on the agenda of the Imperial Conference convened at London in the summer of 1921. In the course of discussion of the alliance at that time it was made clear that it had not been terminated as inconsistent with the obligations of Great Britain under the League of Nations covenant, and that it did not lapse automatically at the end of the ten-year period of its duration, but could only be ended by affirmative action of either Japan or England. The latter naturally did not feel inclined to terminate it abruptly, or in such a manner as to appear arbitrarily to throw Japan over after having made use of her. Consequently it may be surmised that the American President's invitation was regarded as affording an opportunity to terminate the alliance as part of a general Far Eastern settlement.

Of the other Powers invited to participate in the Far Eastern phase of the Washington Conference not much need be said. France, as an Asiatic Power and one claiming a sphere of interest in China, with a leased area, and with a financial stake in the Republic, was naturally invited. Of her Asiatic policies it need only be said that they were not fundamentally dissimilar to those of Russia and Japan. Holland was invited by reason of her territorial possessions in the East rather than because she had been politically active there; and Portugal was recognized as a Far Eastern Power by reason of her possession of Macao, an unsavory reminder of her past glories. Finally, because of her financial interests, an invitation was also extended to Belgium.


There was one decidedly significant omission in the list of the elect, for Russia was tendered no invitation, nor was the Far Eastern Republic included. At the time, perhaps, Russia was considered negligible in the East, although the reason she was not invited was rather the unwillingness of the American government to have any dealings with the unrecognized Soviet authorities, either directly

*Desire to
terminate
alliance*

*The Alliance
and the
Imperial
Conference of
1921*

*Other Powers
invited to
Conference on
Far Eastern
and Pacific
questions*

*Russia not
invited*







or through the medium of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. This omission took away from the international character of the settlements arrived at, and, as will be noted in due course, it did not prevent the re-emergence of Russia as a primary factor in the Far East.

There were two distinct phases of the work of the Washington Conference after its convocation on November 11, 1921. The first involved consideration of the problem of the limitation of naval armaments, while the second required a resolution of the conflicting interests of the Powers in the Pacific area. The second phase involved China, Siberia, and the mandated islands in the Pacific. With the first phase we are not concerned here except in its relation to the situation in the Far East. And we need consider the problems of the Pacific, and the solutions arrived at, only in so far as they have an effect on the Far East.

*Two phases of
work of
Conference*

2. ARMS AGREEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE FAR EAST

Consequently we may best begin to consider the work of the Conference by analyzing briefly the agreements made with respect to naval armament and the Pacific area. In this connection it is desirable first of all to call attention to the summary view given earlier in this chapter of Japan's position with respect to China and Siberia. At the same time her proximity to the Philippines from Formosa should be recalled to mind.

From the military and naval point of view, it is immediately apparent that effective military pressure could be brought to bear on Japan only by threatening her from the Pacific side, by an attack directed against the main islands of the Japanese archipelago and Formosa. Only in this way, furthermore, could China be aided against her, in case of need, by any Power other than Russia. Competent naval authorities held at that time that a successful war could be waged against Japan only by a Power with at least double her naval strength. Even then it would be necessary for that Power to conduct its operations from adequately fortified naval bases closer to Japan than, for example, Hawaii.

*Military
strength of
Japan's
position*

The bearing of these facts on the decisions as to naval armament reached at Washington is clear. The proposals of Secretary of State Hughes fixed the naval ratio, in terms of capital ships, at five for the United States, five for Great Britain, three for Japan, and one and seventy-five hundredths for France and Italy. This means that neither the United States nor Great Britain can hope to attack Japan with any prospect of success. This conclusion is reinforced by an analysis of the agreement by which the *status quo* is to be maintained in fortification of islands in the Pacific, with certain exceptions. For the United States these exceptions are the islands "adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and the Hawaiian Islands." For Great Britain, the exceptions are the islands west of the meridian of 110

*Significance of
the naval ratio
and the non-
fortifications
agreement*

degrees east longitude,² and "those adjacent to the coast of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and New Zealand." This means that in case of war between the United States and Japan the former would have to conduct its operations from the Hawaiian Islands, since Guam has not been adequately equipped as a naval base, and cannot be so equipped now, and since the Philippine Islands are inadequately prepared to serve as a base of operations. With the present ratio of naval strength, a war conducted from the continental United States would be disastrous. Unless a combination of the United States and Great Britain should be directed against her, or unless Singapore should be made available as a base of operations, Japan is guaranteed from attack from the outside for the period of the naval agreement. On the other hand, while Japan could not carry on a successful offensive war against the continental United States or Hawaii, she could readily occupy the Philippines, which are, consequently, potentially in pawn to her.

*The Four
Powers Pact*

Against a possible Anglo-American attack, Japan is protected by the Four Powers Pact, which constitutes a pledge, by the Western Powers, of non-intervention in the Far East. Immune from attack from the West, Japan is secured in her continental interests because of her ability to dominate China and Siberia strategically from her well-chosen locations on the continent, since the Conference imposed no limitation on her right to construct submarines and aircraft, peculiarly suitable for use against the continent, and because of the failure of the Conference even to attempt to reach an agreement on the limitation of land armament. Thus it is clear that the Japanese won a substantial victory at Washington, unless they gave adequate compensation for this security by giving up some of their gains on the continent of Asia made during the past twenty-five years, or unless their government voluntarily modified its policy as a result of gaining immunity from attack. Without such a change of policy a fruitful source of discord would remain in spite of the labors of the delegates assembled at Washington.

3. THE NINE POWERS TREATY CONCERNING CHINA

*Siberian
question
summarily
disposed of*

The outstanding achievement of the Conference, so far as China and Siberia are concerned, is the Nine Powers Treaty concerning China. Siberia was dismissed with but scant attention. Briefly stated, the work of the Conference with respect to that great and undeveloped region was confined to the eliciting of a declaration from Japan that she intended to evacuate Siberia whenever it was feasible to do so, and that she had no aggressive intentions, and had never had any, with respect to it. The American delegation, through Secretary Hughes, while welcoming that declaration, pointed out that it had been made before, and that it was to be hoped that Japan would live up to its terms more completely than she had observed her past declarations.

² This exception gives Great Britain the right to fortify Singapore.

With respect to China it was quite different. Thirty of the thirty-one sessions of the Far Eastern Committee were devoted to China and her problems and claims. The attempt was first made to reach an agreement on a definition of principles to be applied. At the request of the American government, China prepared a statement of needs, from the standpoint of general principles, and these were presented to the committee in the form of ten points, or declarations of principle. They deserve to be quoted textually:³

*Chinese
Statement of
needs and
principles*

(1) *a)* The Powers engage to respect and observe the territorial integrity and political and administrative independence of the Chinese Republic.

b) China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any Power.

(2) China being in full accord with the principle of the so-called open door or equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept and apply it in all parts of the Chinese Republic without exception.

(3) With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these regions without previously notifying China and giving her an opportunity to participate.

(4) All special rights, privileges, immunities, or commitments, whatever their character or contractual basis, claimed by any of the Powers in or relating to China are to be declared, and all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities, and commitments now known or to be declared are to be examined with a view to determining their scope and validity and, if valid, to harmonizing them with one another and with the principles declared by this Conference.

(5) Immediately, or as soon as circumstances will permit, existing limitations upon China's political, jurisdictional and administrative freedom of action are to be removed.

(6) Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be attached to China's present commitments which are without time limits.

(7) In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights and privileges, the well established principle of construction that such grants shall be strictly construed in favor of the grantors, is to be observed.

(8) China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in future wars to which she is not a party.

(9) Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in the Pacific and the Far East.

(10) Provision is to be made for future conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of international questions relative to the Pacific and the Far East as a basis for the determination of common policies of the Signatory Powers in relation thereto.

Instead of urging that these propositions, which it had asked China to advance, be discussed in detail, and supporting their adoption as far as possible, the American delegation almost immediately diverted attention from them by introducing a statement of principles

*The Root
Resolution*

³ *Conference on Limitation of Armament*, Senate Document 126, p. 444.

to be applied to China in the form of a resolution presented by Mr. Root. This was:⁴

It is the firm intention of the Powers attending this conference.

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government, overcoming the difficulties incident to the change from the old and long continued Imperial form of government.

(3) To safeguard for the world so far as it is within our power, the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

*Scope of
discussions
limited*

It will be seen immediately that the scope of the discussions was considerably limited when the Conference took the Root resolution, rather than China's Ten Points, as the basis for the formulation of the principles to be applied to the several phases of the Chinese question. Consequently the American delegation must accept a large measure of responsibility for the failure of the Conference to do much of a practical nature for China. One reason for this lay in American belief in the sanctity of vested interest, which made it dangerous to consider going further than the enunciation of general principles to be given future application, and not to be used to test the validity of existing rights and obligations. At any rate it is only general principles which are to be found in the Nine Powers Treaty.

One of the greatest sources of trouble in China in the past, as has been pointed out, has been the tendency toward the building up, by the Powers, of exclusive interests in various parts of that country.

*Conflicting
interpretations
of Open Door
doctrine*

Attention has also been called to the logical conclusion of the application of the sphere conception, and to the broadening of the policy of the United States as it came to be fully appreciated that the maintenance of the Open Door demanded the preservation of China. The conflict of interpretation of the obligations assumed under the Open Door commitment has also been noted. This difference of interpretation was clearly revealed at the Conference in the remarks of Baron Shidehara, one of the Japanese delegates, and in the statement made by Secretary Hughes. The former took the position that "it was then limited in its scope, both concerning its subject matter and the area of Chinese territory to which it applied; it simply provided, in substance, that none of the Powers having spheres of interest or leased territories in China should interfere with treaty ports or with vested rights or exercise any discrimination in the collection of customs duties or railroad or harbor charges."⁵ Secretary Hughes, in

⁴ Ibid., pp. 454-5.

⁵ Ibid., p. 630.

reply, reviewed the history of the doctrine at some length to show that the intent back of it had been fully appreciated by the Powers, and that its spirit, broader than the three propositions of the Hay circular, constituted the doctrine. The discussion, consequently, showed the necessity for greater precision of definition if future embarrassment was to be avoided.

A decided step in advance, then, was taken at the Conference when agreement was reached as to the scope of the policy, especially in view of the fact that the enlarged American conception of it was written into the Nine Powers Treaty in the form of a pledge: 1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; 2) to maintain and advance the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in China; and 3) not to take any action or support any action designed to create spheres of interest or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.⁶

*American
interpretation
accepted*

The sphere of interest conception, and its antithesis, the Open Door principle, were brought definitely into opposition, and the former conception repudiated. The United States had long supported the latter alone, but England, through Lord Balfour, repeated a declaration previously made that spheres of interest were things of the past so far as England was concerned. If England lends her weight to that of the United States in standing against all violations of the Open Door in the future, and if the other states were sincere in the professions of policy made at Washington, it may be that profession and practice will be made to square more completely than has been true in the past. One can judge of the future only in the light of the past, and it is true that such agreements as those mentioned have not been lived up to by the nations. For that reason, one would be justified in a certain amount of skepticism as to the value of the agreements set forth in the Nine Powers Treaty, were it not for the belief that the two most powerful states signatory to it will find a substantial identity of interest in forcing their observance.⁷

*Sphere of
interest
conception
repudiated?*

In addition to the Open Door definition and agreement, the Nine Powers Treaty contains an undertaking that the unfair discriminations made in tariffs and facilities on Chinese railroads in the past will not be resorted to in the future. The terms of the article imply that China had been an offender in that respect. This is far from the truth, for, as the Chinese delegation pointed out at the Conference, there is no case of discrimination that can be fairly charged against the Chinese railroad administration. The chief offenders have been some of the foreign states controlling various sections of the Chinese railways, and the provision was inserted because of their actions.

*China's
railroads*

⁶ See Treaty between Nine Powers relating to Principles and Policies, Art. 3 and 4, in Senate Document 126, pp. 895-896.

⁷ This belief is weakened, however, by reason of England's retention of the Kowloon territory and her support of the Cassell concession.

*China's
neutrality to
be respected*

Finally, the treaty makes provision for the respecting of China's rights as a neutral, in the event of a war in the future to which the Republic is not a party. China, on her side, agrees to observe the obligations of neutrality. Attention has already been called to the fact that one of the Allied Powers had violated China's neutrality at the same time that Germany was being so strongly condemned for her violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Not much was said at the time about Japan's action, but there can be no doubt that this provision of the Nine Powers Treaty was called forth by it, as well as by similar occurrences prior to the World War. The value of the agreement, like that of the other provisions of the treaty, will not be apparent until a test actually comes.

*Principles not
applied to
established
rights*

That Japan made a concession in agreeing to the enlarged conception and definition of the Open Door principle cannot be denied; but that she lost anything of substantial value by it may be doubted. If the principles of the treaty were to be applied to many foreign rights and interests built up in China in the past twenty-five years, those interests would have to be declared null and void. The various leaseholds extorted from China during the years after the Sino-Japanese War would have to be given up as in violation of her sovereignty and her administrative integrity; foreign post-offices would have to be withdrawn from her territory; tariff autonomy would have to be restored, together with judicial autonomy; foreign wireless stations would have to be destroyed or turned over to China; agreements such as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the Twenty-one Demands would have to be revised or annulled. It is in these things that a change of heart could have been indicated beyond all doubt.

*Other
agreements*

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were brought to an end, not, however, by the application of the principles of the Nine Powers Treaty, but by substituting for them the Four Powers Pact. Japan refused to acquiesce in the discussion of the validity of the 1915 treaties and agreements. Rights already acquired were not tested by the "principles" at all, but were permitted to pass unchallenged, except by China. The principle upon which the Conference proceeded was that vested interests could not be interfered with, even when one set of interests or claims was in conflict with another. China was actually promised the restoration of only one leased territory, Wei Hai Wei, for which Great Britain had no further use, while France offered to discuss in the future the return of Kuangchow Bay, a discussion which may or may not take place. The Kiaochow leasehold was to be returned to China also, but, again, not as a result of the application of the principles of the treaty. The Conference adopted a resolution providing for the investigation of the judicial system of China, and for aid in its betterment, but extra-territoriality still remains. Foreign post-offices were to be withdrawn from Chinese territory, except from the leased areas.

Foreign radio stations were to be brought under the control of China except in the leased territories and the Manchurian railroad zone, and most of the Japanese stations are to be found in the excepted regions. Foreign troops were to be withdrawn from the territory of the Republic, whenever the representatives at Peking should find it expedient. Tariff autonomy was not restored to China, but some concessions were made which will result in substantial additions to her revenue. With the exception of the minor concessions noted, the principles of the Nine Powers Treaty were not applied in such a way as to bring to an end rights and special privileges in conflict with them.⁸

4. ADVANTAGES TO CHINA OF CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS

And yet it may be said that China benefited in a negative fashion from the Washington Conference because she did not lose anything as a result of it. As Dr. W. W. Willoughby puts it:⁹

China gained negatively because she did not lose further rights

Despite, then, the undeniable breakdown of the authority of the Central Government of China; despite the fact that it had been obliged to make default upon certain of its foreign debts; despite the fact that there was in the south of China a political party and political organization which denied, *in toto*, the legitimacy of the Peking Government itself, China came from the Conference not only without any new administrative or other limitations upon its autonomous powers, but with the formal and unqualified assurance that the Powers would not take any advantage of existing conditions to impose any new restraints upon her freedom of action.

In other words, China may be considered to have gained from the Conference because she did not lose more than had already been lost, and because the Powers did not take advantage of the internal situation to intervene to promote their own interests.

The question has already been raised as to how far we may expect these agreements to be observed in good faith in the future. The great defect in the Open Door policy in the past has been the lack of machinery to make it effective. The attempt was made at Washington to create this machinery by providing for the establishment of a Board of Reference, to which appeal might be taken against any contract or agreement on the ground of its being a departure from, and a violation of, the Open Door principle. Such a board is to be established upon the recommendation of the commission on tariff revision for which provision was made, but no Power is obliged to accept this recommendation. Even if such a board is brought into being, however, it has only the power of "investigation and report" and its report need not be accepted. Consequently the observance of

Provision for Board of Reference

⁸ Another exception should also be noted, i.e., the resolution regarding existing commitments. This provided for the notification to the secretariat of the Conference, and the transmission to the Powers, of the terms of all agreements between foreign governments and China, and between nationals and China deemed to be still in force.

⁹ *China at the Conference*, pp. 338-339.

the principle will depend entirely upon the good faith of parties which have not shown a scrupulous regard for similar obligations in the past

5. SETTLEMENT OF SHANTUNG QUESTION

*Method of
consideration
of Shantung
question*

The question which had, more than any other, turned the attention of the American public to the Far East, was that relating to Shantung province. Much of the opposition to the Versailles treaty in the Senate, and in the country at large, had been ostensibly based upon the great injustice done to China by the Paris award. Consequently the Washington Conference would not have been at all successful, in the mind of the American people, if that moot question had not been settled. The Chinese wanted the matter discussed by the whole Conference, but the Japanese demurred on the ground that it was a matter of concern to only two members. In order to get a settlement, the American delegation suggested a joint conference between Japan and China, to be carried on simultaneously with the other meeting and to be participated in by American and British "observers." To this proposal China was forced to consent, although somewhat unwillingly, for to refuse would have been to appear obstructive, and thus to lose her favorable position before the American public.

*Terms of
agreement
reached: a) The
leased territory*

After prolonged discussion, and considerable disagreement as to details, a settlement was finally reached. By its terms Japan agreed to restore the entire leased territory to China, together with the public properties therein formerly belonging to the German government. China was not required to make compensation for these properties except where they had been added to, or improved, by the Japanese during their occupancy, and then only to the amount expended by Japan. Another limitation placed on China's succession was that the properties required for the Japanese consulate to be established at Tsingtao, and those required for the use of the Japanese community for schools, shrines, etc., were to be retained by Japan.

*b) Withdrawal
of Japanese
troops*

All Japanese troops in the leased territory, or along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, were to be withdrawn as rapidly as possible, i.e., as the Chinese were prepared to take over the policing of the railway and of the port. They were all to be withdrawn within six months from the date of the signature of the agreement.

*c) Tsingtao
Customs House*

The Customs House at Tsingtao was to be made an integral part of the Chinese Maritime Customs, the agreement of 1915 between Japan and China respecting it ceasing to be effective.

*d) Shantung
railway*

The Tsingtao-Tsinan railway was to be returned to China upon the payment to Japan of the value of the railway and its properties as assessed by the German Reparations Commission, plus the amount expended by Japan on the railway during her occupancy and administration of it. This amount was to be fixed by a joint commission constituted by the two states. Payment was to be made by China in

the form of treasury notes to be given to Japan, running for a period of fifteen years, although China was given the privilege of redeeming them at the end of five years.¹⁰ During the period of redemption of the treasury notes Japanese interests were to be secured by the appointment by China of a Japanese to serve as traffic manager, and of another Japanese to serve jointly with a Chinese as chief accountant.

The extensions of the Shantung railways, which Japan had secured the right to finance, were to be undertaken by an international syndicate, unless China financed them herself.

These were the main provisions of the Shantung agreement. They effected the cancellation of that portion of the 1915 treaties relating to Shantung province, and thus removed the most serious single obstacle in the road of the development of better relations between the two countries.

*Partial
cancellation of
1915 treaties*

6. VALUE OF DECISIONS REACHED AT WASHINGTON

It is hardly possible to evaluate fairly as yet the accomplishments of the Washington Conference in either of its phases. In its attempt to remove the causes of friction in the Far East it did authoritatively reaffirm and redefine long-accepted and often-violated principles. This reaffirmation, in the form of an international treaty, may prove to have more virtue than the original expressions of the same principles. At any rate, by definition and discussion, the Powers were brought toward a common understanding of the principles on which they have severally professed to base their policies in the past, so that there is less reason for misunderstanding in the future.

*Reaffirmation
of old principles*

The discussion of the problem had also the good effect of bringing it into the open and temporarily focusing the attention of the world on it. Out of this discussion, and the agreements reached at Washington, came a better understanding between the United States and Japan than had existed since 1905. This must surely be set down to the credit of the Conference. This understanding was further promoted by the indications in Japan of an intention of promoting Japanese continental interests by seeking the friendship of China. But good relations were seriously prejudiced by the action of the American Congress in legislating to exclude Japanese immigrants by law, not applying the quota principle to Japan, and arbitrarily terminating the Gentlemen's Agreement. Thus American action has revived the antagonism which the Washington Conference served to lessen, and has created a sentiment in Japan for a return to a strong Asiatic policy.

*Better
understanding
between United
States and
Japan*

7. AFTERMATH OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

We now may conclude our survey of international relations in the

¹⁰ It was stipulated that China should not secure the funds to redeem the treasury notes from any foreign source.

Far East with a brief outline of events since the Washington Conference. First may be considered those growing directly out of it.

*Status of leased
areas*

Since the adjournment of the Washington Conference England has taken steps leading to the actual restoration of Wei Hai Wei to China. Negotiations to that end were commenced in October, 1922, and, after some disagreement, a "Provisional agreement for the Rendition of Wei Hai Wei to China" was concluded on May 31, 1923,¹¹ but the retrocession has not yet taken place. Japan has carried out in good faith the agreements reached as to Shantung province; and she has withdrawn her troops from Siberia. She still remains in Manchuria, which she refused to consider leaving when the Chinese delegation suggested at Washington that she do so; nor has she renounced her claim to a sphere of interest in Fukien province. France remains in possession of her leasehold at Kuangchow Bay, and she has not formally renounced her claimed sphere of interest in the provinces bordering on Tongking, except as that was implied in her actions at Washington; and England remains in control of the Kowloon area opposite Hongkong. So far as the future is concerned, all of the Powers with interests in China except Russia are controlled under the Nine Powers Treaty as to principles to be applied to China. But a change in conditions might readily lead to a reassertion of spheres on the basis of past blanket agreements.

*Foreign
post-offices
withdrawn*

Another advance which must be set down as a direct consequence of the Conference is to be found in the withdrawal of all foreign post-offices from China except those in the South Manchurian Railway Zone.

*Treaty
restrictions:
a) Extra-
territoriality*

But, perhaps, most interest attaches to the movement on the part of China to secure release from the two earliest restraints imposed on her freedom of action—extra-territoriality, and the treaty tariff arrangements. As to the first, it was promised at Washington that a commission would be appointed to investigate the administration of justice in China, and make recommendations in regard to the extra-territorial system. This investigation was postponed until 1925, largely because of political conditions in the Republic, and at the request of the Chinese government. The commission first conducted its investigations at Peking into the actual and proposed changes in the legal system and administration of justice, and then attempted to find out how far the local administration had been brought into harmony with modern ideas. Its work, particularly in the second phase, was interfered with by reason of the renewal of civil war and on account of the disturbed condition of the provinces. Its recommendations proposed certain steps to be taken by China before the Powers could relinquish control of their nationals, suggested that, as the tests were partially satisfied, agreement should be reached as to the basis of progressive ending of the system; and proposed modi-

¹¹ Text, *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 831-836.

fications in operation of the system to make it function more efficiently and acceptably.¹²

In regard to the treaty tariff the Washington agreement provided: 1) for immediate revision of the schedules in order to give China an actual five per cent return on the value of the foreign trade; 2) for the meeting, within three months of the ratification of the treaty, of a special conference to consider the problem of the *likin* tax and its abolition, in return for which the special conference was authorized to provide for the levy of a general surtax of two and one-half per cent, and on certain articles of luxury a surtax of not more than five per cent; and 3) for the acceptance of the principle of uniformity of levy on the land and maritime frontiers, in order that the trade of France, in the south, and of Japan and Russia, in the north, should not continue to enjoy advantages denied to the maritime traders.

The immediate revision promised was duly accomplished, but the special conference was not convened until late in 1925 on account of the failure of France to ratify the treaty. This was due to what is known as the Gold Franc Controversy.¹³ When it came to a resumption, in 1922, of payments on the French share of the Boxer indemnity, after the five-year war moratorium, the French insisted on payment in gold francs. After assenting to this, the Chinese government, under popular pressure, changed its position and insisted on its right of payment in paper francs to get the advantage of the decline in value of the franc. The controversy was not settled until April of 1925. After its settlement, and the completion of ratification of the Nine Powers Customs Treaty, steps were taken to convene the special conference. When it met it was confronted with the demand by China that tariff autonomy rather than revision upwards should be granted. This demand was accepted in principle, and a Chinese national tariff is to go into effect January 1, 1929, by which time China agreed to have abolished the *likin* system. Thus the one is really dependent on the other, and China will have to make considerable strides toward political reconstruction if tariff autonomy is actually regained by the date set. Furthermore, the civil war of 1925-1926, with the consequent overturning of the Peking government, has prevented the official conclusion of agreements embodying the principle of autonomy and providing for an interim arrangement. Thus the present status of the question is indeterminate pending a satisfactory reconstruction of the central government of the Republic.

b) *The tariff*

*Gold Franc
Controversy
delays
Convocation of
Tariff
Conference*

8. RUSSIA, CHINA AND JAPAN

Of just as great importance as the international activities growing out of, or related to, the Washington Conference has been the revival of Russian activity in the Far East.

¹² Text of the Report published by Department of State, Washington, 1927, Recommendations, pp. 107-109.

¹³ For details see *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 837-49. Also, *China Year Book*, 1925, pp. 1296-1300.

Soviet policy

Soviet policy toward China was first formally enunciated in 1919, and again in 1920, at a time when Russian power and influence in the Far East had reached the low-water mark of three-quarters of a century. All rights and interests gained by the Tsarist government at the expense of China's sovereignty and integrity, including extra-territoriality, were expressly renounced, and the sympathy of the struggling Russian peoples for the oppressed Chinese was voiced. This was the beginning of a comparatively rapid movement of recovery of Russian influence. By the summer of 1924 a satisfactory agreement as to the resumption of normal relations had been reached with China, and in the first part of 1925 Japan recognized the Soviet government. In addition to these formal indications of the return of Russia, and of even more significance for the future, must be noted the growing influence of her representatives at Peking and the part they played from 1920 to 1927 in Chinese internal politics.

Soviet methods

Before proceeding further it may be said that the Soviet approach to the problem of restoring Russian influence in the East has been: 1) by playing upon the chord of Western capitalistic imperialism as contrasted with the non-imperialistic aims of the new Russia; 2) by playing off Japan against China in negotiations with both; and 3) by cultivating the Chinese intelligentsia, securing its support, and utilizing this support to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese government.

*Obstacles to
accord between
China and
Russia.
a) Attitude of
Powers*

In moving toward a rapprochement with China the Soviet representatives, on the other hand, encountered several important obstacles. One of these was the pressure the Western Powers, notably the United States, and Japan brought to bear on Peking to prevent a recognition of the Soviet government and a direct settlement of the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This pressure has been steadily less effective as the Washington Conference has become a mere matter of history, and as new sources of discord with the Powers have arisen. Among these sources of discord we may include: the Gold Franc dispute, the position taken by the diplomatic corps at the time of the Linchéng bandit case, and the controversy over the disposition of the Canton customs. Western prestige in China has steadily declined since 1922 and Western methods of action have as steadily come into disrepute.

*b) Question of
Mongolia*

Two other serious obstacles to Sino-Russian accord existed in the question of Mongolia, and that of the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In the first case the difficulty had first arisen in 1911 over the assertion, with Russian support, of the independence of Outer Mongolia. The tripartite agreement of 1915 provided for autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. Following the Russian Revolution the Chinese tried, with a measure of success, to restore their former position in Mongolia. But from 1918 on the situation was complicated by the chaotic conditions in Siberia, and the attempt to use Mongolia as a base of operations against that territory. Finally, in 1920, Baron Ungern, a "White" commander, gained control of Urga and threat-

ened to use it as a suitable base from which to attack the "Red" government in western Siberia. This, in turn, led to an attack by the Soviet troops. Baron Ungern was driven out in 1921, and a Russian supported and controlled government was established. The issue, then, in the relations of Russia and China, was as to the maintenance of Russian troops on territory claimed by China as an integral part of the Republic.

The difficulty over the Chinese Eastern Railway arose because, while in 1919 the Soviet declaration had promised the return of the railway "to the Chinese people without demanding compensation of any kind,"¹⁴ by 1920 it was stipulated that a treaty should be made concerning it, and from the time when M. Joffe reached Peking in 1922 the Russians manifested increasingly an intention to negotiate over its return.

From 1922 to 1924 negotiations continued intermittently over these questions and that of the recognition of Russia before the reaching of a formal agreement, as the Soviet representatives desired. The convention then signed (May 31, 1924) provided, among other things, for the reestablishment of normal diplomatic and consular relations. It made the necessary stipulations with respect to public property and treaties, and voided all the Tsarist treaties with and relating to China affecting her sovereign rights or interest,¹⁵ together with similar Chinese treaties with respect to Russia. It provided for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia, and carried a stipulation against permitting propaganda against the established institutions in each country by the other. It provided for a later conference to work out the details of boundaries, use of waterways, etc., and to settle the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway, on the basis 1) of its recognition as a purely commercial undertaking, 2) of the maintenance of Chinese administrative authority, 3) of the right of China to redeem the road with Chinese funds, 4) the provisional maintenance of the system of management of the road provided for in 1896, except so far as in conflict with the new agreement, and 5) for settlement of the whole question by China and Russia to the exclusion of third parties.¹⁶ Finally, it effected a cancellation of the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity, with the understanding that it would be devoted to educational purposes.

The agreement as to the Chinese Eastern Railway could not be made effective by reason of Chang Tso-lin's declaration of the independence of Manchuria in 1922, and his refusal to acquiesce in its terms. Advantage was taken of his difficulties to secure a separate and more detailed agreement with him on September 20, 1924, as to the conditions of its operation and control.¹⁷

c) Status of
Chinese Eastern
Railway

Terms of
agreement
reached, May
31, 1924

Separate
agreement with
Chang Tso-lin

¹⁴ Text of Declaration in *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 868-870.

¹⁵ This provision was extended in an annex to include similar Soviet treaties.

¹⁶ This went counter to the Resolution concerning the C. E. R. R. adopted at Washington, but the protest against it has been unavailing.

¹⁷ See *China Year Book*, 1925, pp. 797-800, for its text.

*Japan and
Russia*

While these negotiations with China had been going on, Japan had also been approached by Russia. The Imperial Government had attempted to reach a settlement of the Siberian question by direct negotiation with the Far Eastern Republic before the Washington Conference, as has been pointed out. The Dairen Conference broke up, however, without agreement having been reached. After the conference another series of meetings was held at Changchun, these being participated in by the Soviet representative, M. Joffe, as well as by the Far Eastern Republic. The Changchun Conference also failed; several reasons for the failure were alleged at the time, but the real reason was the transfer, with Japanese connivance, of a large store of arms from Vladivostok to Mukden. The disposal of these arms was one of the questions then at issue between Japan and Russia.

*Convention of
January 20,
1925*

From this time no progress seemed to be made looking toward a settlement of the various points at issue between the two governments, in spite of the fact that discussions were intermittently taking place during 1923 and 1924. The Russo-Chinese accord forced Japan's hand, however, as she could not afford to see her old rival on friendly terms with China unless she had herself reached an agreement with Russia. Consequently a convention was signed at Peking on January 20, 1925. This carried with it a recognition of Soviet Russia by Japan, Article I providing for the establishment of regular consular and diplomatic relations. By Article II the validity of the Portsmouth treaty was recognized by Russia, but it was provided that all other treaties made from 1905 to 1917 should be reëxamined by a subsequent conference. Article III safeguarded, for the time, Japanese fishing rights off the coast of Siberia. Article IV set forth the conditions upon which a later commercial treaty should be founded. Article V stipulated against propaganda directed against the established institutions of the one by the other, and provided that neither would tolerate the presence in its territories "of organizations or groups pretending to be the government for any part of the territories of the other party." Article VI contained an assurance of Russian willingness to grant concessions to the Japanese "for the exploitation of minerals, forests and other natural resources."

Other provisions

In protocols and annexes to this agreement, provision was made for the adjustment of questions of public properties and debts, for the evacuation of northern Saghalin by the Japanese troops, for the exploitation by Japanese concessionaires of fifty per cent of the oil fields of northern Saghalin, and for prospecting rights in additional areas for a period of years. Apology was also made by the Soviet authorities for the Nikolaievsk massacre of 1920, which had afforded the occasion for the occupation of the northern half of Saghalin.

*Motive of
Japanese
government*

It was with great hesitancy that Japan reëstablished treaty relations with Russia. No government had looked with greater fear or distrust on the Russian Revolution than had that of Japan. And

certainly none has shown a greater fear of such "dangerous ideas" as those represented by the Soviet philosophy. It was only considerations of continental politics, and perhaps a feeling that possible subversive propaganda could be controlled more effectively if an agreement with Moscow was made, which produced a willingness to recognize and deal with the Soviet government.

These two recognitions, and more especially that represented by the treaty with China, brought Russia once more into the foreground in the Far East. The Soviet policy has been one of pronounced friendship for China, shown by encouraging and aiding the Chinese to struggle against Western imperialism and to abrogate the "unequal treaties." Since Russia has lost, or given up, the privileges enjoyed in pre-revolutionary days, there has been no hindrance to the emphasis on the slogan that imperialism must go. Neither has it been difficult to associate imperialism and capitalism as two aspects of the same thing. Supporting Fêng Yü-hsiang, and establishing a close relationship with the *Kuo Min Tang* leaders at Canton, Russia has fostered the already swelling tide of nationalism as a means of striking a blow at capitalism. It seems clear that the Russian aim is not the introduction of communism into China, but rather the production of the maximum of embarrassment for the Western capitalistic states enjoying a privileged status in that country.

Russian policy

9. CHINA AND THE POWERS

The principal target has come to be Great Britain, partly because of her great interests in China, partly because of the fact that she personifies capitalistic imperialism to the Chinese, but in part because of the animosities which have been created by her position at Hongkong. The Englishman has stood out among the foreigners in the last few years in a way unfortunate for England in China. The incidents connected with the seamen's strike at Hongkong, and the boycott at Canton; the fact that it was an Englishman who commanded the Shanghai police when blood was shed in 1925; the fact that an Englishman, as head of the Maritime Customs Service, refused to allow Canton a proportional share of the customs' surplus; the Wanh sien incident, when British gunboats shelled that village because Chinese troops fired on an English vessel—these and other things have focused the attention of Chinese nationalists on England as the enemy.

*Direction of
hostility toward
England*

After the Washington Conference a concert of the Western Powers and Japan was formally maintained in China until the end of 1926. The first outward indication of change came when, in December, 1926, the British government, in a communication to the other states, urged agreement to what was essentially a more liberal policy than that accepted at Washington in 1921. The desire to placate the Nationalist party undoubtedly inspired the British memorandum. But the action came too late to have that effect. To

*British
memorandum*

the Chinese it indicated, not a forward step, but a concession designed to prevent them from attaining their real objective. Furthermore, it was not a concession dictated by free and voluntary acceptance of the Chinese point of view because of its soundness, but one resulting from the application of pressure.

*Resumption of
control over
concessions*

The Peking government denounced the Belgian "unequal" treaty, declaring it abrogated as from October 27, 1926. By the end of the year the southern Nationalist armies had reached the central Yangtse region, and had occupied Hankow. This was followed by the assumption of control of the British concession at Hankow. Similarly the concessions at Kiukiang were taken over by the Nationalists when that city came into their possession. Having lost this much the foreigners moved to the defense of their position at Shanghai by despatching troops to protect the International Settlement. At the same time that she was sending troops to Shanghai, however, Great Britain began to negotiate with the Cantonese leaders at Hankow, with the result that an agreement was reached in February, 1927, by which the British acquiesced in the occupation of the Hankow and Kiukiang concessions. This represented a decided departure from the policy of negotiating only with Peking as representative of the Chinese Republic. It indicates an intention to treat simultaneously with whatever authorities have actual control of the several parts into which China may be politically divided at a given moment whenever questions involving foreigners in the area arise.

*Policy of Japan
and the United
States*

During this period the Americans and the Japanese have indicated a willingness to negotiate new treaties on a basis of equality whenever there is a government representative of China, and entitled to speak for the country, as a whole. At present this is tantamount to indefinite postponement of treaty revision, although both northern and southern governments have the same attitude toward the treaties.

*Future British
policy*

From the international standpoint, it seems clear that the British will ultimately make far-reaching concessions to the Chinese Nationalists, if it can be accomplished by agreement, in an endeavor to weaken Russia at Canton, and with a view to protecting their own vast commercial interests south of the Yangtse River. They stand to profit more by weakening the anti-British sentiment than by preserving the nineteenth-century régime. These statements, naturally, are based on the assumption that there does not come a clash between British and Chinese at Shanghai in the course of which blood would be shed. The present American policy is equally clear. Foreign lives and property at Shanghai must be protected, but the treaties may go, provided only that they are terminated by agreement rather than by denunciation.

*The Japanese
position more
difficult*

The Japanese course is not so obvious. It is to the interest of Japan to see the British position in China weakened, but not to see Russian influence strengthened. The policy of the Imperial Government is distinctly to conciliate Chinese national sentiment, but to

see the Cantonese move northward checked at the Yangtse if that can be accomplished without foreign intervention. Its hopes are centered in the success of Mukden rather than Canton. So far as the treaties are concerned, Japan is apparently ready to go farther than England or the United States in voluntarily consenting to the end of the extra-territorial system, but not so far or so fast in seeing the tariff arrangements fundamentally disturbed.

The extent to which concessions are made to the Chinese in all particulars seems to depend on the degree of pressure applied to the Powers in China by the Chinese. No relaxation of the present pressure seems to be indicated for the near future, or, indeed, until the ultimate concession of complete equality in treaty relations has actually been made, not merely promised. If Canton is successful in the present struggle, the immediate and unconditional abrogation of the treaties may be expected. If the northern group is able to check the southern march at the point now reached, there is more prospect of conditional and gradual elimination of the unequal features of the treaties.

The principles embodied in the Washington Conference agreements, particularly in the Nine Powers Treaty, relating to the independence and integrity of China and to the Open Door, bid fair to be realized in the future. But this realization seems to be coming through the awakening of Chinese nationalism rather than through the self-restraint exercised by foreign Powers in their dealings with China. The Powers thought they had solved the Far Eastern problem at Washington. They waited too long, however, to put their program into operation. By the time they were ready to act conditions had changed so that their solution became defective. Now, seemingly, the answer to the Chinese question is to be propounded by China and accepted by the Powers.

Concessions
made under
pressure

Conditions of
intercourse to
be fixed by
China

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CHAPTER XXII

THE EAST AND THE WEST

It is outside the scope of an historical study to forecast the future. And yet a knowledge of the past is valuable chiefly as it affords a clue to the future and as it reveals avoidable mistakes which have been made in the relations of individuals or states. Consequently this concluding chapter is designed as a summary review of the relations of the Far Eastern states with those of the West, and as an estimate, on the basis of present trends, of the probable development in the future of the Pacific area.

*Scope of
concluding
chapter*

I. INTEREST OF WEST IN THE EAST

The first thing to be remarked, as it is the most obvious, is the extent of Western dominance of the East. From Constantinople to Peking, European control had been wholly or partially established by 1914. In some places, as in India, Burma, and French Indo-China, this control was tangible because territorial and governmental. Elsewhere it was largely financial in character, as in the case of Persia, Turkey, and China. The control was none the less real because it was less tangible and concrete than the territorial and political.

*Extent of
Western
dominance*

The original motive bringing the West to the East was a desire to secure Eastern products such as tea, spices and silks. It was not until the nineteenth century that this original interest gave way to the desire to find a market for goods which were being increasingly manufactured in excess of the requirements of the European consumer. The interest of the West in tropical products, of course, continued during the nineteenth century, but it was distinctly secondary to the search for markets. With the development of the latter interest, consequent on the Industrial Revolution, Europeans began to move outward in larger numbers, and it became necessary to secure for them rights of residence so that they might carry on trade more comfortably, safely, and satisfactorily. Out of this need, coupled with the general trade interest, there developed in those Eastern countries which escaped control as colonies, the extra-territorial system and the treaty tariff system. Those countries, in eastern Asia, were Siam, China, Korea, and Japan. In India, Burma, Indo-China, Borneo, Malaysia, and the Philippines the control of foreigners rested with particular European Powers, and the extra-territorial and conventional tariff systems were unnecessary from the standpoint of the interests and needs of Europe.

*The original
interest in trade*

The financial or investment interest became predominant only

*Interest in
investment field*

after the end of the nineteenth century. By that time Japan had emerged from her tutelage to Europe, and Siam, protected to an extent by reason of her position as a buffer state between French and British possessions, was reasonably stable, and was beginning to develop her economic and legal systems along Occidental lines. Korea was in the process of absorption by Japan. Consequently all three escaped from European financial control, while China did not.

*Reaction
against Western
dominance*

And now China is today engaged in a struggle to reestablish her complete freedom of action. Furthermore, a reaction against Western dominance is also exhibiting itself strikingly in India and in the Philippine Islands. In passing, it may be noted that both China and Siam have been preserved as international persons up to the present time partly because of the jealousies and the lack of community of interest of the Western Powers. England and France have restrained one another in relation to Siam; Russia, England, France, the United States, Germany, and Japan have had such differences of interest and jealousy of each other in China that China as an entity has been preserved. But both the Chinese Empire and the Chinese Republic have been in the past, and the Republic today continues to be, an international danger zone or storm center, whereas Japan is today a respected, self-controlling member of the international community.

2. COMPARISON OF JAPANESE WITH CHINESE DEVELOPMENT

Much may be learned from a comparison of the respective reactions of Japan and China to the modern world. We are now in a position to make this comparison as a necessary part of the investigation of developments in the Far East in modern times.

*Geographical
differences help
to explain
differences in
development*

The first explanation of differences in reaction is to be found in geography. Japan is small in extent, whereas, in comparison, China is a vast territorial entity. Given the same primitive means of communication, it is apparent that a knowledge of the modern world could be much more rapidly diffused throughout Japan than would be possible in China. Closely joined to this is a similar contrast in the number of people who would have to be introduced to the modern world. The population of Japan, we may assume, was about twenty-five million in 1850, concentrated in a small territory; that of China, at the same time, was probably between three hundred fifty and four hundred millions, scattered over a wide area. Thus, purely quantitatively, the problem of diffusion of knowledge of the new world was many times greater in China than in Japan. Had both countries had railroads, steamships, radio, the telegraph, and the telephone, this difference would have been much less marked. But improved communications were part of the new order which was to be introduced, and consequently were not initially available for its introduction.

In the second place pre-modern Japan was moving toward a new political order. The purpose of this movement was to restore power to the Emperor, and to unify the state under his authority rather than

that of the *Shogun*. The aim of the western clans was not political devolution but close integration under their authority rather than that of the Tokugawa. This internal activity opened the way for the acceptance of new ideas so far as they were not incompatible with the ends of the leaders of the opposition to the *Shogunate*. This view is not invalidated by the initial hostility of the western clans to foreign intercourse, since that was at least partially the product of expediency—of a willingness to use all available means to weaken the Tokugawa control. Furthermore, it must be recognized that before the first treaties were made Western ideas had begun to seep into the country from Nagasaki, and were being diffused through the Dutch school of learning.

*Internal
conditions in
pre-modern
Japan*

The condition of Japan in this respect was markedly different from that of China. There were no new currents perceptible in pre-modern China. The Manchu rule was weakening, but due to its own ineffectiveness rather than to any virile opposition. The intellectual life of China was decidedly static rather than dynamic. The long intellectual inbreeding had fostered an intense conservatism which was nation-wide, and which permeated all classes. This was modified by no progressive intellectual movements, nor was the national conservatism stimulated by the periodic anti-dynastic revolts, for these were economic in origin and motivation.

*China presents
decided contrast
to Japan*

Furthermore, the conditions of development of the cultures of Japan and China had an important bearing on their respective reactions to the new stream of ideas, institutions, and mechanical arrangements carried to them by Western traders, missionaries, and diplomatists. Chinese culture was almost wholly indigenous. Aside from the introduction of Buddhism, external contributions had been so slight as to be almost negligible. This immunity from outside influence had developed a feeling of innate cultural superiority which made it difficult for even the educated class to realize, much less to admit, the material and political backwardness of the Middle Kingdom in comparison with Europe. Japan, on the other hand, had imported her culture and not created it. She had adapted and modified the importation, and in some respects greatly improved on it, to be sure. But the thing to be remembered is that Japan had never been averse to recognizing her own cultural deficiencies, and remedying them by drawing upon others for what she lacked. Her arts and crafts, her religions, except *Shin o*, her administrative ideas, her philosophical systems, even her written language, were gifts from the continent or had been modified in the light of continental ideas. Thus there was no inherent repugnance to imitation or the borrowing of foreign ideas or practices which had value to Japan. The only change in the modern period was in the source from which contributions were drawn.

*Differences in
cultural
development
important*

Another extremely important difference between the two countries, which made it possible for Japan to take on the garments of the

*Trait of
obedience
developed in
Japan*

West more rapidly than China, was the clearly recognized distinction between the governors and the governed. Since the trait of obedience to authority was highly developed in Japan, it was possible for the leaders, once they had determined on their course, to carry the people with them. Three points must be emphasized in this connection: 1) remarkably able leaders developed out of the pre-Restoration and post-Restoration struggle; 2) after they had effected the Restoration, thereby bringing the reins of power into their own hands, they freely accepted the Western contact, and determined to draw upon the West to strengthen Japan; and 3) the acceptance of the obligation of obedience by the masses made it possible for the rulers to put their program into operation, as could not so readily have been done in a more individualistic society.

*Lack of
leadership in
China*

China, on the other hand, had no nationally accepted leadership capable of carrying into effect a program of reorganization and transformation of the state. The dynasty was alien, and could not be expected to command the support of the people as the Imperial House in Japan did after 1867. Such leaders as there were in nineteenth century China never admitted the weakness of the state, failed to perceive its real "backwardness" in the modern sense, and consequently were not led until after 1900 to set up a program of change. Even if they had attempted to do what the rulers of Japan did, they would have encountered much greater difficulty due to the greater individualism of the Chinese people. In China there was almost the reverse of the Japanese amenability to governmental direction. The governing class did not constitute a divinely ordained group set apart from the masses. The tradition of authority, in other words, was as lacking as was the existence of inherited loyalties of the kind so noticeable in Japan. Even though the educated group had not had an inherent consciousness of cultural superiority, it would have been difficult for it to move the people from accustomed grooves of thought and methods of action except by the slow process of education and by gradually demonstrating to the people the advantages of change.

*Differences in
political ideas*

From the political standpoint, furthermore, it was not a very great step from the old system of Japan to the creation of the legal-military society then known as a state. While the Japanese have experienced difficulty in understanding and accepting the canons of democracy, the creation of an integrated political society was comparatively easy. But China was politically amorphous. As has been noted, it had an integrated administrative system, with the officials recruited by examination. But this organization functioned only slightly in relation to Chinese society. The conception of the omniscient state was, consequently, more distinctly foreign to China than to Japan. The former was fundamentally more of a cultural than a political society, while the latter had more highly developed the functions of authority politically organized.

Finally, the most immediately impressive evidence of Western

superiority to the East lay in its highly-developed engines of warfare. These demonstrated the superiority of the West readily enough to a warlike people such as the Japanese, and helped to pave the way for the introduction of the equally superior economic system of the West. This was natural in a country where the fighting men were conceded such a privileged position as were the *samurai*. But it took a longer time for the Chinese to recognize the superiority of the West on account of a demonstrated superiority of armament. This also was natural in a country where the professional soldier was relegated to the lowest place in society. The bombardments of Kagoshima and of Shimonoseki were sufficient to open the eyes of the Japanese. A series of similar episodes on a much larger scale merely confirmed the Chinese in their view of the foreigner as a "barbarian." Since armament was the true test of superiority or of equality among states, the Japanese armed themselves, demonstrated their military prowess, and left the ranks of "backward" nations. It was this demonstration, rather than the progressive modernization of the country, although, of course, the two actually went hand in hand, which elevated Japan to a seat with the Powers.

Superiority of West more readily demonstrated to Japanese than to Chinese

The operation of all of the forces mentioned has served to retard the development of China in comparison with Japan. It was only a short fifteen years after the signature of the first treaty when Japan began her reorientation in terms of the modern world. It took China approximately sixty years to change her outlook to the extent that Japan did in fifteen years. Then the Manchu rulers of the country tried to do what the Japanese did so successfully after 1868 in the governmental field. They set up a program of political reform designed to bring into being a constitutional system through which absolutism could be continued. Their failure, where the Japanese had been successful, was partly due to the fact that they delayed too long; but in part it was due to some of these fundamental differences between China and Japan. Moreover, they did not attempt to put into effect an extensive program of economic change, except as they contemplated an enlargement of the railway system which had been initially forced on them, and as, at foreign suggestion, they contemplated currency reform.

These forces served to retard development of China

With the inauguration of the Republic, China appeared to have gone farther politically than Japan in meeting the new world. While experience has shown that the antecedents of republicanism did not exist, the Republic has meant a distinct break with the past, and as such has certainly accelerated development along non-political lines.

Republic important as a break with the past

From the economic standpoint it has taken China eighty-five years, figuring from the period of the first treaties, to approximate the changes which were clearly apparent in Japan within fifty years. But these developments in China are still mainly confined to a few centers, and are in large part the result of foreign initiative. By the

Economic development contrasted

end of the fifty year period, Japan as a whole had begun to change, and Japanese rather than foreigners were the moving spirits in all kinds of new enterprises. The foreigner had largely been pushed into the background. Consequently the advance made by Japan was both relatively and absolutely greater than that which has been made by China up to the present. And yet, taking into account the size of the country, and the conditions existing in 1842 and continuing until after the end of the century, it may be questioned whether China has not made relatively as great an advance as Japan. At any rate, both are now fully aware of the modern world, and are engaged in making the transition from their ancient régimes to a new order as yet only partially disclosed.

*Legal and
judicial
progress
contrasted*

The chief difference, from the international standpoint, between the China which is today demanding that the treaty-system be ended and the Japan which successfully made the same demand in the last decade of the nineteenth century, is legal and political. China is now politically disorganized, while Japan in 1894 was highly organized. China has no effective government capable of affording full protection to foreign lives and property. Japan had such a government when she threw off the treaty yoke. Japan had prepared and put into operation modern law codes and was making them operative through a modern judicial system. China has merely made paper reforms in her legal and judicial systems except in a few particulars.

*Insistence on
treaty
abrogation in
spite of failure
to make legal
reforms*

Consequently, if the treaty-system is ended only when China has attained the degree of political stability represented by that of Japan in 1894, and when she has made the same actual strides in the direction of legal and judicial reform that her neighbor had made, the treaty restrictions in China might be expected to continue for several, if not for many, years. Under the influence of the contemporary nationalism, however, it is now apparent that China is not going to wait until she can satisfy the tests set up for Japan, but is prepared to abrogate the treaties and start a new international life. Since the Powers seem unable to maintain the old system, either wholly or partially, in spite of the political turmoil existing in the country, we may assume for the purposes of the remainder of this discussion that the China of the future is to be numbered among the fully sovereign members of the society of states.

3. FUTURE RELATIONS OF CHINA AND JAPAN

*Economic
development
will continue
in spite of
political
turmoil*

How long a time will elapse before political stability is restored in the Chinese state cannot be predicted. It may require decades for the political consequences of the revolution to manifest themselves fully, or it may be that a temporary stability will be quickly attained. The rapidity with which the new economic order establishes itself, and diffuses itself throughout the country, will have much to do with fixing the time limits within which a satisfactory political system will be evolved. But it seems clear that no political system

will maintain itself which is not the result of adaptation of past ideas and practices to new conditions. Experience in other countries would tend to indicate that economic and social development will lag until order has been restored. But Chinese development cannot be measured by Western standards. The disintegration of the past decade has not prevented expansion of trade or of production, although it has somewhat retarded it. The reasons for this have already been given and need not be repeated. But this being so, it is safe to assume that China will become an increasingly important economic factor in the modern world, even though a satisfactory political equilibrium is not attained for many years. Her importance will be much greater, of course, as order is evolved out of chaos.

An important factor in the Pacific area and also in the world of the future, then, will be an independent China. Equally important will be Japan. One feature of Far Eastern politics will continue to be the development of their relations with one another. Some writers point to the union of the East against the West as the probable future alignment in world politics. This would predicate a close union of China and Japan, joined by Indian and other Asiatic peoples. At the moment, the bogey of a Russia turned Asia-wards as the leader of such a union is also raised. For the present we may confine our attention to the relations of China and Japan, and attempt to see what is indicated for the future in terms of the past and present.

*Will the East
unite against
the West?*

In the first place, the history of the past thirty-five years does not indicate a union of Japan and China against the West, but rather the reverse—a struggle of the one to maintain itself against the other. Japan's needs and desires have projected her on to the continent. The ultimate end and aim of her policy has been the dominance of China. If she had been successful in this, then a union of the two would have assuredly been effected, but a union resulting from the subjection of the one society to the other. It would have represented the control of the greater—in extent of territory, number of people, and resources—by the lesser. It would also have meant the control of the stronger culture by the weaker. Such dominance, it is true, has been established over China in the past. It would, however, be very difficult to maintain in the modern world, and, judging by the past, would finally end in the cultural subjection of Japan to China. But even at the height of her power, when she dominated the *Anfu* Peking régime, Japan did not find it possible to establish control over China. While the end of the European war, and the re-direction of Western attention to the Far East, had much to do with her failure, the immensity of the task had more to do with it. It may be asserted with reasonable assurance that the possibility of future Japanese control of China is slight.

*Japan will not
control China*

A recognition of this failure, coupled with both direct and indirect Western pressure, has led Japan, since 1921, to adopt a really friendly attitude toward China. Judging by past experience

*Change of
policy of Japan*

and by the present needs of Japan, which are economic, it is sound policy for the future to maintain this attitude. If it is reciprocated, the Japanese, by reason of territorial proximity, will find in China an increasing source of raw materials, an expanding market, and a profitable field for investment. Industrial development in China, even if greatly accelerated, will not prevent the expansion of foreign trade, both export and import. For Japan to share as largely in this trade as she should, Chinese good-will is necessary, since China cannot be reduced to the status of Korea. This changed attitude on the part of Japan would seem to augur a future union of the two countries rather than a continuation of past antagonisms.

*Manchuria a
barrier to
friendship*

But there remains a strong barrier to political friendship. This is to be found in Manchuria, where Japan continues to maintain herself. That region of great potentialities stands as a kind of Far Eastern Alsace-Lorraine. If China continues to regard Manchuria as belonging to her, while Japan insists on retaining her treaty-established and extended rights there, it is reasonable to believe that there is more chance of a renewal of the Sino-Japanese War than of a union of the two countries against the West.

*Removal of
grievances
against the
West*

In any event, such an alliance would have to be motivated by a common set of interests or grievances developed out of contact with the West. The remaining Far Eastern grievances are being rapidly removed by the present action of China in abrogating the "unequal" treaties. This action, it should be noted, affects Japan in the same way that it does Europe, for Japan has enjoyed the privileges of extra-territoriality and the five per cent conventional tariff, and possesses concessions in Chinese ports. Consequently the nationalist movement in China is symptomatic, not of an alignment of the East against the West, but of Chinese determination to end the régime of special privilege for all foreigners, the Japanese among them. As soon as China enters the family of nations as a full and equal member, her grievances against the West will be a memory which will soon become so remote as to be unreal except as the policies of Western states furnish other causes of friction. Unless that happens, Japan in Manchuria, and Russia in Mongolia, together with England at Hongkong, will alone remain as evidences of the nineteenth and twentieth-century imperialism. Economic and financial relationships with a modernized and stable China will be no more productive of trouble than they have been with modern Japan.

*Immigration
as a bond of
union and a
source of
friction*

The question of immigration and treatment of nationals abroad might more possibly serve as a bond uniting Japan and China against those states of the West which control comparatively unoccupied or under-populated regions. This has been indicated as a source of friction between the United States and Japan in the past. With the United States excluding Asiatics herself, and seeking to restrain her neighbors to the south from permitting them to enter other regions in the Americas, with Canada restricting Asiatic immigration, and

with Australia and New Zealand permitting entrance only to white settlers, there is surely a basis of alignment of those states against Japan, China, and India. But the ground of Japanese objection to American action is not to be found in the fact of restriction but in discrimination in restriction. The right of a state to regulate admission to its territories is conceded. To tests uniformly applicable, even though they are of such a nature as to permit European immigration, and actually to exclude mainly Asiatics, as in the case of the Australian language test, the Japanese government does not seriously object. Consequently racial difficulties due to immigration can, at least for the moment, be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and discretion as far as Japan is concerned. The same is true in connection with the more insistent demand that the Japanese shall not be discriminated against after they have been legally admitted into a foreign country. If they are granted admission there is no good reason for withholding the privilege of naturalization, or denying them the usual police protection and civil rights accorded to other aliens.

So far as China is concerned, in spite of her tremendous population there is room for expansion of her agricultural population within her own territories, or into regions where no barriers have been raised against the Asiatic. Some parts of China are sparsely settled. Manchuria remains an open field for colonization, as do Mongolia and Siberia. The merchant class is moving southward in Asia, to the great economic advantage of the regions into which the Chinese have penetrated. Consequently it will be some time before China will be willing to subordinate other interests to a struggle to break down barriers to population movements. The Chinese government, equally with that of Japan, however, has an incentive to act to secure fair treatment for its overseas nationals.

Any careful analysis of the forces at present operative in the Far East must lead to the conclusion that nationalism rather than racialism is to be the dominant motive in the East for many years to come. As national aspirations are realized, the possibility of conflict with the West will be steadily lessened and the Eastern countries will participate in world politics with their policies fixed by divergent national, rather than by common racial interests. This view is confirmed by an appreciation of the general attitude of the Chinese or Japanese toward each other as well as toward the Western peoples. In some circles in the West much is made of the unwarranted feeling of superiority of Europeans to Asiatics. It does not seem to be realized that the Asiatic, whether he be Chinese or Japanese, has an equally strong feeling of superiority to the American or European. This same feeling of superiority manifests itself in the relations of one national group with another in the West, and the same thing is true in the Far East. Thus it is certainly true that the Western groups feel superior to the Eastern, while the Easterner reciprocates the

*Japan more
interested in
immigration
question than
China*

*Nationalism
not racialism
the primary
force*

feeling in kind. But it is just as true that the Chinese feel inherently superior culturally to the Japanese, and that the latter are now inclined to view with considerable scorn their weak neighbor. The substitution of racial for national consciousness as a primary force in the East will come only as the Occident forces it in the future. If, with broader vision, the West becomes less intolerant, less insistent on regarding non-Europeans as inherently inferior to Europeans, the nation rather than the race will continue to be the basis of division or unity.

4. NATIONALISM OUTSIDE OF CHINA AND JAPAN

*Philippine
Nationalist
movement*

That nationalism is the great force to be reckoned with in the future is indicated in other regions than Japan and China. Looking to the south, we find that the people of the Philippines have developed a strong independence movement which is the product of nationalism. The best evidence would seem to indicate that the desire for independence is widespread, and is not confined to a small group of politicians. After title to the islands had been acquired by the United States from Spain, and after the subsequent insurrection had been put down by force, the United States prepared the peoples for self-government by widespread education, and by gradually associating the native leaders with the government in various capacities. From the beginning much was said about the ultimate aim of preparing the Filipino to govern himself. At a time when the "right of self-determination" was being proclaimed, the Jones Bill was passed (1917), under the operation of which, while the Democratic party was in power, the government of the islands passed almost wholly into native hands. Subsequently the attempt was made to recover some of the powers which Governor Harrison had allowed the natives to exercise. Since 1920 there has been a struggle carried on between the Governor, representing the authority of the controlling power, and the native leaders. The latter have been constantly reiterating their demand that the American connection be severed.

*United States
believes people
not prepared for
self-government*

The United States has not renounced its intention of withdrawing from the Philippines when the people are prepared for self-government and for an independent existence. But it maintains that the necessary capacities have not as yet been developed. It is further feared that if independence were granted the islands might fall under the control of some other strong state.

*Will the
United States
withdraw?*

As long as the United States government indicates the intention of ultimately withdrawing, it may be assumed that in the future a new state will exist in the East. Up to the present time, it is true, those in authority have not attempted to establish concrete tests of self-governing capacity. This has led to the charge elsewhere, and to the fear in the Philippines, that the United States is not sincere in its declaration that it will give up its control. It has been pointed

out, that, partly naturally, and partly as a result of American policy, the economic ties between the two countries have been materially strengthened since 1900. Furthermore, it is said, the possession of the islands so strengthens the commercial and political position of the United States in the Far East that Washington will never voluntarily conclude that the people are ready to assume the status of independent statehood. Trade between the United States and the Philippines has certainly grown greatly, and American investments have become of great importance. Economically, the resources of the islands are supplementary to those of the United States rather than competitive with them. All of this makes it difficult to believe that the Americans will behave differently from other peoples under similar circumstances. On the other hand, the Jones Bill moved in the direction of independence, and declarations since that time have reiterated the intention to get out. Acceptance of the one view of the future American policy or the other is ultimately based on a willingness to credit, or a desire to disbelieve in, the sincerity of American professions. The thing that is entirely clear, however, is the existence of a strong nationalist movement, looking toward independence, in the islands. If there is found to be a lack of intention to free the Philippines as time goes on, a movement of revolt may easily develop as a serious complicating factor in the Far East.

Under present conditions it is difficult to believe that world relations in the Far East would be seriously complicated by the granting of independence to the Philippines, if the people can inaugurate and sustain a reasonably stable government. The new state itself would certainly not be strong enough to become aggressive. It would be protected against aggression to some extent if it became a member of the League of Nations. Furthermore, an attempted move of Japan southwards would encounter strong British and Dutch opposition, as a Japanese occupation of the islands would be considered a threat to the security of those Powers in the East Indies. And a move by European Powers northward would certainly be contested by Japan, and, in time, by China, and for the same reason. Whether the Philippines become independent or remain under the tutelage of the United States, it is improbable that the peace of the Far East will be endangered by the Filipino unless, perchance, he should attempt to realize his national aspirations by forcible revolt against the continuance of the present control.

Another strong nationalist movement, and the last one which needs to be mentioned here, is that which has developed in India. It would be out of place, even if space permitted, to attempt to trace the development of British power in India, or to analyze the Indian nationalist movement. But it is significant for this study that Indians are demanding self-government, and that the British government has met their demand to a qualified extent by enacting the India Bill of 1919. This extends Indian participation in the government of the

*An independent
Philippines
not a danger to
peace*

*Indian
nationalism*

country, although not to the point reached by the United States in the Philippines. The professed aim of British policy is the progressive development of self-government until, at some time in the future, the dominion status has been attained. As in the case of American policy in the Philippines, it is difficult to forecast the future of India. There are many obstacles to be overcome before a satisfactory native government can be evolved. There are religious, economic, and social difficulties in India which are peculiar to the country, and which will retard development toward the dominion status, even assuming that Great Britain moves as rapidly as could reasonably be expected in broadening Indian participation in the government.

*Future
importance of
India*

A Dominion of India will be a factor to be considered in the Far East. More than China, but not so much as Japan, India has moved in the direction of industrializing her life. This process will undoubtedly continue so that Indian goods will be in need of markets, and will enter into competition with the products of other countries, not only within the national borders, but in Far Eastern and world markets. The threat from the East—from India, China, and Japan—may well be industrial rather than political or racial. But it is too early to perceive with clarity the economic consequences to the world of the establishment of the machine economy in India and China.

*Nationalism
a gift of the
West to the East*

Except in the case of Japan, nationalism and nationalist movements are gifts of the West to the East. Nationality, whether historically, ethnically, or culturally achieved, was stirred to life as a political force only as a defensive reaction to the impact of the West and as a result of the infiltration of Western political ideas and dogma. Consequently, no matter how much they may deplore it from the standpoint of their own interests, the European peoples cannot fairly condemn the Chinese, the Filipino, the Indian, or the Turk for the nationalist movements which have developed out of contact with the West. Each one of the Eastern movements, however, has reacted somewhat on the others, stimulating it to further expression. The success of Japan in throwing off the treaty restrictions, and even more her defeat of Russia in 1904-1905, had a great influence on Chinese opinion and action for a short time. If the present Chinese movement should prove to be successful in attaining its objectives, it will be interesting to observe its effects on the Philippine and the Indian movements, for it will unquestionably have even greater consequences than the successes of the Japanese.

5. THE WESTERN STATES IN THE FAR EAST

Australia

Another important factor in the Far East of the future, as well as in the larger Pacific area, will be Australia. Since the Commonwealth of Australia was formed in 1900 out of the union of six colonies, the country has made very rapid progress. Population has expanded, the economic development of the country has more than kept pace with the increase in population, and the country has come to be recognized

as one of the most progressive and democratic states in the world. So far there has been little indication given of the international rôle to be played by Australia except in two particulars. It has been made clear that the country is to remain a "white man's land," and that its policy will be determined in Australia, in terms of a local conception of interest, rather than in London. To this it may be added that American and Australian interests are largely parallel, and that the two groups of people tend to understand one another perhaps better than either does the European. Thus, it may be that the future will find the two communities working in harmony in the Pacific and the Far East. What has been said of Australia is also largely true of Canada and of the Canadians.

Of the Western Powers, the United States is the only one which fronts on both the Atlantic and the Pacific. In the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, the Atlantic view was the more important. With the development of the Far Eastern countries, the Pacific frontage bids fair to become the more significant. It must also be remembered that the United States has advanced its territorial frontier to Hawaii, and that it possesses naval bases and coaling stations in the North Pacific to the Philippines. If the American empire continues to include the Philippines, the frontier remains extended almost to Asia. And in addition to its large territorial interests in the Pacific, the United States has a commercial and financial stake which is important and will probably become more so in the future. These material interests are supplemented by a decided humanitarian and sentimental interest in China. Almost without exception, since the beginning of American intercourse with China and Japan, Washington has been sympathetic with both countries. Latterly, this sympathy has been directed more to China than to the self-confident Japan which came out of the war with Russia. The policy of the United States has been not to infringe on the territorial rights of China, except in the case of extra-territoriality, nor to undermine her administrative integrity. Positively, the United States has stood for equality, first of commercial, and then of financial, opportunity in the Far East. This policy, reiterated and more clearly defined at the Washington Conference, may be expected to continue into the future, and will have significance so long as China remains in an unstable political condition. To this may be added as a striking feature of contemporary American policy in China, as in the Central American countries, an insistence on the adequate protection of American lives and property. Under certain circumstances this might well lead to intervention in China, as it has in Central America, except for the greater difficulties and dangers inherent in intervention in the Far East, together with the lack of a supporting opinion for such action in the United States. Intermittently the United States has essayed to play a leading rôle in Far Eastern affairs in the past, and it may perhaps do so more consistently in the future. At any rate it will always remain a factor to be considered.

*Interests and
policy of the
United States*

*English policy
and future
actions*

England and Russia have been the most actively interested in Far Eastern affairs of all of the Western states, however, and this interest bids fair to continue. Trade and finance, together with the desire to protect her position in India, motivated England during the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. All of these interests continue and will prevent England from being a negligible quantity so long as they exist. The present situation finds her bearing the brunt of Chinese hostility as she attempts to salvage as much as possible of foreign privilege from the onset of Chinese nationalism. In the one hand she carries the olive branch of concessions to nationalist sentiment, and in the other the sword to secure consideration for her conciliatory proffers. The sword is perhaps the more necessary because the concessions are not complete. The only principle apparent in the background of her policy is the opportunist one of securing the best position for herself and her nationals possible at a given time and under the circumstances of the moment. Fundamentally her policy of protecting her interests is similar to that of the United States, except that she is bolder in putting it into execution, and does not have it tempered by an inherent belief in the necessity of preserving the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. Consequently it would not be remarkable if the English government saw fit to recognize the existence of two or more separate states and governments if the present Cantonese nationalist party should prove able to maintain itself south of the Yangtse River but not to establish control over the north. The largest British trade interests are in south and central China. These interests have already been adversely affected by reason of the hostility of the Cantonese party. It might appear expedient to conciliate Canton by giving it recognition as a separate government. To an extent Great Britain, together with the other Powers, is confronted with a similar situation to that of the T'ai P'ing rebellion. The T'ai P'ing forces controlled north to the Yangtse, and the Manchus south to that great dividing river. For a time the British inclined toward support of the rebels by according them recognition and thus promoting a division of China into two states. T'ai P'ing incapacity and misrule brought the English then to the American policy of maintaining the unity of China from the international standpoint. But that incapacity does not seem to exist in the case of the contemporary southern government, and the alternative rejected at the middle of the last century may be accepted by the British government today as the procedure best designed to protect and promote British interests.

*Unity of China
should be
respected*

The sounder policy would seem to be that of the United States, both in the earlier and in the present case: that is, the policy of regarding China as a permanent entity. It may be that for a time quasi-official, purely *de facto* relations, will have to be established with various factions. But it would be unfortunate to inaugurate a

policy which would help to promote the permanent division of China. Ten years of struggle has not enabled the north to extend its power over the south, or for the reverse to happen, it is true, but ten years is a short time in the history of China. Neither side is willing to give up the struggle to unify the country, nor would either group be content to restrict itself permanently to control over a part of China. The political contest will continue, regardless of the action of the Powers, taken either singly or collectively, until China has evolved a political system and control satisfactory to the entire country. The cultural bonds are so strong that they cannot be disregarded. The temptation to one or another of the Powers to disregard this fact of cultural unity, and to attempt to promote political division, has been strong in the past and may be stronger in the future. But while temporary gains may be made by yielding to it, the long view indicates that the gain would not compensate for the ultimate losses. Both the north and the south have the same views as to foreign rights and interests in China, even though they may differ slightly as to the method to be employed in making those views effective. Since neither is more favorable to the continuance of the "unequal" treaties than the other, there is no basis of choice between them on that score. Consequently the Washington Conference attitude of "hands-off" so far as the internal difficulty is concerned seems to be the sound one for the future.

One thing which affects British policy now, as in the past, is the attitude of Russia. It is easy to forget that Russia in the past, for her own ends, has posed as the friend of China. During the nineteenth century those ends were represented by territorial aggrandizement or the gaining of economic advantages which would facilitate a peaceful penetration of China. Now they are the promotion of trouble for the capitalistic states by playing on the feelings of those who have suffered from their imperialism. Whether the Soviet government seeks a more tangible reward than that which will come through embarrassing the capitalistic and imperialistic states remains to be seen. It has already been pointed out that Soviet policy in Mongolia and with respect to the Chinese Eastern Railway justifies a doubt as to the real anti-imperialism of Russia. Her special privileges within the Great Wall have been given up, certainly, but they had already been lost in fact when the Soviet government formally renounced them.

But that the Russian position is stronger in China now than at any time since the defeat of Russia by Japan cannot be denied. The nationalist party is openly sympathetic to her, as is the Christian General Fêng. Many of the Chinese intellectuals outside of the south also look toward Moscow. This does not mean that Canton, or any of these others, are communistic in end and aim. It does mean, however, that they react favorably to the support and encouragement which has been extended to them by Russia. Canton is willing to

*The past and
present policy
of Russia*

*New strength
of Russia in
China*

use Russia to promote the acceptance of the principles of Sun Yat-sen, just as the Soviet government is willing to overlook its failure to accept fully the communist ideal in order to strike at capitalism. It is the existence of a supposedly common enemy which has brought Canton and Moscow into close relationship.

*Conciliatoriness
of Powers not
to Russia's
advantage*

If the policy of the capitalistic states continues to be moderate and conciliatory, so that China's national aspirations are realized without conflict, the embarrassment resulting from Soviet policy will ultimately be slight. If the Cantonese nationalist movement had solidified the Western Powers and Japan in support of a northern government on the basis of a continuance of the treaties only slightly modified, the result to the world might have been serious. A union of the "oppressed" peoples of Asia, under Russian leadership, directed against the capitalistic and imperialistic states, might readily have been formed. This possibility will not be finally precluded or predicated until the present movement in China has at last resolved itself in a way satisfactory to the Chinese.

*The Japanese
dilemma in
case of conflict*

In case of such a union, extending from Angora to Canton, and comprehending the dissident elements in India, Japan would be presented with a serious dilemma. Should she cast her lot with Western capitalism and imperialism, with which she is closely allied, or with an Asia revolting against imperialism? If she should accept the second alternative, Japan would go counter to her tradition and development during the modern period of her life. She would also have to renounce the continental position gained during the last thirty years as an evidence of her sincerity. She would forfeit the regard of those very states whose good opinion she has so long been cultivating. And she would not thereby gain the leadership of Asia, which alone could compensate for the sacrifices involved. Fortunately for Japan, it is probable that the present situation will so result as not to force such a selection of alternatives.

*Powers still
actively
interested in
China*

Thus we find Russia and England, Japan and the United States, still actively interested in the Far Eastern question, which revolves around the future of China. Australia certainly, and the Philippines and India probably, will be important additions to the group of interested states. France remains in Indo-China, but is a significant factor in Far Eastern politics today primarily as she supports the policy of one Power rather than another, or as she affects European conditions so as immediately or remotely to influence developments in eastern Asia.

6. WILL THE EAST INFLUENCE WESTERN SOCIETY?

*Western culture
not yet affected
by contact with
East*

Enough has been said to indicate a belief in the ultimate emergence of a politically and economically strong and stable China. Judging from the course of her past development it seems probable that China will not dress in garments borrowed from the West, but will rather cut Western clothes to her own pattern and to fit her own figure. If

that should prove to be the case, then Western society and institutions may in turn be modified by contributions from the East. So far that has not happened. The East has affected the West, in recent times, only by enlarging the sources of supply of raw materials, by broadening markets, and by furnishing a field for the investment of surplus capital. Tribute has indeed been paid to many features of the Japanese and Chinese cultures, but Western ideas and institutions have been very little affected by contact with them. The West has carried its values, both economic and cultural, to the East. Japan has accepted such of them as suited her needs, but has not as yet originated from her contact with the West anything of fundamental value to the Occident. The ideals of old Japan were too closely akin to those of the West in many particulars for any real contribution to have been made. Furthermore, the East has not sought to win converts in the West to its own ideas, as the Occident has in the Orient.

Proceeding more slowly, and perhaps more fundamentally, in her adjustment to the modern world, China may conceivably work Western ideas into her ancient system in such a way as to produce a new culture, upon which the West may draw just as China has drawn, and will continue increasingly to draw, upon the West for elements of her new society. The interaction may not even be direct, but may show itself merely in a stimulation of development throughout the world by reason of contact and comparison of diverse cultures. There is little chance that Eastern countries will have anything to offer Europe on the scientific or technological side, at least for decades to come. China and India are both too handicapped by long-continued inexactness of thought, and by a lack of sense of time, to be able to offer contributions at once to Western scientific and industrial technique.

*China may
produce new
culture by
adaptation of
Western ideas*

That in itself, however, may be one thing that the West has to learn from the East—that time in itself is relatively unimportant, that speed in life may defeat the purposes of living. The East may find a way to master the machine without being mastered by its demand for nervous haste to keep pace with the machine economy. That, in itself, would be a notable contribution. Japan is in process of accepting the Western value put on time, as modern business and productive methods have been introduced. But the Chinese have endured so long, with the same families and institutions perpetuating themselves generation after generation, and have developed such a strong antipathy to haste, that they may not succumb so readily to the Occidental time measure of value.

*Difference in
value placed on
time*

Considerable emphasis needs to be put on the fundamental differences between the East and the West which grow out of the relative emphases on the value of time and of exactness of measurement. The roundabout methods of intercourse employed in the Orient make it difficult for the Westerner and Easterner to understand one another. The former saves time by moving directly to his objective. The latter,

*Effect of
comparative
emphases placed
on time and
exactness*

seeing the goal just as clearly, often approaches it deviously, laying himself open to the charge of insincerity of practice, and subtlety of thought. On the other hand, the directness of the foreigner makes him appear brusque to the point of discourtesy. Furthermore, the lack of time sense makes it possible to set up far distant objectives which can be reached only in the remote future. To attain such an objective it is necessary to move a short distance here and another there, and constantly to vary the moves to meet changing situations without, at the same time, losing sight of the ultimate goal. Because the Westerner does not appreciate the goal, on account of its very remoteness, he sometimes reads into the moves a craftiness and perhaps instability which seem to appal him. He is accustomed to thinking in terms of a decade, or at the most of a generation. But a generation is as a day in the history of China and Japan.

Inexactness of measurement constitutes a similar barrier to understanding. Because of a lack of appreciation of its necessity, the Oriental is hard to pin down to an exact statement of size or quantity. He deals in the large or the small rather than in the exact. This results in more than irritation, for it produces fundamental misunderstanding, just as does the difference in evaluation of time.

*Probable
movement
toward the mean*

As Western science, making carefulness and accuracy necessary, is more widely diffused, China as well as Japan will unquestionably move toward acceptance of the value the West puts on accuracy. Whether the Chinese will accept the Western conception of the necessity for making the most of each moment of time, is much more problematical. It is to be hoped, rather, that the West will learn from the East that time is valuable only as it can be saved for enjoyment and contemplation. As the West grows older and more aware of the value of leisure for contemplation of the underlying realities of life, and as the East grows younger, and consequently more dynamic, this barrier to understanding may finally be removed.

*West may learn
restraint from
the older East*

Confucian China may also teach the West restraint in expression and action, a restraint which is the result of centuries of careful cultivation. This restraint of the Chinese and Japanese is yet another obstacle to understanding of the East by the West. It is sometimes taken to be a mask for plotting and insincerity of action, instead of an exhibition of a highly-cultivated sense of personal and national dignity. Its lack, considered by the Occidental to be an expression of personality, appeals to the Oriental as an evidence of a failure to appreciate the fitness of things.


*Chinese
emphasis on
adjustment*

Furthermore, China, with her tradition of and experience in adjustment—with her appreciation of the value of coöperation as against unrestricted economic competition—may find a basis of class adjustment within the modern industrial system. And from this the West may learn how to solve one of its own difficulties. Survival through selection made as the result of conflict has been the Western principle of life. China, however, has outlived other organized


societies partly by utilizing the contrary principle of survival through adjustment. If survival in itself is the test of fitness, then Western peoples would do well to examine with care the history of China to seek out the reason for her long life.

The modern history of the Far East begins with the West knocking for admission at the gates of China, Japan, and Korea. The gate was gradually forced open and the Westerner found himself admitted. For a time he was able to dictate the terms of his intercourse with the dwellers in the house. Then first Japan with complete success, and subsequently China less fully, insisted that the Westerner should live according to arrangements satisfactory to the householders. By the end of a full century after the foreigner had gained qualified admission, the process of opening China and Japan should have been completed. China, as well as Japan, should have taken her place as an unrestricted member of the family of nations, and the entire country should have been opened to outsiders. Development, or at least change, should be rapid from this time on, with the accumulated momentum of the last twenty-five years to facilitate it. To attempt further to forecast the nature of this development would be futile. That it will be of great consequence to the world cannot be doubted. It can only be hoped that it will be productive of good, that it will facilitate rather than retard the growth of more harmonious world relations. The next few decades will demonstrate the truth or falsity of the saying that "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." If they meet on the basis of greater mutual tolerance than has marked their relations in the past, then the meeting will be productive of good. If mutual intolerance is to govern this meeting, conflict will be the inevitable result.

*Future
development in
the Far East
should be rapid*



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
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
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
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


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